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Editing and Managing Address: Articles and subscriptions: W. J. Dominik, Editor and Manager, Scholia, Department of Classics, University of Otago, P. O. Box 56, Dunedin 9054, New Zealand. Telephone: +64 (0)3 479 8710; facsimile: +64 (0)3 479 9029; e-mail: william.dominik@otago.ac.nz.

Reviews Address: Reviews articles and reviews: J. L. Hilton, Reviews Editor, Scholia, Programme in Classics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041, South Africa. Telephone: +27 (0)31 260 2312; facsimile: +27 (0)31 260 2698; e-mail: hilton@ukzn.ac.za.

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Forthcoming in *Scholia* 16 (2007)

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EDITORIAL NOTE

Consistent with the international focus and readership of *Scholia* since its inception, *Scholia* 15 (2006) contains contributions by scholars at universities in Australia, Ghana, India, Israel, Netherlands, New Zealand, South Africa, United Kingdom, USA and Zimbabwe. These include research articles on Homer, Plato, Alexander, Plautus, medicine and religion.1 One of the aims of *Scholia* is occasionally to publish articles whose topics lie outside the traditional mainstream of the discipline and whose authors may work outside the main countries of classical scholarship; another aim of the journal is to publish articles whose views may be unorthodox but which the editors believe have scholarly merit and deserve the attention of a broad academic audience. One such article that satisfies these aims in this volume is by Ranajit Pal, a scholar from the Indian subcontinent, who writes about an altar of Alexander now standing near Delhi.2

*Scholia* has had a strong web presence with a website containing comprehensive information about the journal. The website has included all articles and other contributions in pdf format in order to ensure maximum exposure of its contents, which have also been archived in LOCKSS. In order to ensure the availability of the journal long into the future, the editors have agreed to allow ProQuest to serve as a repository for all its contents even though as a result *Scholia* will no longer be able to feature its contents online. At the same time *Scholia* will continue to be indexed and abstracted in *L’Année Philologique*, indexed in *Gnomon* and TOCS-IN, and listed in *Ulrich’s International Periodicals Directory*.

The In the Museum section, which contains news about classical artefacts in New Zealand museums, features an article in this volume by Alison Griffith on the James Logie Memorial Collection of classical artefacts at the University of Canterbury.3 This volume also includes the 2006 J. A. Barsby Essay, which is the paper judged to be the best student essay in New Zealand submitted to the competition during 2006. First place was awarded to Donna-Maree Cross (Auckland) for her essay entitled ‘Academic and Pyrrhonian Scepticism: Similarities and Differences’.4 Second place was awarded to Melanie Place (Massey) for her essay ‘The Parthenon as a Study of Contrasts’. The first- and second-place prizes of NZD150 and NZD50 respectively were sponsored by the Australasian Society for Classical Studies. The competition attracted twenty entries and was adjudicated by Paul McKechnie (Auckland), Babette Puetz (Victoria, Wellington) and Patrick O’Sullivan (Canterbury).

William J. Dominik
Editor, *Scholia*

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1 See ‘Articles’, pp. v-vi.
3 See pp. 168-73.
4 See pp. 174-81.
Elizabeth Minchin
Department of Classics, Australian National University
Canberra 0200, Australia

Abstract. This paper takes as its subject Homer’s engagement with and representation of one of the troubling aspects of memory: its persistence (that is, our inability to forget what we want to forget). An account of persistence, as it is understood in cognitive terms today, is followed by a number of relevant case studies from Homer: Penelope, Helen, Aias and Achilleus.

In a number of earlier studies of the Homeric epics I attempted to throw light on the way in which an oral poet such as Homer may have exploited the resources of memory available to him as he rehearsed and then performed stories from his traditional repertoire.1 Much of the evidence presented in those studies was drawn from the poems themselves, from observations of the habitual practices of a poet who had worked with short- and long-term memory, and visual, spatial, and rote memory to facilitate composition in performance. In examining the poems, however, we find that Homer too has reflected on the acts of reminding and remembering. There are those rare self-reflexive moments when he speaks—through his characters—of the craft that he has mastered and its multiple connections with memory.2 And on occasions in the epics he refers to the capacity of song to record the past with the future in mind, acknowledging the oral epic tradition that carries the memories of his society’s semi-mythological past.3

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1 See E. Minchin, Homer and the Resources of Memory: Some Applications of Cognitive Theory to the Iliad and the Odyssey (Oxford 2001). Homer (I use this name to refer to the poet of both the Iliad and the Odyssey) is our sole informant on this subject, as the sole exponent of this tradition whose songs survive to us.

2 For an important discussion of the ways in which Homer reflects on his craft, see C. Macleod, ‘Homer on Poetry and the Poetry of Homer’ in C. Macleod, Collected Essays (Oxford 1983) 1-15.

3 Helen recognizes this when she says, at Il. 6.357ff., that she and Paris will be ὠς καὶ ὅπισσα / ἄνθρωποι πελώμεθ' ἀοίδιμοι ἔσσομένοισι (‘the things of song for the men of the future’); old Alkinoos, king of the Phaiakians, refers to the Trojan war as a creation of the gods to generate subjects of song for generations to come (Od. 8.579ff.). Even the young and still unworldly Telemachos invokes this epic theme when he speaks of Orestes’ avenging of his father’s murder: Orestes’ deed of vengeance, he says, will be celebrated by singers of the future; thus his fame will be ensured (Od. 3.202-04). That is, even Telemachos knows the
But there is another side to Homer’s preoccupation with memory. He has an interest in its functions beyond the creative routines of epic composition, to the extent that he acknowledges in his poems the power of memory, whether for good or for ill, and he reflects on the phenomena of remembering and forgetting in the world that he evokes. We should, therefore, follow the poet’s interests and investigate his understanding of the workings of memory, comparing his observations of the way the mind remembers and forgets with what we can learn today from current studies in psychology. This, clearly, cannot be achieved within the compass of a single paper. Therefore, I have selected just one aspect of memory, its persistence, as a focus for the present study. Persistence (that is, our inability to forget what we want to forget) has been identified by Daniel Schacter as an imperfection of memory, one of its so-called ‘seven sins’. I shall begin by making some comments on the persistence of memory and then give a series of examples of the various ways in which Homer uses his understanding of this phenomenon in his construction of character and in the development of narrative action.

What is it that makes events memorable? One of the factors influencing memorability is involvement. It is known that our recollection of events in which we have played an active role is more enduring than our memory for events in which we have played the role of bystander or observer. A second factor in memorability is emotion. When an event is accompanied by some kind of emotional response on our part, it is (other things being equal) more securely encoded. For this reason emotionally charged events are better remembered in the long term than those that are mundane. This may have both positive and negative consequences. We will remember—even involuntarily—events that have happy associations. These are a source of pleasure to us. But events that

power of song to preserve stories for the future. All translations are taken from R. Lattimore (tr.), The Iliad of Homer (Chicago 1951) and R. Lattimore (tr.), The Odyssey of Homer (New York 1965). Diversions from Lattimore’s translations are noted.

4 On the seven so-called ‘sins’ of memory, see D. Schacter, The Seven Sins of Memory: How the Mind Forgets and Remembers (Boston 2001).


have caused us pain in the past (such as those that leave us with memories of humiliation, emotional distress, or terror) will also intrude unbidden into our daily lives at unexpected moments; in fact, we tend to remember them in greater detail than positive experiences. For this reason we are all at some time likely to be plagued by persistent memories, in painful detail, of the very events that we would prefer to forget. For many people the repeated intrusion of such memories into their lives is a source of continuing, and debilitating, distress.

How can we put these events behind us? Recent studies confirm that simply trying to forget a painful memory, such as a difficult or embarrassing encounter, will not help us—although that is what we most want to do. A more effective therapy for individuals troubled by persistent memories is to encourage them to re-experience the traumatic incident, now in a secure context. Thus the initial physiological response to the trauma can be dampened; it will lose some of its sting. Although in the short term unhappy memories will continue to be distressingly persistent, in the long term our efforts to confront these experiences by re-telling them and in this way integrating them into our lives will prove to be the most effective counter. A similar perspective on the treatment of post-traumatic stress is described by the applied linguist Ruth

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9 Schacter [4] 164. J. Shay, *Achilles in Vietnam* (New York 1994) 166, lists some of the event types that can result in severe post-traumatic stress: serious threat to one’s life or physical integrity; sudden destruction of one’s home or community; seeing another person who has recently been, or is being, killed as a result of accident or physical violence.

10 K. Ochsner, ‘Are Affective Events Richly Recollected or Simply Familiar? The Experience and Process of Recognizing Feelings Past’, *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General* 129 (2000) 255-58; Schacter [4] 164f. Ochsner [above, this note] 256 suggests that recollection and remembering are enhanced by negative affect (and to a lesser extent by positive affect). Cohen and Faulkner [5] 280 record that twenty-three per cent of all memories involve psychological trauma. These include the deaths of people and animals; quarrels and partings; being lost, afraid or humiliated.

11 Schacter [4] 177 notes that attempts to avoid thinking about a horrendous experience are common in trauma survivors, but that these attempts are more likely to amplify, rather than lessen, later problems with persisting memories.

12 Cf. Shay [9] 39, 45, 187f. Shay brilliantly captures the trauma of Vietnam veterans by simply allowing them to speak for themselves. Not all trauma is of comparable severity; but, whatever the experience has been, it constitutes trauma for the affected individual. In the case of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in Vietnam veterans, Shay cannot guarantee recovery, but, he says, it is important that the treatment be moral and social, as were the original injuries of PTSD (184-87). He stresses the need for society to acknowledge the reality of the trauma through formal social ceremony (39) and for the individual to construct a personal narrative (187), and that he or she be provided with a trustworthy community of listeners to hear it (188). Recovery depends on ‘communalization’ (55), the telling of one’s story to socially connected others (39).
Wajnryb, in her account of the ways in which Holocaust survivors have learned to communicate their pain.\(^\text{13}\) She has observed that by talking to ‘insiders’, to people who have ‘been there’ too, trauma victims are ‘most able to be themselves’.\(^\text{14}\) In the company of insiders, she notes, ‘words would flow freely—as would the tears, at other times kept so firmly in check’.\(^\text{15}\) Even silence, under these circumstances, is an active, and a comfortable, choice.\(^\text{16}\)

In the *Odyssey*, a story that takes the pain of recollection as one of its themes, Penelope, the wife of Odysseus, is a study in sorrow. During Odysseus’ twenty-year absence she has remained at home on Ithaka, suffering the grief of loss. She is surrounded by countless cues that at every moment prompt memories of Odysseus.\(^\text{17}\) With memory comes sorrow and longing. Hence her frequent tears:

\[\text{Τηλέμαχ'], ή τοι ἐγὼν ὑπερώιον εἰσαναβάσα} \\
λέξομαι εἰς εὐνήν, ἡ μοι στοιόεσσα τέτυκται, \\
αιεὶ δάκρυσ ἐμοὶ περιφημένη, ἐξ ὁδὸς Ὀδυσσεὺς} \\
φύεθ' ὡμ' Ἀτρείδησιν ἐς 'Πλιον. \]

(Hom. *Od*. 17.101-04)

Telemachos, I will go back now to my upper chamber, 
and lie down on my bed, which is made sorrowful, always disordered with the tears I have wept, ever since Odysseus went with the sons of Atreus to Troy.


\(^\text{14}\) Wajnryb [13] 97. Note that these ‘insiders’ are truly the ‘trustworthy community of listeners’ defined in Shay [9] 188.


\(^\text{17}\) When he speaks of Penelope’s grief, Homer does not make the necessary association between visual cue and memory; he leaves it to us to supply the link. But there is no doubt that he recognizes the association of durable signs and memory (Eurykleia and the scar in *Od*. 19.392-468 assures us of that). For useful discussion from a Homeric perspective, see R. Scodel, ‘Homeric Signs and Flashbulb Memory’ in I. Worthington and J. M. Foley (edd.), *Epea and Grammata: Oral and Written Communication in Ancient Greece* (Leiden 1988) 99-116; and see also M. Conway, *Flashbulb Memories* (Hove 1995).
As she says to Phemios, when she begs him to cease his sad song, which afflicts her with πένθος ἄλαστον (‘unforgettable sorrow’, 1.342), she longs for Odysseus’ dear head whenever her memory is stirred (μεμνημένη οἰεί / ἀνδρός, ‘whenever I am reminded of my husband’, 343f.). In his representation of Penelope, Homer shows us that there are times when it is impossible to halt the flood of memory and the pain it brings.

Although Penelope grieves for her husband, she is preoccupied with a complex cluster of problems that her present circumstances have forced upon her. She faces problems caused by the absence of her husband: the crowd of suitors seeking her hand, despite her reluctance to remarry; their reckless consumption of palace stores; her own future and that of her son. She is obliged to live her life in the present. It is this—the obligation to defend herself and her son—that keeps her, stricken as she is, from succumbing to grief. By contrast, the Helen of the Iliad appears, for much of the time, to be trapped in her past. Near the end of her stay in Troy, she still finds it impossible to forget that she forsook the land of her fathers and a worthy husband for someone whom she now despises (Il. 3.173-76, 428f.; 6.344-51; 24.765f.); nor can she put out of her mind Alexandros’ blind act (6.356) or their joint kakôn μόρον (‘vile destiny’, 357). Her memory of those events is sharpened by the emotional associations that she felt. At that distant time, twenty years before (24.765), it had been sexual desire. But this has now turned to scorn. And, since she has been in Troy, she has felt shame, intensified by the continuing contempt of the Trojans (apart from Hektor and Priam) for herself and for her behaviour (24.768-72). She laments her past; she wishes that everything were different. Again and again she takes refuge in what is termed by psychologists ‘counterfactual thinking’, whereby she envisions alternative scenarios of what might—or should—have happened.

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18 Penelope gains no comfort from Phemios’ song, since it does not address her distress (her grief and longing for Odysseus) but reminds her, rather, of the fact of his absence.

19 For example, she devises her trick—the weaving and unpicking of the shroud of Laertes—for deceiving the suitors (Od. 19.137-58) in order to delay the moment at which she must, as it were, consent to be courted. And later, to the ‘beggar’s’ delight, she works to exploit her power over the suitors to win valuable gifts from them (18.250-303). Penelope, like her husband, is alert to the opportunities that the present moment offers.

20 As Schacter [4] 175 describes the phenomenon, she is ‘stuck’ in the past. He notes that victims who remain focussed on the past for years after a traumatic event exhibit higher levels of psychological distress than those who focus on the present and future. This behaviour in turn stimulates even greater focus on the past, thus setting up a destructive self-perpetuating cycle of persistent remembering like that in observed cases of depression.

consequence of a negative and possibly avoidable experience (in our world, for example, failing an examination or losing money in an investment) and is associated with negative emotions: that is, the emotion, ‘feeling bad’, makes us think ‘if only’, and we think of ways in which we could have avoided what is making us feel bad.22 One of the immediate consequences of counterfactual thinking is, in fact, an exacerbation of that unpleasantness, especially when such thinking reflects self-blame.23 We observe this in Helen. The Helen of the *Iliad* is for the most part absorbed in her memories and preoccupied by the regret they bring. In her reproach to her husband, her first and most powerful counterfactual thought is that she should have been swept away at birth; her second expresses her contempt for the man who seduced her, Paris:24

> δάερ ἐμείο κυνὸς κακοκηκχάνου ὀκροφεύςσης, ὡς μ’ ὀφελ’ ἣματι τῷ ὅτε μὲ πρῶτον τέκε μήπρ οἴχεσθαι προφέρουσα κακῆ ἀνέμου θεέλα ἐῖς ὅς όρος ἤ ἐῖς κῦμα πολυφλοισβοῦ δαλάσσης, ἕνθα μὲ κῦμ’ ἄπορερ πάρος τάδε ἔργα γενέσθαι. αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ τάδε γ’ ὥδε θεοὶ κακὰ τεκμήραντο, ἄνδρος ἐπεὶ ὀφελλὸν ἀμεινονός εἶναι ἕκοιτις, ὡς ὡδὲ νέμεσιν τε καὶ αἴσχεα πόλλ’ ἀνθρώπων.

(Hom. II. 6.344-51)

Brother by marriage to me, who am a nasty bitch evil-intriguing, how I wish that on that day when my mother first bore me the foul whirlwind of the storm had caught me away and swept me to the mountain, or into the wash of the sea deep-thundering where the waves would have swept me away before all these things had happened.

Yet since the gods had brought it about that these vile things must be, I wish that I had been the wife of a better man than this is, one who knew modesty and all things of shame that men say.

There is, however, another aspect to Helen. Along with her lingering regret and remorse for what she and Paris have done, she has a strong sense of the great tragedy in which she is implicated. She is able—on occasions—to distance herself sufficiently from her grief to be able to create the tapestry that will record

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23 Roese [21] 143. Roese [21] 143 also observes that counterfactual thinking may be a motivating force, energizing action. That is, such thinking may be beneficial. This does not appear to be the case for Helen.

24 W. Leaf and M. Bayfield, *The Iliad of Homer* 1 (London 1895) 397f. ad 350 express appropriately Victorian views on Helen’s current state of mind (‘the not uncommon sequel of a lawless attachment’). But they rightly commend the subtelty of the poet’s insight into human behaviour.
for the future the struggles of the Trojans and the Achaians for her sake (οὖς ἔθεν εἴνεκ’ ἐπασχον, ‘which they endured for their sake’, II. 3.128) and to be able to appraise her destiny, and Paris’, as the subject of song for future generations (ὡς καὶ ὀπίσσω / ἀνθρώποι πελάμεθ’ ἀοίδιμοι ἐςσομένοι, ‘so that hereafter we shall be made into things of song for the men of the future’, 6.357f.). This capacity in Helen is exceptional. It is the complexity of the poet’s conception of her character, which draws together her exceptional beauty and charm, her perceptiveness, her guilt and her suffering, and her capacity for looking at her life dispassionately, that makes her so interesting to us.

The Helen of the Odyssey, by contrast with the Helen of the Iliad, is more proactive in her management of memory, although perhaps no more successful. She does not allow herself to suffer the persistence of memory’s pangs as she had in the Iliad. Instead, from the security of Menelaos’ palace in Sparta, the Helen of the Odyssey advocates the blocking of the pain of memory. She knows of a drug that will counter the grief that comes with intrusive memories such as her own, or those of others. It is this drug that she uses when Telemachos and Peisistratos are visiting her and Menelaos in Sparta. At Odyssey 4.219-34 she has her attendants serve hosts and guests with wine to which she has added the drug heartsease. This will stay their tears: αὐτίκ’ ἄρ’ εἰς οἴνον βάλε φάρμακον, ἐνθεν ἐπινον, / νηπενθές τ’ ἀχολόν τε, κακῶν ἐπίληθον ἀπάντων, ‘into the wine of which they were drinking she cast a medicine / of heartsease, free of gall, to make one forget all sorrows’, 220f.). As they drink, she and her husband and the young men are able to share reminiscences of Odysseus without sorrow. But, as we know and as the poet recognizes, dulling the emotions for a day is simply a temporary measure; it is not a cure for the

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25 For discussion of Helen’s use of this epic motif, see J. Griffin, Homer on Life and Death (Oxford 1980) 97: ‘What she makes in Book 3 is exactly what she says in Book 6.’

26 I suggest that it is her part-divine nature that endows her with this capacity. Homer does not let us forget that this exceptional woman, so unlike any of the other women in the epics, is a daughter of Zeus (II. 3.199; Od. 4.184).

27 Drugs that dull the pain of memory, or even destroy it, can be used also for malign purpose. Thus we encounter in the Odyssey magical ways of freeing individuals from responsibility as well as care: the lotus (Od. 9.82-104, esp. 94-97); and the drug that Kirke offers Odysseus and his men (10.233-36), to make them forgetful of their own country (ίνα πάγχαν λαθοίατο πατρίδος οἷς, 10.236). For discussion of the drink that Kirke offers and the drug, see Heubeck in A. Heubeck and A. Hoekstra, A Commentary on Homer’s Odyssey 2 (Oxford 1989) 56f., where Heubeck notes inter alia that when Odysseus’ companions forget their home they lose their memory of their previous life and their sense of identity.

28 For discussion of the conversation that Helen and Menelaos and their two young guests enjoy, see M. Gumpert, Grafting Helen: The Abduction of the Classical Past (Madison 2001) 37-39.
pain of remembering. Telemachos will be himself again the next morning; and his sorrows will return.

Homer, however, knows that although forgetting is impossible for most of the characters in the *Odyssey*, there is for a lucky minority a more effective way of coping with the past. The swineherd, Eumaios, commends the healing power of re-experience through storytelling. After Eumaios and his master have shared a number of stories—and sorrows—in the swineherd’s hut, Odysseus asks the swineherd to tell him the story of how he came to Ithaka (*Od*. 15.381-88). Eumaios is very ready to do so and adds, significantly, that he and his guest will entertain each other remembering and retelling their sad sorrows (κηδεσιν ἀλλήλων τερπώμεθα λευγαλέοισι / μνωμένω, 15.399f.). For, he says, *afterwards* a man who has suffered much and wandered much has pleasure out of his sorrows (μετά γάρ τε καὶ ἀλγεσί τέρπεται ἀνήρ, / ὃς τις δὴ μάλα πολλὰ πᾶθη καὶ πόλλ’ ἐπαληθῇ, 400f.). That is, when that particular episode has reached its conclusion, when one’s trials are at an end, only then can one look back on unhappy experiences with some serenity. 29 Eumaios confirms what psychologists and psychiatrists tell us today, that to take the sting out of painful memories of the past we should create a secure environment in the present and, in this context, work through these memories, as story. Thus the swineherd is able to tell, without present distress, the story of his cruel abduction from a happy home by Phoinikian pirates, because this tale ends well, with his ‘rescue’ by Laertes (15.457-84). Likewise, at the end of the *Odyssey*, when Odysseus and Penelope are reunited and have enjoyed their lovemaking (23.300), Penelope gives Odysseus her account of their years of separation, and Odysseus tells her the story of his adventures (306-341). Both are tales of great hardship, but, as the poet observes, husband and wife can find some pleasure now in telling these tales (τερπέσσθην μύθοισι, ‘they took their pleasure in talking’, 301) since this long and unhappy episode in their lives has at last come to an end. They are together again.

Although Eumaios and Odysseus and Penelope are able, eventually, to look back to their past with some equanimity, others amongst Homer’s characters demonstrate the obsessive and corrosive nature of memory’s persistence. Telamonian Aias belongs to the latter group. When Odysseus encounters him in the underworld (*Od*. 11.543-67), Aias, even in Hades, is still smarting over the decision that awarded the arms of Achilles to Odysseus rather than to him. Whereas in the underworld the souls of Agamemnon and Achilles in turn have

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29 But such calm is impossible before resolution. Note, for example, how Odysseus weeps, at *Od*. 8.521f., when Demodokos tells stories of the Trojan war. For Odysseus, who has not yet reached his homeland after the conclusion of the fighting ten years before, the war continues to be unfinished business.
come up to Odysseus and addressed him readily, Aias stands apart from the hero (νόσσων ἀφεστήκει, ‘he stood off at a distance’, 544). His body language and his refusal to address his former comrade speak for his state of mind. In fact, these actions are the only indication that Aias himself gives about his feelings. We rely on the narrator to remind us of the cause, namely that he is resentful still about a decision that went against him (κεχολωμένη εἶνεκα νίκης, ‘angry on account of that favourable decision’, 544), and on Odysseus to give us an outline of the affair (545-51). Aias had been deeply wounded by the implication that his efforts in battle had been deemed less valuable than those of Odysseus. It cut to his heart. He was bitter, naturally, that his contributions to the Achaian war effort should have been undervalued and unrewarded; but what was more significant was that his self-image as the strong defender of his Achaian comrades had been undermined. For this reason, above all, the award of Achilleus’ arms to Odysseus endured as a vivid memory, even after death. He is angry still. The persistence of this memory and of his associated pain makes him deaf to Odysseus’ words of reconciliation: Αἰας, παῖ Τελαμώνος ἀμύμονος, οὐκ ἀρ’ ἔμελλες / οὐδὲ θανών λήσεσθαι ἐμοὶ χόλου εἶνεκα τευχέων / οὐλομένον; (‘Aias, son of stately Telamon, could you then never even in death forget your anger against me, because of that cursed armor?’, Od. 11.553-55). What is remarkable in this image of Aias is his stern silence. Is it that he does not wish to communicate his pain? We know that Aias is a man who is sparing with his words: his gruff but powerful speech, the final appeal of the embassy (Il. 9.624-42), illustrates this. Or is his hurt a pain beyond words? Aias’ behaviour bears all the marks of that obsessive recycling of thoughts and memories that are described as ‘ruminations’ or flashbacks. The persistence of memory—even in the underworld—can bring enduring pain; and such pain can stand in the way of reconciliation.

30 Aias refuses to address Odysseus on meeting him; he also refuses to respond to Odysseus’ conciliatory words. For comment on the scene, see F. Ahl and H. Roisman, The Odyssey Reformed (Ithaca 1996) 145f.
31 Odysseus, as narrator, refers obliquely to Aias’ suicide (Od. 11.549). For commentary, see Heubeck [27] 109f.
32 One must wonder, however, whether Odysseus was extraordinarily tactless in reminding Aias so bluntly of the incident and thereby increasing his pain; and whether he himself was seeking some sign that Aias bore him no grudge. If this latter proposition is the case, Odysseus is denied his wish.
Perhaps this unhappy situation could have been completely avoided at the time, as Odysseus now wishes (Od. 11.548). In the Iliad we see that it is possible to negotiate potentially difficult situations, provided that one has the presence of mind and the tact to do so. Antilochos, who is very perceptive in his relationships with others, is alert to others’ readiness to harbour resentment at tiny slights and perceived wrongs. He makes every effort to avert a similar outcome in his dispute with Menelaos at the end of the chariot race (Il. 23.539-613). He offers Menelaos the mare that Achilles had presented to him (a prize that Menelaos has disputed), arguing that he would rather give up the mare he has won than fall from Menelaos’ favour and be alienated all his days (σοί ... ἦματα πάντα / ἐκ θυμοῦ πεσέειν, ‘[than] all my days fall from your favour’, 594f.). Antilochos knows that perceived injuries can live on in memory: hence his prompt action and his ready words of compromise. He acknowledges Menelaos’ seniority (587f.) and his higher status (588); and he excuses his own behaviour on the grounds of youthful impulsiveness and folly (588f.). But at no point will he concede that Menelaos actually won the mare (591f.). Even Antilochos, for all his charm, can go only so far towards reconciliation.

Finally, we come to the Achilles of the Iliad, who has taken to heart Agamemnon’s insult to his honour. He has withdrawn from the fighting and he holds firm in his resolve not to return to the battlefield, despite the appeals of the embassy (Il. 9.182-657). His heart, he says, swells up in anger, when he remembers the way in which he was humiliated by Agamemnon before the Achaians: ἀλλά μοι οἴδανται κραδίη χόλω ὀπότε κείνων / μνήσομαι ὃς μ’ ἀσύφηλον ἐν Ἀργείοισιν ἔρεξεν / Ἀτρεΐδης ὃς εἲ τιν’ ἀτίμητον μετανόστην (‘Yet still the heart in me swells up in anger, when I remember the disgrace that he wrought upon me before the Argives, the son of Atreus, as if I were some dishonoured vagabond’, 646-48). It was the accepted social custom in the heroic world, apparently, to erase from memory an insult or a wrong,

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34 Antilochos insists still on his right to the prize; but he recognizes that we all have a long memory for wrongs that we believe have been done to us. For this reason he is prepared to give up the prize to Menelaos.

35 For other examples of Antilochos’s sensitivity to others’ feelings, see Il. 18.32-34 (he holds Achilles’ hands lest he try to kill himself); 23.785-92 (his good humour on coming last in the footrace; and his careful tribute to Achilles).

36 Note particularly Aias’ strong ‘appeal’ to Achilles (Il. 9.624-42). He makes the point that Achilles has chosen not to accept the gifts that Agamemnon has offered; any other man would accept them and curb his pride and his anger (9.634-36). Achilles, he says, has forgotten the affection and honour of his friends (9.630-32). For commentary, see B. Hainsworth, The Iliad: A Commentary 3 (Cambridge 1993) 142f. Achilles, in reply, says that he will not return to the fighting until the Trojans set fire to the vessels of the Achaians (Il. 9.650-53).
once one had received an apology (or a stated desire to make amends) and gifts. Achilleus does not follow custom. By refusing the offer the embassy conveys and by remaining out of the fighting, he in fact places himself in the wrong. It is only later, when he observes the battle going against the Achaians (Il. 11.596-601) and sees Patroklos’ distress at the situation (16.2-45), that he judges the time has come when he can think again of taking up arms. At this point he does not deny his bitterness (16.52, 55) or his sense of having been wronged, but he is prepared, he says, to let Agamemnon’s insult be a thing of the past. He will ‘give over’ his anger:

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\text{ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν προτετύχθαι ἐάσομεν οὐδ’ ἀρα ποὺς ἢν ἄσπερχες κεχολώσθαι ἐνὶ φρεσίν’ ἢτοι ἔφην γε οὐ πρὸν μηνιθσὶν καταπαυσάμεν, ἄλλ᾽ ὀπότ᾽ ἄν δὴ νήσες ἐμὰς ἀφίκηται ἁυτή τε πτόλεμός τε. (Hom. Il. 16.60-63)}
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Still, we will let all this be a thing of the past; and it was not in my heart to be angry forever; and yet I have said I would not give over my anger until that time came when the fighting with all its clamour came up to my own ships.

So he sends Patroklos into the fighting with firm instructions to return when he has turned the battle from the ships (16.95f.). Patroklos in his zeal forgets this command (16.686-691). His forgetfulness leads to his death. Achilleus then resolves to return to battle himself and before the assembled Achaians he addresses Agamemnon (19.56-73) and announces an end to their quarrel. He regrets it, he says, and he adds that in his view it will be remembered by the Achaians all too long: ἀειτὸρ Ἀχαιόν δὲρὸν ομὴς καὶ σῆς ἕριδος μνήσεσθαι ὄω (‘Yet I think the Achaians will too long remember this quarrel between us’, 19.63f.).

He speaks now of how he will cope with his memory of the insult that lay at the heart of the quarrel. He will put an end to his anger; he will beat it down ‘by constraint’ (ἀνάγκη). It is an emotional response unbecoming to him:

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\text{ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν προτετύχθαι ἐάσομεν ἄχνυμενοι περ θυμὸν ἐνὶ στῆθεσι φίλον δαιμάσαντες ἀνάγκη}.
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37 This, at the very least, is what Agamemnon and the embassy think should happen: see Il. 9.115-61, esp. 157 (Agamemnon), 259-63 (Odysseus), 602-05 (Phoinix), 628-42 (Aias).

38 Achilleus points out how retentive our memories can be for critical events in our lives. The quarrel of Achilleus and Agamemnon will live on in cultural memory in the same way as do personal disputes at a high level in our own world. I think here of a personal disagreement in the 1990s between the then Prime Minister of Australia and the leader of Malaysia at the time that, although a bystander memory for all but one Australian (the Prime Minister himself), has embedded itself in cultural memory.
He will make what has happened between him and Agamemnon a thing of the past (19.65; cf. 16.60). This may have been his claim; and the Achaians appear to have seen it that way: they rejoiced at Achilleus’ ‘unsaying his anger’ (μὴνν ἀπειπόντος, 19.74ff.).39 But the reality is, I suggest, different. As Loraux notes, in her examination of the amnesty of 403 BC in Athens, ‘such a forgetting leaves traces’.40 Bitter memories are never erased; one cannot ever forget completely. And I do not believe that Achilleus forgets Agamemnon’s insult—nor that he tries to do so.41 Indeed, in the subsequent exchanges between Achilleus and Agamemnon we observe a certain stiffness on Achilleus’ part. His reply to his commanding officer’s ‘apology’ and offer of recompense (19.137-44) is close to ungracious (δῶρα μὲν αἱ κ’ ἑθέλησθα παρασχέμεν, ώς ἐπιεικές, ἢ τ’ ἐχέμεν παρὰ σοῦ, ‘the gifts are yours to give if you wish, and as it is proper, or to keep with yourself’, 19.147f.);42 his compliment to Agamemnon at the close of the funeral games has a perfunctory ring (23.890-93);43 and his words to Priam soon after suggest that he has little respect for his own leader:

39 And indeed Agamenon, in accepting Achilleus’ ‘unsaying’ admits himself that he had been troubled by memories of his own failure, or as he presents it, the way he was deluded (οὐ δυνάμην λελαθόθεν Ἀττής ἢ πρῶτον ἄσσην, ‘I could not forget Delusion, the way I was first deluded’, II. 19.136).


41 Shay [9] 185 makes this point in the Vietnam context: ‘[a]ny knowledge is potentially transforming; the knowledge of evil, particularly in trusted authorities, custodians of themis, and within oneself, brings irreversible change’. Once Achilleus has felt insulted and betrayed by his leader there can be no return to the way things were before that injury. Trust can no longer be assumed.

42 This ungraciousness is observed. Note that Odysseus is quick to step in to soften the effect of Achilleus’ words by turning to the practical steps that should be taken before battle: food and eating (II. 9.155-72).

43 M. M. Willcock, A Companion to the Iliad (Chicago 1976) 265 ad 890-94, observes that Achilleus brings the games to an end with a compliment to Agamemnon. Achilleus’ words ἐνίμεν γὰρ ὅσον προβεβήκας ἀπάντων / ἥδ’ ὅσον δυνάμει τε καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπελεύ άριστος (we know how much you surpass all others, by how much you are the greatest for strength among the spear-throwers’, II. 23.890f.) are superficially a compliment, but they are
Achilleus of the swift feet now looked at Priam and said, in a gently mocking tone,

‘Sleep outside, aged sir and good friend, for fear some Achaian might come in here on a matter of counsel, since they keep coming and sitting by me and making plans; as they are supposed to. But if one of these come through the fleeting black night should notice you, he would go straight and tell Agamemnon, shepherd of the people, and there would be a delay in the ransoming of the body.

But how is it that Achilleus can set aside his anger, or beat it down, so promptly, given that Agamemnon’s insult had been so profound? Achilleus’ return to the fighting after the death of Patroklos was not a matter of a long and careful consideration on Achilleus’ part. His return was inevitable. But, even under these new, and urgent, conditions, this return still required a nominal ‘reconciliation’ with Agamemnon. And in the light of that greater sorrow, the death of Patroklos, which had engulfed him and swamped the hitherto persistent memory of Agamemnon’s insult, it was not so difficult for Achilleus to unsay his wrath. His sense of outrage had become almost irrelevant: this was signalled, as we noted above, by Achilleus’ haste to return to battle and his complete lack of interest in Agamemnon’s gifts. Instead, he wanted arms; he wanted battle; not from the heart. His words certainly allude to the quarrel that has been the subject of the Iliad and its issues: see N. Richardson, The Iliad: A Commentary 6 (Cambridge 1993) 269f.; and J. Tatum, The Mourner’s Song: War and Remembrance from the Iliad to Vietnam (Chicago 2003) 162, who speaks of Achilleus’ ‘elegant flattery’.


To avenge a fallen comrade is the automatic response of a hero. Even before Achilleus speaks to his mother about his intentions (Il. 18.88-93) she knows what he will do and what the consequences will be (18.59f.).
and he wanted Hektor. Achilleus would try to blot out the pain and the sorrow associated with the loss of Patroklos and his failure to defend him (Il. 18.98f.) by an act of vengeance. But, as he discovered, even that act—the killing of Hektor—was not enough; nor were the potentially healing ceremonies of the funeral games. The problem is that Achilleus is now besieged by memory, marked by the kinds of flashbacks described above:

Only Achilleus wept still as he remembered his beloved companion, nor did sleep who subdues all come over him, but he tossed from one side to the other in longing for Patroklos, for his manhood and his great strength and all the actions he had seen to the end with him, and the hardships he had suffered; the wars of men; hard crossing of big waters.

The cruel persistence of his memories of Patroklos is in time made somewhat more tolerable by meeting and talking with someone who is suffering in the same way—in this case, Priam, the father of Hektor. This night-time meeting, in private, between the two, is an example of ‘insider-talk’, described above, and of the healing power of silence in such circumstances:

But when they had put aside their desire for eating and drinking, Priam, the son of Dardanos, gazed upon Achilleus, wondering at his size and beauty, for he seemed like an outright vision of gods. Achilleus in turn gazed on Dardanian Priam

46 On Achilleus as a berserker, on the death of Patroklos, see Shay [9] 77, 89f. (‘During berserk rage, the friend is constantly alive; letting go of the rage lets him die’: Shay [9] 90.)

47 For comment on the need for social ceremony as a necessary part of what Shay [9] passim calls ‘griefwork’.

48 For the symptoms of PTSD, see Shay [9] 166f. These include intrusive recollections of the event itself, detachment/estrangement from others, restricted range of affect, sense of foreshortened future, difficulty in sleeping, outbursts of anger—all could apply to Achilleus.
and wondered, as he saw his brave looks and listened to him talking. 
But when they had taken their fill of gazing one on the other . . .

Thus, in hearing the sorry tale of Priam (Il. 24.486-506), a man who reminds Achilleus of his own old father, and in comforting him (599-620), Achilleus finds comfort himself. For now at last, like Priam, he is able to sleep: αὔτῷ Ἀχιλλεύς εὕδε μυχῷ κλισίης ἑυπήκτου / τῷ δὲ Βρισῆς παρελέξατο καλ-λιπάρης (‘But Achilleus slept in the inward corner of the strong-built shelter, and at his side lay Briseis of the fair colouring’, 675f.). Do we discern a spirit of forgiveness here? Not at all. Achilleus has not forgiven Agamemnon; nor has he forgiven Hektor. And there is no question of Priam forgiving his host. As Griffin notes, in another context, ancient literature is ‘not much interested in forgiveness’. What Achilleus and Priam share is a moment of mutual understanding, of insight into what it is to be human. Neither man will forget his pain—ever. But each one has taken a first step in learning to live with it.

It is clear that the poet of the Iliad and the Odyssey (drawing, I suggest, to a greater or a lesser extent on both his experience of everyday life and on the tradition in which he worked) had learned much about memory and its virtues and vices. He certainly knew something about the persistence of unwanted memories. Today, psychologists and psychiatrists have formalized this knowledge; they can identify and, through a range of narrative-based therapies, can help us manage intrusive and painful memories of failure, disappointment, regret and grief. But, as we have seen, these symptoms are not new: they have been part of life ever since people first experienced trauma. Indeed, we can observe these same emotions and behaviours realized vividly in Homer’s representations of Penelope, Helen, Aias, and Achilleus. We can see each one of them struggling to deal with the painful consequences of memory’s persistence, as we do today, with more or less success. This poet—indeed, this tradition—knows from experience that memory can be a power for good; but there is recognition also that its defects, if unchecked, can be devastating.

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49 See J. Griffin, Virgil (Oxford 1986) 88 (a comparison between the encounter of Achilleus and Priam of Il. 24.471-76 and the encounter between Aeneas and Dido in the underworld as Virgil describes it in Aen. 6.450-76. Here Griffin argues that the Aeneas/Dido encounter is ‘one of the few scenes in ancient literature which hinge on forgiveness’.


51 Shay [9] 183 uses the evocative phrase ‘aching reconciliation’ to describe the particular nature of this moment.
PLATO’S EUTHYPHRO AND SOCRATIC PIETY

Kofi Ackah
Department of Classics, University of Ghana
Accra, Ghana

Abstract. Recent constructivist accounts of Socratic piety tend to ignore the Euthyphro up to 10e. In consequence, these accounts miss significant illumination of a Socratic conception of piety. For example, the first half of the Euthyphro bars a Socratic belief in transcendent, fully anthropomorphic gods; hence, it bars a Socratic conception of piety based on such gods. This study draws attention to the implications of this section of the Euthyphro for a new constructive account of Socratic piety and conception of god.

Introduction

Socrates has been indicted for corrupting the youth by teaching them impious or atheistic matter (Pl. Euthphr. 2b12-c5, 3c6-d8; Ap. 19b4-c1, 23c-24a1, 24b8-c1). He is presently attending committal proceedings at the king-archon’s offices. There he encounters Euthyphro, seer by profession, a self-proclaimed or reputed religious expert who has come to indict his own father for manslaughter, on grounds both that his father negligently caused the death of his hired farmhand (Pl. Euthphr. 4b-e1) and that such conduct violates a divine law according to which whoever has done wrong ought to be punished. Homicide—negligent or malicious—is a civil wrong believed to produce bloodguilt and pollution on the murderer’s household and to jeopardise the public good. Euthyphro is anxious to cleanse this contagion (4c). Yet prosecuting one’s own father is also commonly believed to be an act of filial impiety (4d-e1). Euthyphro, however, sees no conflict of duty to father and god, for he dismisses the accusation of filial impiety as the belief of those who know little about divine matters (4e1-3).

Euthyphro thus sets himself in sharp contrast to Socrates. He actually claims ἀκριβῶς εἰδείην (‘to know accurately’, Pl. Euthphr. 5a2) about divine

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1 Pl. Ap. 24b8-c1 purports to reproduce the wording of the indictment.
2 The text used for Plato’s Euthyphro is from J. Burnet (ed.), Platonis Opera 1 (Oxford 1900). Translations are from H. Tredennick (tr.), The Last Days of Socrates (London 1969), adapted here and there. Unless otherwise specified, references to Socrates are to Plato’s Socrates in the so-called early period dialogues of Plato. For what constitute Plato’s early period dialogues, see especially G. Vlastos, Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher (Ithaca 1991) 46-50.
matters, whereas Socrates insists that he does not know them, but would need such knowledge to be able to mount a successful defence at his trial (5a3-b8).

**Verifying Euthyphro’s Claim to Religious Wisdom**

Just as in law the onus of proof is on the one who alleges, so in Socratic dialectic the onus is on the one claiming or reputed to be wise to demonstrate his knowledge. Accordingly, Socrates puts the religious ‘expert’ to the test with the following question:

[1] . . . what sort of thing do you say are the pious and the impious in connection with murder and other things? [2] Or is not the pious itself by itself the same in every action and, on the other hand, is not the impious the opposite of the pious, always the same with itself and whatever is to be impious possessing some one form?

The complex question above consists of a main question [1] and a subsidiary one [2]. When not differentiating the two, I shall refer to the complex whole as Socrates’ question. At least two preliminary issues arise about Socrates’ question.

First, it is common knowledge that the Greek expression translated ‘the pious’ is a substantivisation of the neuter adjective ‘pious’, and that as a noun expression ‘the pious’ is ambiguous and may be used in several senses. In the present context, however, Socrates’ use of ‘the pious’ cuts across the traditional lines in which a noun may be used as a proper, abstract and common noun. In the sentence beginning ‘or is not the pious itself by itself the same in every action . . .’, the phrase ‘the pious itself by itself’, along with the locative ‘in’, clearly distinguishes some unique thing called ‘the pious’ from its manifestations in a class of actions. So here ‘the pious’ functions as a proper noun. But also ‘the pious’ seems to be abstracted from a class of actions; so it

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3 τὸ ἁγίον (‘the holy’, Pl. Euthphr. 5c9-d2), but I shall maintain the former expression or its cognates throughout this article.

has the abstract, non-technical sense similar to ‘justice’, ‘reality’, *et cetera*. Still, the phrase ‘the pious itself by itself’ suggests that ‘the pious’ is more than a mere abstraction or proper name, for it is also used to refer to something common to or shared in by all actions of a certain kind: it is ‘the same in every action’. Bearing this complex use of ‘the pious’ in mind, I shall henceforth substitute the expression ‘piety’ for ‘the pious’ and ‘impiety’ for ‘the impious’.

The second preliminary issue is this: it will be noticed that the subsidiary question [2] is rhetorical, for Socrates anticipates an affirmative answer to it. To that extent it appears to affirm a Socratic belief. Thus, while [1] may be glossed ‘what is it that, in all relevant situations, we appropriately or competently denote by the terms “piety” and “impiety”’, [2] seeks to remind Euthyphro of what, at any rate, is logically presupposed when we appropriately or competently use those terms, namely, the ‘form of piety’ or ‘piety itself’ and the ‘form of impiety’ or ‘impiety itself’—nouns intended to capture human qualities that pious or impious actions enable us to infer. Understood as a human quality, ‘piety itself’ or ‘impiety itself’ is radically different from traditional piety, which has to do with acknowledging and subserving external, fully anthropomorphic gods. Euthyphro, however, unsuspectingly thinks he understands the Socratic question and proceeds to answer.

If, for convenience, we refer to Euthyphro’s responses to the Socratic question as $F$’s, distinguished from one another with numerical indices, his first response is as follows:

... τὸ μὲν ὤσὶν ἐστὶν ὅπερ ἐγὼ νῦν ποιῶ, τὸ ἀδικοῦντι ἡ περὶ φόνους ἡ περὶ ιερῶν κλόπας ἢ τί ἄλλο τὸν τουλώτων ἔξαμιρτανόταν ἐπεξείνα, ἠάντε πατήρ ὁν τυχάνη ἠάντε μήτηρ ἠάντε ἄλλος ὀστισσοῦν, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐπεξείνα αὐνόσιον.

*(Pl. Euthphr. 5d8-e2)*

... piety is what I am doing now: prosecuting murder and temple theft and everything else of that sort, regardless of whether that person happens to be one’s father or mother or any one else at all, whereas not prosecuting is impious [$F_1$].

Euthyphro immediately explains $F_1$:

ἐπεί, ὦ Σώκρατε, θέασαι ὡς μέγα σοι ἐρώ τεκμηρίων τοῦ νόμου ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει... μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν τῷ ἀσεβοῦντι μηδ᾽ ἀν ὀστίσοιν τυχήλη ὅν. αὐτοὶ γὰρ οἱ ἀνθρώποι τυχάνουν νομίζοντες τὸν Δία τῶν θεῶν ἀρίστων καὶ δικαίωταν, καὶ τούτων ὠμολογοῦσιν τὸ αὐτόν πατέρα δῆσαι ὅτι τοὺς ἰεῖς κατεπίνεν ὡς ἐν δίκῃ, κάκεινιν γε αὖ τὸν αὐτὸν πατέρα ἐκτεμεῖν δι᾽ ἐπερα τοιαύτα ἐμοὶ δὲ χαλεπαίνουσιν ὅτι τῷ πατρὶ ἐπεξερχομαι ἀδικοῦντι, καὶ οὕτως αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς τὰ ἐναντία λέγουσι περὶ τὸν θεὸν καὶ περὶ ἐμοῦ.

*(Pl. Euthphr. 5e2-6a5)*
Now Socrates, see what great proof I shall give you that this is a prescription of the [divine] law . . . that one must not let off the perpetrator of impiety whoever he should happen to be . . . For people believe that Zeus is the best and most righteous of the gods. And they agree that Zeus put his own father in chains for swallowing his children unjustly and that Zeus’ father had in turn castrated Zeus’ grandfather for a similar offence. But they take me to task for prosecuting my father when he has done wrong; thus they contradict themselves by making one rule for the gods and another for me.

For Euthyphro the gods have laid down the principle of piety, that he who has done wrong ought to be punished; his father, he believes, has done wrong; therefore piety prescribes that his father be punished; not to do so is impious. Thus Euthyphro’s \( F_1 \) intimates a motivating belief of a sort: his present action is motivated, that is, caused by a belief (or system of beliefs) that prescribes that it is pious to punish a class of acts including murder and temple theft; not to do so is impious.

Socrates points out, however, that prosecuting a wrongdoer is not the only way in which piety is exemplified (Pl. \textit{Euthphr.} 6d6f.). This implies that \( F_1 \) fails to intimate the appropriate sort of universal cause/reason that will systematically explain \textit{all} cases of piety and impiety (6d9-e1).\(^5\) Socrates thus reminds Euthyphro:

\[
\text{μέμνησαι οὖν ὅτι ὃς τούτῳ σοι διεκελεύομην, ἐν τι ἡ δύο με διδάξαι}
\]
\[
\text{τὸν πολλὸν ὀσίων, ἀλλ'] ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ τὸ ἐιδὸς ὃ πάντα τὰ ὀσιὰ ὀσία}
\]
\[
\text{ἐστιν; ἔφησα γὰρ ποι μιὰ ἰδέα τὰ τὲ ἀνόσια ἀνόσια εἶναι καὶ τὰ ὀσιὰ}
\]
\[
\text{ὀσιὰ:}
\]

\[\text{(Pl. \textit{Euthphr.} 6d9-e1; emphasis mine)}\]

Remember that I did not ask you to give me one or two examples of pious actions. I asked for the form itself \textit{by which} all pious actions are pious. For you agreed that it is \textit{by one form} that pious actions are pious and impious actions are impious.

This reminder adds further information to the non-traditional conception of piety implicit in Socrates’ complex question. This additional information comes with the expression ‘the form itself \textit{by which} pious [or impious] actions are so. That is to say, if ‘\( F(x) \)’ is read ‘\( x \) is \( F \)’, where ‘\( x \)’ stands for a subject term and \( F \) an appropriate predicate term, then \( F(x), F(y) \) and \( F(z) \) equals \( F(x, y, z) \). In other words, \( x, y \) and \( z \) may be different in every respect except in virtue of each being \( F \), which appears to be what bonds them together. \( F \), then, must denote

\[\text{As A. Nehamas, \textit{Virtues of Authenticity: Essays on Plato and Socrates} (Princeton 1999) 159-75 argues, Euthyphro’s first answer does not fail in the condition of universality required for an adequate Socratic answer; it fails, however, as the single explanation that will cover all cases of pious and impious actions.}\]
some property common to or shared in by x, y and z. Hence, neither x nor y nor z is the same as F, though each is in some way related to F. To the extent that x or y or z is not F, Socrates can talk of F ‘itself by itself’, that is F as distinguished from x, y, and z; to the extent that every x or y or z is F, F would be that by which—causally speaking—x, y and z are commonly known and called. Thus, though F is instantiated by x, y and z, nevertheless F is logically and realistically distinct from any of its instantiations. All this implies that F is a causal universal of a cognitive kind that imparts strictly formal identity to its disparate instantiations. It also implies that piety, denoted by F, is an agent-relative cognitive principle. Since ‘piety’ for the Greeks is a moral excellence—the religious aspect of justice—F as piety will be the principle by which a moral agent is pious or is otherwise able to identify, classify or judge other persons as pious and impious. I shall understand a moral principle to be a decision-making, a motivating belief, a disguised conveyor of a desire, goal, and aspiration that prescribes a certain mode or standard of conduct as preferable to the opposite mode or standard of conduct. In general, in searching for Fs, Socrates searches for moral decision-making beliefs that are causal universals of a cognitive and prescriptive kind.

6 Missing in the secondary literature is the recognition that Socrates’ moral forms, here denoted by Fs, are primarily prescriptive cognitions that determine or contribute to the way we see morally relevant things. The general impression, implicit in translations of the terms ἰδέα or εἶδος (Pl. Euthphr. 6d9-e1), is that F is primarily a material feature of related things that may be cognised or a mere concept. Thus R. E Allen, Plato’s ‘Euthyphro’ and the Earlier Theory of Forms (London 1970) 26-28, translates ἰδέαν and εἶδος as ‘character’and ‘characteristic’; L. Cooper (tr.), ‘Euthyphro’, in E. Hamilton & H. Cairns (edd.), The Collected Dialogues of Plato (Princeton 1961) 174 translates both ἰδέαν and εἶδος as ‘essential form’; B. Jowett (ed. and tr.), Dialogues of Plato (London 1987) 193 translates εἶδος as ‘general idea’ and ἰδέαν as ‘idea’; H. Tredennick (tr.), The Last Days of Socrates (Harmondsworth 1954) 26 translates ἰδέαν as ‘feature’ and εἶδος as ‘characteristic’; L. Versenyi, Holiness and Justice: An Interpretation of Plato’s Euthyphro (Washington 1982) 43 translates ἰδέαν as ‘characteristic mark’. Cf. also the highly insightful but equivocal account by Allen [above, this note] 48: ‘The principles Socrates sought were the Forms, standards fixed in the nature of things, which would enable a man infallibly to judge the difference between right and wrong. Without knowledge of these principles, the moral life becomes guess-work, and guess-work marred by mistake. Supreme confidence in the objectivity of moral principles combined with doubt as to anyone’s claim to understand their nature is the customary mark of the early dialogues’. But if moral forms are objective moral principles which enable us to judge between right and wrong, how are the moral forms also ‘standards fixed in the nature of things’? What sort of things? And how are these standards to be captured in the essential definition of piety, which Allen believes Socrates seeks?

Before Euthyphro can proffer an answer to the Socratic question, however, Socrates further attempts to clarify the parameters in which an answer would be valid. He now tells Euthyphro to:

. . . με αὕτην διδαξέω τὴν ἰδέαν τίς ποτέ ἐστιν, ἵνα εἰς ἐκείνην ἀποβλέπων καὶ χρώμενος αὐτής παραδείγματι, ὅ μὲν ἂν τοιοῦτον ἢ ἂν ἂν ἢ σὺ ἢ ἄλλος τίς πρᾶττῃ φῶ ὅσιον εἶναι, ὅ δὲ ἂν μὴ τοιοῦτον, μὴ φῶ.

(Pl. Euthphr. 6c3-6)

. . . teach me [Socrates] what this form [of piety] itself is, so that I [Socrates] may look to it and use it as a paradigm by which, should those things which you [Euthyphro] or someone else may do be of that sort, I [Socrates] may affirm that they are pious but should they not be of that sort, deny it.

Implicit in this final directive is the Socratic supposition that one who claims to have moral/religious knowledge claims to have infallible expertise, for he must know and be consciously determined to conduct by a paradigmatic decision-making principle which enables him to resolve all cases of piety and impiety. Such infallible expertise would surely imply an optimal state of cognition. But that, in itself, would not entail that piety is a know-all or nothing affair: it would not entail that either you know piety because you are a moral/religious expert or you know nothing about piety because you are not such an expert, for Socratic dialectic involves an inductive approach to moral knowledge and implies that moral knowledge is a cognitive scale that may be ascended by the right procedural method. To demonstrate this, I shall refer to one key assumption of Socratic dialectic.

Socrates tests interlocutors’ claims to moral expertise by a dialectical axiom, a commonly acknowledged belief about the virtues—that they invariably have good and fine consequences. On the basis of that axiom, Socrates insists that a virtue-belief must be logically consistent and coherent (Pl. Grg. 474c3-475d5, Chrm. 159b-160b9, 160e5-161b2; La. 192b9-193b8). He uses the dialectical axiom to test his own elenctically acquired principle, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι κάκιον ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ διδόναι δίκην τοῦ διδόναι (‘doing wrong is worse than suffering it and escaping punishment is worse than incurring it’, Pl. Grg. 474b2-5; cf. 508d-e), and proceeds to describe the principle as κατέχεται καὶ δέδεται, καὶ εἰ ἄγροικότερον τι εἰπεῖν ἔστιν, σιδηροῖς καὶ ἰδαμαντίνους λόγους (‘held firm and bound with reasons of steel and adamant’, 508e7f.). He further qualifies this by suggesting that the principle is theoretically falsifiable, because he does not know how it is true, though whoever has so far maintained the opposite principle has appeared ridiculous (508e7-509a7). I suggest that this moral principle, like many others of its kind, is held firm by steely and adamantine arguments because it is certified by a series of elenetic tests as satisfying certain logical and social-
psychological criteria of truth (hereafter, criteria of truth): it must never be inherently or, if more than one, mutually inconsistent or incoherent and must never lead to shameful or ridiculous consequences or consequences that are physically, social-psychologically or spiritually harmful (493a-494a5, 507e1-7).8

By the repeated elenctic search through which it was acquired, such a Socratic principle must be a highly conscious sort of cognition that, while falling below one that knows how the principle is true, is yet far above one that is unanalysed, half- or sub-conscious or acquired by tradition and practice. Given Socrates’ vehement disavowal of expert moral knowledge, we can safely assume that knowing how a moral principle is true is the capping knowledge required to turn elenctic knowledge into expert knowledge. Yet, if elenctic knowledge of the virtues satisfies the criteria of truth, then such knowledge would be compatible with expert knowledge of the virtues, which knowledge must minimally satisfy the same criteria. Hence elenctic knowledge would be genuine knowledge, though not optimal knowledge, of the virtues; thus Socratic dialectic implies degrees of knowledge of the virtues.

If the above conclusion is reasonable, we may now impute to Socrates the following claims about moral cognition, symbolised for shorthand references hereafter. Let $F_0$ be a paradigmatic decision-making principle that invariably prescribes pious conduct in all relevant situations, and $C_0$ be an optimal state of moral cognition—a state of moral expertise. Then $C_0$ will characteristically exemplify $F_0$. Let the whole range of

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8 On the truth or otherwise of an interlocutor’s proposition see Pl. *Euthphr.* 7a4, 9c4-10a1; cf. *Chrm.* 161c7f., 162e5; *Grg.* 479e8, and H. H. Benson, *Socratic Wisdom: The Model of Knowledge in Plato’s Early Dialogues* (Oxford 2000) 80-85. On the social-psychological and spiritual content of these criteria we may recall especially the *Gorgias*. There, Callicles’ hedonistic principle, as succinctly restated by Socrates, is that those who enjoy themselves with whatever kind of pleasures are happy (Pl. *Grg.* 494e9-495a1). Socrates refutes this to the following effect. Desires are the sort of things that can grow so wild as to cost a great deal of resources and distress in trying to satisfy them (493a-d3). But whereas the temperate person who is fully informed of what he really needs is content when he meets his basic needs, the intemperate will suffer continuous distress or pain from feeling continual dissatisfaction (493d6-494a3). He will become a robber who is interminably in trouble in trying to satisfy desires gone wild (507e1-3). Nor can such a permanently needy person be socially desirable or be in communion with god (507e3-6). So the intemperate not only suffers bodily harm, he also loses the social/psychological/spiritual good of friendship with humans or gods. It is implied that temperance will produce the opposite results. Since the virtues imply each other, this argument will apply to the other virtues, with only slight variations of result for each according to the domain in which each virtue predominantly operates. For example, justice and piety will conduce to, but will not directly produce, physically beneficial consequences.
non-optimal moral/religious cognition be \( C \), then \( C \) will characteristically exemplify a non-paradigmatic principle, \( F \).\(^9\) Finally, let \( C \rightarrow C' \) represent the capacity or possibility of the human mind to attain moral/religious knowledge. Then, Socratic dialectic implies that our ordinary use of moral/religious terms such as ‘piety’ and ‘impiety’, or ‘just’ and ‘unjust’, et cetera is caused by an inherent operative principle \( F \) that enables us to apply such terms to various situations with more or less success. \( F \) can function as such because it is a universal cause of a cognitive and prescriptive kind. In its aspect as a principle or an enduring belief, \( F \) can be stated in propositional terms; in its aspect as a cognitive principle, \( F \) can be attained to different degrees. An \( F \) is a valid degree of moral knowledge if it satisfies the criteria of truth. \( F' \) implies expertise because, as a product of \( C' \), it satisfies the criteria of truth and is, in addition, a paradigmatic rule of conduct and judgment. So much, then, on the logical implications and the Socratic presuppositions of the Socratic question, ‘what are piety and impiety?’, as Socrates further explicates it.

To the Socratic question and its further explication, Euthyphro now offers the following answer:

\[
\text{ἐστὶ τοῖνυν τὸ μὲν τοῖς θεοῖς προσφιλὲς ὅσιον, τὸ δὲ μὴ προσφιλὲς ἄνδρον.}
\]

(Pl. Euthphr. 6e10-7a1)

Piety is [doing] what is dear to the gods, impiety what is hateful to them \([F_2]\).

\( F_2 \) is to be understood as stating a rule of conduct, namely, that the pious person is he/she who is committed to the principle of doing what pleases the gods (not just prosecuting wrongdoers), otherwise he/she is impious. The following Socratic analysis of \( F_2 \) must therefore be imagined as introduced by the question: assuming \( F_2 \), can it be verified in fact and defended in logic as the reason why people act religiously rightly? Alternatively, we could ask whether \( F_2 \) can satisfy the dialectical criteria of truth.

Socrates begins his analysis of \( F_2 \) by arguing to the effect that human beings have been able to develop procedures for the authoritative and consensual resolution of quantitative issues, but that on moral issues the same is not true: enmity, hatred or long-term disagreements reflect our general lack of

\(^9\) I may be accused of violating Occam’s rule by introducing \( F' \) in addition to \( F \). But if Socratic moral forms, here denoted by \( F \), are basically cognitive principles, as I am arguing they are, then we must distinguish and label levels of cognition. This means that we must distinguish on the one hand between Euthyphro’s proffered answers which, though they fail elenctic examination, enable some identification between pious and impious situations to be made, and on the other hand the optimal answers expected by Socrates. \( F \) and \( F' \) are therefore appropriate symbolisms because they denote different points on the same cognitive scale.
moral knowledge (Pl. *Euthyphr.* 7b6-d6). Hence if gods can be pleased and displeased or can love and hate, as *F*₂ purports to say, they would typically do so on moral grounds (7d7-e). By *F*₂, therefore, the gods, that is if more than one, can be divided, as humans often are, over whether or not Euthyphro’s move to prosecute his own father is pious or impious. It follows that the same action can be pious and impious to the gods. *F*₂ thus fails in one or more of the said criteria of truth: it is at least inherently contradictory (8a). An empirical consequence of this contradiction is that *F*₂ cannot secure what Euthyphro intends to achieve by prosecuting his father, namely, to cleanse his household of the bloodguilt incurred as a result of his father’s alleged impious actions.

Euthyphro insists, however, that all the gods would be agreed at least on this, that it is right to punish a murderer (Pl. *Euthyphr.* 8b7-9)—which is just what he is doing. But Socrates quickly points out that humans do not [normally] argue whether or not an evildoer should be punished; rather, they argue about the fact of who is the evildoer, what he/she has done, and when (8d4-e). In other words, we are led to contrary judgments about ‘facts’, not principles. But why would ‘facts’ lead to contrary conclusions? Obviously—we could answer on behalf of Socrates—because, as others have noted, there are no such things as pure facts: facts come to us as cognised or as evaluated by each person’s cognitive perspective, whose objectivity depends on the degree to which it is rooted in non-rational or subconscious factors. By influencing the estimation of facts, such factors give the otherwise publicly accessible facts a subjective or attitudinal bias. Accordingly, if the gods can be pleased or displeased and can hate and love, this would occur, as far as we can imagine, by the same psychological processes which generate differences among humans. And Euthyphro, challenged to prove beyond doubt that all the gods would arrive at the same judgment about his case (9a), can hardly do so (9b4f.).

At this point Socrates grants a concession to Euthyphro: assume that all the gods love (that is, are pleased with) your action and hate (or are displeased) with your father’s conduct. What, then, are piety and impiety? With some relief, Euthyphro readily accepts the concession and amends *F*₂ thus:

... τὸ ὀσίον ὁ ἀν πάντες οἱ θεοὶ φιλῶσιν, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον, ὁ ἀν πάντες θεοὶ μισῶσιν, ἄνόσιον.

(Pl. *Euthyphr.* 9e1-3)

... piety is [doing] what all the gods love, impiety what all the gods hate [*F*₃].

To examine this question, Socrates demands to know the answer to this:


(Pl. *Euthyphr.* 10a1-3)
[1] Do the gods love an action because it is pious, or [2] is an action pious because the gods love it?10

Questions [1] and [2] are intended to be logically exhaustive alternatives, so that the affirmation of [1] entails the denial of [2] and vice versa. Euthyphro unwittingly or rather confusedly affirms both [1] and [2].

But suppose we affirm [2], we then imply that actions themselves have no intrinsic value: the moods or preferences of the gods invest them with one. This implication is consistent with traditional religious beliefs, as represented by Euthyphro’s $F_2$ or $F_3$. But we have seen that the moods or preferences of the gods in relation to our actions are at least difficult, if at all possible, to verify in fact or to defend in logic. There appears to be no publicly justifiable reasons for believing that gods approve or disapprove what we do. It seems, then, that we cannot logically defend the affirmation of [2].

Here, we may be reminded of Socrates’ claim in the *Apology*, to the effect that dreams, oracles, and other divinations are extra-rational channels through which the duty to philosophise was impressed on him (Pl. *Ap.* 33c4-7). The objection, as others have noted, is that Socrates never sees the various forms of divination as positive forms of knowledge, that is, as publicly accessible discursive reasons for doing or not doing,11 rather, they appear to him as signs which require experience or rational interpretation to make them practically useful.12 Knowledge generated from human consciousness seems for Socrates the only positive and certain guide to a life worth living for human beings, for ὁ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπως (‘the unexamined life is not worth living for human beings’, 38a6). Consequently, the logical and evidential chasm between our moral practice and the commands of gods remains, and this means that we cannot affirm [2]. The only alternative is to affirm [1].13

10 In further explanation of this question, Socrates adduces a series of parallel cases with the same logical form, all of which point to the conclusion that piety is not the same as that which is god-loved but its contrary (Pl. *Euthphr.* 10a-d). The dialectical refutation of Euthyphro will turn mainly on his affirming both contraries at 10d1-e8—pulled as he clearly is in contrary directions by the force of tradition and by the logic of moral/religious language.


12 Like the Benthamite conception of utility as a welfare criterion which cannot be made publicly accessible informatively to enable comparisons between persons to be made.

13 When Socrates concludes the discussion up to this point by remarking that rather than state what the οὐσία (essence) of piety is, Euthyphro has stated only a πάθος (some attribute) of piety (Pl. *Euthphr.* 10e9-11b2), some scholars infer that Euthyphro correctly identifies a πάθος of piety or has stated a fact that happens to be true of piety. See Allen [6] 45; and M. L. McPherran, ‘Socratic Piety’, in Prior [11] 2.118-43. But this cannot be so. In
But if we affirm [1], we imply a number of things that are antithetical to traditional piety, with implications for an alternative conception of god. For affirming [1] implies (a) that pious actions are intrinsically lovable, whether or not gods love them; (b) that moral agents autonomously embody principles of conduct and have self-sufficient reasons for acting rightly; and (c) that the rightness of a course of action exists prior to and independently of gods, if any. These implications are consistent with the logical presuppositions of Socrates’ initial question as further explicated. And those presuppositions, feeding on the logic of our ordinary use of moral/religious terms, imply an intrinsic connectivity between our moral/religious language, logic, and the motivation for moral conduct as human-centred rather than as inspired by anthropomorphic gods.

A Socratic Conception of Piety and God?

There is general agreement among constructivists that Socrates’ dialectical remarks and leads after the aporetic interlude at Plato’s *Euthphro* 10e-11d imply that he takes for granted the existence of the traditional gods, morally sanitised, and that he has a non-expert, working conception of piety. The question that will be addressed in the rest of this article is: in what sense does Socrates take the gods for granted? Indeed, after the aporetic interlude, Socrates suggests to Euthyphro to consider piety is an aspect of justice/righteousness (11e). Taking advantage of that suggestion, Euthyphro’s new account becomes:

\[
\ldots \text{πίστις εστὶ κατὰ τὴν ὑποκατάστασιν τοῦ δικαίου, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὴν τῶν θεῶν ἑαυτοῦ τὴν ἡσυχίαν, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸ λοιπὸν εἶναι τοῦ δικαίου μέρος. (Pl. Euthphr. 12e5-8)}
\]

\[\ldots\text{. . . piety is that part of justice having to do with care of the gods, while the remaining part has to do with care of men [F₄].}\]

the same passage and also earlier at 10d12-14, Socrates describes the οὐσία of piety and the πάθος given by Euthyphro as ἔννοιας ἔχετον (‘having the opposite relation’, 11a4) and, therefore, as completely different from each other. How can a true attribute of a subject be opposed to the essence of that subject? Socrates, I believe, uses οὐσία and πάθος in context to distinguish between piety as an intrinsic cause of pious conduct and piety as externally motivated conduct, which is Euthyphro’s conception of piety.

14 For example, McPherran [13] 131: ‘Socrates apparently believes that real gods exist and that they may be called by the same names as the gods of the state . . .’; Vlastos [11] 145: ‘[Socrates] subscribes unquestioningly to the age-old view that side by side with the physical world accessible to our senses, there exists another, populated by mysterious beings, personal like ourselves, but unlike ourselves, having the power to invade at will the causal order to which our own actions are confined . . .’.
But Euthyphro concedes Socrates’ point that ‘caring’ involves the application of knowledge to benefit the subject of care. Given $F_4$, this implies that the pious person is an expert who benefits the gods by caring for them. Euthyphro sees that this is ridiculous, because he shares the traditional belief that the gods are self-sufficient, from which it follows that humans cannot benefit the gods (Pl. *Euthphr.* 13c10). With some help from Socrates, he revises his account by substituting ὑπηρεσία (‘service’) for θεραπεία (‘care’), so that piety becomes:

... θεών θεραπεία... Ἑνπερ... οἱ δούλοι τοὺς δεσπότας θεραπεύουσιν.

(Pl. *Euthphr.* 13d4-6)

... service to the gods... such as... servants render to masters [$F_3$].

Euthyphro agrees to Socrates’ gloss that ‘service’ generally means the assistance which non-experts give to experts (such as doctors, shipwrights, builders, farmers) in the production of socially beneficial products (Pl. *Euthphr.* 13d4-e1). Socrates now demands to know the πάγκαλον (‘all-beneficial’) product which pious persons assist the gods in producing (13e6-11).

Euthyphro can not specify the product but says:

... ἑπίστηται τοὺς θεοὺς λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν εὐχόμενὸς τε καὶ θύων, ταῦτα ἐστὶ τὰ δόσια, καὶ σώζει τὰ τοιαύτα τοὺς τε ἵδιος οἴκους καὶ τὰ κοινὰ τῶν πόλεων

(Pl. *Euthphr.* 14b3-5)

... piety is knowing how to pray and sacrifice to the gods; this saves the family and state [$F_5$].

Socrates responds to this answer with remarks that, to constructivists, suggest an outline of Socratic piety. He says that Euthyphro’s answer ὠραχυτέρων (‘could have been briefer’), and that Euthyphro ἰκινῶς ἄν ἡδὴ παρὰ σοῦ τὴν ὀσιότητα ἐμεμοιδίκη (‘turned away at the very point of giving an answer that would have constituted adequate information’) about what that all-beneficial product is which we humans assist the gods in producing (Pl. *Euthphr.* 14b8-c3). In particular, constructivists have taken this and preceding leads as evoking memories of Socrates’ defence against the charge of impiety, as we find in Plato’s *Apology*. There he claims that true wisdom is the property of god and, in comparison, human wisdom has little or no value (23a4). There, too, he pleads that he really believes in gods (26d1-3, 35d2-8) and argues that the very ground of the indictment against him—his philosophical activity, an example of which

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15 On καλὸν as beneficial, see Pl. *Grg.* 474d3-475a4, where Socrates leads Polus to accept that whatever is καλὸν is so on account of its being either ἄδεια (‘pleasant’) or ὑφέλιμο (‘beneficial’) or both.
is his encounter with Euthyphro—is both ὑπηρεσίαν (‘a service’, 30a7; cf. ὑπηρεσία, ‘service’, Pl. Euthphr. 14d6; ὑπηρετική, ‘service’, 13d5-8) and βοηθῶν (‘an assistance’, Pl. Ap. 23b7) to god; hence, an act of piety. From these statements in the Apology and the Euthyphro, outlines of Socratic piety (‘SP’) have been proposed that converge to the following effect:

SP: Piety is a just relationship in which essentially unwise humans serve essentially wise gods by assisting them in the production of an all-beneficial product.16

SP or its equivalent, as proposed by recent constructivists, assume and, therefore, impute to Socrates certain problematic beliefs. One such imputation is peculiar to Weiss, who claims that for Socrates piety does not require knowledge because it involves acknowledging one’s lack of knowledge of good and bad, such as the god possesses, and that one sees that such ignorance entails obedience or service; piety vanishes with the acquisition of such knowledge.17 If this is what Socratic piety is, it is surprising that Socrates subjected Euthyphro to the elenchus. For, like all traditionalists, Euthyphro’s action against his father already involves precisely what Weiss claims to be Socratic piety: acknowledging and obeying the moral authority of the gods. Further, if Weiss were right, why would Socrates expect Euthyphro to know what piety is before setting out to prosecute his father for impiety? Socrates tells Euthyphro: εἰ γὰρ μὴ Ἴδησθα σαφῶς τὸ τε ὅσιον καὶ τὸ ἄνόσιον, οὐκ ἐστιν ὁποῖς ὁν ποτε ἐπεχειρήσας υπὲρ ἀνδρός θητος ἄνδρα πρεσβύτην πατέρα διωκάθειν φόνον (‘for if you did not know clearly what piety and impiety are, it is unimaginable that . . . you would ever have attempted to prosecute your father for murder’, Pl. Euthphr. 15d4-6). And what could be Socrates’ point in expecting Euthyphro to state a paradigmatic principle by which all cases of piety and impiety can be classified and resolved since, on Weiss’ terms, piety need not involve this?

I have argued that a genuine expression of Socratic piety involves knowledge, for it is minimally consistent with the highest expression of piety as expertise by satisfying the criteria of truth, which involve a high degree of

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17 Weiss [16] 206.
consciousness that one’s pious beliefs satisfy those criteria. Further, the logic of our ordinary use of moral/religious language, including the Socratic insistence that pious actions presuppose ‘piety itself’ as cause or reason, entails that piety is an agent-centred sort of cognition rather than an obsequious acknowledgement of and obedience to the moral authority of externally existing, fully anthropomorphic gods.

A second problematic assumption that is imputed to Socrates is common to recent constructivists. It is the imputation that Socrates believes in gods who are supernatural, externally existing and fully anthropomorphic, differing from the traditional or state gods only by being thoroughly good and wise. This imputation ignores two related dialectical results of Plato’s *Euthphro* up to 11a. One is that piety understood as a relationship between humans and externally existing, fully anthropomorphic gods has no probative basis and is logically incoherent. Nothing in the rest of the dialogue contradicts this. The other—just mentioned—is that piety as signified by the logic of our moral language is an autonomously embodied mode of cognition. These results forbid an account of piety as relative to gods conceived as transcendent and fully anthropomorphic.

Thirdly, proponents of SP or something of the sort impute to Socrates a belief in an unbridgeable gulf between human wisdom and divine wisdom: the moral knowledge of the gods is essentially infallible, certain and complete, but that of humans is essentially fallible, uncertain, and incomplete; hence, Socrates (and all humans) cannot completely specify the all-beneficial product that we assist the gods in producing. If such a gap exists, surely constructivists and Socrates himself cannot know that SP or a version of it is a genuine expression of Socratic piety. Thus constructivists’ own belief that Socrates has a working knowledge of piety is defeated by the assumption of such a gap. My own account claims that human and divine knowledge is continuous and scalar, for

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19 Cf. McPherran [13] 130: ‘The field of human wisdom comprises the knowledge of human affairs, including knowledge (fallible) of virtue; it does not extend to the full and infallible apprehension of divine objects such as gods, or facts such as whether or not dying is certainly good (Pl. *Ap.* 42a). ... Thus it does not extend to the complete and infallible understanding of the definition of piety, since that would require a complete and infallible knowledge of the gods’ εργον. To strive after such knowledge in the hope of actually obtaining it is futile’. Weiss [16] 213, after entertaining the possibility of ‘some “divine” human being’ appearing one day, dismisses that possibility by invoking the unbridgeable gulf ‘theory’: ‘Yet even were such a one to appear, Socrates’ discovery by way of the oracle of the chasm dividing divine from human wisdom, such that it would be true of human beings generally not only that they have not but that they cannot attain wisdom greater than human, would remain intact.’
both degrees of knowledge minimally satisfy the common criteria of truth. Only by understanding piety as a cognitive continuum could Socrates claim both to have and to lack moral knowledge and could—if we agree—sincerely claim to be pious in his defence, for he has a valid degree of knowledge of piety though he lacks optimal knowledge of piety. Alternatively, if at all it were true that an unbridgeable gap of knowledge exists between gods and humans, it would be too trivially true to be significant. Without exception there is virtually in every field of search for knowledge a theoretical upper limit, an optimal knowledge that remains unattainable by humans no matter the level of actually attained knowledge. Hence, for humans, any actually attained knowledge is incomplete, fallible, and, to a degree, uncertain. In contrast, gods are commonly conceived as optimally or infinitely knowledgeable.

Of course my own account is incomplete, for it has not yet provided an answer to the following question: If Socrates believes in gods, how is piety as an agent-centred mode of cognition a relation between humans and gods? The two dialectical results earlier referred to, and the Socratic claim that gods only are wise, lead to the following conclusion: that god, for Socrates, is no more than a personified moral wisdom. This need not entail the actual existence of god as a transcendent, fully anthropomorphic being. The divinity of moral wisdom is its reality as the ideal whose pursuit chiefly accounts, in Socrates’ view, for human salvation and happiness. For Socrates, moral wisdom is the only ideal that is absolutely good (Pl. Euth. 278e3-279d); and it is ‘the good’ which is the end of all human actions, for the sake of which all other things are done, and not it for theirs’ (Pl. Grg. 499e9-500a1).

In the light of the Socratic conception of god suggested here, Socratic piety would be the devotional pursuit of moral rationality or its production in others. This interpretation has at least two advantages. It bridges the gap between piety as orthodoxy and as orthopraxy because Socratic piety is a conscious belief that takes pleasure in and leads to virtuous action; it also

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20 But cf. McPherran [13] 189 n. 5: ‘... the correct understanding of virtue that Socrates seeks and is depicted as having failed to achieve is a general theoretical understanding of why each virtuous thing is virtuous. Failure to achieve this sort of knowledge does not ipso facto preclude a pretheoretic knowledge of particular instances falling under an unanalyzed concept. Thus, e.g., Socrates can be as certain as is humanly possible that his mission is virtuous without having a complete and certain account of either his mission or the attending ethical concepts’. So far, I have argued that, given the right method of moral search, an example of which is the Socratic method, human knowledge of good and bad can go far beyond a mere pretheoretical ability to identify instances of moral particulars.

21 This result is influenced by Y. Kachi, ‘God, Forms, and Socratic Piety’, AncPhil 3 (1983) 82-88.
bridges the gap between Socratic piety as service\textsuperscript{22} and as moral knowledge,\textsuperscript{23} for Socratic \textit{dialectic}, as engagement and as practice of piety, necessarily tends to induce rationality in others, by making them conscious not only of their cognitive level on the scale of moral wisdom but also of the need for further development of rationality for their own and society’s wellbeing.

If god as a personified moral wisdom is puzzling, we must remember that in Greek thought the ideal or sublime or perfect is divine, on account either of its mysteriousness, or of its extra-rational quality and its causal effect on human life. Such divinisation, however, does not necessarily presuppose a supernatural agent. Discussing the difference between knowledge and right opinion in the \textit{Meno} (Pl. \textit{Men.} 97a-98a), Socrates solicits Meno’s agreement thus:

\begin{quote}

καὶ γὰρ οὐτοί ἐνθουσιάζοντες λέγουσιν μὲν ἀληθῆ καὶ πολλά, ἵσσαι δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσιν . . . καὶ αἱ γε γυναῖκες δήπον, ὁ Μένος, τοὺς ἁγαθοὺς ἁγάθον θείους καλοῦσι καὶ οἱ Λάκκενες ἄταν τινά ἐγκομιάζοσιν ἄγαθον ἄνδρα, Ὑθεῖος ἀνήρ, φασίν, οὗτος . . .

(Pl. \textit{Men.} 99c3-5, 99d7-9)
\end{quote}

And ought we not reckon those men divine who, with no conscious thought, are repeatedly and outstandingly successful in what they do and say . . . Women, you know, Meno, do call good men ‘divine’, and the Spartans, too, when they are singing a good man’s praises, say, ‘he is divine’.

These passages imply that the expression ‘divine’ can be attributed to agents who exhibit repeated excellence. In Socrates’ view, only one with moral wisdom is infallible and can exhibit repeated excellence (Pl. \textit{Euthyd.} 280a10-12).

The ‘divine’ has other but related applications. Some passages suggest that to produce excellence repeatedly without conscious knowledge is to do so under divine inspiration, where being divinely inspired is apparently predicated on both the mysterious and extra-rational mode of producing the excellence. Compare Plato’s \textit{Apology}, where Socrates tells the jury:

\begin{quote}

ἐγὼν οὖν αὐτὶ καὶ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ὁλίγῳ τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ σοφίᾳ ποιοῖν ὁ ποιεῖν ἀλλὰ φύσει τινὶ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες ύστερ οἱ θεομάντεις καὶ οἱ χρησμοδότες καὶ γὰρ οὕτωι λέγουσι μὲν πολλά καὶ καλά, ἵσσαι δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσιν.

(Pl. \textit{Ap.} 22b8-c3)
\end{quote}

I noticed that it was not by wisdom that they write their poetry, but by a kind of nature and divine inspiration, such as you find in seers and prophets, who

\textsuperscript{22} For example, Brickhouse and Smith [16] 64-67; McPherran [13] 29.

deliver all their sublime messages without knowing in the least what they mean.

The conjunctive phrase φύσει τινι καὶ ἐνθουσιαζοντες suggests, among other things, that excellence or prophetic information may be generated naturally or under divine inspiration. Alternatively, the καὶ could be used epexegetically, making either φύσει or ἐνθουσιαζοντες explicative of the other. In either case, no supernatural agency is necessarily implied. Thus, when Socrates claims in Plato’s Apology that he accepted ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτο . . . προστέτακται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεου πράττειν καὶ ἐκ μαντείων καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ψπέρ τίς ποτε καὶ ἄλλη θεία μοίρα ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ὁτιοῦν προστέταξε πράττειν (‘the divine command to philosophise through oracles and dreams and in every other way any divine dispensation has ever impressed a duty upon man’, 33c4-7), he need not imply that transcendent, fully anthropomorphic gods commanded him to philosophise through dreams, oracles, and other divinations. Apollo, we know, did not answer Chaerophon with a command to Socrates to philosophise (21a). In other words, Socrates would not be inconsistent or insincere if he understands dreams and daemonic voices as hunches but still refers to them as divine sources of information on account of their mysterious and/or extra-rational quality and their impact on human life.

The same considerations apply to Plato’s Apology 26b-c, where Socrates refers to the charge that he does not believe in the gods of the state but other new divinities he has invented, and reads ἄλλα δὲ δαιμόνια καινῷ (‘the other new divinities’, 26b5) as an allusion to his claim to be subject to daemonic promptings? He then asks Meletus to see whether it is not contradictory to accuse him of atheism and of inventing new divinities, since divinities, new or old, are either gods or children of gods (27b-28a2). It may be argued that by inferring such a contradiction from Meletus’ indictment, Socrates understands the promptings of his daemonion to be caused by an externally existing, fully anthropomorphic god. But this conclusion must be resisted. Socrates’ daemonion is φωνή (‘a voice’, 31d3) or σημεῖον (‘a sign’, 40c3, 41d6) which he may well take to be both a hunch and divine—a hunch because it is not knowledge; divine because it is a mysterious, extra-rational reality that consistently affects his life. But further, to draw attention to the inferrability of a divine agent is not the same as affirming or asserting such an agent in an indicative mood; Socrates nowhere identified the god whose promptings constitute the daemonion (cf. 27c10-28a1).

From the foregoing considerations, it is reasonable to suppose that we cannot take Socrates’ use of ‘god’ on its face value. I have argued that god for Socrates is personified moral wisdom and piety involves the recognition and devotional pursuit of the ideal of moral wisdom. Recognising the ideality of
moral wisdom would come with an experience of its power in action and results generated by living the examined life (Pl. Ap. 38a3-6). Thus Socratic philosophising is legitimate piety, because it involves elenctically informed recognition of the ideal of moral rationality. The image of the morally wise serves the human tendency towards happiness, because it inspires action towards the acquisition of moral rationality, which chiefly guarantees happiness. ‘To serve god’ or ‘to assist god in producing an all-beneficial good’ are metaphors that serve to draw attention to both the controlling role of moral wisdom in human wellbeing and the duty this imposes on all claiming to be pious, to induce moral rationality in others or at least to bring others to an awareness of this.

Conclusions

We have seen that externally existing anthropomorphic gods are in fact and in logic unnecessary for moral conduct. This is the logical implication of our ordinary usage of moral terms like piety, justice, et cetera, which seem to presuppose agent-centred principles of conduct—principles which form the basis of and explain our moral/religious conduct. As these principles are cognitive in kind, they constitute a human capacity that can be developed to optimal levels. Thus our moral/religious sense has a cognitive elasticity that can be developed to various levels of knowledge. To attain the highest level of moral rationality, namely to be wise, is to be god. Piety, then, consists in personal and social action inspired by and in pursuit of the ideal of moral wisdom. In this respect piety serves the innate human search for happiness, which is chiefly a function of moral rationality. Elenctic examination is a way to pursue the ideal, as it appears to have helped Socrates advance his own, if not others’, rationality from its subconscious and pre-analytical level to the higher level of conscious faith in and commitment to the pursuit of moral rationality, the foundation of our happiness and of our highest possible existence, in Socrates’ view.

24 D. Bostock, ‘The Interpretation of Plato’s Crito’, Phronesis 35 (1990) 20 claims by reference to Pl. Men. 89e1-96c10 and Prt. 319a10-320b5 that Socrates explicitly denies that moral experts exist on the grounds that virtue cannot be imparted from one person to another. I doubt if Bostock is right. Socrates, in these passages, is claiming only that he has not seen any reputed Athenian who has been able to impart whatever goodness he has to another. He therefore does not think that virtue can be taught. This means, not that there is not or cannot be a moral expert, but that the most likely candidates in Athenian history are not moral experts. The main import of these passages is that a moral expert, if any exists, ought to be able to impart their knowledge.
EPIDICUS MIHI FUIT MAGISTER:
STRUCTURE AND METATHEATRICALITY
IN PLAUTUS’ EPIDICUS

Lisa Maurice
Department of Classics, Bar Ilan University
Ramat Gan 52900, Israel

Abstract. The Epidicus has generally been regarded as poorly constructed and full of inconsistencies and weaknesses. A performance-based interpretation of the Epidicus reveals a much clearer structure than has previously been appreciated, a structure that in itself betrays a self-conscious approach to drama. Emphasising Plautus’ careful structuring and metatheatrical self-consciousness reveals the Epidicus as a glorious exposition of Plautus’ favourite figure, the crafty slave.

The Epidicus is a play about a clever Plautine slave and it contains many of the elements commonly found in Plautus’ depiction of this standard figure. Yet the Epidicus, unlike the Pseudolus or the Bacchides, both of which glorify servi callidi (‘crafty slaves’), has generally not found favour in the eyes of critics,1 who have found the plot poorly constructed and full of inconsistencies and weaknesses.2 Scholars have raised several problems in connection with the Epidicus. Several of these have been satisfactorily answered over the years,3 but

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3 See Wheeler [1] 241 (the direction of Thesprio’s entrance); Wheeler [1] 242 (Periphanes and Apoecides’ unawareness of the soldiers’ return); and Duckworth [1] 197 (the explanation of the appearance of two soldiers). There is also the more minor discrepancy of the sums of money bandied about in the play; this, however, is no more than a typical bit of Plautine fun,
others have continued to worry those reading the play. The careless construction often seen in the Epidicus is thought to be reflected in several other weaknesses, namely the inconsistencies both in Epidicus’ plans and in the behaviour of the characters (in particular that of the fidicina, ‘lyre-player’), and the lack of clarity about the love affairs of the plot whereby there are no clear solutions to the romances of Periphanes and Stratippocles.

Yet Plautus himself did not regard the play as a ‘flop’. Indeed, as the oft-quoted line in his Bacchides reflects, Plautus uniquely singles out the Epidicus for approval by name: etiam Epidicum, quam ego fabulam aeque ac me ipsum amo (‘even Epidicus, a play which I love like I love myself’). This line is, however, rarely quoted in context. The complete statement of Chrysalus runs:

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Non res, sed actor mihi cor odio sauciat.
etiam Epidicum, quam ego fabulam aeque ac me ipsum amo,
nullam aeque invitus specto, si agit Pellio.
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(Plaut. Bacch. 213-15)

Not the thing, but the actor offends my heart with hatred.
Even Epidicus, a play which I love like I love myself,
no play would I watch so unwillingly if Pellio is acting.4

In other words, the Epidicus’ superiority—or at least its preclusion from failure—is conditional upon the actor, as Plautus draws attention to this figure in a metatheatrical statement about the performance-based nature of successful drama. Plautus has long been recognised as a self-conscious dramatist, who uses various techniques to underscore the nature of the play as drama. Metatheatricality, whereby drama makes reference to itself as drama, is an extreme aspect of this approach, in which the audience is encouraged to view the play on two levels, both as a representation of reality and also as an unreal piece of dramatic fiction. As one scholar recently put it, metatheatre is ‘drama within drama as well as drama about drama’.5 Such interpretations are based upon an understanding of staging and performance, rather than upon a reading of the plays as texts.

A performance-based interpretation of the Epidicus reveals a much clearer structure than has previously been appreciated, a structure that betrays a

4 The text here and that of the Epidicus throughout is that of F. Leo, Plauti Comoediae 1 (Berlin 1895).

self-conscious approach to drama. In several of Plautus’ later plays, and notably in the *Bacchides* and the *Pseudolus*, both of which feature crafty slave characters, metatheatricality features prominently, underscoring the fictitious nature of drama as drama. The *Epidicus*, which predates both of these plays, will be shown to contain similar elements, albeit in a less developed form, and it is in this context, in light of Chrysalus’ comment in the *Bacchides*, that we should look afresh at the problems of the *Epidicus*.

*The Structure of the Epidicus*

**Conscious Manipulation: A Symmetrical Plot**

One of the main reasons for the negative response to the *Epidicus* is a feeling that the plot is over-complicated, full of multiple and confusing deceptions, coincidences and improbabilities that leave the reader (although perhaps not the audience) breathless. Yet upon close examination, the plot is not, as has so often been claimed, unclear and confused, but rather demonstrates a balanced structure, which in itself reveals Plautus’ high level of conscious manipulation of his genre. While the play contains an unusual number of intrigues, in each case the aim is the same—to glorify Epidicus at the expense of other characters, and in particular Periphanes—and in each of the intrigues this aim is achieved. Despite the pace of the play, it is extremely carefully constructed. If the main theme of each scene is highlighted, it becomes apparent that the play is constructed symmetrically, which may be graphically as a pyramid as

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7 S. Goldberg [2] 86-88 points out the parallelism of the *Epidicus* but does not fully explore the structure of the play.
8 T. Baier, ‘Griechisches und Römisches im Plautinischen *Epidicus*’, in Auhagen [1] 16-30 reduces the plot to four different tricks, one involving Acropolistis, another concerning the soldier, a third involving the flute-girl and the fourth, the pimp. While this is correct, I am unconvinced that such an observation helps to explain the plot of the *Epidicus*.
10 I refer to acts and scenes, rather than line numbers, for ease of reference and clarity in my argument, despite the fact that these are later divisions. However, I also include the line-numbers in order to assist precise identification from Plautus’ text.
11 The question of how far this structure is typical of Plautus’ writing, or indeed of Greek and Roman new comedy in general, is a topic that requires further investigation, and which falls outside the scope of this paper, although see J. R. Clark, ‘Structure and Symmetry in the *Bacchides* of Plautus’, *TAPhA* 106 (1976) 85-96.
demonstrated in figure 1. The first scene of the play reveals the information that Acropolistis is residing in Periphanes’ house, having been passed off as his daughter (Plaut. *Epid* 1-103), while the last scene of the play shows Telestis accepted into the house as Periphanes’ rightful daughter (666-733). In the second scene of the play Stratippocles’ love affair is introduced (104-65); in the penultimate scene of the play, that love affair is concluded with the knowledge that Telestis is actually Stratippocles’ sister (607-65). The first two scenes of act 2 concern respectively Periphanes’ romantic problems and the deceptive trick played on the two old men in order to obtain the money from Periphanes and remove Acropolistis from the house (166-305). The parallel two scenes in the second half of the play (act 4, scenes 1 and 2) invert the order to produce a chiastic structure (526-606). Act 4, scene 1 resolves Periphanes’ love affair (529-69), while the following scene concerns the discovery of the trick played upon the two old men (570-606). The brief third scene of act 2 explains how Epidicus will produce a substitute for Acropolistis by using the *fidicina* (306-19); in act 3, scene 4a, the *fidicina* intrigue is discovered (475-525). A scene involving Stratippocles and Chaeribulus opens the third act (320-36), while the scene between Periphanes and the soldier occupies the parallel position (437-74). These scenes are on the surface very different, yet both involve a figure who is shown to be all bluster (the useless friend Chaeribulus and the *miles gloriosus*), and provide comic relief. Finally, at the centre of the play stand two climactic scenes, one involving Epidicus exulting over his success (*Epid.* 337-81), and the other, Periphanes, exultant on his own accord, smugly confident that he is completely successful (382-436).

An overview of the metrical structure of the play lends weight to the plausibility of this arrangement. The comedy both opens and closes with *canticum* followed by trochaic *septenarii* (*Epid.* 1-163, 526-733), followed at the beginning of the play by Epidicus’ monologue in iambics (164f.), and preceded at the end of the comedy by Periphanes’ monologue in iambic *senarii* (517-25). The apex of the play is marked by two monologues in iambic *septenarii*, by Periphanes (382-95) and Epidicus (341-81) respectively, while the midpoint of the play is also emphasised by a repeated metrical motif that occurs only in the first half of the play, whereby there is a pattern of cretics, a

12 The language of ‘ring composition’ used in discussions of Homer can also be used to describe this structure, but I have preferred to utilise the term ‘pyramidal structure’ since I feel it better highlights the apex which places Epidicus at the climax of the play in striking contrast to his ‘arch enemy’, Periphanes.


mixture of metres and iambics to mark the entrance of Epidicus (166-305, 320-40a). Epidicus’ monologue in iambic *senarii* (306-19), which is itself paralleled by a monologue by Periphanes in the second half of the play (517-25), divides the two sections of mixed metres. The second half of the play utilises unaccompanied iambic *senarii* in place of the mixture of metres noted in the first half, thus delineating the two sections of the play that centre around the two monologues. While there is not a complete metrical symmetry in the play, the metrical organisation does strengthen the pyramidal structure outlined above, as illustrated in figure 2.

This careful pyramidal structure also makes extremely unlikely the theory of clumsy adaptation of a Greek model. Whatever lost Greek comedy provided the basis for the *Epidicus*, the comedy is so carefully constructed that this must be something that Plautus himself has imposed upon the play, unless he translated his model far more faithfully than usual. The large number of obviously Plautine elements in the play also points to the structure being implemented by Plautus himself, for a specific purpose.

The Release of Information

Within this structure, it is also true that the different elements of the plot are introduced in a very controlled manner, one step at a time. Critics have complained that the lack of a prologue complicates the plot unnecessarily. In place of a prologue, there is a scene featuring Epidicus and Thesprio, a slave newly returned with Stratippocles from campaign (Epid.1-103). In this scene we learn that Epidicus has bought a flute-girl beloved of his master under Stratippocles’ orders, but that Stratippocles is now enamoured of another captive girl whom he has bought. We have to wait until the end of the scene (80-100) to learn some of the background to the play and to hear of the deception already performed upon Periphanes. From the very outset Plautus leaves the audience in the dark, as he releases information slowly throughout the first act. In the first half of the first scene, Stratippocles’ new love affair is revealed (1-55); in the second half of the act Epidicus’ first deception is

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15 *Pace* Goldberg [2], I do believe that there was a Greek original upon which the *Epidicus* was modelled, however loosely. See W. G. Arnott, ‘Plautus’ *Epidicus* and Greek Comedy’, in Auhagen [1] 71-90; Lowe [1] 57-62.


described (56-103). It is in the second scene that Stratippocles’ money troubles are developed (104-65), and in the next that Periphanes’ dilemma of whether or not to remarry is introduced (166-80), as Plautus scatters the information that could be explained in a prologue over a space of almost two hundred lines.

This approach, far from being problematic, seems in keeping with the rest of the play. As one recent study has demonstrated, the information is very carefully released to the audience throughout the play, and the events build skilfully upon each other in order to develop a picture of Epidicus, the master-contriver. The very speed and pace of the action and the convolutions of Epidicus in the face of the complex and changing circumstances make the play a hilarious show, but the play is so carefully constructed as to keep the situation clear in the minds of the audience. In the Epidicus, Plautus constantly juggles his information and misinformation, releasing snippets slowly and telling the audience only as much as he wants to tell them at every stage. In this way, he performs a balancing act between providing the audience with enough information to follow what is happening, and keeping them in suspense, whilst still maintaining the frenetic pace. This juggling act is carried out for the specific purpose of placing the figure of Epidicus himself at the centre of the stage and of the plot itself. The speed and pace of the plot, far from confusing the audience, make it a hilarious roller coaster of fabulous feats revolving and building up around Epidicus.

**Duality Method**

The symmetrical structure of the play both emphasises and is itself reinforced by the conscious duality of events and characters in the Epidicus. There are two soldiers (a fictional Euboean mentioned by Epidicus and the Rhodian who appears to claim Acropolistis) and two sums of money (thirty minae paid for Acropolistis a few days earlier and forty minae plus interest, the sum of money Stratippocles requires and Epidicus obtains). Similarly, there are two sets of friends (Chaeribulus and Apoecides) and two masters, both of whom are also lovers (Stratippocles and Periphanes). We find two flute-girls (Acropolistis and the hired flute-girl), and two daughters (Acropolistis and Telestis, the real daughter) who are both objects of Stratippocles’ love. The Epidicus also contains a double case of confused identity. In Epidicus’ original plan Acropolistis is substituted for Telestis and Periphanes thinks that Acropolistis is

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his daughter; in the play itself the flute-girl is substituted for Acropolistis as part of Epidicus’ plan to get rid of Stratippocles’ now unwanted love.

The effect of all these doubles is to create constant echoes and repetitions, which leave the audience with a sense of bewilderment as to who is who and what is reality within the play. Watching the Epidicus is like watching a play through a kaleidoscope or through a distorting mirror, yet despite this frenzied atmosphere, the play leaves us with a sense of satisfaction, due to the balanced and symmetrical structure of the play. This structure not only lends shape to the play but also, by drawing attention to the elements of duality within the comedy, highlights the figure of Epidicus, who stands out in sharp relief as the only character who does not possess a ‘double’ and, typically of crafty slaves, alone comprehends the true state of affairs.

The Unresolved Romances of Periphanes and Stratippocles

An appreciation of the structure of the Epidicus can help address another issue that has been cited as a weak spot in the Epidicus, namely the resolution of the romance between Periphanes and Philippa. Early on in the play, the idea of Periphanes’ remarriage is introduced but then seems to be dropped summarily; although Philippa, the one-time lover of Periphanes and mother of Telestis, arrives, it is never explicitly stated that the two will marry, leaving an unresolved situation unusual in Roman comedy. Closer examination, however, reveals that the situation is perhaps not so unresolved as is often assumed. As the pyramidal structure of the plot reflects, the two scenes dealing with Periphanes’ romance and the trick played upon the two old men are resolved in parallel scenes which form a chiastic structure, so that act 4, scene 1 is presented as an answer to the earlier scene (act 2, scene 1). When Philippa appears in this later scene, the audience would already have anticipated that this was the woman to whom Periphanes had referred as his new bride (Epid.166-80); her status as Periphanes’ old flame is emphasised by the exaggerated recognition scene, more than thirty lines long (525-57), and so typical of Roman comedy. The characters move from unawareness of each other through awareness and then vague recognition to positive identification in such an overstated manner as to emphasise Philippa’s position, leaving the audience in no doubt as to her status and function here. Just to make certain that the point is made, their next brief exchange runs: Per: cedo manum. Ph: accipe (‘Per: Give me your hand. Ph: Take it’, 559). At first sight, and to modern eyes, this does not seem incongruous, a gesture of affection perhaps. Yet in republican Rome, where physical contact between husband and wife was frowned upon in public,

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officially at least, such a gesture seems unusual. The word *manum* (‘hand’) has another meaning, however, which is more relevant here, that of the legal power of a man over his wife, and one form of marriage, the *Dextrarum Iunctio* (‘joining of the right [hands]’), involved the joining of the right hands of the bride and groom.\(^\text{21}\) It is entirely possible that the staging here mimicked a Roman wedding ceremony with these words and the joining of hands by Periphanes and Philippa. If this is so, there is a clear resolution to the theme of Periphanes’ romance.

Additionally, if Periphanes’ romance is satisfactorily resolved, the question of the resolution of Stratippocles’ love affair is more easily solved. Stratippocles first falls in love with Acropolistis, and then with Telestis, who ultimately turns out to be his sister; thus critics have complained that Stratippocles is left without his beloved at the end of the play. The only hint of a successful resolution to the situation is Epidicus’ suggestion that he transfer his affections back to Acropolistis, but it is not stated clearly that this will happen. Yet bearing in mind the parallelism of structure, and the fact that the other romantic element does seem to be resolved, it is likely that the audience would not have needed a clearer indication than this. Epidicus lays out his solution to Stratippocles’ problems: *tibi quidem quod ames domi praestost, fidicina, opera mea; / et sororem in libertatem idem opera concilio mea* (‘there is ready at home a flute-girl whom you can love, thanks to my efforts; and your sister is free thanks to those same efforts of mine’, *Epid*. 653f.), to which Stratippocles agrees: *Epidice, fateor* (‘Epidicus, I agree’, 655). Epidicus’ stress here upon his own role in these affairs (*opera mea; concilio mea*) also dispels any doubt that his advice will be taken; as the audience has seen throughout the play, when Epidicus directs, the other players, and in particular Stratippocles, fall in with his plans without demur.

*Actors and Acting in the Epidicus*

In light of the careful structure of the *Epidicus*, it seems unlikely that the inconsistencies in Epidicus’ plans are random careless slips on the part of Plautus. Thus it follows that these inconsistencies are there for a purpose. I believe that this purpose is to demonstrate Epidicus’ skill as an actor. This becomes all the more likely when the metatheatrical nature of the *Epidicus* is taken into consideration. Throughout the play, characters behave out of character, which raises questions about the nature of characterisation within a play, in which the figures are merely actors assuming roles. The nature of role-

play becomes even more striking in light of the behaviour of the *fidicina*, who explicitly takes on a dramatic role, in which Epidicus, the master actor, behaves as director.

*Inconsistencies in Epidicus’ Plans*

Epidicus’ role as an actor is prominent throughout the play. His ability to weave his magic is so great that Plautus does not even attempt to explain how he manages to achieve certain sleights of hand. Three different problems fall into this category. First, the audience is not told how Epidicus persuaded Periphanes that Acropolistis was his long-lost daughter. Secondly, it is not clear how Epidicus could plan that Acropolistis should be sold to a soldier when Periphanes regards her as his daughter. Finally, it is not explained how the deception of Apoecides was accomplished, a particularly important thread of the play. As Wheeler points out, ‘Since Apoecides went along with Epidicus when the money for the *fidicina* was carried to the *leno* ['brothel keeper'] . . . an important part of the slave’s plan must have consisted in convincing Apoecides that the money . . . had been paid to the *leno*, but we are not told how the deception of Apoecides was accomplished’ 22.

Yet in the context of the play, these issues do not seem to be problems. The point of the play is not to show Epidicus presenting viable plans as such, but to show the other characters being dazzled by Epidicus’ brilliance, 23 a point that is emphasised by the very weakness of Epidicus’ plans. The clearer it is that he has no workable plan, the more amazing it is that he succeeds. Thus in Epidicus’ first plan to sell Acropolistis to a *Euboicus miles* ('Euboian soldier'), it is irrelevant that since Periphanes believes Acropolistis to be his daughter she cannot be sold so easily (*Epid.* 151-56). What is important is not if the plan will work, but that Stratippocles believes that it will work.

A demonstration of Epidicus’ ability to convince is provided on stage for the audience when, in the typical manner of the *servus callidus*, Epidicus must spontaneously improvise a plot in response to the changing situation in which he finds himself (*Epid.* 181-305). As soon as Stratippocles informs his slave of his new passion Epidicus, responding to the need to get rid of Acropolistis, improvises a plan to get the money from Periphanes, utilising what he hears of the conversation between Periphanes and Apoecides. At this point, relatively early on in the play, as soon as the problems have been set down, Epidicus demonstrates his ability to perform his magic by weaving a plot before our eyes. He describes an imaginary conversation he has supposedly overheard at the

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22 Wheeler [1] 244.

port, telling Periphanes that Stratippocles has a mistress and proposing the plan to buy the girl and send her away so that the two young lovers will be separated. As Goldberg puts it, ‘The heart of this second act is a long, colourful monologue in which Epidicus, describing a scene he has not witnessed, reports the conversation of two girls who do not exist, and wins Periphanes and his friend Apoecides to a course of action he has no intention of following’. By the time this scene finishes, the picture of Epidicus the trickster is so firmly established in our minds that not only the characters in the play, but also the audience, assume him capable of anything.

This message is equally clear in the climactic scene in which Apoecides returns with the *fidicina*, whom the old men assume to be Acropolistis (*Epid.* 395-436). Once again, what is important is not how Epidicus convinced Apoecides, but rather the fact that he did fool and convince him. Plautus stresses the success of Epidicus’ plan by presenting Apoecides as completely under the spell of the slave, when he returns singing Epidicus’ praises:

Ne tu habes servom graphicum et quantivis preti,  
non carust auro contra. ut ille fidicinam  
fecit <sese ut> nesciret esse emptam tibi!  

(Plaut. *Epid.* 410-12)

Well, you certainly have a masterly slave, cheap at any price and worth his weight in gold. He did it so that the music girl didn’t know she was being bought for you!

To which Periphanes replies in wonder: *mirum hoc qui potuit fieri* (‘It’s amazing how it could happen’, *Epid.* 414). Apoecides hilariously and ironically goes on to describe how he played dumb during the deception: *ego illic me autem sic assimulabam: quasi / stolidum, combardum me faciebam* (‘At that point I pretended to look like this; I made myself as if I was stupid and slow-witted’, 420f.). The irony of this statement would not have gone unnoticed by the audience, who would have taken the obvious point, that despite the obvious difficulties and weaknesses of Epidicus’ plan, he has succeeded in implementing it. The details of how he did so are simply not relevant. The audience had been shown, in the brilliant showpiece scene discussed above (act 2, scene 2, 181-305), just how well Epidicus is able to extemporise a story or a plan convincingly; now they witness the evidence that he has managed to do so again magnificently.

It is a commonplace of Roman comedy that characters behave contrary to the expectations both of the audience and of the other characters; in other words, characters assume roles that are markedly different from what the audience expects. This is particularly noticeable in the Epidicus, where almost everybody behaves out of character. As the play unfolds, it becomes clear that nothing is what it seems and no one is what he appears to be. Stratippocles and Periphanes are free men, masters of Epidicus, yet it is Epidicus who controls them, even to the extent of being the one to decide if they may free him or not. In every encounter between Epidicus and his masters, it is Epidicus who controls the situation, and indeed that is what Stratippocles and Periphanes expect. As so often in Roman comedy, the roles of slave and master are not so much blurred as interchanged. Similarly, the two friends in the play, Chaeribulus and Apoecides, do not match up to the expected standards of friendship. At the beginning of the first scene in which he appears, Stratippocles remarks to Chaeribulus: *is est amicus, qui in re dubia re iuvat, ubi rest opus* (‘he’s a friend, one who is of use in an emergency, when there is need of him’, Epid. 113). He then asks Chaeribulus to lend him the money he needs, something that his friend declares himself unable to do, being under financial pressure himself. Stratippocles retorts: *malim istius modi mihi amicos furno mersos quam foro* (‘I’d rather have friends like this burnt up in an oven than bankrupt’, 119). It is notable that the only one who fulfils Stratippocles’ definition of a friend, someone who helps practically in case of emergency, is his slave Epidicus. Similarly, after Apoecides has brought back the flute-girl whom he assumes to be Acropolistis, Periphanes muses philosophically:

> Nihil homini amicost opportuno amicius:
> sine tuo labore quod velis actumst tamen.
> ego si allegavissem aliquem ad hoc negotium
> minus hominem doctum minusque ad hanc rem callidum,
> os sublitum esset . . .

(Plaut. Epid. 425-29)

A man can have no better friend than a friend in need. Without any work from you, whatever you want will happen. If I had used some man less clever and less crafty in this business, the wool would have been pulled right over my eyes . . .

The irony is, of course, that he has been hoodwinked by Epidicus, while his ‘friend’ Apoecides is no friend at all, as his eagerness to abandon Periphanes, during the search for Epidicus, reflects (Epid. 666-81). Apoecides himself is
portrayed as the epitome of a wise senator. According to Epidicus, people regard Apoecides, like Periphanes, as among those senators *senati qui columnen cluent* (‘who are called the pillar of the senate’, 188; cf. Plaut. *Cas.* 536). This view is corroborated by Periphanes himself when he says of his friend: *omnium / legum atque iurum fuctor, conditor cluet* (‘of all he is called a creator and founder of laws and statutes’, *Epid.* 521-23). Yet this wise man is completely fooled by Epidicus, and by the end of the play he is almost as much a victim as Periphanes. Despite his initial opposition to Epidicus’ insolence in the last scene, where he exclaims that *edepol mancipium scelestum* (‘by god, what a disgraceful slave!’, 686), he is soon reduced to helping Epidicus, responding to Periphanes’ appeal for guidance: *quid agas? mos geratur* (‘what should you do? Let him do as he wants’, 693). Finally he advises Periphanes to go along with Epidicus’ request: *ei, non illuc temerest* (‘there’s no disgrace in this’, 714). He also is completely under the slave’s spell by this point. The wise counsellor of the senate is actually the fool of a slave. This pattern is repeated with the flute-girls. When the flute-girl is brought in, Periphanes gives explicit instructions that she should be kept apart from his ‘daughter’: *divortunt mores virgini longe ac lupae* (‘the behaviour of a maiden is very different from that of a slut!’, 403). The irony of course is that the girl inside, whom Periphanes thinks is his daughter, is actually a slut herself, whereas the flute-girl herself is actually a freedwoman, as we later learn (497f.). Meanwhile, the daughter herself is actually the beloved of her own brother—although he has not consummated relations with her, as Plautus stresses.

Thus the *Epidicus* contains a slave who behaves as a master, masters who are under the thumb of their slave, friends who are unable to perform the services of friendship, prostitutes who are really freeborn girls, and a daughter who is really a prostitute. No one is who or what he or she appears to be; nothing is absolute. In the context of a play this is striking, for of course none of the characters is real, but each is merely an actor assuming a role. Yet the character who proves himself the master of role-play is, of course, Epidicus himself; the reason that Epidicus manages to succeed in his plans is that he is a consummate actor. The first time the audience hears the details of Epidicus’ first successful plan, in which he introduced Acropolistis into the house under

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26 Commentators have stressed this point, e.g., Duckworth [1] 171; T. Riley, *The Comedies of Plautus* (London 1912) 110: ‘This is a very important passage, as it relieves the Audience from the apprehension they might otherwise feel in the fifth act, that Stratippocles had unconsciously been guilty of incest’.

the guise of being Periphanes’ long-lost daughter, is in a self-consciously metatheatrical dialogue, in which Epidicus assumes a role (Epid. 81-103). In other words, the audience sees evidence of Epidicus’ acting ability, at the very moment when a seemingly impossible accomplishment is being related. It seems that Epidicus, the actor, achieved success through his acting ability.

The Behaviour of the Fidicina

If the role of the *fidicina* is considered in the context of the wider play, and against this background of characters playing assumed roles, it is possible to understand more clearly an issue which has often been regarded as problematic, namely the *fidicina*’s revelation of the truth to Periphanes, despite Epidicus’ earlier statement that he would coach her in her role (Epid. 317f.). As already discussed, Epidicus is the actor *par excellence*. He is not only an actor, however. In the course of the play, he also becomes a director, as he employs the *fidicina* who will substitute for Acropolistis to act out this role. As he devises his plan to use the *fidicina*, he says that she will be brought here and *praemonstrabitur* (‘taught’) how to fool the old man (317f.). The word *praemonstrabitur* has a metatheatrical meaning here of ‘to direct’ (cf. Plaut. Per. 148, Trin. 854), and Epidicus follows up this word with the word *subdola* (‘sly’), a favourite word used to describe tricky slaves in Plautus (for example, Plaut. Aul. 334; Capt. 520; Poen. 1032, 1089, 1108), and one which is very connected with his conscious manipulation of this role. Epidicus declares thereby that he will direct the *fidicina* in her theatrical role, whereby she will use her acting skills to fool the old men, just as he, the *servus callidus*, does so often. Yet when this plan actually takes place, the *fidicina* does not behave in this way. Instead, when she is questioned, she answers honestly that she was hired for a few hours to play at a sacrifice, a seemingly pointless inconsistency, as scholars have complained. It is worth looking at this scene in detail, in order to understand exactly what is happening here.

When the soldier is shown the *fidicina*, he at first thinks that he is being intentionally duped, and suspects Periphanes of trying to trick him in the manner that *servi callidi* often deceive their victims (Epid. 475-79). That the *miles* suspects Periphanes of acting in this way is reflected in his use of the word *nugari* (‘talk nonsense’, 478; cf. Plaut. Cas. 979; Merc. 121f., 185;

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Mostell. 585, 1105; Trin. 843-973 [nine times]), one of Plautus’ favourite words to describe trickiness, and which often refers to the activities of the crafty slave. Periphanes, however, shows the soldier that he is not the servus callidus, but rather has himself been duped by him. He reveals himself as ignorant of the deception that has been played upon him, exclaiming in puzzlement: unde haec igitur gentiumst? (‘so where on earth is she from?’, Epid. 483) and explaining: equidem hercle argentum pro hac dedi (‘I gave good money for her!’ , 484). The miles realises that Periphanes is not the perpetrator but the victim of the trick: stulte datum / reor et peccatum largiter (‘I think you gave it foolishly and blundered big time!’ , 484f.), and stresses who is actually responsible for it: em istic homo te articulatim concidit, senex, tuos servos (‘that man, your slave, has cut you up into pieces, old man’, 488f.). In other words, he recognises not only that Periphanes is not acting the part of the servus callidus here, but that Epidicus is doing so, and that the slave has successfully duped his master. Despite the fact that he is not on stage, Epidicus’ presence dominates the scene, and lest we forget what that presence means, that the figure of Epidicus is an actor, the soldier follows up his observation with a reference to a theatrical theme. Periphanes seizes upon the word concidit (‘be slain’), questioning the soldier as to his meaning, and is answered by a reference to the deer who was substituted for Iphigeneia in some versions of the myth, a myth that is likely to have been best known to the Roman audience from theatre. Both Periphanes and the soldier now recognise Epidicus’ role and behaviour, utilising the phrase os est sublitum (‘the mask is applied’, 491; cf. Plaut. Capt. 656, 783; Merc. 485, 604, 631; Mil. 467; Pseud. 719; Trin. 558) and the word emunxisti (‘tricked’, Epid. 494; cf. Plaut. Bacch. 701, 1107; Cas. 391f.), both of which typically describe Plautine trickery, underscoring yet again the persona of Epidicus as tricky slave.

This persona is shown up even more clearly by the fidicina, when she denies that Apoecides bought her earlier that day, and instead states truly that she was hired for a few hours to play the flute at a sacrifice (Epid. 500f.). Despite the criticism levelled by scholars,30 there is no inconsistency here. When Epidicus evolves the plan concerning the fidicina, it is in connection with one outstanding problem, namely what girl he should pass off as Acropolistis, not to Periphanes, but to Apoecides. This is stated clearly: Apoecidi quam ostendam fidicinam aliquam conducticiam (‘which hired flute-girl I should provide for Apoecides’, 312f.). The senex (‘old man’) referred to a few lines later is not Periphanes, but Apoecides: quo pacto fiat subdola adversus senem (‘in what way the old man should be tricked’, 318). It is against Apoecides that this plan is directed, and it is clear that the plan succeeded magnificently. As

30 See [29].
discussed above, Apoecides is completely fooled by Epidicus and the *fidicina* in act 3, scene 3 (396-424). Clearly Epidicus has succeeded in instructing the flute-girl in her part.

When the flute-girl faces Periphanes and tells the truth (*Epid. 500f.*), she is not betraying her teacher, nor has the plot changed, for this meeting was never part of the plot and the *fidicina* was never rehearsed in how to deal with Periphanes. Epidicus in this situation would improvise his way out of the problem, but the *fidicina* is by no means an actor in the same class as Epidicus. She is no crafty slave, able to adopt roles at will, but only able to play the one role in which she has been coached. The *fidicina*’s appeal to Periphanes is also interesting here, as she asks: *fides non reddis?* (‘are you giving back my lute?’, 514), for the word *fides* is a wordplay with the double meaning of ‘lute’ and also ‘trust’, so that she is asking not only for the return of her lute, but also plaintively, ‘don’t you trust me?’; the *fidicina* attempts to be a crafty slave figure, but does not really have the ability to carry this through. Clearly—in contrast to Simia in the *Pseudolus*, who is a rival to the eponymous hero of the play31—she is no match for Epidicus. When the opportunity arises for some spontaneous crafty slavelike improvisation, she tells the truth. She is unable to improvise or act a part in which she has not been coached, and by the end of the scene she departs, having failed, losing her musical instruments and mouthing empty threats of revenge upon Periphanes. In contrast, Periphanes now understands that Epidicus has bought Acropolistis for Stratippocles and that: *planissume / meum exenteravit Epidicus marsuppium* (‘Epidicus has completely gutted my purse’, 510f.). Even more importantly, Periphanes now realises that his wise friend Apoecides has been duped by the master actor Epidicus, as the last lines of the scene show:

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   atque me minoris facio prae illo, qui omnium
   legum atque iurum fictor, condictor cluet;
   is etiam ses sapere memorat: malleum
   sapientiorem vidi excusso manubrio.    
   (Plaut. Epid. 521-24)
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But I am less concerned for myself than for him, who of all
is called a creator and founder of laws and statutes
He even talks about his wisdom; I have seen a mallet
with its nails knocked off show more wisdom!

Periphanes realises that Epidicus’ acting has tricked this wise pillar of the senate, and this is part of Periphanes’ recognition of Epidicus’ supremacy; if the

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fidicina had not revealed the truth at this stage, Periphanes would not have come to this realisation, defeating the whole purpose of this scene.

This theme is later repeated by Acropolistis when it is revealed that she is not Telestis. In this scene (Epid. 570-606), Acropolistis underscores both her own role as actress and that of Epidicus as director. Despite the fact that Epidicus himself does not appear in this scene, his unseen presence is clearly felt, as Acropolistis declares that: Epidicus mihi fuit magister (‘Epidicus was my teacher’, 592). The subject of Epidicus’ instruction to Acropolistis was the role that she should act out, just as he instructed the fidicina in her role. Acropolistis at first may seem a better actress than the fidicina, playing out her part to the full, and presumably having sustained it for a considerable period of time. Yet she is also incapable of improvisation when the plan is discovered. Rather than merely stating the facts, however, as the fidicina had done, Acropolistis takes refuge in the unreality of the dramatic persona as her defence. When Periphanes angrily orders Acropolistis not to call him father, she immediately acquiesces, saying: ubi voles pater esse, ibi esto; ubi noles, ne fueris pater (‘when you want to be my father, be so; when you don’t want to, don’t be my father’, 595). Plautus self-consciously stresses that there is no reality or truth here; all roles are artificially created, and Epidicus, the magister, is director of these creations.

Conclusion

In this play, Plautus presents us with a picture of Epidicus, the servus callidus par excellence. He highlights Epidicus’ supremacy through a careful structure that places Epidicus as the apex and pivot around which the action revolves. This impression is strengthened by a metatheatrical presentation of the slave as master actor, playwright and director, who controls the whole play. Even when he is offstage, his presence dominates and controls the action. A consideration of the play that emphasises Plautus’ careful structuring and metatheatrical self-consciousness reveals the Epidicus as a glorious exposition of the figure of the crafty slave, a figure who is aware of his own power on two levels, both as a slave outwitting his master and as an actor manipulating the drama itself. It is for this reason that Chrysalus exclaims in the Bacchides that he loves the Epidicus—so long as the actor is a fitting practitioner of this powerful craft.

Figure 1.
Symmetrical Pyramidal Structure of the Epidicus

- Epidicus exultant
  - Act 3, scene 2, 337-81

- Periphanes exultant
  - Act 3, scene 3, 382-436

- Stratippocles and Chaeribulus
  - Act 3, scene 1, 320-36

- Fidicina intrigue
  - Act 2, scene 3, 306-19

- Trick played on senes
  - Act 2, scene 2, 181-305

- Periphanes' romantic problems
  - Act 2, scene 1, 166-80

- Telestis in Periphanes' house as his rightful daughter
  - Act 5, scene 2, 666-733

- Aeroplistis in Periphanes' house as his daughter
  - Act 1, scene 1, 1-103

- Discovery of trick played on senes
  - Act 4, scene 2, 570-606

- Stratippocles' love problem ended
  - Act 5, scene 1, 667-65

- Resolution of Periphanes' romantic problems
  - Act 4, scene 1, 526-69

- Periphanes and soldier
  - Act 3, scene 4, 437-74

- Periphanes'
  - Act 2, scene 1, 166-80

- Act 1, scene 2, 104-65
Figure 2. Metrical Structure of the Epidicus

Iambic septenarii: Epidicus

Cretics Mix of meters Iambs (entrance of Epidicus)

341-81

120-40a

Iambic septenarii: Periphanes

382-95

396-516

Unaccompanied iambic senarii.

Epidicus' monologue: iambic senarii

306-19

517-25

Periphanes' monologue: iambic senarii

Canticum Trochaic septenarii

526-733

Cretics Mix of meters Iambs (entrance of Epidicus)

166-305

Monologue of Epidicus: iambics

164f.

Canticum Trochaic septenarii

1-163

Unaccompanied iambic senarii.
FACTS AND FANCIES ABOUT MALE AND FEMALE
IN GRAECO-ROMAN MEDICAL THEORIES

Louise Cilliers
Department of English and Classical Languages, University of the Free State
Bloemfontein 9300, South Africa

Abstract. Certain important distinctions between male and female in Greek and Roman
medical theories, particularly those of the Hippocratic writers, Aristotle, Herophilus and
Galen, are discussed. Their views were greatly determined by prevailing cultural assumptions
and preconceived notions about female anatomy. Empirical observations were thus sometimes
adapted, or ignored, in support of particular theories. These theories transcended ancient
medicine and had a pervasive influence in following centuries.

The difference between the sexes has been a topic of discussion since
time immemorial.¹ The opinions expressed in this ongoing ‘debate’ during the
Graeco-Roman period were obviously determined by the circumstances of the
time and often influenced by pronouncements of influential figures of the past.
As a result, these opinions did not necessarily reflect the objective truth. In fact,
empirical observations were even at times ignored in accordance with the
prevailing cultural structures and views. In modern times, we have a very easy
answer to the question of what the difference is between the sexes. Maleness
and femaleness are basically physical matters, depending on the genitalia: we
are born as males or females. But in a patriarchal society, like that throughout
the Graeco-Roman period, the male was the standard, the norm, the ideal, and
those aspects in which the female’s body differed from that of the male were in
most cases seen as deviations or even mutilations.² The differences between the
sexes were thus viewed by many ancient medical writers as comprising a sliding
scale on which, in the words of Laquer, ‘the boundaries between male and
female are of degree and not of kind . . .’.³

¹ This article is an abbreviated and adapted version of a master class given at the
University of Leiden, The Netherlands, on 17 May 2002. I wish to thank Paul Hoftijzer and
the Scaliger Institute at the University of Leiden for the opportunity to complete this article
under very agreeable circumstances while being a Fellow at this Institute in 2002.
² H. King, Hippocrates’ Woman: Reading the Female Body in Ancient Greece (London
1998) 11, points out that it was ‘not until the late eighteenth century that the sexuality of
the body was thought to extend to all its parts, including the mind . . . only then did the uterus
cease to be an internal analogue of the penis, becoming an organ with no male counterpart’.
³ T. Laquer, Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud (London 1990) 25.
During the past fifteen years there have been some excellent contributions to the study of the female in general as seen by medical writers in ancient Greece and Rome: for example, the works of Lesley Dean-Jones, Rebecca Flemming, Monica Green, Ann Ellis Hanson and Helen King, to mention only a few. In this article, the focus is on the one hand narrower, insofar as the emphasis is specifically on views regarding the female vis-à-vis the male. But on the other hand it is wider, since a period of more than 500 years is covered (ca. 400 BC-ca. AD 200), which should enable one to trace the development (if any) of views in this regard. The discussion follows the traditional pattern of Graeco-Roman treatises, that is, a capite ad calcem (‘from head to toe’).

1. Some Conspicuous Differences Between Male and Female Discussed by Greek and Roman Authors

The authors whose works contain significant information on this topic are the Hippocratic writers (fifth to third centuries BC), Aristotle (384-22 BC), Galen (AD 129-199/216), and to a lesser extent Soranus (late first to early second centuries AD) and the elder Pliny (AD 23-79). Although Galen and Soranus were born in Greek Anatolia in the East and wrote in Greek, both eventually went to Rome where they practiced medicine for a considerable period of time: Soranus during the reign of the emperors Trajan (AD 98-117) and Hadrian (AD 117-38), and Galen in the time of Marcus Aurelius (AD 161-80) and his successors. Chronologically they thus belong to the Roman period. Latin authors like Cato, Scribonius Largus and Celsus were also consulted, but no specific information relevant to the study could be gleaned from them.

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In their discussion of the differences between the sexes, these authors sometimes produce views that appear rather strange to us. One should however keep in mind that, with the exception of the third century BC Alexandrian anatomist, Herophilus, the dissection of human corpses was forbidden. They thus had to base their theories on deductions from observation of those animals’ entrails whose internal parts resemble those of human beings.\(^5\)

A select number of the physical characteristics mentioned by ancient authors as distinctive of the sexes, which puts the female in a disadvantaged position, will be discussed in this study, and an attempt will where possible be made to determine the reason for these views. It will become clear that the different perspectives of the authors play an important role in the selection of the information provided and that their perceptions are to a great extent determined by preconceived notions regarding the differences between the sexes. This is well illustrated by the following passage found in Galen:

\[
\text{γυναίκες γὰρ ἀνδράσιν ὄμοιαι μὲν εἰσίν καθὸ καὶ αὐταὶ ὑπάρχουσι \\
\text{λογικὰ ζώα, τουτέστιν ἐπιστήμης δεκτικά, καθὸδον δὲ τὸ μὲν τῶν ἀνδρῶν γένος ἵσχυρότερον ὑπάρχει καὶ εἰς ἄπαν ἔργον τε καὶ μάθημα ἑλτιον, αἱ γυναίκες δὲ ἀσθενεστέραι τε καὶ χείρους, ἀνάμοιοι γε κατὰ τούτον εἰσίν.}
\]

\((\text{PHP 9.3.23.1-6; CMG 4.1.556.28-37})\)\(^6\)

For women are similar to men to the extent that they too are rational animals, that is, capable of acquiring knowledge; but to the extent that the genus of men is stronger and superior in every activity and learning, and women are weaker and inferior, in this they are unlike.

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5 Cf. Aristotle’s remark in this regard: \(\text{τὰ μὲν οὖν μόρια τὰ πρὸς τὴν ἔξοω ἐπιφάνειαν τούτων τέτακται τὸν τρόπον, καὶ καθὸπερ ἐλεξῆ, διωνύσομαι τε μᾶλιστα καὶ γνώριμα διὰ τὴν συνήθειαν ἐστίν· τὰ δὲ ἐντὸς τούναντιον, ἐγνωσά τα γὰρ ἑστὶ μᾶλιστα τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅσε δὲ πρὸς τὰ τῶν ἄλλων μόρια ζώων ἀνάγοντας σκοπεῖν, οἷς ἔχει παραπλησίαι τὴν φύσιν (‘I have now described the arrangement of the parts which are on the visible surface; and as I said, they mostly have their own proper names and are well known through their familiarity. With the inner parts the reverse is true. They are for the most part unknown—at least, those of man are, and hence we have to refer to those of other animals, the natural structure of whose parts those of man resemble, and examine them’, Hist. An. 494b19-24). Source-references and translations of Greek and Latin texts are from current Loeb editions, unless otherwise stated. For a discussion of the history of dissection in antiquity, see L. Edelstein, ‘The History of Anatomy in Antiquity’, in O. Temkin and C. L. Temkin (edd.), Ancient Medicine: Selected Papers of Ludwig Edelstein (Baltimore 1967) 249-301; H. von Staden, Herophilus: The Art of Medicine in Early Alexandria (Cambridge 1994) 139-55.}

6 Tr. Flemming [4] 358. Source-references for Galen are from C. G. Kühn (ed.), Claudii Galeni Opera Omnia 1-22 (Leipzig 1821-1833), except as otherwise stated. References to the CMG are to H. Diels et al. (edd.), Corpus Medicorum Graecorum (Berlin 1908-).
1.1. The Skull

According to Hippocrates, τῶν ἀνθρώπων αἱ κεφαλαὶ οὐδὲν ὁμοίως σφίσιν αὐταῖς, οὐδὲ αἱ ραφαὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς πάντων κατὰ ταὐτὰ πεφύκασιν (‘men’s heads are not alike nor are the sutures of the head disposed the same way in all’, VC 1.1f.\(^7\)). No distinction is made between male and female: as the title of the work (‘On Head Wounds’) indicates, the skull and sutures are examined from a physician’s point of view.

Aristotle was a natural philosopher and his goal in his work Historia Animalium was to make a classification of all living things, in the process also distinguishing between male and female. He maintains that the male’s skull has three sutures, whereas the female’s has only one that is circular (Hist. An. 491b2f.). He relates this to the size of the brain: ὅπως ὁ τόπος εὐπνοος ἦ, καὶ μᾶλλον ὁ πλείων ἐγκέφαλος (‘it is to secure ventilation, and the larger the brain, the more ventilation it requires’, Part. An. 653b2f.).\(^8\) Aristotle did not dissect human beings, but could possibly have seen or heard about the appearance of the skulls of men wounded or killed on the battlefield. In reality, of course, men and women have the same number of sutures (eleven in all), although the sutures can change over time as individuals age: in fact, this change is sometimes used in forensics to gauge the age of individuals at time of death.

Galen also describes the skull, but makes no distinction between the male and female. In his attempt to justify the way in which Nature designed the body by showing the fitness of a part for performing its function, he finds the sutures necessary for transpiration: the fine apertures of the sutures serve to evacuate the vaporous residues passing upward through the body (UP 9.1\(^9\)).

1.2. The Teeth

Aristotle states that ἔχουσι δὲ πλεῖονς οἱ ἄρρενες τῶν θηλείων ὀδόντας καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἐπὶ προβάτων καὶ σίγον καὶ ὑδών (‘males have more numerous teeth than females, not only in mankind, but also in sheep, goats and pigs’, Hist. An. 501b19-21). He seems to associate more teeth with a longer life span: perhaps he thinks that more teeth allow men to masticate better and

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\(^7\) Source-references for Hippocratic texts not contained within current Loeb editions are from E. Littré, Oeuvres Complètes d’Hippocrate 1-10 (Paris 1839-1861); references from Littré are identified accordingly.

\(^8\) See also Part. An. 653a28f.; Hist. An. 516a17-20; and the elder Pliny, who many centuries later remarks that the brain of a man is larger than that of a woman (HN 11.132).

therefore to digest their food more efficiently, as suggested by Dean-Jones.\textsuperscript{10} Aristotle’s observation could also be due to the fact that men probably had a consistently superior diet, that women had lost more teeth due to calcium deficiencies during pregnancy,\textsuperscript{11} or that he could have examined young women who had not yet cut their wisdom teeth while their older husbands had. And in any case, to admit that women have the same number of teeth as men makes them the equals of men in this respect, which does not fit into Aristotle’s overall scheme in which women are in all respects inferior to men.

The number of teeth that individuals have does in fact differ, but this is explained by the fact that there is seldom enough space for the four wisdom teeth of which only one or two, or none, emerge. Twenty-eight or thirty teeth for an adult are thus not exceptional; however, to link the number to a difference between the sexes is obviously without any scientific foundation.

\subsection*{1.3. The Anatomy of the Reproductive Organs}

In his book on Herophilus, von Staden states that ‘while the physiology of reproduction interested Greek philosophers and scientists from the earliest times . . . the anatomy of the reproductive organs remained relatively neglected and primitive until Herophilus’ time. Very often anatomy seems to have served as not much more than an ancillary prop for a preconceived theory of generation’\textsuperscript{12} The following discussion serves as a clear illustration of this observation.

\subsection*{1.3.1. The Uterus: the Theory of the Wandering Womb}

One of the most famous misconceptions in antiquity about female anatomy is the strange notion of the ‘wandering womb’. This theory is given prominence by none other than Plato (ca. 429-347 BC). In the \textit{Timaeus}, Plato portrays the uterus as an independent living creature that, seeking sexual intercourse and pregnancy, travels around within the body of a woman, and in its wanderings blocks passageways, obstructs breathing, and causes a suffocating sensation as well as many diseases (\textit{Ti}. 91b-d).\textsuperscript{13} This description should in all probability not be interpreted literally, since animal analogies for organs are used elsewhere

\begin{enumerate}
\item[\textsuperscript{10}] Dean-Jones [4 (1991)] 126.
\item[\textsuperscript{11}] G. E. R. Lloyd, \textit{Science, Folklore and Ideology: Studies in the Life Sciences in Ancient Greece} (London 1983) 102, points out that he could have compared women of different ages.
\item[\textsuperscript{12}] Von Staden [5] 165.
\item[\textsuperscript{13}] Lloyd [11] 84 and n. 100 points out that this belief was also found in Egypt, although this was not necessarily the source of the belief in Greek medical science.
\end{enumerate}
in the *Timaeus* and also in other philosophical texts.\(^{14}\) This is the beginning of a long tradition, however, possibly rooted in the popular perception of a patriarchal society where the male and the male body are the norm, so that the uterus has no place of its own inside the female body because the male body has no space set aside for one.\(^{15}\)

The Hippocratic writers never describe the uterus as an independent living creature wandering at will, but they believe that the uterus was mobile within the abdominal cavity (*Mul.* 2.123-31\(^{16}\)). Although they often apply their knowledge of the anatomy of animals to human beings, strangely the sedentary nature of animal reproductive organs does not lead them to challenge the theory of the wandering uterus. A mechanical and rational explanation is given for its movements: if it is not anchored in its place by pregnancy or kept moist by intercourse, it becomes light and dry and is attracted upwards to the moister organs of the heart and brain (*Mul.* 2.123\(^{17}\)); or to the diaphragm (2.128\(^{18}\)); or to the liver (1.7; 2.126\(^{19}\)). Young girls, widows and older women in particular are prone to such a displacement of the uterus (1.7; 2.127, 177\(^{20}\)). The emphasis is thus on the ability to procreate, which clearly indicates the socially-defined role of women at this time.\(^{21}\) Although the Hippocratics reject the theory that uterine movement is caused by irrational factors, they recommend odour therapies to entice the uterus back to its proper position, revealing a conviction that the uterus is a sentient being, able to recoil from foul smells and attracted to pleasant ones (*Mul.* 2.125, 154\(^{22}\)).

Aristotle, basing his view on the dissection of animals, asserts that in the *vivipara* the female uterus is fixed and not wandering (*Gen. An.* 720a12-14). Herophilus’ dissection of human bodies gives a much clearer idea of female reproductive organs and enables him to describe the uterine ligaments that

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\(^{14}\) See King [2] 223-25 for a more detailed discussion of this matter. King agrees with M. J. Adair, ‘Plato’s View of the ‘Wandering Uterus’’, *CJ* 91.2 (1996) 153-63, who believes that the passage in the *Timaeus* is about the sensation or desire to procreate that moves through the body, rather than about the womb itself. She concedes that Plato expands the Hippocratics’ mechanical explanation of the mobile uterus by attributing to it something akin to ‘a mind of its own’ (224).

\(^{15}\) Hanson [4 (1991)] 82.


\(^{17}\) Littré [7] 8.266.


\(^{19}\) Littré [7] 8.32-34, 270-72.


\(^{21}\) See also the discussion in King [2] 78f.

technically make movement an impossibility (*fr.* 114). Soranus rejects the claim that the uterus is an animal: οὕτως θηρίον ἔκ φωλεῶν ἥ μήτρα προέρπει, τερπομένη μὲν τοῖς εὐώδεσι, φεύγουσα δὲ τὰ δυσώδη (‘it does not issue forth like a wild animal from the lair, delighted by fragrant odours and fleeing bad odours’, *Gyn.* 3.29). Galen adopts Herophilus’ view and finds the Hippocratic notion of the wandering womb ridiculous (*De Ut. Diss.* 5; *De Loc. Aff.* 6.5). Yet he retains the scent therapy (*De Meth. Med.* 1.15). The remarks of Soranus and Galen thus indicate that, even as late as the second century AD, after Herophilus’ dissections had revealed five centuries earlier that the uterus is held in place by ligaments and other structures, medical opinion was still divided on the question of the movement of the uterus and on whether this necessarily implied according it the status of a ‘living creature’ or ‘wild animal’.

It is difficult to explain the tenacity of this curious perception of the Greeks and Romans. Dean-Jones suggests that the idea of the wandering uterus causing a suffocating sensation in the chest, presenting as hysteria, was kept alive by Greek wives to ‘blackmail’ their husbands (who had an array of other sexual outlets, for example, slaves, concubines and prostitutes) into giving them the desired sexual attention without threatening their husbands’ dominant position in a patriarchal society. By contrast, King points out that the serious nature of the symptoms described as hysteria is too easily dismissed by this explanation. Since in the view of the Hippocrates all disorders are due to the female’s spongy flesh and excess of blood, a doctor would probably in any case have recommended the ‘logical remedy’ of sexual intercourse and pregnancy. Despite our detailed knowledge today of anatomy, however, and of the damage

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24 Tr. O. Temkin, *Soranus’ Gynecology* (Baltimore 1956) 153. Although rejecting the use of bad odours, Soranus retains the view that pleasant odours were conducive to relaxation.
26 Kühn [6] 8.425. Elsewhere, Galen allows some movement. Discussing the muscles holding the uterus in place, he remarks: χαλαροὶ δὲ οὕτω πάντες οἱ δέσμοι, καὶ διὰ τούτο ἐπὶ πλείστον ἡ μήτερα κηνείσθαι τε καὶ μετασχηματίζεσθαι δύναται (‘the moorings of all these are slack and therefore the uterus can move considerably and change its shape’, *De Ut. Diss.* 4 [Kühn (6) 2.893.5f.]).
27 Kühn [6] 10.43f. Contradictory views such as these are best explained by J. Caddan, *Meanings of Sex Difference in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge 1993) 37, who ascribes them to ‘the complexities of Galen’s thought, the variety of perspectives he took on sex difference and reproduction, the tensions between theories and observations, and perhaps too, the changes and inconsistencies in his ideas . . .’. See also Flemming [4] 326.
28 Dean-Jones [4 (1994)] 76.
a wandering organ could have caused, our fascination with hysteria, for which even now no specific organic problem can be identified, has not diminished. As a concept hysteria has through the centuries had a greater historical impact on the public position of women in society than many other physiologically based notions. It was used to justify manifold restrictions placed upon women, considerations of which the Greeks would not have been devoid.

1.3.2. The Bicameral Uterus

The theory regarding the bicameral uterus is a good example of empirical observations of the human anatomy being ‘adapted’ by the ancients to suit prevailing cultural views (or ‘fancies’). The doctrine that the more favourable right side of the uterus is associated with the male and the colder left side with the female can be traced back to the pre-Socratic philosophers. The implication of this view, that the uterus has left and right sides, is that it must have two chambers.

The Hippocratic writers refer to the uterus in the plural in various treatises (Salubr. 1.30). Aristotle states explicitly that the uterus has two chambers: αἱ δ’ υστέραι πᾶσι μὲν εἰσὶ διμερεῖς καθάπερ καὶ οἱ ὀρχεῖς τοῖς ἄρρεσι δύο πᾶσιν (‘the uterus is bipartite in all [females], just as in all males there are also two testicles’, Gen. An. 716b32f.). In this case, his observation of animal uteri, especially of the sow that has a bicameral uterus, could have influenced him to apply this information to human beings. Herophilus seems to have abandoned the traditional theory of a two-chambered uterus. But Galen once again follows the well-established custom when he refers to one sinus placed in the right part of the uterus and one in the left, since according to him the whole body is double with right and left sides (UP 14.431); however, since Galen bases his views on the dissection of apes, dogs, sows and goats, this statement is understandable (De Anat. Admin. 2).

1.3.3. Testes/Ovaries and Spermatic Ducts

The tendency in antiquity to base explanations and descriptions of female organs on analogy of male organs often leads to incorrect deductions. In the case of Herophilus, however, it leads to the discovery of the ovaries. He calls

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33 Cf. Galen’s remark: ὃ δὲ μοι θαυμάζειν παρίσταται μάλιστα, καὶ δὴ φρύσω· καὶ θέσιν καὶ μέγεθος καὶ φύσιν ἀκριβῶς γράψας τῶν ἐν θήλεσι ξόοις ὀρχεων, οὐ
the ovaries *didymoi* (‘twins’) on the analogy of the male testes, because they seem to him to be virtually identical structures with similar functions, although inverted.\(^{34}\)

The Hippocratic Corpus reveals knowledge of the existence of the testes. But the author seems to regard them as merely a passage through which the seed passes from the spinal marrow to the penis:

\[\text{επίν δὲ ἐλθὴ ἐς τοῦτον τὸν μυελὸν ἢ γονῆ, χωρεῖν παρὰ τοῦς νεφροὺς . . . παρὰ δὲ τὸν νεφρὸν ἔρχεται διὰ τῶν ὀρχιῶν μεσάτον ἐς τὸ αἰδοῖον καὶ χωρεῖ εἰς ὑπὲ τὸ ὀὖρον, ἀλλὰ ὁ ὁδὸς ἐστὶν αὐτῆς ἑχομένη.}\(^{35}\)

\[\text{(Genit. 1.3)}\]

Once the sperm has entered the spinal marrow it passes in its course through the veins along the kidneys . . . from the kidneys it passes via the testicles into the penis—not however by the urinary tract, since it has a passage of its own which is next to the urinary tract.

Aristotle does not mention the ovaries in *vivipara*.\(^{37}\) He seems to regard the double uterus as the equivalent of the male’s two testes (*Gen. An. 716b32f*). He also makes the mistake of denying that the testes produce seed; he believes instead that the *epididydimes* and *ductus deferentes* produce seed.\(^{38}\) The function of the male testes, according to Aristotle, is to keep the spermatic ducts stretched downward and to prevent them from being drawn up inside the body; he compares them to τὰς λαίας προσάπτουσιν αἱ ύφαίνουσαι τοῖς ἱστοῖς

\[\text{παραλιπών δὲ οὐδὲ (‘I will mention what especially causes me astonishment: he [Herophilus] described the position, size, and nature of the testicles in female creatures accurately, not omitting anything’, De Ut. Diss. 4 [Kühn (6) 2.893]; tr. C. M. Goss, ‘On the Anatomy of the Uterus’, The Anatomical Record 144 [1962] 79).}\]

\[\text{34 Soranus follows this line of reasoning many centuries later (Gyn. 1.11).}\]

\[\text{35 See also the discussion in I. M. Lonie, The Hippocratic Treatises ‘On Generation’, ‘On the Nature of the Child’ and ‘Diseases IV’ (Berlin 1981) 1f.}\]

\[\text{36 Littré [7] 7.470.}\]

\[\text{37 Von Staden [5] 232f. refutes the argument that Aristotle has already recognized the ovaries, because his reference to eels (Hist. An. 570a5) is so unspecific that it cannot be claimed with confidence that it implies knowledge of the fallopian tubes or ovaries; he does however know of oviducts in sea urchins and oysters (Part. An. 680a11-15, b3-9). Aristotle also refers to the excision of a part of the ovaries of sows in order to still their sexual appetites and to fatten them rapidly (Hist. An. 632a21f.), but he never refers to the ovaries of any other species, let alone those of human females.}\]

\[\text{38 In contrast to animals such as snakes and fishes, where the seminal passages are straight and thus lead to a quick through-flow of the sperm and a rash compulsion to copulate, Aristotle believes that the many convolutions of the vessels in human testicles serve to retard the passage of the sperm and to temper the male’s desire (Gen. An. 718a1-17).}\]
Galen adopts Herophilus’ view of the ovaries. He regards them as inverted testes and describes them as flat, gland-like, and smaller and rounder than the testes (De Ut. Diss. 9). He corrects Aristotle’s view on the function of the testes by stating that they do produce seed (De Sem. 1.12-16). In fact, he states that he has seen the spermatic ducts full of a thick seminal fluid and believes that the blood in the vessels leading to the testes is already beginning to be changed to sperm, as is proved by the fact that it becomes whitish in colour the closer it comes to the testes (De Sem. 2.1). (The Aristotelean haematogenous theory, according to which seed originates from blood, is thus still adhered to after more than five centuries!) Since the female testes are regarded as smaller and less perfect, however, the seed generated in them must be scantier, colder, wetter and less perfect (UP 14.6; cf. also 14.14).

In the case of Herophilus, the same principle of analogy that led him to the discovery of the ovaries also informs his view that the spermatic ducts of the female (the Fallopian tubes) follow a course similar to that of the male spermatic ducts and also end in the neck of the bladder (fr. 61, per Galen De Sem. 2.1.23-25). This misconception, which lasts for at least another 400 years, has enormously far-reaching consequences, since the logical corollary is that female seed does not reach the uterus but is excreted externally and can thus not be drawn upon for generation. Rufus of Ephesus (AD 98-117) is the first to notice that the spermatic ducts of sheep terminate in the uterus and not in the bladder: συνετέτρητο δὲ ταῦτα εἰς τὸ κοίλωμα τῆς ύστερας (‘these [namely, the vessels that grow out of the ovaries] opened directly into the cavity of the bladder’).

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42 E. Lesky, Die Zeugungs- und Vererbungslehren der Antike und ihr Nachwirken (Wiesbaden 1950) 162, remarks that ‘auch in der hellenistischen Wissenschaften die Emanzipation der Medizin von gewissen philosophischen Theorien nicht erreicht ist’.
45 Kühn [6] 4.596-98. Galen emphatically disagrees with this view of Herophilus: ἐξῆς τοῦτοι πολὺ μείζων ἐπεισώσατο φάμενος εἰς τὸν αὐχένα τῆς κύστεως ἐμφύτευσαι τῷ τοῦ ἄρρενου ὀμοίως . . . γὰρ εἰς τὸν αὐχένα τῆς κύστεως τῶν σπερματικῶν πόρων οὐδέτερος ἐμφύτευται κατ’ οὐδέν θήλης ξόφον (‘he next made a mistake far greater than that, when he said that it enters the neck of the bladder like the duct in the male . . . the spermatic ducts enter the neck of the bladder in any female animal’; tr. P. de Lacy [ed.], Galen: De Semine [Berlin 1992]: CMG 3.1.149, 151).
uterus’, *De Nom. Part. Hom.* 186.5f.\(^{46}\); however, von Staden points out that Rufus’ observation is based on the spermatic ducts in female sheep, not in women.\(^{47}\)

Galen mentions great past figures (Diocles, Praxagoras and others) who still maintain that the spermatic ducts in women are inserted into the neck of the bladder and enter the same place as in the males, without directly refuting this theory (*De Ut. Diss.* 9\(^{48}\)); however, in a later work he explicitly states that in the human female the spermatic ducts are connected with the uterus and do not end in the bladder neck: καὶ τοῖνυν αὐτὰ καθάπερ ἀπαντῶσαι τῷ σπερματικῷ προμήκεις ἔαυτῶν ἀποφύσεις ἐκτείνουσιν εἰς τὰ πλάγια, δὲ ὁν ὑποδέχονται τὸ σπέρμα (‘and indeed the uterus, as though going to meet the spermatic vessel, sends out laterally its own long outgrowths, through which it receives the semen’, *De Sem.* 2.1\(^{49}\)). In fact, it is this discovery that leads him to conclude that the female also contributes to generation, since her spermatic ducts convey seed from her ovaries to the uterine cavity.

1.3.4. The Female As an Inverted Male

The tendency in antiquity to describe female organs by analogy with male organs also leads to the view of the female as an ‘inverted male’. Aristotle, having described the male reproductive organs, then remarks that τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐν τῷ θῆλει πάντα πέρυκεν· διαφέρει γὰρ οὐδενὶ τῶν ἑσώ πλῆν ταῖς ὑστέραις (‘all the parts mentioned are similar in the female as well: there is no difference so far as the internal parts are concerned, except for the uterus’, *Hist. An.* 497a30f.). He also states that they are τὸ δὲ τῆς γυναικός αἰδιότων ἐξ ἐναντίαις τῷ τῶν ἀρρένων· κούλων γὰρ τὸ ὑπὸ τὴν ἱβην καὶ οὐχ ὴσπερ τὸ τοῦ ἄρρενος ἐξεστηκός (‘opposite to that of the male: the part below the pubes is receding, and does not protrude as in the male’, *Hist. An.* 493b2-4).

Galen goes even further in his view that men and women are anatomically analogous, also in terms of their reproductive organs and fluids. The only difference is that women are men turned ‘outside in’, as it were, and that men’s genital organs are outside. He also tries to explain how this difference between the sexes came about by pointing to the male’s greater supply of innate heat, which causes his organs to be turned inside out, so to speak, and to protrude


\(^{48}\) Kühn [6] 2.899-901.

from the body; the female, less richly supplied with heat, is unable to give the organs the final eversion to make them protrude, and so they remain inside \((UP \ 14.6^{50})\).

1.3.5. Females are Colder and Wetter Than Males

In the view of the Hippocratic authors, males and females are totally different creatures. Females differ from males in being wetter, due to their loose-textured, spongy flesh, in contrast to the firmer body of males \((Aer. \ 10; \ Nat. \ Puer. \ 15.3^{51})\). Females’ wetness accounts for their unstable emotional temperament and their inclination towards foods and activities that are cold, wet and soft, whereas males are hot and dry \((Salubr. \ 1.27)^{52}\). The image used to illustrate the contrast is that of wool, with which female flesh is compared, in contrast to a closely woven garment, with which male flesh is compared \((Mul. \ 1.153)^{53}\). The implication is that women’s flesh is ‘raw material’, whereas men’s flesh is a ‘finished product’ \((Mul. \ 1.1;^{54} \ Gland. \ 1.16)^{55}\). According to the Hippocratic view, this anatomical difference also accounts for the phenomenon of menstruation: since females have more fluid in their bodies, they have to menstruate in order to evacuate the surplus that has accumulated. King aptly phrases it: ‘. . . in Hippocratic gynaecology, to be a woman is to menstruate’. \(^{55}\)

If menstruation does not occur, the surplus blood accumulates in the body, putting pressure on various organs until disease or even death ensues.

The role of heat in the determination of the sex of the foetus during conception is an issue raised by the pre-Socratic philosophers and is still a hotly debated question in the fourth century BC. Aristotle quotes Empedocles, who states that:

\[
\text{τὰ μὲν γὰρ εἰς θερμὴν ἐλθόντα τὴν ὑστέραν ἄρρενα γίγνεσθαι φησὶ τὰ δὲ εἰς ψυχρὰν θήλεα, τῆς δὲ θερμότητος καὶ τῆς ψυχρότητος τὴν τῶν}
\]

\(^{50}\) Kühn \[6\] 4.158f.
\(^{51}\) Littré \[7\] 7.492-96.

\(^{52}\) The Hippocratic authors also give another reason for females being wetter and colder than males: it is not only due to their natural constitution, but also because . . . γενόμενα τε τὰ μὲν ἀρσενα τῇ διάτησι ἐπιπονωτέρης χρήται, ὡστε ἐκθερμαίνεσθαι καὶ ἀποξηραινεσθαι, τὰ δὲ θήλεα ύγροτέρησαν καὶ ραθυμωτέρησαν τῇ διάτησι χρέονται καὶ κάθαρσιν τοῦ θερμοῦ ἐκ τοῦ σώματος ἐκάστου μηνὸς ποιέοντα (‘males tend to have more laborious regimens that heat and dry them, while females have wetter and idler regimens and purge the heat from their bodies every month’, Salubr. 34).

\(^{53}\) Littré \[7\] 8.10-14.
\(^{54}\) Littré \[7\] 8.10-14.
\(^{55}\) King \[2\] 76.
The semens which enter a hot womb, become males, those which enter a cold one, females; and that the cause of this heat and cold is the menstrual flow, according as it is hotter or colder, older or more recent.

The Hippocratic author of *De Diaeta Salubri* clearly adopts and expands this Empedoclean theory, adding dryness as another constitutional quality of the male and coining the opposite qualities for the female. We read that males are warmer and drier and females moister and colder: the reason is that males are more active and females indolent, and that females furthermore purge the heat out of their bodies every month when menstruating, thus ending up being colder (*Salubr.* 1.34). Over the centuries, these qualities became generally accepted and ‘volkstümliche Traditionsgut’.57

Aristotle does not accept Empedocles’ theory about the differentiation of the sexes being based on the warmer right side generating males and the colder left side females. His point of departure is that the male body is hot and the female cold, in fact too cold to heat up and concoct the blood into seed and thus unable to reach perfection (*Gen. An.* 775a14-20; *Part. An.* 650a8f.).58 The male has a much greater supply of vital heat that enables him to produce perfect seed: τὸ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμενον πέττειν καὶ συνιστάναι τε καὶ ἐκκρίνειν σπέρμα ἔχον τὴν ἁρχήν τοῦ εἴδους ἄρρεν (‘he is able to concoct, to cause to take shape and to discharge seed possessing the principle of the form’, *Gen. An.* 765b12f.). By contrast, the colder, imperfect female is capable of producing only the imperfectly concocted *catamenia* or menstrual fluid (*Gen. An.* 765a34-b35; 766b16-26). In Aristotle’s biological theories, heat is always a positive factor, therefore the female lacks it since she is inferior to the male. In answer to those who say that the female is hotter because blood is hot, and that which has more blood is hotter, he states that διὰ γὰρ ψυχρότητα καὶ ἀδύναμίαν πολυαμεί κατὰ τότους τινὰς τὸ θῆλυ μᾶλλον (‘it is on account of coldness
and inability that that the female is more abundant in blood in certain regions of
the body’, *Gen. An. 765b17f*.

According to Aristotle, the difference in the formation of the sexual parts
is also due to heat:

\[
\text{Gen. An. 766b19-26)}^5\]

Now seed is a residue, and in the hotter of the blooded animals, i.e. the males,
this is manageable in size and amount, and therefore in males the parts which
receive this residual product are passages; in females, however, on account of
their failure to effect concoction, this residue is a considerable volume of
bloodlike substance, because it has not been matured; hence there must of
necessity be here too some part fitted to receive it, different from the male,
and of a fair size. That is why the uterus has these characteristics, and that is
the part wherein the female differs from the male.

Galen believes, as does the Hippocratic author of *De Diaeta Salubri*, that
\(\text{UP 14.6)}^{63}\), and he takes up and elaborates upon Aristotle’s view on the role of
heat. He states the reason why the female is less perfect than the male: she is
colder (*UP 14.6). According to Galen, ‘strong heat’ is necessary for the
production of precisely perfected seed (*De Sem. 2.4.23*)\(^6\). He considers heat to be Nature’s ‘primary instrument’ and that it is also responsible for the fact that
the female is less perfect than the male in respect of her generative parts which,
because of her lack of heat when still a foetus, do not emerge and project
towards the outside (*UP 14.6*). This lack of heat, however, has an advantage

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\(^5\) For more detail about the role of heat, see the discussion of Empedocles’ theory on


\(^61\) Galen, however, adds the consoling thought for women that there must be females,
since the Creator would not purposely make half the human race imperfect and ‘mutilated’
unless there is some advantage in such a mutilation (*UP 14.6 [Kühn (6) 4.162]*).


since the female, being colder, cannot disperse all the nutriment that she concocts, and some will be left to nourish the foetus (14.664).

2. The Female’s Role in Generation

Another hotly debated question in antiquity is whether females also play a role in generation by contributing seed. According to pre-Socratic theories, only the male parent contributes seed. Aristotle reports that Anaxagoras supports this so-called ‘one-seed theory’ (DK 59 A 10765), as do Hippon (DK 38 A 14) and Diogenes of Apollonia (DK 64 A 27). Its supporters also include Aeschylus and Plato (Aesch. Eum. 658; Pl. Ti. 50 D 91). Other authorities support the contrary view, namely that both parents contribute seed (the ‘two-seed theory’): these include Alcmaeon (DK 24 A 14), Parmenides (DK 28 B 18) and Empedocles (DK 31 B 63). Empedocles’ view is that each parent provides a tally, as it were, and that the foetus is produced from the two halves.66 Lesky refers to a heated polemic Num Feminae Suum Semen Sit (‘Whether the Female Has Her Own Seed’) between Albrecht von Haller and M. Schurig in the eighteenth century.67 This debate thus persisted for many centuries.

The majority of the Hippocratic authors believe that both the male and the female produce seed, and that females somehow emit it in the uterus during intercourse.68 Female seed, however, is regarded as imperfect because the female body is cold in contrast to that of the male (Salubr. 28).

Herophilus describes the ovaries as being the analogues of the male testes and thus also producing seed like the male testes (De Sem. 2.169). He goes too far in his analogy by believing that the spermatic ducts leading from the ovaries also end in the bladder, and that the seed is thus excreted externally via the urinary tract without contributing to reproduction. Due to Herophilus’ stature

65 References to DK are to H. Diels and W. Kranz (edd.). Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (Berlin 1960).
68 See inter alia μεθετε δὲ καὶ ἡ γυνὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος (‘the female too emits something from her body’, Genit. 3f. [Littré (7) 7.474]); reference to seed from both partners (Genit. 5 [Littré (7) 8.476]); suggestion that what the female emits is sometimes stronger and sometimes weaker (Genit. 6 [Littré (7) 7.478]). See also Genit. 8 (Littré [7] 7.480-82); Nat. Puer. 12 (Littré [7] 7.486-88), 20 (Littré [7] 7.506-10), 31 (Littré [7] 7.540); and Salubr. 27. In Genit. and Salubr. it is maintained that there is a precise equality in the contributions of each of the two parents.
and to the fact that later scientists could not perform dissections, this erroneous view remains anatomical dogma up to the time of Galen. Even Soranus still supports it (Gyn. 1.12.2f.). Herophilus’ momentous discovery thus makes no contribution to the clarification of the process of generation; in fact, it endorses and fully confirms Aristotle’s point of view that the female makes no contribution to conception.

Aristotle devotes a long section to the refutation of the pangenetic theory that appears to have been the prevalent view in his time (Gen. An. 721b11-724a13; 727b33-728a9). He seems not to have known the ovaries in vivipara, and he denies that the female produces seed, that is, properly concocted seed: φανερὸν ὅτι τὸ θῆλυ οὐ συμβάλλεται σπέρμα εἰς τὴν γένεσιν (‘it obviously follows that the female does not contribute any semen to generation’, Gen. An. 727a27f.). According to Aristotle, the female’s contribution is the material cause, the catamenia or menses. This provides the material containing the parts in potentia from which the foetus is formed by the male seed acting on it as the efficient cause and contributing the principle of motion. The menses are analogous to seed but, due to the female’s lack of heat, are less concocted and thus not pure (Gen. An. 728a26f.; 737a27). It is thus a perittoma, a residue, and since no animal produces two different seminal secretions at the same time (Gen. An. 727a25-30), it follows that females do not contribute any seed, only an unconcocted residue, to generation (Gen. An. 721b7-724a13; 727a5-9.

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70 Lloyd [11] 108 n.189 states that it is doubtful whether the ongoing debate between the Stoics and Epicureans on this subject took notice of Herophilus’ anatomical discoveries. The Epicureans seem to maintain a version of the pangenesis theory (Lucr. 4.1209-222), and the sources for individual Stoics seem to suggest that they believe that the female produces no seed (Censorinus, DN 5.4) or at least no fertile seed (Diog. Laert. 7.159).

71 The three main theories on the origin of seed are: (1) the encephalo-myelogenic theory, which stated that seed originates in the brain or the spinal marrow during sexual arousal and then travels down to the genitalia; (2) the pangenetic theory, according to which seed is produced everywhere in the body; and (3) the haematogenous theory, which states that seed originates from blood, which in turn evolves from the concoction of food in the intestines.

72 The one-seed theory may have originated in Egypt. Dean-Jones [4 (1994)] 150 refers to Diod. Sic. who relates that the Egyptians thought that the father is the true parent of the child and that the mother supplies only the nourishment and place, and in consequence they called trees that bear fruit male and those that do not female (1.80.4). The female ovum was not discovered until the microscope studies of the German scholar Ernst von Baer in 1827: this discovery is reported in E. von Baer, De Ovi Mammalium et Hominis Genesi: see R.Porter, The Greatest Benefit to Mankind (London 1997) 325f.

73 Aristotle refers to the menses as ἦττον πεπεμένον (a less concocted residue) and αἰματώδους ύγρότητος πλήθος (a bloodlike fluid) (Gen. An. 726b31-33). It is thus the male’s greater amount of inherent heat (a theory that Aristotle adopts from Empedocles) that makes the difference between the two analogous excretions of male and female.
26-30). By itself it can thus produce no more than the equivalent of wind-eggs (741a18). He thus describes the female as an ἄρρεν ἀγονόν, an infertile male, the equivalent of a young boy who is yet incapable of concocting the nutriment in its last stage into seed (728a18-20). The female is also described as a deformed or mutilated male (737a28), or as a castrated male, the equivalent of a eunuch (784a5-11), because she is too cold to concoct the blood into seed and because her seed is weaker than that of the male.

Galen knows of the existence of the ovaries, the ‘female testes’ (De Sem. 2.176). He insists that the female also produces seed (De Ut. Diss. 977). In fact, he believes that he has seen the spermatic ducts full of thick seminal humour (De Sem. 2.178). According to him, both seeds have Aristotle’s material and efficient causes, and the menstrual blood is merely nutritive. Galen thus comes nearer to the real function of the testes. But he still believes, under the spell of Aristotle, that the first phase in the production of seed takes place in the blood vessels. He considers that, as a result of the concocting ability of the blood vessels, the transformation from blood to a semen-like fluid begins to take place in the many convolutions of these vessels leading to the testes and ovaries (De Sem. 2.179). The final pepsis or concoction of the semen-like fluid then takes place in the testes (2.2).

Galen retains enough of the Aristotelian model to assert that female seed is imperfect insofar as it is colder and wetter than that of the male; the female’s contribution to conception is thus smaller, and her seed cannot generate by itself (UP 14.6; De Sem. 1.78). He even goes so far as to agree with Aristotle that

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74 M. T. May (ed.), Galen: On the Usefulness of the Parts of the Body (Ithaca 1968) 631 n. 24 points out that Aristotle sometimes wavers from this position by saying that the menstrual blood itself may be seen as semen in an impure state (Gen. An. 725a11-728b22, 737a27-29).

75 M. C. Horowitz, ‘Aristotle and Women’, Journal of the History of Biology 9 (1976) 183-213, remarks that Aristotle’s habit of describing the female body as a departure from the norm set by the male, and his definition of the female as a ‘mutilated male’, had a pervasive influence through the centuries not only in the biological sciences but also in theology and philosophy. According to Horowitz [above, this note] 185 n. 7, ‘Freud’s influential theory of the female castration complex is one of the most blatant examples’.


82 Kühn [6] 4.536. In fact, these qualities already occur in theories from Alcmaeon to the Stoics and show Galen to be the ‘Erbin jahrhundertalten Denkens’ (Lesky [42] 180).
the female is less perfect than the male and that she is like a deformed creature, but adds that the Creator would not have made half the race imperfect without a purpose: the purpose of the ‘mutilated’ being is, in his understanding, reproduction \((UP\ 14.6^{83})\). Galen also criticizes many of Aristotle’s views, including his view that the testes do not produce seed but are merely there to keep the seminal passages taut, and that the role of male seed is just to provide the ‘efficient cause’ in reproduction \((Gen. An.\ 717a34;\ 787b23-6;\ 788a3f.;\ De\ Sem.\ 1.15,\ 2.2^{84})\). In addition, he refutes Aristotle’s one-seed theory, pointing out that the Hippocratics have already discovered that the female also produces seed \((De\ Sem.\ 2.1^{85})\). Furthermore, he contradicts Aristotle’s view that menstrual blood is the material out of which the foetus is formed, since he considers the menses to be totally unsuitable for that function \((UP\ 14.3;\ De\ Sem.\ 1.5^{87})\). He also criticizes Herophilus for not attributing a greater role to the testes in seed production, but concedes that he was at least not quite as mistaken as Aristotle who compares the testes to loom weights \((De\ Sem.\ 1.16^{88})\).

The Stoics follow Aristotle in their view that the female has no effective seed. Zenon is reported as saying that Sphairos believes the female seed to be ineffective insofar as it is lacking in power and quantity and has a watery quality \((DK\ 24\ A\ 13)\).

3. Theories Regarding the Sex of the Child

What the sex of a child will be and whether it will take after its father or mother were matters of great concern, especially in patriarchal societies such as those of Greece and Rome.

3.1. The Prevalence/Epikrateia Principle

The earliest attempt to explain how the difference between the sexes is determined is made by Alcmaeon, who states that the sex of the foetus depends on which parent’s seed prevails in quantity \((per\ Censorinus,\ DN\ 6.4)\).\(^{89}\) Hippon has a slightly more complicated approach. Male seed (that alone is able to


\(^{89}\) Democritus also believes in the epikrateia principle, but only regarding the seed coming from the genitalia \((DK\ 68\ A\ 143)\). See also Lesky [42] 25.
generate) can produce both male and female individuals, depending on its condition. If its consistency is thick and strong, it will produce a male offspring; if it is watery and weak, it will not be able to withstand the constituent material provided by the female, and the offspring will be a girl. In brief, when the male seed has the upper hand, a male is generated; when the nourishment (the female material) prevails, a female (per Aet. 5.7.7\textsuperscript{90}). The explanation of mastery or prevalence is deeply rooted in the character of the Greeks, which reveals a spirit of competition in every facet of life, whether politics, art or sport, where the stronger competitor gains the mastery. This competitive approach is also transferred to the biological-medical sphere, where the prevalence of seed is believed to determine sex. This view, referred to in abbreviated form as the epikrateia principle, manifests itself in various forms over time, exerted a lasting influence and became an integral part of most of the ancient theories of inheritance from Democritus to Galen.

Two factors obtain in the epikrateia principle, since both the quantity and quality of the male and female seed come into play. At different times, a person of either sex may produce either strong or weak seed (Hipp. Genit. 6.1). Furthermore, both sexes produce both male and female seed (Genit. 7.2). Two strong seeds will produce a boy, two weak ones a girl. When one is strong and the other weak, the sex is determined by the quantity of the seed (Alcmaeon DK 24 A 14; Emp. DK 31 A 81; Parm. DK 28 A 54). This can result in a virile girl or an effeminate boy (Genit. 6.1f.).\textsuperscript{91} The epikrateia principle also plays a role in Galen’s theory on the sex-determination. Sex is determined by the dominant seed, which in turn depends on the quality of the seed (UP 14.7\textsuperscript{92}).

3.2. The Heat Theory

In contrast to Alcmaeon’s theory, which sought the solution to sex determination in the physical condition of the generative material, Empedocles introduces a new factor, namely heat (per Censorinus, DN 6.6\textsuperscript{93}). In this approach, seed is indifferent sexwise. It is the condition in the uterus in which the foetus develops that is the determining factor. Greater heat promotes

\textsuperscript{90} DK 38 A 14.

\textsuperscript{91} See also King [4 (1990)] 13.

\textsuperscript{92} Kühn [6] 4.175.

\textsuperscript{93} DK 31 A 81. See also Arist. Gen. An. 764a2-7. The cause of this heat and cold is the menstrual flow, which alters the temperature depending upon whether older (hotter) or more recent (colder).
metabolism and growth in general and is believed to lead to the development of a male foetus.\textsuperscript{94}

### 3.3. The Right-Left Theory

Probably the most influential theory on the determination of sex is that in which the male is connected with the right side of the body and the female with the left, where the right side symbolizes that which is favourable and perfect, and the left that which is unfavourable and imperfect.\textsuperscript{95} The connection of right/left with male/female is found as far back as the sixth/fifth centuries in a fragment of Parmenides (per Censorinus, \textit{DN} 5.2\textsuperscript{96}). Anaxagoras and others also believe that the male comes from the right side and the female from the left (DK 59 A 19). Empedocles proposes that the male foetus develops in the warmer side (DK 31 A 81). This theory is adopted by some of the Hippocratic writers.\textsuperscript{97} They equate the right side with the warmer side and the left with the colder (\textit{Epid.} 6.2.25).\textsuperscript{98} A male foetus develops in the right side of the uterus and a female on the left (\textit{Epid.} 2.6.15, 6.25; \textit{Aph.} 5.48). In their view, \textit{γυναικὴ γαστρὶ ἐξούσῃ ἢν ὁ ἄτερος μοσθὸς ἰσχνὸς γένηται, δίδυμα ἐξοῦσῃ, θάτερον ἐκτιτρώσκει καὶ ἢν μὲν ὁ δεξιὸς ἰσχνὸς γένηται, τὸ ἄτρεν ἢν δὲ ὁ ἀριστερὸς, τὸ θῆλυ} (‘when a woman is pregnant with twins, and one breast withers, she loses one child by miscarriage, a male if it is the right breast that withers, a female if it is the left’, \textit{Aph.} 5.38.1-3). The right testis produces boys,

\textsuperscript{94} Lesky [42] 35 refers to an experiment of one Meisenheimer with the eggs and larvae of grass frogs, which proves that higher temperatures lead to an increased number of hatchings since the life processes are accelerated.

\textsuperscript{95} Cf. the Pythagorean table of contrasts (per Arist. DK 58 B 5).

\textsuperscript{96} DK 28 A 53. The association of right with lucky/superior/strong/noble, and left with unlucky/inferior, goes far back into history and occurs repeatedly in, for example, the Homeric epics, Hesiod’s poems, the Pythagoreans, the tragedies, Aristophanes and Plato. See Lloyd [11] 56-66 for a detailed discussion.

\textsuperscript{97} The Hippocratic Corpus also draws upon the extra-biological factor of education in the determination of sex, as the degree of manliness depends upon the blending of the seeds and upon education and habits’, \textit{Salubr.} 1.28).

\textsuperscript{98} It should be noted, however, that Parmenides believes that women are hotter than men on the ground of the menstrual flow, which is due to their heat and the abundance of their blood (per Arist. \textit{Part. An.} 648a29-32). In opposition to the Coan School, who support Empedocles, the Cnidians support Parmenides’ view regarding the constitution of the female, and it is against them that Aristotle directs his polemic (\textit{Gen. An.} 765b19f.).
the left girls (Epid. 6.4.21; Superf. 31). The belief in a bicameral uterus naturally accommodates this right/left theory and would help to perpetuate it.

Both Plato and Aristotle reject the natural inferiority of the left side, as well as the theory that right and left in some way determines the sex of the child (Arist. Pol. 1274b13-15; Gen. An. 765a3f.; Pl. Leg. 7.7). In an important step forward, Aristotle insists on verifying evidence, saying that his dissections of animals prove that males and females are not always formed in the right and left sides of the womb respectively (Gen. An. 764a33f.; 765a3f.; 766b15-27; 768a6f.). In his view, there is no battle between the sexes at the moment of conception, because everything has been determined beforehand. The male provides the form and the soul through the movement imparted by the sperm; the female merely provides the inanimate material of which the embryo is made, the thickened, inert blood of menstruation. This explains the engendering of boys, the ideal situation, but what of girls? Aristotle is clear about this. A female is the product of a union in which there is an insufficiency of male dunamis, of vital heat, owing to youth, old age, or some similar cause: due to the lack of creative energy, the male then produces an imperfect, defective form (Gen. An. 766b15-26; 768a6f.).

Soranus regards the Hippocratic left/right view, which was still greatly in vogue in Roman times, as plausible but not necessarily true (Gyn. 1.45). Galen returns to the old right/left theory, in referring to the importance of the side of the body from which the seed of the male parent comes and the side of the uterus the embryo occupies: obviously a male foetus will be in the right (hot) side. He fuses it, however, with the Empedoclean theory of heat, which was rejected by Aristotle and Soranus, and tries to provide it with an anatomical substructure. Underlying this attempt is Galen’s view that the blood vessels are configured asymmetrically as they descend to the generative parts in men and women. On the right side the blood arrives at the uterine sinus or testicles after it has been purified by the kidneys, while on the left side it is still impure, watery and serous, and thus colder than the purified blood since pure blood is warmer than blood full of residues. He thus concludes that the right uterus and the testis lying on that side are warmer than those on the left, consequently reasoning that it is fair to conclude that the parts on the right side produce males

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99 See also Hanson [4 (1992)] 44. Anaxagoras, who also supports this principle, believes that the critical factor is the side of the body from which the father’s seed comes (per Arist. Gen. An. 763b30-35).

100 Aristotle also states that ἠ τὸ ἄρρεν μὲν ἐν τοῖς δεξιοῖς τὸ θῆλυ δ’ ἐν τοῖς ἄριστοις· οὐχ ἦτον δὲ ἄφωτερα γίγνεται ἐν τοῖς δεξιοίς (‘a male embryo has actually been observed in the right part of the uterus, and a female one in the left part, and no less both are formed on the same side’, Gen. An. 765a20f. See also Lloyd [11] 61.
and those on the left females. Moreover he believes that, since the foetus is associated with the right side of the uterus for a longer time, male embryos will for the most part be found there and females in the left uterus (UP 14.7). The surroundings of the seed (whether hot or cold) thus play an even more important part in Galen’s view than the nature of the seed itself: warmth (that is, environmental factors) is in his view the essential factor in sex-differentiation. To quote Boylan, ‘sex is thus according to him not determined as something give per se by either parent, but is the result of the way it is given’.102

3.4. Time in Menstrual Cycle

The time of the menstrual cycle at which intercourse takes place is regarded as the determining factor in the Hippocratic Corpus (Superf. 31). The temperature of the uterus is important. If it has been cooled (for example, by menstruation), a girl will probably result. A girl is also more likely to be conceived if menstruation is in progress, and a boy at the more favourable time when it has just finished.

3.5. Physiognomy of Pregnant Woman

Prognostications about the sex of the unborn child are also based on the size of the mother’s breasts and on the state of health of the pregnant woman (Superf. 19; cf. also Plin. HN 7.5.41). Obviously good health meant it was a boy. Quite a number of prognostications are based on the complexion of the woman. For example, a healthy ruddy complexion denotes a male child and a pale complexion a female child (Aph. 5.42).105

4. The Differential Development of Male and Female Embryos

There was a widespread belief in antiquity that male embryos develop more quickly than female embryos.106 The earliest evidence of this belief is found in

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105 Women with spots on their faces are pregnant with a female child, but those who have a good complexion with a male child (Steril. 3.216 [Littré (7) 8.416]).
106 Galen states that almost all physicians share this belief, with the exception of Diogenes of Apollonia (Gal. Comm. Hippoc. Epid. 6: 2.47 [Kühn (6) 17 A 1006-008]).
Empedocles who, according to Oribasius, believes that the male is articulated earlier than the female and that the parts on the right-hand side are formed earlier than those on the left-hand side (DK 31 A 83).

Basing his view on the assumption that a woman can say precisely when conception occurred, it is believed in the Hippocratic Corpus that the male foetus is fully developed in thirty days and the female in forty-two days (Nat. Puer. 18.1). The reason that the female seed coagulates and becomes articulated later is that it is weaker and more fluid (Nat. Puer. 18.8). Prognostication about the expected course of events is an important part of Hippocratic medicine. The theory of critical days would play a role here, giving the feeling of control over the future.

Aristotle offers basically the same explanation, but with more emphasis on the lack of heat: ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῇ μητρὶ ἐν πλείονι χρόνῳ διακρίνεται τὸ θήλυ τοῦ ἄρρενος . . . ἀσθενεῖται γάρ ἐστι καὶ ψυχρότερο τὰ θῆλεα τὴν φύσιν . . . διάκρισις πέψις ἔστι, πέττει δ" ἡ θερμότης, εὔπεπτον δὲ τὸ θερμότερον (‘in the womb the female is articulated within a longer period than the male . . . for the female is weaker and colder in constitution . . . articulation is concoction, and it is heat that concocts, and what is warmer is more easily concocted’, Gen. An. 775a15-18). Movement starts when the hair and nails are formed and the extremities are fully extended: at age three months in the male and four months in the female. Aristotle believes that a boy is fully developed and articulated (and about the size of a large ant) after forty days, and a girl after ninety days (Hist. An. 9.583b3-7). Regarding the length of gestation, the

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107 Hanson [4 (1987)] 590, 597 points out that the numbers are multiples of six (which plays an important role in Pythagorean embryology) and seven (which is a crucial figure in human physiology in all periods of Greek thinking).

108 Littré [7] 7.498-500. Also, females articulate more slowly than males because of their affinity to the uterus (Septim. 9 [Littré (7) 7.450]).

109 King [2] 112 states that ‘models of regular crises taken from malarial-type fever’ are used.

110 This is a logical corollary of the theory that the male foetus develops in the warmer right side of the uterus and thus reaches sooner the critical stages of articulation, quickening and parturition. Ironically, when after birth the male and female are approaching a negative outcome (death), it is the female who reaches it first, aging more quickly. This view is based on the theory that what is inferior deteriorates more quickly: ἐσο μὲν οὖν διακρίνεται διὰ τὴν ψυχρότητα βραδέως (ἵδι αὐτὰ διάκρισις πέψις ἔστι, πέττει δὲ ἡ θερμότης, εὔπεπτον δὲ τὸ θερμότερον), ἐκτὸς δὲ διὰ τὴν ἀσθενείαν ταχῦ συνάπτει πρὸς τὴν ἀκμήν καὶ τὸ γῆρος (‘While it is within the mother, then it develops slowly on account of its coldness, since development is a sort of concoction; concoction is effected by heat, and if a thing is hotter, its concoction is easy; when however it is free from the mother, on account of its weakness it quickly approaches its maturity and old age, since inferior things all reach their end more quickly’, Gen. An. 775a20-22).
Hippocratic Corpus gives different possibilities but does not differentiate between male and female foeti (Nut. 42.9). Aristotle considers that the female is slower than the male to attain articulation of all its parts and therefore tends more than the males to be born at ten months (Hist. An. 9.583b24-7).

Conclusion

This panoramic survey of the views of Greek and Roman medical writers on differences between the sexes enables one to make some observations that might otherwise not be so obvious. The views, different as they may be, have in common that they were determined by the prevailing cultural assumptions about the female, and by preconceived notions about the anatomy of the female, to the extent that empirical observations were at times adapted or even ignored to support a particular preconceived theory.

The kind of information presented is also influenced by the perspective and aim of the author, whether that of a physician or a researcher or both. The Hippocratic writers were interested in human anatomy since it enabled them to understand the human body, which in turn helped them as physicians to cure diseases. On the other hand, Aristotle approached his material as a natural philosopher building a system, not as a practising physician, and thus he regarded sexual differentiation as a subordinate part of the whole phenomenon of generation among living things. The polarization between the sexes is thus much more pronounced in Aristotle than in the Hippocratic writers, and the differences inevitably contain implications of value that had devastating consequences for the perception of women in the centuries to follow. In turn Galen, particularly in his work De Usu Partium, described the anatomy of the human from a teleological perspective, trying to justify the way in which Nature designed the body by showing the suitability of a part for performing its function. Although he also regarded the female as an embodiment of lack, he believed that Nature made her so for a specific reason.

It is noticeable that very little progress was made in the field of anatomy in the course of the period under review. Obviously the fact that dissection was not allowed was a serious drawback and accounts for much of the lack of development in this regard. But then, even in the case of Herophilus, one of the very few who could dissect human corpses, one finds that his momentous discovery of the ovaries went unnoticed for many centuries since the point of departure that led to his discovery, namely the preconceived notion that the female’s anatomy is analogous to that of the male, also led to the erroneous view that the female spermatic ducts end in the neck of the bladder like the male ducts, thus denying that the female makes any contribution to generation.
Another reason for the lack of progress can be found in the respect with which the theories of authoritative figures of the past were regarded. Herophilus’ erroneous view that the female spermatic ducts end in the uterus lasted for more than 400 years before being rectified by Galen. Aristotle’s negative premise that the male is the norm, and the female a deformed, infertile and mutilated male, was unquestioningly accepted even by Galen, himself one of the giants of Graeco-Roman medicine. Although Galen criticized Aristotle on other points, he was still greatly under the spell cast by the latter’s authority and his premise that the female is an embodiment of lack. So even Galen’s views reveal ‘fancies’ about females. I agree with May that Galen ‘was also, alas, not above occasionally suppressing or distorting his facts; he sometimes saw or says what he needed to see in order to support his theory’.\textsuperscript{111}

Finally, if preconceived notions did prevail over empirical observations, one should perhaps keep in mind that in many cases the pursuit of superior knowledge for the sake of greater authority, fame or wealth and a better medical practice could also have played a role. Moreover, the acquisition of scientific knowledge \textit{per se}, based on truthful observations, was probably not the only aim of these authors.

\textsuperscript{111} May [74] 12.
AN ALTAR OF ALEXANDER
NOW STANDING NEAR DELHI

Ranajit Pal
Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute
Pune, India

Abstract. The vanishing of the twelve magnificent altars set up in India by Alexander the Great has intrigued many scholars. This article shows that one of the altars was re-inscribed by Emperor Asoka, who was the Indo-Greek King Diodotus I. There is an indication that Alexander may have tried to promote brotherhood in these altars. It is just possible that the four-lion emblem of India may be linked to Alexander.

Even in the heyday of Assyriology, when the lure of grand discoveries drew archaeologists to Sumer and Akkad, some eminent figures opted for India.\(^1\) Apart from the enigma of the Indus culture, a prime attraction was the undiscovered altars of Alexander cited in several ancient texts. Alexander was the greatest ambassador of the West, and the failure to locate the altars saddened archaeologists like Wheeler, who writes:

> And yet it is astonishing how very little actual trace we have of his passing . . .
> his material presence has eluded us. It is as though a disembodied idea had come and gone as a mighty spiritual force with little immediate tangibility.\(^2\)

The vanishing of the altars was seen by some as an index of the insignificance of Alexander’s legacy, and was at the root of much criticism levelled against him. However, survival of relics is often a matter of chance; to the layman the accounts of Arrian, Plutarch and others may appear trivial in contrast to the lustre of the Taj Mahal or the splendour of Tutenkhamun’s relics, but the historian must tread cautiously. Natural disasters like earthquakes and floods, wilful destruction by political or religious reactionaries, and at times plain misjudgment by historians, may accumulate in order to diminish a legitimate hero. Lastly one must consider the effects of misappropriation. Had it not been for the ballasting of more than one hundred miles of the Lahore-Multan railway with bricks from the monuments of Harappa, the task of reconstructing the glories of the Indus civilisation would have been far easier. This background has other dimensions as well: only a little more than fifty years after the

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\(^1\) In the preparation of this article, the author gratefully remembers the kind encouragement of the late N. G. L. Hammond.

construction of the altars, all of which apparently disappeared, one encounters the majestic Asokan pillars. Since Asoka has a very strong presence in the northwest, it is natural to suspect a link between the vanishing of all the altars of Alexander and the simultaneous emergence of nearly the same number of Asoka’s Pillar Edicts, many of which had lion-capitals. It can be recalled that when Philip wanted to commemorate the momentous victory at Chaeronea he set up the famous lion statue. It is more than likely that his illustrious son had also erected lion capitals in India.

Who Erected Pillars in India Before Asoka?

The find-spots of relics are of great importance in the reconstruction of history; but one of the recurrent problems in Indian history is that pillars were often rewritten and re-erected at different locations. Unfortunately historians such as H. C. Raychaudhuri and R. Thapar have not taken this into account. Even though the weight of some of these pillars is about thirty tons, it is not safe to assume that they were erected in their present locations. Keay writes:

> The question of how these pillars had originally been moved round India, and whether they were still in their ordained positions, was an intriguing subject by itself. It was now apparent that they were all of the same stone, all polished by the same unexplained process, and therefore all from the same quarry.³

Significantly, although most writers place this quarry at Chunar near Benares, Prinsep locates it somewhere in the outer Himalayas.⁴ The altars of Alexander were grand structures. Plutarch writes that in his day these were held in much veneration by the Prasiians, whose kings were in the habit of crossing the Ganges every year to offer sacrifices in the Grecian manner upon them (Plut. Alex. 62). What happened thereafter? Was there a scramble among the later rulers to use these splendid monuments for their own purposes? The fame of Samudragupta as one of the greatest rulers of India rests on his Allahabad inscription which was rewritten on an old Asokan pillar; Kulke and Rothermund suggest that it was shifted from Kausambi.⁵ In the fourteenth century, Sultan Feroz Shah was so impressed by the Asokan pillars that he had two of them shifted to Delhi, one from Meerut and another from Topra in Ambala district, about ninety miles northwest of Delhi. Monahan writes:

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The fact that ten of the pillars bear inscriptions of Ashoka is proof they were erected not later than his reign; it does not prove that none of them was erected earlier.\(^6\)

In the Sanskrit drama *Mudrarakshasa*, Chandragupta is called *Piadamsana* (Act 6). *Piadamsana* is a colloquial error for *Priyadarshana*. From this, Raychaudhuri concludes that it is not always safe to ascribe all epigraphs that mention *Priyadarshana* to Asoka the Great.\(^7\) The intriguing fact is that Asoka says that pillars bearing edicts had been in existence in India before his time; he was not the first to use pillars for the propagation of *Dhamma* (Eusebia). In the seventh Pillar Edict [*PE*], after recording that he has erected ‘Dharma pillars [pillars of the Sacred Law]’ (*dhammadhambhani*), Asoka writes:

\[
\text{Etaṃ devānampiye āhā: iyaṃ dhamma-libi ata athi silā-thaṃbāṇi vā, silā-phalakāṇi vā tata kaṭaviyā ena cila-ṭhitike siyā.}
\]

\text{(Asoka PE 7)}

Concerning this, the Beloved of the gods [the Devānampiyya] said: Wherever there are either stone-pillars or stone-slabs, thereon this Dharma-rescript is to be engraved, so that it may long endure.\(^8\)

This shows that there were already pillars in India before the Asokan era and also implies that, like Samudragupta, Asoka also had engraved his own message on at least some of them. To realise that no one other than Alexander could have erected these pre-Asokan pillars, one has to take a close look into an age-old blunder in Indology that has greatly falsified world history.

### The Location of Palibothra

Alexander historians have often been baffled by the scarcity of new sources, archaeological or textual, and new writers are usually content with re-interpretation of old documents.\(^9\) Unfortunately this is due to a faulty perspective; too much

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\(^6\) F. J. Monahan, *The Early History of Bengal* (Delhi 1974) 225. Monahan (like V. A. Smith) was a British Indologist who was also a civil servant. For the sake of consistency, future references (other than in titles of works, or direct quotations) in this article are to Asoka, rather than to Ashoka or other variants of the name.

\(^7\) H. C. Raychaudhuri, *Political History of Ancient India* (Calcutta 1972) 240.

\(^8\) A. C. Sen, *Asoka’s Edicts* (Calcutta 1956) 162f., 168f.

\(^9\) Archaeologists have found little in India or Iran that can be directly linked to Alexander, and reference to him in Indian literature is scanty though not non-existent. There were about twenty contemporary accounts of Alexander but these are not extant. Aristoboulos and Ptolemy wrote many years later. Historians have been forced to use the later accounts of Arrian, Plutarch and other secondary sources.
stress has been laid on the Greek and Roman sources at the expense of crucial data from Sanskrit and Pali documents. Moreover, the value of the Indian sources has been impaired by one fatal error—Jones’ location of Palibothra at Patna. This has not only blurred the identity of major conspirators in the history of Alexander, but has also left room for much unwarranted criticism against him. Once Jones’ idea is rejected and the scenario is shifted to the northwest, important clarifications emerge in the history not only of India but also that of Iran and Afghanistan. It turns out that Alexander was chasing through Gedrosia a very powerful adversary, and that he was not quite the villain that he has been made out to be.

Recounting the scenario after the Hyphasis mutiny (Arr. Anab. 5.25; Curt. 9.2.1-3.19; Diod. Sic. 17.93-95), Badian writes with an air of definiteness:

> For the moment, he tried to use the weapon that had succeeded before. He withdrew to his tent, for three days. But this time it did not help. The men were determined, and as Coenus had made clear, they had the officers’ support. Alexander could not divide them. All that remained was to save face.

Badian not only finds Alexander in an awkward position, but also notes his subsequent declaration that he would go on nonetheless and his ordering of sacrifices for crossing the river. Alexander’s vow to fight against the Prasii in the face of stiff opposition from both the soldiers and officers does appear somewhat comical but here lies a trap—where was their capital Palibothra? Could it really have been at Patna, so far removed from the northwest—the centre of early India?

The significance of this question has been generally overlooked. Only Hammond, discoverer of Aegai, recognises the crucial role of geography in this history, and states that ‘Patna is too far east’ to be a Palibothra. Some

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10 W. Jones, *On Asiatic History, Civil and Natural: The Tenth Anniversary Discourse*, delivered 28 February 1793 by the President at the Asiatick Society of Bengal.


12 E. Badian, ‘Alexander in Iran’, in I. Gershevitch (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Iran 2: The Median and Achaemenian Periods* (Cambridge 1985) 466f. Ptolemy also reported that the omens were unfavourable (Arr. Anab. 5.29). But that may not have been the reason why he turned westwards.

13 I am indebted to N. G. L. Hammond for this private communication to me.
archaeologists such as Ghosh also point out that Jones’ discovery has no archaeological basis. It is known that the Maurya empire extended to the west as far as Aria, Seistan and Makran; and this makes it likely that Palibothra was in this region. Elisséeff remarks that from the archaeological viewpoint, eastern Iran was closer to India. Bivar may be unaware of Jones’ error, however, or of the alleged frauds in Nepalese archaeology, since he comments about the Persepolis tablets as follows: ‘So far as India is concerned, the Fortification Tablets attest an active and substantial traffic, though they shed no light on the geography of that province’. In fact, the tablets throw invaluable light on the geography of greater India. They also provide data that revolutionise Indology. Sedda Saramana of the tablets appears to be Siddhartha (Sedda-Arta) Gotama, and the ubiquitous Suddayauda Saramana seems to be his father Suddo-dhana. Alberuni writes that Gotama’s real name was Buddho-dana, which puts him in the same bracket as Daniel. Nunudda of the tablets may be Nanda, a relative of Gotama.

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14 A. Ghosh, The City in Early Historical India (Simla 1973) 66: ‘… of Pataliputra which is mainly known from non-archaeological sources’. For a more detailed discussion, see R. Pal, Non-Jonesian Indology and Alexander (New Delhi 2002).
16 V. A. Smith, Asoka: The Buddhist Emperor of India (Jaipur 1988) 75.
17 V. Elisséeff, ‘Asiatic Protohistory’, in Encyclopedia of World Art 2 (New York 1960) 3: ‘The Iranian region, with its affinity for the Orient, permitted the development of two different cultural areas: the northwestern one, more properly Iranian, with the localities of Tepe Giyan, Tepe Sialk, Tepe Hisaar, and Anau; and the southeastern one, which can be considered Indian, of Baluchistan and the centers of the valley of the Zhob and of Quetta and Amri’. R. N. Frye, The Heritage of Persia (London 1962) 27, on the other hand, stresses only the linguistic diversity of Indo-Iranians, not their common heritage: ‘To the south the Persians and other Iranian invaders found the land occupied by Elamites and related non-Indo-European speakers. Further east were probably Dravidian peoples in Makran, Seistan and Sind, represented today by their descendants, the Brahuis’.
Through the mist of vague reports and geographical misconceptions, it is difficult to probe into the Hyphasis revolt, which came as a serious jolt to Alexander. After this, even though there were safer routes, Alexander chose to return to Iran through the desert of Gedrosia, suffering heavy losses in soldiers and civilians from lack of water, food and the extreme heat. That the motive behind this voyage has appeared so perplexing is due to two crucial lapses—the false location of Palibothra, capital of the Prasii, and the concomitant failure to recognise the mysterious Moeris of Pattala who played a determinant role.

‘Alexander, of course, had read Herodotus’, writes Badian, but does not note the purport of his reference to Indians in the Gedrosia area. Toynbee writes on world history and makes no mistake to note the shifting nature of India’s boundary: ‘... and we can already see the beginnings of this progressive extension of the name ‘Indian’ in Herodotus’s usage. The reports of Alexander’s historians clearly indicate that southeast Iran was within Greater India in the fourth century BC. As Prasii was in the Gedrosia area, the question arises—did the army refuse to fight the Prasii or only to march eastwards? If Alexander wanted to move eastward it was not to defeat the Prasii. Tarn writes that he had nothing to do with Magadha on the Ganges. If he had learnt that the fertile Gangetic plains were only a few days’ march away, and wanted to be there for mere expansion of empire, he would have met little resistance. Reluctance of the army could be due to the lack of any tangible gain, not fear of the mighty Easterners. If this was the case, then Alexander bowed down to the wishes of his men. However, if the reluctance was to confront the Prasii, it appears sensible due to their formidable strength. As Moeris had fought beside Porus, the Prasian army cannot have been left intact, though it could still have been a fighting force. It is probable that Moeris and his agents fomented discord among Alexander’s officers and soldiers. The magicians and other secret agents of

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22 Badian [12] 462. Herodotus writes: ... oì δὲ ὑπὸ ἡλίου ἀνατολέων Ἀιθιοπείς (διεξούς γὰρ δὴ ἔστρατευοντο) προσετέχατο τοῖς Ἰνδοῖς ... οὕτω δὲ οἱ ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίᾶς Ἀιθιοπείς τὰ μὲν πλέον κατὰ περ Ἰνδοὶ ἐσσαύχατο ... ('The eastern Ethiopians—for two nations of this name served in the army—were marshalled with the Indians ... Their equipment was in most points like that of the Indians’, Hdt. 7.70.1-7).


25 This can be inferred from the Sanskrit drama *Mudrarakshasa* which recounts the rise of Chandragupta. The fabulous strength of the Nanda army disagrees with the archaeological
Moeris probably overblew the might of the Prasii in order to frighten the invaders. From this point onwards, if not earlier, Eumenes, Perdikkas and Seleucus may have been in touch with Moeris.

**Victory Over Moeris at Palibothra**

Only Justin reports that Alexander had defeated the Prasii (Just. *Epit.* 12.8). Palibothra, the Prasian capital, was famous for peacocks. Lane Fox writes: ‘... Dhana Nanda’s kingdom could have been set against itself and Alexander might yet have walked among Palimbothra's peacocks. 26 Curiously, Arrian writes that Alexander was so charmed by the beauty of peacocks that he decreed the severest penalties against anyone killing them (Arr. *Ind.* 15.218). 27 The picture of Alexander amidst peacocks appears puzzling: where did he come across the majestic bird? Does this fascination lead us to Palibothra? It is implausible that eighteen months after the battle with Porus, Alexander suddenly remembered his victory over the Indians in the wilderness of Carmania and set upon to celebrate it with fabulous mirth and abandon (Arr. *Anab.* 6.28.1-4). Surprisingly it did not jar with the common sense of anyone why this was not celebrated in India. The victory over the Indians in southeast Iran can lead to only one judicious conclusion—this was India in the fourth century BC. Moreover, if Alexander had indeed defeated the Indians, who could have been their leader but Moeris or Maurya? This clearly indicates that Alexander had indeed conquered the Prasii in Gedrosia.

Bosworth writes that the name of the place where the victory was celebrated was Kahnuj. 28 The name tells all, for Kanauj was the chief city of the Indians, the name of which is echoed in the famous city in eastern India which later became most important. Smith is aware that Kanauj in eastern India was not the city mentioned in the ancient texts; 29 yet he does not suspect that the same could be true of Jones’ Palibothra. Firista identifies Sandrocottos with Sinsarchund, who

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27 Asoka's Edicts hint that ritual slaughter of the bird (*Mayura*) was practised by the Mauryas (*RE* 1; *PE* 5): see Sen [8] 64f., 154-57.


ruled from Kanauj. It is therefore clear that Alexander did not run away from the Prasii, as Badian imagines, but had in fact pursued Moeris, their leader, through Gedrosia. The palace at Kahnuj where Alexander rejoiced must have been the fabled one which, according to Aelian, excelled those at Susa and Ecbatana (Ael. NA 13.18).

Nearchus certainly had other tasks than scientific fact-finding; the army was ordered to keep close to the shore and the navy moved in tandem (Arr. Ind. 20.1-42; Plin. HN 6.96-100). This orchestration and the large number of troops and horses on ships (quite unnecessary for a scientific mission) show that the navy was not only carrying provisions for the army which was engaged in a grim and protracted battle with a mighty adversary, but that the troops on the ships were also ready to support the army if needed. This is why the navy waited for twenty-four days near Karachi. The names Pataliputra and Pattala and Moeris and Maurya leave little to imagination. But Badian does not recognise that Moeris was Chandragupta Maurya of Prasii; and his allusions to Alexander’s insanity, Dyonisius and Semiramis, et cetera do not follow readily from what can legitimately be inferred from available data. Badian is unaware that the food crisis was due to the collusion of Alexander’s officers with Moeris. As a general, Alexander can hardly be blamed for imposing a levy in order to arrange for the supplies for his army; this is the reason why the people of Pattala had fled. In seeking to cast Alexander in a stereotype, Badian overturns the whole episode and goes on to compare him with Chengiz Khan. Further

30 A. Dow (ed. and tr.), The History of Hindostan. From the Earliest Account of Time, to the Death of Akbar: Translated from the Persian of Mahummud Casim Ferishta of Delhi 1 (Dublin 1792) 5, 9f. The geographer J. Rennel, Memoir of a Map of Hindoostan (London 1778) 49 was the first to identify Patna as Palibothra but later opted for Kanauj. W. Francklin, Inquiry Concerning the Site of Ancient Palibothra (London 1815) 47 disagreed with Jones and placed Palibothra at Bhagalpur. See also S. N. Mukherjee, Sir William Jones: A Study in Eighteenth Century British Attitudes to India 2 (London 1987) 97.

31 W. Heckel, The Marshals of Alexander’s Empire (London 1992) 248 notes that thorough descriptions of the voyage by the two key participants, Nearchus and Onesicritus, are preserved in these primary source-references.

32 J. W. McCrindle (ed. and tr.), The Invasion of India by Alexander the Great as Described by Arrian, Q. Curtius, Diodorus, Plutarch and Justin (New Delhi 1973) 396f.

33 Pattala is said to have been a great city and could have been another Mauryan capital.

34 M. Wood, In the Footsteps of Alexander the Great: A Journey from Greece to Asia (Berkeley 1997) 214 discards the Dionysius-Semiramis stories, and proposes that Alexander may have been exploring whether cities could be founded along the coast for trade with India.

35 There may have been a smear campaign launched by the generals who took over after Alexander. The very existence of the junta depended on an extensive falsification and defamation campaign. That Ptolemy had to defend Alexander only shows the extent of such a campaign (Diod. Sic. 18.4.1-6). Sasigupta could have justified his role by blackening
clarifications in Alexander’s history come from an unexpected quarter—the history of Asoka.

**Who Ruled Arachosia: Asoka the Saviour or Diodotus I Soter?**

A powerful heuristic in artificial intelligence research is ‘coalesce’, which consists in assigning the same value to two different variables.\(^{36}\) In ancient history also a similar approach at times leads to great simplification. It is not often that Soters rub shoulders with Saviours, but at first sight this is what seems to have happened in Arachosia. Macdonald writes: ‘Who was the lord of Arachosia when it was traversed by the Seleucid troops, it is difficult to say. It had once been Asoka.’\(^{37}\) That Asoka was the ruler of Arachosia is clear from the fact that his bilingual Kandahar Edict was in Aramaic and Greek;\(^{38}\) but curiously evidence from coins seems to suggest that the Indo-Greek king Diodotus I was the master of this area.\(^{39}\) To unravel this seemingly unsolvable mystery one has to delve deep into the persona of the two men. The picture of Asoka in the Indian sources is that of a fearsome warrior who later turned into a pious missionary king, a matchless propagator of *Dhamma*.\(^{40}\) Tradition has it that in his youth he had a very violent disposition and killed his elder brother Susima on his way to the throne.\(^{41}\) Indeed, in the thirteenth Rock Edict the Alexander. The expedition probably did not bring economic prosperity immediately to Greece, and some Athenians, perhaps the Peripatetics and Demosthenes, may have spared no effort to belittle Alexander.


38. See B. N. Mukherjee, *Studies in the Aramaic Edicts of Asoka* (Calcutta 1984) 52f. for discussion. Many aspects of Asoka’s life are obscure. Although some punch-marked coins have been associated with his name, this has been disputed. Apart from the Edicts, archaeology has unearthed few inscriptions. Palaces unearthed near Patna have been said to be his, but in the absence of inscriptions this is uncertain. Even Taxila, so often associated with his name in the texts, has proved disappointing. Recently inscribed relics of Asoka have been found from Kanganhalli in Karnataka which are said to belong to a later period.

39. While Diodotus I has numerous coins but no inscriptions, Asoka has many inscriptions but no coins. The satisfaction shown by H. P. Ray, *Ancient India* (New Delhi 2001) 55 about Asoka’s coins is unusual. Kulke and Rothermund [5] 75, on the other hand, write: ‘Whereas the Maurya emperors had only produced simple punch-marked coins, even petty Indo-Greek kings issued splendid coins with their image’.


41. Coins of Abd Susim, probably a relative of Asoka, have been found at Persepolis. This again hints that Asoka belongs to the northwest.
emperor himself recalls his enterprises with the sword, and admits that he found pleasure rather in conquests by the Dhamma than in conquests by the sword (Asoka Rock Edict [RE] 13). In the Edict, he writes that he had sent emissaries to distant kingdoms, including that of Epirus. The circumstance of a king of Patna writing to the King of Epirus, of all persons, is a jarring incongruity which under normal circumstances would have led the investigators to a valuable clue regarding the true identity of Asoka; but no one suspected that Jones’ identification of Palibothra could be wrong. For instance, Rhys Davids chooses to distrust the king’s account instead. The Ceylonese chronicles give the exaggerated story of his killing of ninety-nine brothers in his youth (*Dipavamsa* 6.21f.; *Mahavamsa* 5.20, 40).

It is astonishing that the picture of Diodotus I has exactly the same mien. As already noted, the Mauryas ruled Aria and Seistan. This in a way opens up a Pandora’s box, for if Seistan and Aria were within the Mauryan kingdom it immediately follows that some of the Indo-Greek kings of Bactria and Seistan were Mauryas. Was Diodotus I a Maurya? Diodotus belonged to the same space and time as Asoka and just like the latter he was a fierce warrior in his youth. Macdonald writes: ‘The spectacle of the greatness of the Maurya empire would not be lost upon a satrap of such force of character as the elder Diodotus’. The figure of Zeus wielding the thunderbolt in his coins is perhaps awesome, but there is much more to Diodotus than just brute power. On his gold and silver coins he sometimes calls himself Soter, ‘the saviour’. That he was regarded as a saviour long after his death is clear from the coins struck in his memory by the later Graeco-Bactrian kings Agathocles and Antimachus, which mention Diodotus Soter. The title has baffled all scholars. Tarn considers it as mere royal rhodomontade, but this is unwarranted. Narain also grapples with the problem and proposes that Diodotus I took the title Soter as he considered himself as the saviour of the Bactrian Greeks. Narain does not consider the real likelihood that Diodotus the warrior may have transcended into a great missionary and holds the view that his name Theodotus (*Theos* = God), quoted

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43 Sen [8] 24, 102f., cf. 27.
46 Macdonald [37] 393.
by Justin (Just. *Epit.* 41.4), was just a scribal error. The story of civilisation is replete with instances of fierce men and women who later responded to higher callings but, due to Jonesian misunderstandings, scholars such as Holt have not noted that the image of Diodotus in conjunction with Zeus’ thunderbolt is not at all irreconcilable with that of a Bodhisatva-like *Soter* spreading the message of *homonoia*. That the history of Asoka matches that of Diodotus line by line can only imply that they were one and the same person.

*Devanampiya Was the Same as Devadatta*

As Seleucus’ daughter had come to the Mauryan household, Asoka could have been an Indo-Greek; yet his true face remains veiled because he has been placed at Patna. Wheeler writes:

> It is just possible that Ashoka had Seleukid blood in his veins; at least his reputed vice-royalty of Taxila in the Punjab during the reign of his father could have introduced him to the living memory of Alexander the Great, and, as king, he himself tells us of proselytizing relations with the Western powers.

Wheeler does not mention that there is no archaeological relic that links Asoka with Patna, but notes the strong Achaemenian influence on him. Tarn is impressed by the very wide scatter of Diodotus’ coins, but does not note the true bearings of Diodotus: ‘. . . coins of Diodotus, for example, have been found in Seistan and in Taxila, places where he never ruled and never even was’. Narain remarks with acuity:

> It may be more than coincidence that almost at the same time as Euthydemos established his authority in Bactria Asoka died in India. It is not impossible that he was among those who tried to feed on the carcass of the dead Mauryan empire.

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54 Tarn [48] 216.
But, due to Jonesian misunderstandings, Narain does not contemplate that if Euthydemus had not tried to feed on a carcass, he had in fact killed a Maurya, namely Diodotus II, son of Asoka.56

By which name was Asoka known in the West? From the fact that the Graeco-Roman writers do not refer to Asoka or his other name Piyadassi, Thapar concludes that he was unknown in the West.57 This is implausible: Asoka was one of the greatest emperors of history, and had sent religious emissaries to the farthest corners of the civilised world. The classical writers must have used a different name—the name Asoka is rare even in his Edicts. Only Jones’ error obscured that, apart from Piyadassi and Devanampiya, Devadatta was also a name of Asoka. The name dmydty in Asoka’s Taxila pillar Aramaic inscription refers to Devadatta; the line ldmy dty ‘l, which Marshall and Andreas translated as ‘for Romedatta’, in fact refers to Damadatta or Devadatta (‘M’ and ‘B’ were often interchanged).58 Tarn notes that Diodorus of the Greeks can be the same as Devadatta of the Indians.59

In fact, Devanampiya, his most common name in the Edicts, has the same meaning as Devadatta. Its literal Sanskrit rendering, ‘Beloved of the Gods’, is only a secondary sense aimed at his subjects in the sub-continent. Like the Greek word νόμος (nomos), the word Nam in Persian means ‘law’, another Persian word for which is Dat. Thus Devanam has the same meaning as Devadat; Piya stands for a redeemer (like Priam of Troy). This clearly shows that Asoka was the same as Diodotus I. After embracing Buddhism, Asoka had to change his name from Devadatta since it was the name of Gotama’s hated adversary. In the eighth Rock Edict he states that his ancestors were also Devanampiyas (Asoka RE 8),60 which shows that it is a cognomen, not a title—thus even Chandragupta could have been a Devadat or Diodotus (of Erythrae).61 The term Deva, as known from the Shahnama, the Avesta and Xerxes’ daiva inscription, initially meant a clan, not god. But without these considerations, references in Asoka’s Edicts have been translated incorrectly as ‘Gods mingled with men’.

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56 That cats fed on the carcass of Artaxerxes III was reported by the Greek sources (Ael. VH 6.8); it is uncanny that this is also confirmed by the Mudrarakshasa.
57 The remark by Thapar [45] 20 that ‘Greek sources speak of Sandrocottus and Amitrochates but do not mention Asoka’ presupposes that the Greeks would also use the name ‘Asoka’ current among the Indians.
58 Mukherjee [38] 24, 26; J. H. Marshall, A Guide to Taxila (Delhi 1936) 90.
Asoka Ruled Parthia

That Diodotus could have ruled Parthia is natural, but it is difficult to place Asoka so far west. Mahālake hi vijitam (‘large indeed is [my] dominion’), he proclaims majestically in an Edict (RE 14), but how vast really was his kingdom? Asoka’s voice reverberates throughout the length and breadth of India, and his Edicts usher in a new era in Indian history; but a careful study reveals that his dominion in the West was far more extensive than anyone could imagine. Macdonald writes that the first Arsaces ‘is sometimes a Parthian, sometimes a Bactrian, sometimes even a descendant of the Achaemenids’. Significantly, Asoka is also sometimes a Parthian, sometimes a Bactrian, and sometimes even a descendant of the Achaemenids. Many Parthian Kings assumed the title Arsaces, which was also written as Assak. The similarity of Assak with Asoka may appear fortuitous, but it is not so. Another Parthian royal title, Priapati(us) also resembles Piadassi, Asoka’s title. Asoka’s hold on Bactria is beyond dispute, and scholars such as Wheeler note the strong Achaemenian imprint on his architecture. Furthermore, the Mauryas are said to be descendants of the Nandas in some Indian texts (Dhundiraja). Due to Jones’ error, no one realised that the Nandas were great Indo-Iranian kings. Darius II, whose title was Nonthos, and Artaxerexes III, who is cited in the Babylonian records as Nindin, were Nanda kings. Although the archaeological scenario for this view is bleak, Thapar places Asoka at faraway Patna; yet she wonders why there are no Edicts at his so-called capital. She also asserts that the king of Patna could have been a second cousin of the Syrian king Antiochus II. Was Diodotus a descendant of the great Vedic hero Divodasa the Parthava? Indeed, Hillebrandt asserts that Parthia was once within the sphere of greater India. Rostovtzeff’s suggestion of Parthian influence on Buddhist art has been

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63 Macdonald [37] 394. Although nearly all scholars reject the Achaemenian link as a fabrication, this is unwarranted. The name Arsaces or Assak could also have been used by Chandragupta who may be Ashkh of the Shahnama; the eldest son of Darius II was Arsaces.
64 Wheeler [52] 174-76, 178f.
67 Thapar [45] 233f. writes that ‘the identification of Pataliputra is certain . . . extensive excavations have shown that the city existed in certain sites in and around modern Patna’. But she does not mention that no relic of the Mauryas or the Nandas has been found at Patna; nor that the wooden palace unearthed at Patna cannot have belonged to Asoka, whose architecture lays such stress on stone.
68 A. Hillebrandt, Vedische Mythologie 1 (Breslau 1929) 96.
greeted with quiet disbelief in academic circles, but this scepticism is groundless.69 Another art critic, Yazdani, also identifies the characteristic Parthian dress of some women in Ajanta paintings.70 Bussagli writes:

It should be borne in mind that at the time of its maximum expansion the Parthian kingdom covered an area far greater than that of Iran proper and included the Indian subcontinent, Mesopotamia, Armenia and some of the regions where Indian and Iranian influences overlap.71

Armed with this definition of Parthia, one can turn to an invaluable clue in Asoka’s Edicts on the Mauryas and the Bactrian Greeks. In the Minor Rock Edict 1, Asoka explicitly calls himself the ‘king’ of ‘Pathavi’ (Asoka MRE 1), an unmistakable allusion to Parthia (Parthava of the Achaemenian records).72 Association of the word Pathavi with Prithvi, the Sanskrit word for the Earth, and interpretation of the statement as just another instance of royal vainglory, is negated by the fact that his name, Asoka Var dhana, links him with Parthian Kings like Vardanes. Rostovtzeff’s suggestion of Parthian influence becomes only natural if one notes that the king of Pathavi was Asoka. Smith is certain that Seleucus surrendered to Chandragupta the districts of Aria (Heart area), Gedrosia (Baluchistan area), Arachosia (Kandahar region) and Paropamisadaca (Kabul region).73 But Tarn maintained that Asoka received no part even of the Paropamisadaca. Tarn’s view became untenable in the light of the discovery of Asoka’s Kandahar Edict, and he conceded that Asoka ‘established some sort of suzerainty over Paropamisadaca’.74 Asoka’s own claim of being the king of Pathavi in a way lays the controversy to rest. The Parthian Prince An-shih-kao, who dedicated his life to the spread of Buddhism, is clearly Diodotus.75 Tsung


71 Bussagli [69] 106.

72 Sen [8] 51-57; cf. Mukherjee [38] 60, 62. In this Edict, Asoka describes his dominion as Jambudvipa, which is usually assumed to be the same as modern India. In the version of the Edict found at Nittur in Tumkur district of Karnataka, the emperor calls it Pathavi. It is possible that Jambudvipa was a much wider territory covering nearly the whole of civilised Asia.

73 Smith [16] 75.


75 Frye [17] 172 writes that An-hsi is the same as Arshak. R. Ghirshman, *Iran* (Harmondsworth 1954) 243 notes that the name is also given as Assak.
Ping (AD 375-443) writes in his Ming-fo-lun that Buddhism was first brought to China by Asoka. Thomas notes that in his Edicts Asoka does not mention his neighbour Diodotus Theos. He tries to explain this within the Jonesian framework; but it is strange that the man whose religious overtures won the heart of the entire civilised world failed to impress upon his god-like neighbour. Asoka also does not mention Iran in his Edicts; the nearest foreign king that he mentions is Antiochus II Theos of Syria (Asoka RE 2, 13). This shows that the Syrian King stationed at Selucia near Babylon was indeed his neighbour. Asoka does not refer to Diodotus because he was Diodotus himself. According to Wheeler, the first Edicts were inscribed ‘in and after 257 BC’. Narain holds that Diodotus proclaimed himself as king by about 256 BC. Macdonald points out that Chaldaean records indicate that by about 273 BC, Diodotus sent twenty elephants to assist Antiochus I in his war against Ptolemy Philadelphus. The elephants remind one of the gift of five hundred elephants by Chandragupta to Seleucus in return for suzerainty over Aria, Arachosia, Paropamisadae and Gedrosia (Str. 15.2.1; cf. App. Syr. 55; Plut. Dem. 28f.). It is judicious to assume that Diodotus also extracted some favours from Antiochus I in return, and this may correspond to Smith’s view that Asoka became king in 273 BC.

Asoka seems to have died when Diodotus died. His Edicts stopped appearing by about 245 BC. Thapar writes:

The issuing of pillar edicts was the next known event of Aśoka’s reign, and these are dated to the twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth year . . . It is indeed strange that for the next years until his death in 232 BC there were no further major edicts. For a man so prolific in issuing edicts this silence of ten years is difficult to explain.

Significantly, according to most scholars, Diodotus died in 245 BC, and this may be the reason why the Edicts stopped appearing. The year of Asoka’s death

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78 Sen [8] 24, 66f., 102f. From Asoka’s references to Antiochus, the relation between the two appears to be cordial. It is not impossible that he also took a favourable view of Asoka’s Dharmavijaya.
79 Wheeler [52] 176.
80 Narain [49] 16.
81 Macdonald [37] 393.
83 Thapar [45] 51.
given by Thapar and others is 232 BC, but this may be incorrect. Diodotus’ son, who was also a Diodotus, died in 232 BC. However, an alternative scenario is also possible: some writers give 232 BC as Diodotus’ death, which agrees with the Indian texts, but the Indian accounts of Asoka after the death of his wife Asandhimita (ca. 245 BC) are so fanciful that it is more sensible to infer that he had died by ca. 245 BC. Asoka’s Queen Tissarakshita is blamed for ordering the death of his son Kunala by the Indian sources (Asoksavadana), which may be an echo of the alleged marriage of Diodotus with a Seleucid princess.

_Lion of Chaeronea and Lions on Asokan Pillars_

The vanishing of the altars and the true bearings of Sasigupta and Diodotus cast a flood of light on a vexing problem of art history. When the Sarnath pillar with a lion-capital was discovered, it created a flutter all over the world. Marshall writes that ‘the Sarnath capital, on the other hand, though by no means a masterpiece, is the product of the most developed art of which the world was cognisant in the third century BC’. However, despite its Indian symbolism, it bespeaks a strange fusion of Hellenic as well as Achaemenian traditions which has baffled all. At first sight there seems to be nothing unnatural for Asoka, considered by Thapar to be a native of Bihar, to appoint Greek or Persian artisans. But apart from Jones’ assertion nothing links Asoka to Patna. Wheeler notes the strong Achaemenian influence on Asoka, and recognises the double-lion capitals at Persepolis as the precursors of Asoka’s lions, but does

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84 Thapar [45] 51.
85 Thapar [45] 52f.
86 It can be argued that Asoka’s lions were borrowed from Nebuchadrezzar’s Babylon—lions guarded the famous E-Sagila—or from the Sumerians who also preferred the lion symbol. As F. Cumont, The Oriental Religions in Roman Paganism (Chicago 1911) 163 n. 75 notes, the lion was a symbol of ancient Lydia; see also A. H. Krappe, ‘The Anatolian Lion God’, JAOS 65 (1945) 144-54. Four lions also guarded the Meghazil tomb near Amrit; but Gudea’s double lion mace-head is also relevant. See Pal [14] 185-268; R. Pal and T. Sato, Gotama Buddha in West Asia (Osaka 1995) 69.
88 Thapar [45] 9, 20f.
89 In an article by B. M. Barua, Indian Culture 10 (1944) 34, the author sees no link between Chandragupta, Asoka’s grandfather, and Bihar. He writes that the language of Asoka’s stone masons was the West Asian Kharosthi. Only two names of Asoka’s governors are known, and by no stretch of imagination can they be linked to Patna: Tushaspa was surely from the northwest. Smith [29] 103 writes that the elaborate hair-washing ceremony of the Mauryas is a Persian custom.
not address the crux of the problem. Ray writes that the Mauryan artists owed much to the Achaemenians, but attributes the stylistic impetus to Hellenistic art. Marshall points out that Asoka’s lion capitals represent a totally new era in Indian art: their fixed expression, authentic spirit, canon-based form and stylisation all betray a strong Hellenistic influence. Foucher does not explain how the lion symbol sprang up in Sarnath. Both Marshall and Smith hold that the finest of the Asokan pillars were the work of foreign artists. In retrospect, one must pay tribute to scholars like Marshall, Foucher and Ray who were not aware of the true identity of Diodotus I, yet recognised the Hellenistic content of Mauryan art.

Surprisingly, no one mentions that Alexander had come to Punjab. After the middle ages the first Westerner to notice the Asokan pillars was the Englishman Thomas Coryat, who in 1616 was greatly impressed by the superbly polished forty-foot-high monolithic column and presumed that it must have been erected by Alexander the Great ‘in token of his victorie’ over Porus. Moreover, Wheeler [52] 174: ‘It has long been recognised that these columns, without precedent in Indian architectural forms, represent in partibus the craftsmanship of Persia. Actually, the name ‘Persepolitan’ which is commonly given to them by writers on Indian architecture is not altogether happy, since the innumerable columns of Persepolis are invariably fluted, whereas those of Ashoka are unfluted, as indeed was the normal Persian custom. But if for ‘Persepolitan’ we substitute ‘Persian’ or, better still ‘Achaemenid’, there can be no dispute’.

Ray, ‘Mauryan Art’, in N. Sastri (ed.), Age of the Nandas and Mauryas (Delhi 1967) 346 indirectly hints at Jones’ error: ‘The fact remains therefore that we have no examples extant of either sculpture or architecture that can definitely be labelled chronologically as pre-Mauryan or perhaps even as pre-Asokan’. He adds later (376) that: ‘Compared with later figural sculptures in the round of Yakshas and their female counterparts or the reliefs of Bharhut, Sanchi and Bodhgaya, the art represented by these crowning lions belongs to an altogether different world of conception and execution, of style and technique, altogether much more complex, urban and civilised. They have nothing archaic or primitive about them, and the presumption is irresistible that the impetus and inspiration of this art must have come from outside’.

Marshall [87] 562-64.


T. Coryat, Thomas Coriate Traveller for the English Wits. Greeting: From the Court of the Great Mogul, Resident at the Towne of Asmere, in Eastern India (London 1616) 29. Philostratos’ statement that Apollonius of Tyana, on his journey into India in the second century AD, found the altars still intact and their inscriptions still legible probably indicates that they were in places where Alexander had erected them (Philostr. VA 2.43; McCrindle [32] 215 n. 1, 349): see E. H. Bunbury, A History of Ancient Geography Among the Greeks and Romans from the Earliest Ages till the Fall of the Roman Empire (London 1883) 503.
although the lion is an intrusive symbol in India, it was common in Macedonia. Not many years before Alexander’s arrival in India, his father Philip had erected a famous lion statue after the historic victory at Chaeronea. Even though we know nothing about the artistic pedigree of the altars, it is sensible to assume that the son had also erected lion capitals in India. Were the inscriptions in Greek? This may explain why all of them were summarily re-inscribed. The history of the altars throws a flood of light on not only Mauryan and Gandhara art but also the nature of the Hellenistic phenomenon spearheaded by Alexander—a world-citizen. As Herzfeld writes:

There is no deeper Caesura in the 5000 years of history of the Ancient East than the conquest of Alexander the Great, and there is no archaeological object produced after that period that does not bear its stamp.96

An Altar of Alexander from the Beas Area

It turns out that Coryat was right—truth may be indestructible but at times it is stranger than fiction—as it was Asoka who re-inscribed the much sought-after pillars of Alexander. In Coryat’s time, the inscriptions on the pillar were unreadable. But today, thanks to Prinsep, we know that it contains an inscription of Asoka.97 Yet there is more to it than meets the eye—many of Asoka’s pillars were not erected by him. One has to recall that after the Hyphasis mutiny, Alexander gave up his plans to march further east, and to commemorate his Indian expedition he erected twelve massive altars of dressed stone. Arrian writes:

Οἱ δὲ ἔβοων τε οἶς ἃν ὕψωσεν ξυμμιγής χαίρων βοήσειε καὶ ἐδάκρυον οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτῶν ὁ δὲ καὶ τῇ σκηνῇ τῇ βασιλικῇ πελάξοντες ήξοντο Ἀλεξάνδρῳ πολλά καὶ ἀγαθά, ὅτι πρὸς σφῶν μόνων νικήθηκαι ἤνεχετο. ἔνθα δὴ διελὼν κατὰ τάξεις τὴν στρατιὰν δώδεκα βωμοὺς κατασκευάζειν προστάττετε, ύψος μὲν κατὰ τοὺς μεγίστους πύργους, εὐρὸς δὲ μείζονας ἢτι ἢ κατὰ πύργους, χαριστήρια τοῖς θεοῖς τοῖς ἐς τοσόνδε ἀγαγούσιν αὐτῶν νικῶντα καὶ μνημεία τῶν αὐτῶν πόνων. ὡς δὲ κατασκευασμένοι αὐτῷ οἱ βωμοὶ ἤσαν, θείες δὴ ἐπ’ αὐτῶν ὡς νόμος καὶ ἀγώνα ποιεῖ γυμνικὸν τε καὶ ἱππικόν.

(Arr. Anab. 5.29.1.1-2.3)

He then divided the army into brigades, which he ordered to prepare twelve altars to equal in height the highest military towers, and to exceed them in point of breadth, to serve as thank offerings to the gods who had led him so far as a conqueror, and also as a memorial of his own labours. After erecting the

96 E. Herzfeld, Iran in The Ancient East (New York 1941) 303.
97 J. Prinsep [4].
altars he offered sacrifice upon them with the customary rites, and celebrated a
gymnastic and equestrian contest.

Curiously, unlike most writers who place the altars on the right bank of the
river, Pliny places them on the left or the eastern bank:

. . . ad Hypasim non ignobiliorem, qui fuit Alexandri itinerum terminus,
exuperato tamen amne arisque in adversa ripa dicatis.

(Plin. HN 6.62.6-8)
The Hyphasis was the limit of the marches of Alexander, who, however,
crossed it, and dedicated altars on the further bank.

Pliny’s crucial hint suggests a reappraisal of the riddle of the altars. Precisely
how far east had Alexander and his men come? Although Bunbury holds that
the location of the altars cannot be regarded as known even approximately, the
Indian evidence sheds new light.98 Masson places the altars at the united stream
of the Hyphasis and Sutlez.99 McCrindle also writes that the Sutlez marked the
limit of Alexander’s march eastward;100 and this is precisely the locality from
where Feroze Shah brought the pillar to Delhi.

Thapar does not discuss Alexander’s voyage in this context, and writes
that, although at present there is no archaeological evidence, Topra must have
been an important stopping place on the road from Pataliputra to the
northwest.101 But, contrary to Jonesian Indology, there can be little doubt that
the Delhi-Topra pillar at Firozabad near Delhi, which bears Asoka’s seventh
Edict, is a missing altar of Alexander the Great.102 The very name Chandigarh
(Chandragarh) may be an echo of Alakh Chandra, Alexander’s Indian name. In
the thirteenth Rock Edict of Asoka, the name Alexander is given as Alikasudara
or Alik Su(n)dalo (Asoka RE 13).103

Alexander and Asoka

Historians have denied Diodotus his true place in world history. If almost no
words seem to be sufficient for the description of Alexander, the same is true of

98 Bunbury [95] 444.
99 C. Masson, Narrative of Various Journeys in Balochistan, Afghanistan, and the
100 McCrindle [32] 120f. n. 1.
101 Thapar [45] 230. Authors like Raychaudhuri and Thapar do not treat Alexander’s
voyage in detail, and hold that Alexander does not belong to Indian history proper.
Asoka who swept away all, as it were. His impact on the civilisations of both the East and the West is immense. As Droysen holds, Christianity grew out of an intercourse between Hellenism and the Eastern cultures. There can be no doubt that the chief architect of the great expansion of Hellenism and Buddhism, which ultimately paved the way to the rise of Christianity and Islam, was Diodotus. Toynbee writes: ‘At its maximum extent, Hellenism had expanded in Latin dress as far westward as Britain and Morocco, and in Buddhist dress, as far eastwards as Japan’. Smith is more specific:

Finally, the central religious literature of both traditions—the Jewish Talmud (an authoritative compendium of law, lore, and interpretation), the New Testament, and the later patristic literature of the Early Church Fathers—are characteristic Hellenistic documents both in form and content.

If Alexander was the harbinger of this Hellenistic revolution, Diodotus was its greatest champion. In the thirteenth Rock Edict, after declaring that he had himself found pleasure rather in conquests by the Dhamma than in conquests by the sword, he says that he had already made such conquests in the realms of the kings of Syria, Egypt, Macedonia, Epirus, and Kyrene, among the Cholas and Pandyas in South India, in Ceylon and among a number of peoples dwelling in the borders of his empire. This was, as Asoka saw it, the Kingdom of God:

. . . śavatā devānampīyasā dhaṃmānuṣathi anuvatəṃti. Yata pi dutā devānampiyasā no yanḍi—te pi sutu devānampiyasā dhaṃma-vutam vidhanəṃ dhaṃmānuṣathi, dhaṃmam anuvidhiyaṃti, anuvidhiyaṃti cā. Ye se ladhe etakenā hoti savatā vijaye, piti-lase se.

(Asoka RE 13)

Everywhere are followed the Dharma instructions of the Beloved of the gods [Devānampiya]. Even where the envoys of the Beloved of the gods [Devānampiya] do not go—they (the people of those countries) too, having heard of the Dharma practices, the (Dharma) prescriptions and the Dharma instructions of the Beloved of the gods [Devānampiya], follow the Dharma and

107 Wheeler [52] 170 writes: ‘This book is not a History, but in its last chapter the impersonal disjecta of prehistory may fittingly be assembled in the likeness of a man. Ashoka came to the throne about 268 B.C. and died about 232 B.C. Spiritually and materially his reign marks the first coherent expression of the Indian mind, and, for centuries after the political fabric of his empire had crumbled, his work was implicit in the thought and art of the subcontinent, it is not dead today’. 
Diodotus not only utilised Alexander’s monuments, but in many other respects he trod in the latter’s footsteps. In the Rummindei Pillar Edict, Asoka reduced taxes for the local people as this was the birthplace of Gotama (Asoka Rummindei PE). This has a very distant echo linked with Alexander and Gomata. Impressed by their way of life and civic administration, Alexander extended the boundary of the Ariaspian of Prophthasia and conferred nominal freedom (Arr. Anab. 3.27.4f.). Waiving part of the taxes may have been a part of his decree. In the prelude to his seventh Pillar Edict, Asoka states:

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\text{Devānampiye Piyadasi lājā hevaṁ āhā: ye atikāmātāṃ aṃtālāṃ lājāne husu, hevaṁ ichisu—kathaṃ jane dhaṃma-vaḍhiyā vaḍheyā. No cu jane anulūpāyā dhaṃma-vaḍhiyā vaḍhithā.}
\]

(Asoka PE 7)

The Beloved of the gods, King Priyadarśin, [King Devānampiyya Piyadasi] spoke thus: The kings who were in times past, desired thus, (viz.) that the people might progress by the promotion of Dharma. But the people did not progress by the adequate promotion of Dharma.

Who are these kings? Despite Asoka’s measured silence on Alexander, it is possible that he is referring to him. Asoka not only used Alexander’s pillars, 

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109 N. A. Nikam and R. McKeon (edd. and trr.), The Edicts of Asoka (Chicago 1959) 69; Thapar [45] 261. This Edict has to be examined in view of the alleged frauds in Nepalese archaeology, as pointed by T. A. Phelps: see online resource above, n. 19. It is more than likely that this pillar was brought from the northwest. A careful study shows that Gomata of the Behistun inscriptions was the true Gotama. See Pal [14].

110 The Ariaspian are the Hariasvas of the Indian texts, who were a lost tribe. The Mahabharata says that King Haryasva never ate flesh in his life (Anusasana Parva 11.67). See V. Mani (ed.), Puranic Encyclopedia (New Delhi 1975) 57. Alexander noted the similarity of their system of justice with that of the Greeks. It is said that the Ariaspians enjoyed special privileges as they had given succour to the starving army of Cyrus, but this cannot be the full story as the holiness of Seistan is well recorded in the Shahnama.


112 The corpus of Asoka’s inscriptions is vast, but one is mystified by what he did not say. He never names his father or his illustrious grandfather. Was he a nephew of Bindusara? See Lama Chimpa et al. (edd.), Taranatha’s History of Buddhism in India (Delhi 1990) 50. Was Asoka’s proscription of samajas (revelling parties) (Asoka RE 1: see Sen [8] 11, 64f.) due to his horror of Alexander’s poisoning in such a party (Arr. Anab. 7.28; Curt. 10.10.14-17; Diod. Sic. 17.118; Plut. Alex. 77.1-3).
but also undertook to spread the message of homonoia championed by Alexander with a greater resolve.

**The Mission of Alexander the Great**

In so far as it failed to rout the Prasii, and in view of the great losses in human lives that it caused, Alexander’s Gedrosian operation cannot be called an all-round success. Nevertheless, this unique expedition achieved its goals and marks a high point in world history having no parallel in any other age. That it greatly augmented world trade and ushered in a new era of East-West intercourse cannot be denied. No one could have combined a scientific and a military expedition in the manner Alexander did. It is here that one can recognise the student of Aristotle. His Titanic voyage across so many continents and seas to mingle with the exotic peoples of Africa and Asia appears truly mind-boggling. Nothing could deter him, not the huge Prasian army or the elephants, not the desert heat, not even the lack of water and food. His emergence from the desert inferno of Gedrosia was a superhuman feat. It is said that he had wept after seeing Nearchus in Carmania (Arr. *Ind.* 35.4-7).

When the Macedonians and Greeks first set out with the mandate of the Corinthian League, they were probably guided by simple nationalist motives. But after Alexander was declared a Son of Amon at Siwa, and also under the affectionate guidance of the great Buddhist philosopher Asvaghosa (Calanus), this changed into something far more pregnant.113 More than just a lure for Persian gold or a yearning for the unknown (πόθος), Alexander and his followers were driven by a mission to usher in a new world. Russell squarely reproved Aristotle for his outlook in the *Politics*: ‘There is no mention of Alexander, and not even the faintest awareness of the complete transformation that he was effecting in the world.114 Like Cambyses, Alexander got a very bad press. Scholars such as Badian and Green stress the need for demythologizing, but this demands a precise knowledge of history and geography.115 It is necessary to analyse history carefully to perceive Alexander’s greatness, which has been acknowledged through the ages.116 Like many Eastern gods, he was not

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113 The name given as Sphines by Plutarch is the same as Aspines or Asvaghosa (Plut. *Alex.* 65.5.2). Asvaghosa may have been an Ariaspian.


116 I. Worthington, ‘How “Great” was Alexander the Great?’, *AHB* 13.2 (1999) 39-55 attempts, relying almost exclusively on the Greek and Roman sources, to analyse why Alexander was called ‘Great’ even in ancient sources.
above sin; his role in his father’s death is far from clear, and his killing of Cleitus (Arr. *Anab.* 4.8.8f.; Curt. 8.1.49-52; Just. *Epit.* 12.6.3; Plut. *Alex.* 51.9-11) and his treatment of Callisthenes (Arr. *Anab.* 4.10-14; Curt. 8.5-8; Plut. *Alex.* 52-55) were unfortunate yet not inhuman acts. He was certainly less prone to violence than Diodotus in his youth. It is important to consider the possibility that his alienation from his compatriots may have been due to his reinterpretation of Hellenic religion.

For about a century after the voyage, the Orient was witness to momentous events that altered human destiny. It was here that Hellenistic culture and religion were born. No study of the Hellenistic phenomenon can be complete without reference to Diodotus/Asoka. His Edicts indicate that apart from recording his achievements, Alexander’s messages in the altars were also meant for the propagation of homonoia. This is the goal that Asoka took up with a greater zeal. As Bevan writes: ‘One may notice first that nothing was further from Alexander’s own thoughts than that his invasion of India was a mere raid’. Material evidence for Buddhism in India starts appearing from the fourth century BC, and this is the era of Alexander. Alexander’s role in this renaissance in Indian culture should not be denied. Tarn links Alexander and Asoka:

For when all is said, we come back at the end to his personality; not the soldier or the statesman, but the man. Whatever Asia did or did not get from him she felt him as she scarcely felt any other; she knew that one of the greatest of the earth had passed. Though his direct influence vanished from India within a generation, and her literature does not know him, he affected Indian history for centuries; for Chandragupta saw him and deduced the possibility of realising in actual fact the conception, handed down from Vedic times, of a comprehensive monarchy in India; hence Alexander indirectly created Asoka’s empire and enabled the spread of Buddhism.118

The influence of Alexander’s pillars, which were later modified by Asoka, on world history is inestimable. Although it cannot be proven conclusively from considerations of art history, it is not impossible that the Sarnath pillar is also a timeless relic of Alexander the Great modified by Asoka. Due to Jones’ error, scholars such as Tarn and Rostovtzeff underrate Alexander’s role. Yet the staggering possibility that the four-lion emblem of India may in fact be a work

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119 Wheeler [52] 174 writes: ‘Equally Persian are the famous lions which crowned the Ashokan column at Sarnath, near Benaras, and have been assumed as the republican badge of India’.
of Alexander calls for a drastic reassessment of his true legacy. Alexander’s direct influence did not vanish from India. It was due to his vision that East and West first met, and the myriad effects of this fraternisation are beyond any estimate. If homonoia is still a living creed, the credit for part of it must be ascribed to Alexander’s wisdom and tireless energy. His dream of a Brotherhood of Man may forever remain unfulfilled, yet he remains the finest symbol of our vision of a United Nations.
DEA AFRICA: EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE

J. A. Maritz
Department of Religious Studies, Classics and Philosophy, University of Zimbabwe
Harare, Zimbabwe

Abstract. It is often alleged that Africa was the object of personal and public cult, and that this is proved by numerous epigraphical, archaeological and literary sources. This paper examines some of these, and concludes that there is little compelling evidence for a dea Africa. It suggests that the well-known type of Africa in an elephant-scalp was a Roman portrayal adopted over time by the local population.

Was there a goddess called Africa? The remark of the elder Pliny that in Africa nemo destinat aliquid nisi praefatus Africam (‘no one in Africa does anything without first calling on Africa’, HN 28.24.5f.) is well known, as is the account by the younger Pliny of the dream of Curtius Rufus in which Africa appears to Curtius in order to give him prophecies about his future career and death (Ep. 7.27.2; see also Tac. Ann. 11.21). These texts are often cited as proof for the existence of a dea Africa (‘goddess Africa’). It is alleged that Africa was the object of public cult, whose importance is proved by numerous archaeological and epigraphical discoveries.¹ Both these claims are misleading, and deserve further attention. This paper re-examines the evidence provided by the archaeological and epigraphical discoveries.

Inscriptions

Before considering any artefacts in detail, there is need to review the epigraphical evidence that supposedly supports evidence of a cult of the dea Africa. There is no extant inscription that specifically and in full names the dea Africa. There is a dedication to the dea Maura² (‘the Moor/Mauretanian goddess’), but Maura is

¹ For claims regarding a cult, see M. Le Glay, ‘La Déesse Afrique à Timgad’, in M. Renard and R. Schilling (edd.), Hommages à Jean Bayet (Brussels 1964) 374-82; ‘Encore la déa Africa’, in R. Chevallier (ed.), Mélanges d’archéologie et d’histoire offerts à André Piganol 3 (Paris 1966) 1233-239. The existence of the goddess is taken for granted in statements like ‘The importance of this goddess is verified by the very wide diffusion of her portrait in various media, including coins, sculptures, lamps, terracottas, paintings and gems’: H. Slim, ‘Africa, Rome and the Empire’, in M. Blanchard-Lemée et al. (tr. K. D. Whitehead), Mosaics of Roman Africa: Floor Mosaics from Tunisia (London 1996) 18 and figs 1, 3, 6 and 8. I have found no reference to dea Africa (‘goddess Africa’) in any handbook or sourcebook of Roman religion.

² Dessau, ILS 2.1.11 no. 4501.
not identical with *Africa* in spite of loose and inconsistent geographic terminology of both ancient Romans and modern scholars, who may apply the principle of *pars pro toto* (‘part for the whole’; *Serv. Aen.* 5.192, 6.60). Furthermore, Maura is adjectival; there is no inscription to *dea Mauretania* (‘the goddess Mauretania’). When the *dea Syria* occurs in inscriptions, the use of the word *Syria* is interpreted as adjectival, and translated as ‘the Syrian goddess’, referring to the dominant deity of the area, namely Atargatis. One could translate it as ‘the goddess of Syria’; it does not signify a personified Syria as goddess. The same argument should apply to *dea Maura* (‘the Moor/Mauretanian goddess’). The fact that the plural is often used, *dii Mauri* (‘Moor/Mauretanian gods’), confirms the use of the adjective for indigenous deities. ‘Dea Maura’ is a female goddess of the Moors, not a personified deification of the country. When a personification of the place does occur, *Mauretania* is interpreted as a representation of the Roman province, not of a deity.

Dedications from Timgad have been cited by Le Glay and Leschi as proof of the cult of deified Africa; in fact, these read *at deam patriam, deae patriae suae*, and *genius patriae suae*, which translate respectively as ‘the fatherland goddess’, ‘to the (fatherland) goddess (of their fatherland)’, and ‘guardian spirit of their fatherland’, and it is hypothesis, not proof, that this *dea patria* was the personification of Africa. *Patria* as a noun means ‘fatherland’, but it is also the feminine form of the adjective *patrius*, which means ‘handed down from the fathers/ancestors’. *Deam patriam* can be translated as ‘the goddess, the fatherland’ (nouns in apposition), but can just as correctly be translated as ‘the ancestral goddess’ (noun qualified by adjective). So *at deam patriam* and *deae patriae suae* then may be translated as ‘the (ancestral) goddess (of the fathers)’ and ‘to the (ancestral) goddess (of their fathers)’. The fact that there are numerous dedications to *dii patrii* (‘gods of the fathers’) in the plural, not just from Africa, suggests the use of *patria* for any local deity, not one specific goddess.

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4 In *RE* 4.2. 2236-243, ‘dea Syria’ takes up eight columns of text; there is no reference at all for ‘dea Africa’.


7 It has been pointed out that in recent times it is often people outside their own country who refer to it as their *patria*. If the same custom applied in Roman times, dedications to the *dii patrii* would have referred to gods of foreigners serving in Africa, not to African gods, and the
in fact follows this line when he suggests that the *dii patrii* of Lepcis are Herakles (Melqart), Aphrodite (Astarte) and Dionusos (Eshmoun). In that case the *dea patria* (feminine singular of *dii patrii*) would be Astarte. To then argue that the *dea patria* of Timgad was Africa personified is no proof at all for the existence of *dea Africa*. Furthermore, *Africa* grammatically, like *patria*, may be a noun or the feminine form of the adjective. *Dea Africa*, like *dea Maura* and *dea Syria*, would refer to the female deity of the place, not the place personified. The most important point is, however, that the phrase *dea Africa* does not occur in classical texts or inscriptions but is only used by modern scholars.

**Personification of Place**

Apart from the *genius patriae suae* mentioned above, there is the well known account by Polybius of the oaths sworn by the *daimon* (‘spirit’) of Carthage and of inscriptions that mention the *genii* (‘guardian spirits’) of Lambaesis, Carthage, an Augustan colony and *thermae* (‘warm springs’; 7.9). The *genius* of each individual was a tutelary god linked to the procreative power and rational spirit; the equivalent spirit of the world was a god (Censorinus DN 3.1; August. De Civ. D. 7.13). Later writers such as Servius and Prudentius make it clear that not only people but also every place and time was thought to have its own *genius* (Serv. Georg. 1.302; Prudent. C. Symm. 2.369, 2.373f., 2.446; see also Verg. Aen. 5.95). One may therefore assume that in addition to the *genii* of specific sites the concept of a *genius terrae Africae* (‘guardian spirit of the land of Africa’), a tutelary divinity of a large geographical area, could exist—among the Romans. Again, however, there is no extant inscription that specifically and in full names the *genius terrae Africae*, often used by scholars as if synonomous with *dea Africa*. What does exist is the legend *GTA* on a coin of Q. Metellus Caecilius Scipio dated to 46 BC. The interpretation given by Crawford and regularly quoted as fact, *genius terrae Africae*, is basically still that of Agostini in 1593,

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8 See *genio Lambaesis* (‘guardian spirit of Lambaesis’, CIL 8.2528); *genius Carthaginis* (‘guardian spirit of Carthage, CIL 3.993); *genii* (‘guardian spirits’, RE 7.1 1155-69); *numini Mauretaniae et genio thermarum* (‘to the numen of Mauretania and to the guardian spirit of the hot springs’, RE 8.8926); *genio coloniae Augusti sacrum* (‘to the guardian spirit of the colony of sacred Augustus’, AD 169, Antiquités africaines 2 [1968] 197-220).

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triple cella would have been the usual form dedicated to the Capitoline triad. Compare the reference to [Apollo] *deus patrius . . . et genius coloniae* (‘ancestral god . . . and guardian spirit of the colony’, CIL 8 Suppl. 4.25511f.). Were these intended to be synonomous? Note too that in Hadrian’s address to the troops at Lambaesis he mentions the *cohors Hispanorum, ala Pannonium* (‘cohort of the Spaniards, Pannonian squadron’) and the Commageni, that is, non-African troops: see E. M. Smallwood, Documents Illustrating the Principates of Nerva, Trajan and Hadrian (Cambridge 1966) 110 no. 328 (quoting ILS 9134).
who translated the abbreviation as genius totius Africæ (‘guardian spirit of all Africa’) or genius tutelaris Africæ (‘tutelary guardian spirit of Africa’). The variation is in itself proof that all interpretations are only hypotheses not as yet supported by full epigraphical evidence.

The genius was usually envisaged as a snake (Serv. Aen. 5.95), or in art by a personification with scales and a cornucopia. The type on this coin is depicted as a lion-headed woman. A second-century AD lion-headed terracotta statue from the sanctuary of Baal and Tanit at Thinissut (now in the Bardo Museum in Tunis) has been identified as the genius terrae Africæ on the evidence of this coin. Servius specifically states that Isis autem est genius Aegypti (‘the guardian spirit of Egypt is Isis herself’; Aen. 8.696); that is, the genius in this case is not the personification of the place, but its dominant deity (compare the epigraphical dea Syria). The lion-headed deity of Egypt was Sekhet; but a lion was also associated with Astarte and sometimes with her equivalents Tanit and Caelestis. An interpretation that explained GTA as genius Tanit Africæ (‘Tanit, guardian spirit of Africa’) would be analogous to Isis as the genius of Egypt.

Whatever the correct interpretation of the letters GTA, this image is not the origin of the usual depiction of Africa (contra Slim). The symbolism of an animal-headed god, as those in Egypt, implies a merging of animal and human natures. A scalp as used in Greek art, on the other hand, is a trophy; an elephant-

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9 Discorsi del S. Don Antonio Agostini sopra le medaglie et altre anticaglie, divisi in XI dialoghi, tradotti dalla lingua spagnola nell’italiana . . . (Rome 1593); M. H. Crawford, Roman Republican Coinage 1 (Cambridge 1974) 472 no. 460.4, 2 pl. 54.


11 Since genius terrae Africæ does not occur in full in extant inscriptions, the current interpretation of the abbreviation GTA is not substantiated, and could equally well have stood for something quite different: for example, Genetrix Tanit Alma (‘Tanit, caring/nourishing ancestress’), since she was a mother goddess; or Caelestis Tanit Astarte giving three synonymous names (‘Caelestis Tanit Astarte’), given the equivalence of G and C on coinage. Even if GT did stand for Genius Terrae the A could stand for Aegyptus. There is currently no proof whatsoever for the normal translation.


13 It has been suggested to me that it is an African way of thinking that animals and humans partake of each other’s shapes. Compare, for example, the use of masks that ‘replace’ the human face with an animal one or the belief in metamorphosis such as people changing into animals that are portrayed in current African sculpture. See C. Winter-Irving, Stone Sculpture in Zimbabwe: Context, Content and Form (Harare 1991) for a man turning into a hippo (cover), a rhino (p. 200), and an antelope woman (p. 31). The Greek method was through the use of attributes, which added to the human rather than merging the human and the animal. Half-human forms in Greek mythology, for example, the centaurs and minotaur, seem to have been of non-Greek origin.
scalp is not analogous to a lion-head but to the lion-scalp worn by Herakles after he killed the Nemean lion. The symbolism of the elephant is secondary in this case to the symbolism of the defeat of the elephant. A lion is not an attribute in the earliest representations of Africa, and cannot therefore be seen as the origin of the ‘goddess’ as claimed by Slim. The strange thing is that both representations (lion-headed goddess and a head wearing an elephant-scalp) occur on coinage of Q. Caecilius Metellus Scipio, both dated to 46 BC. Why should he use two such different representations for the same goddess? The answer is surely that he did not. The lion-headed female is a deity; the one in the elephant-scalp represents Africa as a personification of place, possibly indicating Metellus’ political affiliations with Pompey and the area loyal to him.

In spite of claims to the contrary, epigraphical discoveries and coins do not in fact prove the existence of a dea Africa. What one does have are many representations of a personification; however, concepts such as personification, allegory, eponymous heroes, patron and tutelary deities tended to overlap. The Romans did worship personifications as divinities—Salus (‘Health’), Concordia (‘Harmony’), Pax (‘Peace’) and others—and one might argue that even the major deities were really personifications of the elemental forces. What of personifications of places? As long ago as 1888 Gardner considered various ways in which geographic entities were represented symbolically by the Greeks and


16 For this second coin see Crawford [9] 472 no. 461, 2.pl. 54. In discussing this coinage, Crawford 737-9 points out that much of Pompey’s military coinage was produced by his lieutenants, who after his death gathered in Africa. For discussion of the use of the elephant-scalp headdress by Pompey and his followers and its association with the head of Alexander, see J. A. Maritz, ‘The Image of Africa: The Evidence of the Coinage’, AClass 44 (2001) 105-25.
Romans, through *inter alia* an eponymous hero, an allegorical figure, a protector divinity, a *Tyche* or *Fortuna* (‘Fortune’) figure.\(^{17}\) More recently, Salcedo has discussed the extent to which the *Tyche, Fortuna* or *Genius* may come to represent or personify the place itself.\(^{18}\) The problem arises when the argument is reversed: the divine may personify the place, but does that make the place a divinity? Athene may represent Athens symbolically, but the city is not usually considered a goddess; the *Tyche* of Antioch personifies the city, but the city itself is not divine; Libya was said to have been named after a nymph (Hdt. 4.45), but this is not proof that Libya the land was considered a *dea*.\(^ {19}\) On the other hand, Rome does appear frequently as a goddess, in the public cult of *Roma et Augustus*, in literature (e.g., Claud. *Pan. Prob. Olyb.* 126, 165) and on coins. There is ample epigraphical evidence that the public cult of Rome required temples, statues and altars, and that cult practice included *Romaia* (‘Roma’) festivals with formal processions, sacrifices and dedications, athletic contests, gladiatorial and wild beast shows, music and drama competitions. In Pergamum a month of the year was named for the goddess Rome.\(^{20}\)

As shown above, there are no similar epigraphic records for a *dea Africa*. What archaeological discoveries provide proof that personified Africa was also the object of cult, either public or private? The normal identifying attribute for Africa is the elephant-scalp headdress. A figure wearing such a scalp occurs in all the media mentioned by Slim.\(^{21}\) The recent study by Salcedo includes 136 items that she identifies as Africa; the vast majority of these feature the elephant-scalp.\(^{22}\) Not every personification, however, in an elephant-scalp represents Africa;\(^{23}\) on

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\(^{17}\) P. Gardner, ‘Cities and Countries in Ancient Art’, *JHS* 9 (1888) 47-81.


\(^{19}\) Libya is not in this case synonomous with Africa, in spite of Plin. *HN* 5.1.1.


\(^{21}\) Slim [1].

\(^{22}\) Salcedo [14].

\(^{23}\) Types appearing on Ptolemaic, Seleucid and Bactrian coinage, on that of Agathocles of Syracuse, and on Hellenistic bronzes, gems and sealings are usually identified as portraits even when showing a female face. Similar types on Numidian, Mauretanian and Roman coins as well as female figures in elephant-scalps appearing in media other than coinage during the Roman period are usually identified as personifications. While this division is generally correct, the continuing debate as to the identity of, for example, the face on the Boscoreale *patera* is proof that the distinctions are not cut and dried (Paris, Mus. Du Louvre Bj 1969, Collection E. de Rothschild; M.-O. Jentel, *LIMC* 1.1.380, 1.2.295 s.v. ‘Aigyptos 10’; M. Le Glay, *LIMC* 1.1.254 s.v. ‘Africa 55’).
some coins the figure is identified by legend as Alexandria or Mauretania, and one must at least consider the possibility that the same is true in other media. Even when the elephant-scalp does denote Africa, it need not represent dea Africa; the attribute does not per se signify divinity, though its original use with the portrait of Alexander the Great may well have led to its acquiring an apotropaic significance (Hist. Aug. 14.6; John Chrysostom Ad Illuminandos Catachesis 2.5). Other secondary attributes that occur with the figure of Africa signify defence or warfare (spears) as well as fertility (ear of corn, plough, cornucopia, basket of corn). Salcedo considers these to be precisely the functions of a tutelary deity; she points to syncretism in North Africa and the assimilation of attributes of various gods to the dea Africa. Such explanations are unnecessary, for these attributes, like the lion and scorpion that occur with some representations, are equally relevant to Africa purely as an indication of place or to represent its inhabitants. Although it is impossible to discuss all figures of Africa within a short article, the list of media in which Slim claims the ‘portrait of the goddess’ appears, namely coins, sculptures, lamps, terracottas, paintings and gems, needs to be critically examined in greater detail.

Coins

A female bust wearing an elephant-scalp and having attributes of spears, or a plough, appears on Roman Republican, Numidian and Mauretanian coinage. Contrary to much current opinion, there is reason to believe that this was not an indigenous type, and that it reflected not an indigenous deity but a Roman personification, evolved at the same time as other personifications of provinces to reflect Rome’s ideology of conquest. On later coinage, specifically on the commemorative issues of Hadrian and Antoninus, Africa is shown in a position of subjugation, kneeling in front of the emperor or sacrificing, the attitude of a province, not a divinity.

Scuplture and Decorative Metalwork

Africa occurs in marble, bronze and terracotta, in relief and in the round, from statuettes to busts that are larger than life-size. Two of these that are the right size

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26 Slim [1].
for cult statues apparently come from herms. The head found in the Theatre at Cherchel is 0.28 m. high (0.4 m. including shoulders).28 The bust previously in New York in the Cooper Hewitt Museum for Decorative Arts is 0.36 m.29 Both are of marble (possibly imported); both have been thought to be first century BC-AD copies of a fifth century Greek original; and both are connected with Juba II and Ptolemy of Mauretania, respectively the husband and son of Cleopatra Selene. It is worth noting the Roman and Ptolemaic connections of these rulers, emphasised by type-links on their coinage,30 and that Ptolemaic queens had been depicted wearing elephant-scalps.31 The statues cannot be copies of a fifth century original; elephants were not known to the Greeks at the time. These statues are among the earliest identified as Africa, but one cannot rule out the possibility that they were based on or even intended as depictions of Cleopatra Selene, as has been suggested for the bust on the Boscoreale patera. Picard thought that the herm at Cherchel was a figure of worship; Durry considered it only an ornament.32

Another herm (0.66 m. to the chin), dated to the first century AD, is in the form of a caryatid, carrying a basket on her head.33 A double herm features ‘Libya’ and Triton.34 Other large marbles include a head in Copenhagen (0.26 m. to the chin),35 one heavily restored bust (0.19 m. to the chin) now at Broadlands,36

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30 See Maritz [16].

31 See D. Svenson [14] 221.


35 Copenhagen, Ny Carlsberg Glyptotek 278 (IN 1474). F. Poulsen, *Catalogue of Ancient Sculpture in the Ny Carlsberg Glyptotek* (Copenhagen 1951) 208 no. 278.

and another in Rome (0.61 m., including a bust that does not belong to it).\textsuperscript{37} The only one that has a recorded find-site that suggests a religious context is the marble head (0.30 x 0.26 m.) found near a sanctuary in the vicinity of the Capitolium at Lambaesis.\textsuperscript{38} The figure on a marble urn from Timgad has no head and cannot be securely identified; Le Glay’s claim that the sacrificial scene on the urn gives evidence of the actual official cult of Africa cannot be substantiated.\textsuperscript{39}

The evidence for private worship is equally uncertain.\textsuperscript{40} A bronze bust (5.5 cm.) from Berrouaghia, now in the Algiers Museum, may have been fixed to a wall of a \textit{lararium} (‘shrine for the household gods’).\textsuperscript{41} Le Glay identifies statuettes, for example, a bronze from Belgrade, as figures for the \textit{lararium} for personal worship.\textsuperscript{42} There are several pieces small enough to belong to this category: full figure statuettes from Lambaesis\textsuperscript{43} and busts in bronze from Cairo (8.5 cm.),\textsuperscript{44} Paris (6.6 cm.,\textsuperscript{45} 6.3 cm.\textsuperscript{46}) and Announa (Thibilis) in Numidia.\textsuperscript{47}

\textsuperscript{37} W. Amelung, \textit{Die Skulpturen des Vatikanischen Museums} 2 (Berlin 1908) 494 no. 296, pl. 68.
\textsuperscript{38} Le Glay [1 (1966)] 1236.
\textsuperscript{39} Le Glay identifies the figure in a short tunic [37] as \textit{dea Africa}, with \textit{vexillum} (‘flag’), cornucopia and lion at her feet. The first publishers identified the headless figure as probably the \textit{genitus exercitus} (‘guardian spirit of the army’), and the animal as a dying bull: A. Ballu and R. Cagnat, \textit{Timgad} (Paris 1905) 238-40. Salcedo [14] 193-96 claims that Africa and Alexandria can be distinguished since Africa always wears a long tunic; this is incorrect, since Africa wears a short chiton and holds a \textit{vexillum} on the Hadrianic \textit{Adventus} (‘arrival’) coin (Toynbee [14] 34 pl. 2.9), but a short garment is unusual for Africa. The \textit{vexillum} appears on a terracotta medallion on which Africa is identified by the letters ‘AFR’ (M. Le Glay, \textit{LIMC} 1.1.253, 1.2.189 s.v. ‘Africa 43’) and on a relief from Rapidum (Le Glay, \textit{LIMC} 1.1.254, 1.2.190 s.v. ‘Africa 47’); on coinage it is often associated with Alexandria (M.-O. Jentel, \textit{LIMC} 1.1.489f., 1.2.370 s.v. ‘Alexandria 14-15, 19-20, 23, 25-26’), not Africa. The main objection to positive identification of the figure on the urn is, however, the loss of the head.
\textsuperscript{40} For discussion of the relationship between private and public cult in the case of emperor worship, see L. R. Taylor, \textit{The Divinity of the Roman Emperor} (Middletown 1931).
\textsuperscript{41} M. Le Glay, \textit{LIMC} 1.1.252, 1.2.186 s.v. ‘Africa 22’; V. Waille, ‘Note sur l’éléphant, symbole de l’Afrique à propos d’un bronze récemment découvert à Berrouaghia (Algérie)’, \textit{RA} 17 (1891) 380-84; P. Wuilleumier, \textit{Musée d’Alger, Supplément} (Paris 1928) 60 pl. 8.2.
\textsuperscript{42} Le Glay [1 (1966)] 1233-239; Le Glay, \textit{LIMC} 1.1.254 s.v. ‘Africa 46’.
\textsuperscript{43} M. Le Glay, \textit{LIMC} 1.1.253, 1.2.188 s.v. ‘Africa 38’.
\textsuperscript{44} Cairo, Egyptian Mus. 27923 JE 7252 Collection Huber. C. C. Edgar, \textit{Catalogue général des antiquités égyptiennes du Musée du Caire 19 Greek Bronzes} (Cairo 1904) 72 no. 27923; M.-O. Jentel, \textit{LIMC} 1.1.492 s.v. ‘Alexandria 68’.
\textsuperscript{45} E. Babelon and J. A. Blanchet, \textit{Catalogue des bronzes antiques de la bibliothèque nationale} (Paris 1895) 262 no. 619; M. Le Glay, \textit{LIMC} 1.1.252, 1.2.187 s.v. ‘Africa 27’.
\textsuperscript{46} Babelon and Blanchet [45] 262 no. 620; M. Le Glay, \textit{LIMC} 1.1.252 s.v. ‘Africa 28’.
In terracotta there is a bust (9.9 cm.) from Geneva, one from the necropolis on the Via Portuense, and a head (8 cm.) from Timгад.

Divinities were such a favourite motif in classical art that there are instances when the function of such figures must have been largely decorative rather than purely religious, for example, as furniture finials. This is definitely true of Africa, specifically in decorative metalwork. Leaving aside the Alexandrian male heads, which wear an elephant-scalp and which were probably not meant to represent Africa, one finds the head of Africa (8 cm.) used on the lid of a vase in Paris, on a circular bronze medallion (diameter 32 cm.) from Pompeii, on a bronze appliqué (9 in.) in London probably intended for furniture, under the handle of an oinochoe, and on a tripod finial (9.2 mm.) from Nürtingen-Oberensingen (Baden-Württemberg). Even Le Glay admits that many figures of Africa do not necessarily have a religious significance. This is surely true of the Belletti relief, on which the figure sits in the dejected pose of a captive, and of the Boscoreale cup, on which she appears as one of seven figures.

49 M. Le Glay, LIMC 1.1.253 s.v. ‘Africa 37’; R. Paribeni, NSA (1922) 426 fig. 5.
50 Le Glay [1 (1966)] 1234f. figs 3-4; Le Glay, LIMC 1.1.252, 1.2.187 s.v. ‘Africa 25’.
52 Babelon and Blanchet [45] 262 no. 618; M. Le Glay, LIMC 1.1.252, 1.2.187 s.v. ‘Africa 26’.
55 Salcedo [14] 87 no. 88, pl. 30 B.
57 Le Glay [1 (1964)] 374.
(captives?) led by a figure in military uniform. On these she must be thought of as representing a subjugated Africa, whether the original province or a wider area. This depiction clouds the identification of the figure on the companion Boscoreale *patera*, which has been variously identified as Egypt, Alexandria, Africa, Cleopatra VII, Cleopatra Selene or Isis. On other reliefs too there is uncertainty. On fragments of limestone from Rapidum (Sour-Djouab), figured relief in two registers has been interpreted as Africa among signs of the zodiac or as Africa, Mauretania and Numidia among symbolical figures of the country and sea. On a sarcophagus carved with the hunt scene from the *Aeneid*, Africa surely represents the geographical setting, not a goddess; this is borne out by the male figure of a river god seated on her right. A similar allegorical interpretation is given to the figure of Africa appearing in a marriage scene on another sarcophagus.

**Paintings**

Seven paintings from Pompeii feature a figure in an elephant-scalp; various publications identify these as personifications of Africa, Egypt, Alexandria, Asia or some neighbouring country. The context suggests a geographical personification rather than a deity. On an outside wall on the Strada Nolana, she

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61 Bayet [34] 40-74 sees them as symbolical figures; M. Le Glay, *LIMC* 1.1.254, 1.2.190 s.v. ‘Africa 47’ and Wuilleumier [41] as signs of the zodiac.


appears with Sicily,\textsuperscript{64} in a fresco (now lost), she appears in a scene of Dido Abandoned.\textsuperscript{65} The ship that appears above the human figures in the painting from the House of Meleager suggests that this too might represent the story of Dido Abandoned rather than Europe, Asia and Africa, as is often claimed; either way it suggests a place rather than a cult.\textsuperscript{66}

\textit{Mosaics}

On a black and white mosaic from Ostia, probably dating to the Flavian period, Africa forms part of a large panel that includes personifications of Egypt, Spain, Sicily and the four winds.\textsuperscript{67} This context clearly shows that it is Africa the province that is represented. Another black and white mosaic, dated to the second century AD, is in Catania, Sicily.\textsuperscript{68} One from Seleucia, now in Jerusalem, dated to the third century AD, has the inscription \textit{AF(rikh)}.\textsuperscript{69} A large pavement from Antioch, dated AD 325-350, probably shows Gē and her fruits and identifies \textit{AEGYPTOS}.\textsuperscript{70}

Two mosaics come from the same house at El Djem (Thysdrus). One shows the bust of Africa in the centre, with a Season in each corner.\textsuperscript{71} The other features seven hexagons: a seated figure of Rome holding the \textit{orbis terrarum} (‘sphere of the earth’) is in the central one, with alternate busts and standing figures of provinces in the six surrounding hexagons.\textsuperscript{72} Slim claims that the two

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{64} Helbig [63] no. 1115; M. Le Glay, \textit{LIMC} 1.1.254 s.v. ‘Africa 52’; V. Spinazzola, \textit{Pompei alla luce degli scavi nuovi di Via dell’Abbondanza (anni 1910-1923)} (Rome 1953) 156 fig. 193.
\item \textsuperscript{65} Spinazzola [64] 158 fig. 197.
\item \textsuperscript{68} Salcedo [14] 108 no. 120.
\item \textsuperscript{69} Salcedo [14] 109 no. 121.
\item \textsuperscript{70} Salcedo [14] 109 no. 122.
\item \textsuperscript{71} Slim [1] 17-34 figs 1, 3.
\item \textsuperscript{72} Slim [1] 17-34 figs 6, 8.
\end{itemize}
busts of Africa are so different that the first can be recognised as a goddess, the second as a province. The details mentioned—features, hairstyle, solemnity—do not differ greatly and may be explained by different styles of two artists working next to each other on the same theme in two rooms of differing sizes; the pavement that shows six provinces has a surface area five times as big as the other. The greatest difference in iconography, namely that the first has no tusks on the elephant-scalp whereas the second does, is ignored by Slim. It is very unlikely that a goddess should have no tusks while a mere province does; far more likely that the artists were not differentiating between the two concepts. Context is much more important in this case than iconography. Slim is correct that the outer figures must be provinces orbiting Rome but not that the presence of the Seasons implies that the central bust in the first mosaic is a deity. Seasons were popular fillers-of-four-corners. While they did symbolise the agricultural year and so indirectly fertility, they were not necessarily linked to divinities but often appeared with only geometric surrounds. One mosaic from Carthage shows the Seasons with a figure thought to be the personification of Carthage, but it is too late to be a precedent for the Seasons with a personification of place.73

Lamps

Many lamps with a design identified as a head of Africa have been found in many sites in North Africa, and it is noteworthy that those at Lixus and Volubilis should be very similar to those at Carthage, Sfax and Hadrumetum.74 If they were produced locally to represent an indigenous divinity, it was a widespread one and not, for example, only the dea of the province Africa. Although often mentioned in one breath with the coins and gems as examples of ‘the same type’ of personification of Africa, the lamps in fact often show a very different representation: a broad frontal face, with flat nose, wide mouth and a headdress where tusks appear like horns and ears as loops. It is unlikely that these would ever be identified as elephant-scalps if the type were not known from other media. They are dated from the first to the third centuries AD. Many different deities and mythological figures appear on lamps. While they may have functioned as apotropaic devices, their use would also have been mainly decorative and does not provide strong proof of cult.


74 According to M. Le Glay, *LIMC* 1.1.251, all the museums of North Africa possess numerous examples of lamps bearing the head of Africa, as a head or a bust, with hair plaited across the face or in curls on either side. Le Glay gives examples under *LIMC* 1.1.251-53, 1.2.185 s.v. ‘Africa 16 a-f’ and 41’.
Gems

Numerous gems, sealings and glass pastes feature a head in an elephant-scalp. Some of these are portraits of Hellenistic rulers; many are identified in publications as Libya or Africa. Some of these identifications are certainly incorrect. A green paste in Copenhagen has an aegis, for example, and a sealing from Cyrene has the horn of Ammon, both attributes previously used with portraits of Alexander the Great, not with personifications of place. On the gems, they indicate representations of a Ptolemaic queen rather than of a personification of Africa. Some gems and pastes show the attributes of spears and ears of corn found on the coinage. If the head on the coins is the personification of Africa, that on the gems should be similarly identified, though not all the gems are securely dated and they are not necessarily contemporary with the coins. Apart from the fact that gems often depicted divinities, there is slight reason to identify a head wearing an elephant-scalp as a ‘goddess’. The only reasonable connection may be that it appears on Janus-type examples, once linked to a Silenus-type face and once with Zeus-Ammon. Since Ammon is very specifically connected with the Siwa site, the joint heads may be an indication of the place, Africa-Egypt. Since similar Janus-types exist for Isis-Serapis, however, this type may be construed as two deities. Dating ranges from the second/first century BC to the first century AD.

On the other hand, gems provide the strongest evidence that Africa was not considered divine. A carnelian in Vienna shows a nude man holding a winged Victory and standing with his foot on a head wearing an elephant-scalp. The latest dating sets this piece in the decade after Actium, and it is identified as Augustus in the guise of Mars subduing Africa. A nicolo now in Cambridge,
dating to the late first century AD, shows Roma holding a head with projections that have been interpreted as tusks that indicate the elephant-scarf of Africa.\textsuperscript{81} It is inconceivable that a divinity should be treated like this, that is, as decapitated. A carnelian from Xanten, dated to the second half of the first century BC, shows a shield and a prow with Africa, identified by an elephant-scarf headdress.\textsuperscript{82} Both the date and the attribute would suit a reference to Sextus Pompeius who was defeated in 36 BC, as was Lepidus, who had been assigned Africa when the second triumvirate divided the empire among themselves. Octavian then restructured the province and established numerous colonies.\textsuperscript{83} A number of glass pastes from this period are said to be a medium for propaganda, bestowed by Augustus on his leading supporters and possibly therefore on leaders in the new African colonies.\textsuperscript{84} Although not every design has a symbolic meaning,\textsuperscript{85} there is literary evidence that the subject on a gem could have a special relevance for the wearer.\textsuperscript{86} It is likely that once the type for Africa was established, it did have some personal significance. This is illustrated by a glass paste that has representations of the standards of Legio XI, the wolf and twins, Spain and the Nile, as well as of Africa and her attribute, the scorpion.\textsuperscript{87} In this case the gem probably commemorates a soldier’s career and the territories in which he served. Such large pieces may have been donatives, like medallions in the late empire.\textsuperscript{88} Africa here is an indication of place, not divinity. This is one of three gems showing an elephant-scarf that bear a legend. Significantly the references are to the legion, a ruler, and a good-luck wish, not to a place or deity.\textsuperscript{89} Finally, Henig


\textsuperscript{82} G. Platz-Horster, \textit{Die antiken Gemmen aus Xanten} (Cologne 1987) 37 no. 66 pl. 13.

\textsuperscript{83} S. Raven, \textit{Rome in Africa\textsuperscript{2}} (London 1984) 58.

\textsuperscript{84} M. Henig, ‘Roman Sealstones’, in D. Collon (ed.), \textit{7000 Years of Seals} (London 1997) 89.


\textsuperscript{86} These included the use of Venus (Genetrix) by Julius Caesar (Dio Cass. 43.43.3) who claimed descent from the goddess; Augustus’ use of his own portrait (Dio Cass. 51.3.4); portraits of ancestors, friends or teachers (Cic. \textit{Cat.} 3.5.10; Ov. \textit{Tr.} 1.7.6; Cic. \textit{Leg.} 5.3.1). See Richter [85] 1-6 for further discussion and bibliography.


\textsuperscript{88} Cf. Henig [84] 89.

speculates that the large numbers of gems from North Africa were the product of local schools, but workshops have not yet been identified and would surely be late. He gives no evidence, however, that the gems that portray a head in an elephant-scalp were among the large numbers coming from North Africa; nor does he suggest any indigenous use of engraved gems in the pre-Roman period.

**Discussion**

It is clear that, in all media, when Africa appears in a composition with other figures, it is usually in a secondary or even subservient position characteristic of a dependent province, not a deity; the chief exception is the relief from Rapidum, where Africa is almost central. Only very occasionally does a figure identified as Africa appear in the company of gods. In these instances it may then be thought of as *dea Africa*, as when a head of Africa faces one of Jupiter Ammon on a glass paste now in Munich. Kuypert mentions a coin that shows Jupiter Ammon, Athene and Africa. In a funerary context, Africa was found with figurines of other gods, as will be discussed later. Sometimes Africa appears as a single figure but with attributes of other gods, again suggesting that she herself may be divine. The most obvious example is the Boscoreale patera on which there are at least eleven attributes that may belong to a divinity other than Africa, as will be discussed later. The only artefact that may suggest a context of sacrifice, namely the stone vase at Timgad, is broken, bears no identifying elephant-scalp and therefore cannot provide conclusive evidence.

Does the context of the finds imply divinity? Salcedo lists four finds from temples or surrounding areas. First, a third or fourth century terracotta medallion (on which Africa is identified by the legend AFR on a vexillum) from the vicinity of the Capitolium, Timgad. The legend EX OF/ICINA/TAM/UGAD/

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90 Henig [84] 90.
91 Provincial seals from Britain, quoted as a parallel, are dated from the end of the first to the third centuries AD. See Henig [84] 90.
92 See, e.g., Brandt [76] 182 no. 1054 pl. 118.
93 G. Kuypert (Cupertus), *De Elephantis in Nummis Obviis* (The Hague 1719) 132.
94 Salcedo [14] 185 lists twenty-four attributes that occur with the elephant exuviae (‘remains’) in the first century AD. Of these, eleven do not occur in any other period—they are the ones on the Boscoreale patera. If so many attributes appear together on one piece but on no other representation of Africa, they may well refer to other deities—or the identification may be incorrect. See Linfert [60].
ENS/(I)UM [sic] indicates its official nature and suggests a dedication to a divinity.96 Secondly, the second century marble head found near a statue of Isis close to two adjacent sanctuaries in the vicinity of the Capitolium at Lambaesis.97 The head (identified as Africa) and Isis have therefore been identified as the deities worshipped in the adjacent sanctuaries. Thirdly, a second/third century fragment of architectural moulding now at Volubilis from a sacellum (‘shrine’) of the imperial cult. This was originally identified as Isis.98 Fourthly, a relief from the seventeenth century monument to Scipio Africanus that may originally have come from the Hadrianeum.99 If it did, it would of course have been one of the ‘people and provinces’ series. Neither the moulding nor the relief portrayed the object of worship, and cannot in fact provide evidence for a cult of dea Africa.

It is worth noting that other figures now identified as Africa have been differently identified in the past, notably as Dionysus on the fresco at the House of M. Lucretius,100 or as Isis (a head in the Ny Carlsberg Glyptotek).101 Tran Tam Tinh specifically identifies a figure with an elephant-scalp and sistrum, also from the House of M. Lucretius, as Isis, not Africa.102 The Torlonia herm discussed earlier has as its companion piece a head of Serapis, which suggests an Isiac context for Africa—or an African context for Serapis. Witt refers to Isiac attributes on the Boscoreale patera but concludes that the figure ‘is clearly conceived as African, if not Africa herself’.103 Green uses the Boscoreale patera as an illustration for Isis, however, completely ignoring the elephant-scalp and giving no justification for his identification of this figure as Isis.104 Slim talks of Tanit as the goddess of the ‘countless names’ addressed in Apuleius, ‘well placed to personify Africa’.105 This is inaccurate: Apuleius refers to Isis, never to Tanit or a dea Africa. While there was doubtless syncretism in North Africa, both Green and Slim make sweeping and unjustified assumptions.

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96 Salcedo [14] 83; Le Glay [1 (1964)] 378-81, fig. 5; Le Glay, LIMC 1.1.253, 1.2.189 s.v. ‘Africa 43’.
97 Salcedo [14] 95; Le Glay [1 (1966)] 1236; Le Glay, LIMC 1.1.252, 1.2.186 s.v. ‘Africa 24’.
98 M. Le Glay, LIMC 1.1.253 s.v. ‘Africa 36’; Salcedo [14] 99. Le Glay lists what was originally identified as Isis as Africa with a proboscis and a cornucopia; it is not illustrated.
99 Salcedo [14].
100 M. Le Glay, LIMC 1.1.252 s.v. ‘Africa 29’.
101 Poulsen [35] 208 no. 278.
102 V. Tran Tam Tinh, Essai sur le culte d’Isis à Pompéi (Paris 1964) 73.
103 R. E. Witt, Isis in the Graeco-Roman World (London 1971) 150, pl. 36.
104 Green [60].
Some finds have a funerary context. A late first century appliqué now in Madrid comes from a necropolis of Bolonia-Cadiz;¹⁰⁶ a third century terracotta head comes from Timгад;¹⁰⁷ one second century terracotta bust comes from the necropolis on the Via Portuense in Rome that also included figures of (possibly) Tanit and Astarte, suggesting that Africa too was a divinity.¹⁰⁸ On sarcophagi, however, she seems to have been only an indication of place, as discussed earlier.

What is interesting is how many of the examples occur outside Africa. Admittedly coins, gems, statuettes and even large works can travel, and many original find-sites are not recorded; for example, the Broadlands head was bought in Rome, but there is no record of where Cavaceppi acquired it. Comparatively few statues are recorded as found in Africa, however, and large sculpture, all the paintings, both sarcophagi and most of the known mosaics occur outside Africa, the majority in Italy. Metalwork and terracottas are recorded as found in Spain, Italy and Germany. Only the lamps seem to have been recorded predominantly in North Africa. For all media, even when the site is on the African continent, it may be anywhere from Egypt to Mauretania and therefore not confined to the Roman province of Africa.

Even more significant is the dating of the artefacts. With the dubious exception of one coin, no depiction of ‘Africa’ in an elephant-scalp pre-dates the time of Pompey.¹⁰⁹ The only large sculpture that perhaps dates to first century BC, that from Cherchel, is of imported marble and workmanship. Of the artefacts dated to the Augustan era, several show Africa in an attitude of subjugation, not as a divinity. Similarly paintings from Pompeii and the Boscoreale treasure, that is, earlier than 79 AD, and the Flavian mosaic from Ostia show Africa with other provinces as a province. So do the Hadrianic coins. Evidence offered by Le Glay for a public cult of Africa comes from the Roman camps of Lambaesis and Timгад in the second century AD or later, and most of the statuettes and lamps that may be associated with a private cult come from the late second, third and fourth centuries AD when Romanisation was at its greatest and well after the time that the elder Pliny made his comment.

One would expect that an indigenous religion would be strong before colonisation, and would be assimilated as time went by. If ‘everyone’ in Africa called on Africa in the guise of a personal god in a lararium or in a public place of worship, the local statues and statuettes should run into thousands from every site

¹⁰⁹ See Maritz [16].
and date from before the time of the elder Pliny. There is, however, remarkably little evidence for a cult of Africa at any period;\textsuperscript{110} what there is puts it firmly in the context of later Roman, or Romanised, Africa. If one considers the extent of space and time, Le Glay’s examples are too few and much too late to apply to Pliny’s \textit{Africa}. One needs to re-examine the texts again. The elder Pliny does not use the words \textit{dea} or \textit{genius}. His comment is part of a discussion on whether formulae or charms are effective and follows immediately after his reference to the custom of saying ‘good health’ when someone sneezes and ‘two’ when one sees one scorpion (to prevent its stinging; \textit{HN} 28.24.1-5).\textsuperscript{111} Scorpions remind him of Africa and the custom there that one says ‘Africa’ before deciding on a course of action \textit{(in Africa nemo destinat aliquid nisi praefatus Africam, 28.24.5f.)}. \textit{Praefatus} can mean ‘invoked, called upon’, and it is this translation that has led to the deduction that Africa was considered divine: ‘no one decides on anything before invoking Africa’. There is a purely literal meaning, however, namely ‘to say first, to preface’, which does not have this connotation: ‘no one decides on anything without first saying “Africa”’. The first meaning may be suggested by the context since Pliny continues that the normal form would be to seek the will of the gods before embarking on a course of action: \textit{in ceteris vero gentibus deos ante obtestatus, ut velint} (‘however, among other peoples, having first addressed the gods, that they may be willing’, \textit{HN} 28.24.6f.), where \textit{obtestatus} may be seen as a synonym for \textit{praefatus}. The implication of \textit{in ceteris vero gentibus} (‘however, among other peoples’), however, is surely that Africa provides a contrast to what Pliny is used to: in Africa one does not invoke a god; one says ‘Africa’ instead. This may be proof of a superstition but scarcely of a cult.

In the work of the younger Pliny, the story of Africa and Curtius Rufus is part of a discussion as to whether \textit{phantasmata} exist and whether they have a shape and \textit{numen} (‘divine spirit’) of their own \textit{(habere propriam figuram numenque)}, ‘have their own shape and divine spirit’, \textit{Ep.} 7.27.1.2f.) or are merely a figment of the imagination. \textit{Numen} can of course mean divinity, but the fact that here it is used as prelude to a ghost story may well connote a more nebulous \textit{aura

\textsuperscript{110} The cult of \textit{Africa} should not be confused with the imperial cult in Africa. The \textit{sacerdos provinciae Africæ} (‘priest of the province of Africa’) was a priest of the imperial cult, not of the \textit{dea Africa}: see Taylor [40] 212. Similarly, recent discussion concerning the evidence for the priesthood of Apuleius may or may not refer to the priesthood of the province of Africa (i.e. the imperial cult), but not to a priesthood of the \textit{dea Africa}. See S. J. Harrison, \textit{Apuleius: A Latin Sophist} (Oxford 2000) 8 and n. 30; J. B. Rives, ‘The Priesthood of Apuleius’, \textit{AJPh} 115 (1994) 273-90.

\textsuperscript{111} Pliny’s next sentence records a custom of removing a ring when the table is ready \textit{(HN} 28.24.7-25.1).
‘Dea Africa: Examining the Evidence’, J. A. Maritz

(‘breath of air’). Like his uncle, Pliny does not call Africa dea or genius tutelaris (added by translators of the Penguin and Loeb series).\(^{112}\) Nor does he say that she wore an elephant headdress, only that she was mulieris figura humana grandior pulchriorque (‘the figure of a woman larger and more beautiful than a human [woman]’, Ep. 7.27.2.4f.); Tacitus describes her as species muliebris ultra modum humanum (‘the appearance of a woman of more than the human measure’, Tac. Ann. 11.21.5f.). These descriptions of a figure larger than life might apply to a ghost or dream as much as to a divinity. It is also significant that the figure is said to have appeared to a Roman, Curtius Rufus.

The literary sources, like the epigraphical sources, do not provide proof of a dea Africa, certainly not of an influential and widespread organised cult. At most they suggest a custom of addressing the land as a non-iconic (rather than aniconic) entity. It is worth remembering a recent analysis of pre-Roman Africa: ‘Left to themselves, the Libyans were always more drawn to the sacred than to the gods’.\(^{113}\) It is perhaps also worth noting that in the twenty-first century AD, veneration of ancestors is still the basis of African Traditional Religion south of the Sahara. ‘Venerated forefathers’ might well be translated in Latin as di patrii.

**Conclusion**

Neither literature nor inscriptions specifically mention a goddess or a genius of Africa. The elephant-scalp was used by the Romans for personifications of Alexandria, Africa and Mauretania (all identified by legend on coinage); modern scholars have used the term dea for Africa but not for Alexandria or Mauretania, which are seen only as provinces. While there are many representations in Roman art that may be interpreted as representing Africa, very few of these obviously represent a deity or occur in a context that necessitates identification as a deity rather than as a plain personification. Those that do are late and in Roman contexts, whether on the continent (not merely the province) of Africa or in Europe. This suggests that the well-known type of Africa in an elephant-scalp headdress was a Roman portrayal adopted over time by the local population. If such a deity as dea Africa existed, it must have been non-representational before the Roman period, in which case such a spiritual concept would have been far closer to later African religions than to the classical world that recorded it for posterity.

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\(^{112}\) B. Radice (ed. and tr.), *The Letters of the Younger Pliny* (Harmondsworth 1963) 203; W. Melmoth (ed. and tr.), *Pliny: Letters* 2 (London 1915) 68f.

REVIEW ARTICLES

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ALEXANDER IN AFGHANISTAN

John Atkinson
School of Languages and Literatures, University of Cape Town
Cape Town 7700, South Africa


Holt’s story of Alexander the Great and the Mystery of the Elephant Medallions begins in Bactria with the Oxus Treasure, a hoard that may have been buried by Zoroastrian priests at a place called Takht-i Sangin on the Amu Darya, perhaps in the mid-second century BC (pp. 35f.). The contents of the hoard began to wash into the river in 1877 and, in the context of the Second Afghan War, British officials operating in the area were well placed to acquire items from the hoard that turned up in the bazaars of Peshawar and Rawalpindi. One of these collectors was Sir Augustus Wollaston Franks, a Keeper at the British Museum, who in 1887 donated a large silver ‘medallion’ or decadrachm to the Museum, with the bare information that it had been ‘found at Khillum Bokhara’, which was taken to mean that it had been part of the Oxus Treasure. It featured on the obverse a horseman attacking from the rear an elephant with two mounted fighting men, and on the reverse a figure who might be described as a warrior king, but with a thunderbolt in his right hand as the attribute of Zeus. Percy Gardner identified the king as Alexander but argued that the coin was minted by a Greek king of Bactria, perhaps Eucratides, in the second century BC, who used the obverse image to celebrate a battle that had recently taken place in the area. Holt notes that B. V. Head was the first to claim that the elephant decadrachm referred to the battle of Hydaspes in 326 BC. But in his description of the coin, as Holt shows, Head mistranslated the crucial participle in Arrian 5.18.7 as meaning that Porus turned

1 P. Gardner, ‘New Greek Coins of Bactria and India’, *NC* 7 (1887) 177-81.
himself round on his elephant to attack Taxiles, whereas the Greek must mean that Porus wheeled his elephant round for the attack (pp. 56f.). This is crucial to the case that Holt develops later (pp. 128f.). The second medallion of this type came to light in 1926; its publisher, G. F. Hill, noted significant differences from the earlier specimen and argued that the attacking horseman was Alexander and not Taxiles. The appearance of this second coin allowed Head, and now Holt, to begin the analysis of the minting of this coin type in terms of mass, standard and die axes.

Holt critically reviews in chapter 4, ‘Whose Pachyderm?’ (pp. 68-91), the history of the diverse interpretations of these coins in the twentieth century as more specimens came to light. Thus he covers Kaiser’s line that the reverse image depicted Alexander in Homeric guise (pp. 70f.), Pandey’s case that the battle scene referred to Alexander’s victory over Darius at Gauagamela (pp. 73-76), and Michiner’s attempt to attribute the series to a mint in Bactria long before the campaign in India (p. 77). Holt illustrates the dangers in privileging an isolated statement in a literary source and not allowing a coin issue to stand as an independent source. He also shows how forgeries have added to the pitfalls through the forgers’ inaccurate copying, enhancement of the original design and wilful addition. Holt opens chapter 5, ‘Another Treasure’ (pp. 92-116), with an account of the discovery of a large hoard of coins near the site of Babylon in the winter of 1972/3, which yielded more specimens of the elephant medallion and a number of coins of a distinct but related type combining a riderless elephant on the obverse and an Indian bowman on the reverse. I commend this chapter as a most interesting and valuable contribution to Alexander studies in respect of numismatics, source analysis and the Nachleben of Alexander in modern scholarship. In the following chapter, ‘A Closer Look’ (pp. 117-38), Holt establishes his own case that the reverse figure is Alexander carrying a thunderbolt in one hand and that the obverse image shows Porus as the front rider or driver of the elephant. Again he goes way beyond the immediate numismatic issues, as in this case he draws in a comparison with the image of Alexander and Darius on the Alexander Mosaic to challenge Badian’s influential reinterpretation. He does not accept that the Mosaic was intended to belittle Alexander in any way. This in turn leads Holt to comment, as in the preceding chapter, on the appropriate criteria for judging Alexander. Holt would side with those who insist that he should be judged by the values by which he lived, which he takes to be ‘the Homeric code’ (pp. 134, 151). That point calls for some debate. The final chapter, ‘A Dark and Stormy Night’ (pp. 139-65), deals first with numismatic issues to show that few dies were used for these types; relatively few coins were minted; weights, die axes, designs, and quality of workmanship were uneven. Bringing all the evidence together, he concludes that they were not minted as coins but as ‘commemorative medallions, or aristeia’ (p. 147; that is, awards for valour) and were produced in less than ideal field conditions in the

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3 G. F. Hill, ‘Decadrachm Commemorating Alexander’s Indian Campaign’, *British Museum Quarterly* 1 (1926-27) 36f.; ‘Greek Coins Acquired by the British Museum’, *NC* 7 (1927) 204-06.
Punjab not long after the battle of the Hydaspes. Holt would then see the figure of Alexander with the thunderbolt of Zeus as a direct reference to the stormy night that provided cover for Alexander’s final manoeuvres before the battle. This in turn leads into conclusions about Alexander’s divine pretensions, and a final claim that the elephant medallions take us ‘as deep as we may enter into the mind of Alexander the Great’ (p. 165).

The plates and illustrations are adequate for their purpose. Appendices provide brief catalogues of the published elephant medallions, some possible forgeries of the large medallion, and a summary of the contents of the 1973 Iraq hoard. The only obvious corrigenda are where the computer clearly lacked the fonts to render the Greek words properly (pp. 56f.). The history of the discovery of the elephant medallions offers a fascinating and instructive narrative and Holt’s analysis of the numismatic issues is masterly and very persuasive. 4 This is a book that specialists in Alexander studies need to read and that the general reader will follow with great pleasure.

Invocation of the events of 9/11 has unfortunately become a cliché in self-justificatory comments of writers, artists, performers, ad-men and whoever else has a message to sell. The image is called up in the opening sentence of the preface to Into the Land of Bones: Alexander the Great in Afghanistan, but here with every good reason since as the book reflects on the déjá vu elements of the American retaliatory raids into Afghanistan that began in 2001. Furthermore, Holt was already well qualified to write on the military history of Afghanistan by virtue of a long list of relevant earlier publications. 5 Holt suggests in the ‘Introduction’ (pp. 1-22) the continuities between Alexander’s campaigns in 329-27 BC and the British campaigns of 1838-1842 and 1878-1880, the Russian occupation of 1979-1989, and the American invasion that began soon after the events of 11 September 2001. President Bush justified his invasion with much the same line as Alexander would have taken: it was to root out the terrorists and warlords, who were the enemies of civilisation (p. 15). Here we seem to have crossed a parallel too far. Later he equates the hyparchs, men like Spitamenes, Dataphernes, and Catanes, with the insurgent warlords of modern Afghan history (see, e.g., pp. 41, 51f.). He likens Spitamenes and his men to the mujahideen who resisted the Soviets and then went to war with each other (p. 81). He hesitates to follow A. S. Shahbazi6 in thinking that they were motivated by religious fervour, but he is sure that Spitamenes and his group matched the mujahideen in terms of ‘charismatic leadership, fierce local loyalties, shifting alliances, guerrilla tactics, gritty endurance, and inborn xenophobia’ (p. 81); likewise

4 Holt’s work on these coins will now replace the brief commentary provided by M. J. Price, The Coinage in the Name of Alexander the Great and Philip Arrhidaeus 1 (London 1991) esp. 452f.
there was the complete absence of any national purpose and coordinated planning. But the political complexities and dimensions of the situation since 2001, and perhaps more so since 2003, cast some doubt on the value of drawing such parallels. There is some danger of ennobling Bush’s war by giving it millennia of history.

On the campaigns of 328 BC, Holt commends Alexander for realising that he had reached the point where hammer and anvil tactics would not work and chose instead to split his army up, with four brigade commanders operating in Bactria, probably under Craterus’ overall command, while he crossed into Sogdiana, and likewise to divide his contingent into five operational units before he headed south into Margiana, the area around Merv. Thus Alexander avoided the sort of humiliating failures that the Americans suffered at Tora Bora and in the Shah-i Kot Valley (pp. 66-68). Alexander’s strategy also meant that he was able in due course to win over the minds, if not the hearts, of the local populace. Holt cites the case of the village of Xenippa, which refused to allow Bactrian rebels to shelter in their community when the Macedonian army approached (pp. 79 and 84; Curt. 8.2.14-18).

Problems abound in fixing Alexander’s movements geographically since few of the places named by the sources can be positively identified and the sources could be sadly confused as, for example, when Curtius seems to imagine that Maracanda (reasonably well identified as close to modern Samarkand) lay to the north of the Tanais/Iaxartes/Syr-Darya (7.5.36 with 6.10). The problems of establishing a chronology for these campaigns are no less severe and Holt has to make choices. He is not convinced by Bosworth’s revision of the chronology for 328 BC and thus stays with the idea that Alexander personally led a campaign into Margiana. He has also changed his mind on some details since his earlier treatment of the war. Thus, for example, he now would put Sisimithres’ Rock in the vicinity of the Iron Gates on the Shurob River (p. 83), whereas earlier he suggested somewhere beyond Pendzhikent. He notes in support the recent find of a stone catapult ball in the area of the Gates (p. 83). Earlier in his narrative Holt similarly draws in archaeological evidence of pottery finds as somewhat tenuous support for the idea that Alexander crossed into Sogdiana not at Kerki nor at Termez but at Kampyr-Tepe (pp. 38f.), which would indeed seem to have offered a more direct route to the Iron Gates.

Chapter 5, ‘Love and War’ (pp. 85-104), leads into the campaigns of 327 BC, and Alexander’s meeting with Roxane/Rauxnaka, which Holt brings to life by suggesting a likeness between the Bactrian and the Afghan girl whose image was immortalised by the photograph that appeared on the front cover of the June 1985 issue of National Geographic. She was tracked down in 2002 and identified as


8 The earlier reference is at Holt [5] 66 n. 5. I have commented on the range of identifications of the Rock; see J. E. Atkinson, Q. Curzio Rufo, Storie di Alessandro Magno 2: Books 6-10 (Milan 2000) ad 8.2.18-20.
Sharbat Gula, who at the time of the original photograph was about eleven years old and an orphan living as a refugee in Pakistan. Her interviewers found her ‘devout and defiant’ and angry at the photographer’s first ‘presumptive intrusion’ into her life (pp. 88f.). Holt suggests that Roxane, who as a child fell victim to an invading army and was forced into a marriage that cut her off from her own people and country, became similarly resentful. He may well be right in thinking that Aetion’s romantic painting of the marriage of Alexander and Roxane, as described by Lucian (Her. 4-6), was a travesty of the truth.

While Holt makes much of the constants (especially the geographical determinants) and ‘ageless pattern[s]’ (p. 163), he also emphasises the discontinuities, as, for example, in Alexander’s policy of massive settlement in Bactria, which he contrasts with the strategy of modern British, Soviet and American invaders (p. 97). Of particular interest is his reference to dendrochronological evidence that there was a concentration of some of the coolest summers since c. 5400 BC in the period 330-21 BC. Thus he suggests that while Alexander was in Afghanistan in the period 329-27 BC he had to contend with abnormally severe winters (p. 34; cf. p. 92). In the same vein he picks up on a claim in a medical journal that the wound that Alexander suffered at Cyropolis in 329 BC was ‘the first reported case of transient cortical blindness’ (p. 50). Holt begins chapter 7, ‘The Legacy’ (pp. 125-48), with a brief survey of Seleucid attempts to control Bactria and with new generations of warlords. He then covers the rediscovery of Hellenistic Bactrian history in modern times, which leads into the sorry tale of the looting of treasure from Afghanistan that has gone on particularly over the last two and one-half centuries. The scale of the destruction of Afghanistan’s cultural heritage since 1989 is horrendous and, as Holt shows, the blame cannot be heaped just on the Taliban. There is a great deal of value and interest in this book, which should be welcomed by those engaged in Alexander studies and also those who follow affairs in modern Afghanistan.

**ELECTRA TRANSFORMATIONS**

Elke Steinmeyer
Programme in Classics, University of KwaZulu-Natal
Durban 4041, South Africa


Jill Scott’s book *Electra After Freud* consists of an introduction, conclusion and chapters on Hugo von Hofmannsthal (1, 3), Richard Strauss (4), Robert Musil (5),
Heiner Müller (2), H.D. (6) and Sylvia Plath (7). The book is rounded off by an impressive bibliography (pp. 173-90), including publications in English, German, French and Spanish and covering a time span from 1921-2003, and a short index (pp. 191-200). In the introduction (pp. 1-24), Scott outlines clearly her goals, approach and methodology. The dominant role of the Oedipus myth in western culture in the past has been taken over by the Electra myth in the twentieth century. She uses the famous quotation from Müller that ‘[i]n the century of Orestes and Electra that is unfolding, Oedipus will be a comedy’ (p. 6). One possible explanation might be that ‘the twentieth century embraced her [Electra’s] capacity for cruelty and naked pain, perhaps in an effort to come to terms with the appalling violence in the world around us’ (p. 7). Another one might be that the frequently used phrase ‘Electra complex’, coined by C. G. Jung in 1913 as a counterpart to Sigmund Freud’s ‘Oedipus complex’, had never been deeply researched. The selection of texts illustrates Scott’s ‘interest in tracing a particular Germanic and Anglo-American reception of psychoanalysis in the myth of Electra’ (p. 2). She wants to ‘engage with Freud’s early works on hysteria and sexuality but also with the cultural theories of Johann Jacob Bachofen and Walter Benjamin, the philosophy of Ernst Mach, and the feminist psychoanalytic theories of Julia Kristeva and Melanie Klein’ (p. 3) ‘within a theoretical and cultural framework of psychoanalysis, medicine and performing art (opera and dance)’ (p. 4).

Scott starts with a short definition of myth before discussing the Attic tragedies. She is not a classicist and passes over the texts before tragedy very quickly and therefore misses out on the (popular) etymology of the name Electra given by the lyric poet Xanthos in the sixth century BC (PMG fr. 700): the name Electra, spelled with an eta in Greek (‘Ηλέκτρα), is the Dorian dialect form of the Attic word ἅλεκτρα, which means (with alpha privatium) ‘unbedded’. For Scott tragedy was used as a vehicle to ‘demythologize’ myths and to illustrate the growing power of the rational logos over the irrational mythos. She sides with Derrida and against the structuralists: ‘Instead of viewing myth as having a hard kernel or mythologeme, we might envision it as a perpetually deferred signifier, never fully determined’ (p. 23).

The drama of the Austrian author Hofmannsthal is ‘an important catalyst for the Freudian reception of the myth in subsequent adaptations’ (p. 13). Scott investigates the function of Electra’s ‘Totentanz’ (pp. 25-43). Electra’s death has been an invention by Hofmannsthal. She interprets the phenomenon of dance within its cultural context of the fin-de-siècle in Europe when it was associated with ‘disease, morbidity and sexuality’ (p. 27) and with irrationality and madness. Important is the influence of Bachofen’s Mother Right on Hofmannsthal. Elektra’s chthonian, dark nature is closely linked with the feminine and matriarchy, supported by the gloomy, claustrophobic atmosphere in the play. Her death represents ‘the neat transition from the subterranean, material right of the mother to the celestial, Olympian right of the
father’ (p. 38). Finally, Scott applies Walter Benjamin’s concept of allegory to Elektra’s death.

Scott challenges (pp. 57-80) the long established view of Hofmannsthal’s Elektra as a hysteric, postulating that Elektra deliberately stages the symptoms of hysteria as a theatrical performance in order to demonstrate her ‘radical otherness . . . as woman’ (p. 58) and to ‘parody the discourse of hysteria’ (p. 59). Using speech or aphasic disorder, Scott develops an interesting hypothesis: Elektra not only serves as analyst to her mother, but also cures Hofmannsthal himself of his ‘writer’s block’ (p. 61) because the play Elektra is his first work after his crisis, documented in the famous ‘Chandos Letter’ of 1901 as his struggle about ‘the failure of language’ (p. 75). The aspect of performance combines Elektra’s dance and hysteria into one single ‘dancing cure’ (p. 80). Scott takes up the idea of ‘choreographing a cure’ (p. 81) in Strauss’ opera (pp. 81-94). Elektra’s ‘dancing cure’ (pp. 81, 85) is performed through a ‘manipulative dialogue with the waltz’ (p. 85). Scott applies Carolyn Abbate’s theory that music expresses a polyphony or plurality of voices on multiple levels. She concludes that the musical motifs often undermine the words in the libretto. They reveal ‘the decadence of the waning Habsburg Empire’ (p. 81) and Vienna as a ‘neurotic city’ (p. 90). Following the example of Anna O’s ‘talking cure’ and Elektra’s ‘dancing cure’, Strauss himself undergoes a ‘musical cure’ (pp. 81, 94).

Musil’s novel The Man Without Qualities (pp. 95-119) does not mention the name Elektra; the myth, however, ‘permeates the novel like a musical leitmotiv’ (p. 96). Musil explores the motif of the ‘sibling incest’ between Ulrich and Agathe (p. 96) in order ‘to complete his vision of an alternative relational ethics’ (p. 117). Agathe represents the ‘new woman’ (pp. 97, 107), characterised by being ‘hard, tight, boyish’ (p. 113) and ‘androgynous . . . even asexual’ (p. 115) replacing the traditional ‘round, soft, maternal woman’ (p. 113). This shift symbolises the transition from matriarchy to patriarchy and a ‘figurative matricide’ (p. 116). Ulrich rejects his father’s traditional masculinity and adopts a feminised gender orientation: he wants to be a woman, to become his sister and melt with her into one being. Their relationship, never sexually consumed, moves from the feeling of being Siamese twins (Doppelgänger) into a realm of hermaphroditism and a complete, somehow mystical, union where ‘the two have practically fused into one’ (p. 115).

The East German Müller wrote in 1977 Hamletmaschine, which combines the myths of Oedipus and Electra with the story of Hamlet and Ophelia. It is a short, enigmatic text of eight pages that can hardly be described as drama because of its unconventional form. It is written in a sort of telegraph style, very condensed, with a brutal, cruel way of expression, and makes extensive use of quotations from other texts. It has often been seen as ‘Müller’s thinly veiled critique of the GDR’s ahistoric and simplistic approach to Vergangenheitsbewältigung, its problematic antifascist rhetoric, and its totalizing politics’ (p. 47). Elektra threatens to commit suicide and has

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1 Scott comments that, according, to Bachofen Aeschylus’ Oresteia also illustrates ‘the transition from matriarchal law to the role of patriarchy’ (p. 37).
mutilated her body so that ‘she is disabled to the point that she remains confined to a wheelchair from beginning to end’ (p. 53). This physical shortcoming does not prevent her from being full of hatred and desire of destruction. She has taken over the leading role, while Hamlet and Oedipus has simply disappeared from stage, ‘a dispensable, outdated, and problematic ideal’ (p. 56). Müller’s play is full of autobiographical elements. But he leaves a strange legacy: ‘If you don’t understand Hamletmaschine as a comedy, the play will be a failure’ (p. 54 and n. 42).

The Electra myth features in only one single poem cycle of the American poet H.D. with the title A Dead Priestess Speaks. H.D. was inspired by Euripides’ Electra and Orestes, ‘hermaphroditic sexuality’ (p. 120), and Musil’s idea of Siamese twins. There is an encounter not only between Electra and Orestes after the matricide but also between Electra alias the dead priestess and the dead Clytemnestra in the underworld. Electra finally learns to understand and respect her mother. They both represent the two complementing halves of femininity and Electra emerges from this transitional encounter as mature woman. The Electra poems of the American poetess Plath (Electra on Azalea Path; The Colossus; Daddy) illustrate a similar transition into a new form of femininity. Plath deals with the autobiographical loss of her father and her suffering from the Electra complex (p. 143). By the extensive use of cannibalistic images (as in the Greek myths of Atreus, Thyestes and Tantalus), Plath undergoes a figurative process of mourning for the dead father by trying to incorporate in various ways the lost object. She negates the former father-image, falsifying it by turning him into a monster. After the act of incorporation, Plath undergoes the opposite process, ‘reversed incorporation’ (pp. 152f., 160), by expelling him from her poetry and life. The last step ‘away from the mourning daughter toward the fertile, creative and nurturing mother, from Electra to Clytemnestra’ (p. 161) completes the process.

Claudia Gründig’s Elektra durch die Jahrhunderte consists of three main parts: Tradition und Rezeption (pp. 26-45), Transformation und Innovation (pp. 46-129) and Vergleichende Betrachtungen (pp. 130-147), framed by a preface (pp. 7-9), an introduction (pp. 11-25) and a short conclusion (pp. 148f.). It is completed by an appendix (p. 150), a comprehensive bibliography with strong emphasis on German scholarship (pp. 155-172), and a register (pp. 173-177). The appendix is an extremely useful chronological list of all Electra and Orestes adaptations that she could find (including a puppet play or ‘Kaspertheater’ by Gottfried Reinhardt from 1970), an updated version of Pierre Brunel’s. In the introduction, Gründig states her goal. Gründig investigates the transformations of the myth of Electra and Orestes in the last century using a multitude of terms: ‘Metamorphosen’ (p. 17), ‘Reinkarnationen’ (p. 17), ‘Mythenadaptation’ (p. 18), ‘moderne Reprisen’ (p. 18). Her four key questions are (p. 19): (1) In what ways do modern adaptations differ from their classical models? (2) What do modern adaptations have in common with each other and where do they differ? (3) Can we trace any specific influences from the authors in these adaptations? (4) Under which aspects was the myth adapted? There are a few minor glitches in the introduction: in the table of contents, the introduction is correctly numbered with II, while in the text we find a slightly confusing I (pp. 5, 11); Plath
appears among a group of prose writers but is correctly identified as a poet in the appendix (pp. 12, 153); and finally Brunel’s monograph *Le Mythe d’Électre* appeared in 1971 and was only reprinted in 1995 (cf. pp. 24, 161). Gründig briefly defines (pp. 26-45) the terms ‘Mythos’ and ‘Mythenrenaissance’; more interesting are the links to the intellectual movements of the respective epochs (p. 40). Hofmannsthal was influenced by Impressionism characterised by suffering and death; Eliot by ‘Humanästhetik’, Sartre by Existentialism, O’Neill by ‘Psycho-Realismus’, and Hauptmann by Neo-Classicism (pp. 42f.).

Gründig selected five pieces for her study: Hofmannsthal’s *Elektra* (pp. 46-64), O’Neill’s *Mourning Becomes Electra* (pp. 65-84), Eliot’s *The Family Reunion* (pp. 84-100), Sartre’s *Les Mouches* (pp. 100-16) and Hauptmann’s *Atriden-Tetralogie: Elektra* (pp. 116-29). Each chapter starts with a brief overview about the sources used by the author, some biographical information, and the circumstances in writing his adaptation. This offers a solid background for the subsequent reading, a detailed summary with explanatory and interpretative comments. Each chapter ends with several motives from the text, which Gründig analyses by applying the relevant scholarship and, where possible, quotations from the authors themselves. Here one can see the fundamental difference between English and German scholarship. While Scott applies the same hypothesis to each text and draws the results consequently into one coherent line of argument with a substantial theoretical underpinning, Gründig uses a more traditional, inductive (p. 19) method, providing a sort of commented reading of each text individually, and provides a much more text-immanent interpretation.

The main motives in Hofmannsthal’s play are the constant tension between being and becoming, faithfulness and transformation. Electra’s death is a logical consequence. None of the three female characters is living in the present. Hofmannsthal is doing away deliberately with the Sophoclean theology and uses psychopathology. O’Neill’s trilogy *Mourning Becomes Electra* has a plot that is very similar to its main source text, Aeschylus’ *Oresteia*, but is dominated by Realism, Puritanism and Calvinism. There is no god, no Christian mercy, only retribution; the destinies of the characters lie in their emotions and the fatal network of these emotions among the family members. Most of their names are derived from the Old Testament. The motif of the masks is very important.

It is difficult to trace the ancient Electra theme in Eliot’s *The Family Reunion*, because the ancient names have been replaced by modern ones and the family constellation is different. Orestes is Harry, while the ancient mother-figure is split into two opposite female characters: Harry’s mother Amy (= Clytemnestra) and his aunt and mother’s sister Agatha (= Electra).2 Agatha had an emotional relationship with Harry’s father, who hated his wife and was pushed into suicide by her. Amy has never forgiven her sister for the close relationship with her husband. She is the matriarch of

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2 In this context, we should remember that in Robert Musil’s novel *The Man Without Qualities* the modern counterpart of Electra is also called Agathe.
the family and the estate. Eight years after he left home, Harry comes back for his mother’s birthday. He has been married but has lost his wife under unclear circumstances. At the end he leaves again and therefore causes his mother’s death. All the characters behave in a somehow lifeless manner. Eliot also introduces a strong religious Christian element of the search for redemption.

Sartre’s *Les Mouches* can be seen both as a drama of Resistance and a drama of Existentialism. It mirrors the occupation of France by Germany in World War II and the French *Résistance* and explores the question of freedom. There are references to the earlier French drama *Électre* by Giraudoux. The flies symbolise the remorse and bad conscience of the inhabitants of Argos, their collective guilt, when they keep silent about the murder of Agamemnon. The flies grow up into the Erinyes after the matricide. Electra gives up her freedom and subjects herself to the god Jupiter, who is depicted as a sort of devil, while Orestes makes his choice freely and autonomously. He leaves Argos and takes all the flies with him; he is condemned to total and complete freedom and isolation. This illustrates Sartre’s existentialist philosophy. In a more political context one can interpret Orestes as a (French) freedom fighter against the dictatorship of (German) Aegistus and the collaborators (Clytemnestra) of the Vichy regime in the France of 1943.

Hauptmann’s *Elektra* is the third piece in his *Atridentetralogie*. He uses the myth in order to illustrate his idea of an archaic and barbaric Hellenism where the characters are again determined by divine forces. He increases the role of Pylades, who kills Aegisthus, and changes the matricide into an act of self-defence: Orestes longs for maternal love, but his mother attacks him physically and forces him to defend his own life. Elektra takes over Cassandra’s prophetic powers and seems to be very remote from human emotions. The main reason for her hatred is not her hatred but instead the archaic law of blood retribution. Many scholars have seen the *Atridentetralogie* as Hauptmann’s attempt to come to terms with the disaster at the end of World War 2.

Grundig reaches a final, unexpected conclusion: she feels that there has been no real change in the ancient myth but rather just an external metamorphosis because the basic elements of the plot remain the same in all versions. As the *summa summarum*, it can be said that the two books under discussion are well informed (although both ignore the recent chapter on Strauss’ *Elektra* by Simon Goldhill3), clear, precise and pleasant to read. A follow-up on the development of the myth in the more recent decades would be indeed a welcome sequel.

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A WORLD OF ROMAN MYTHS

Alison B. Griffith
Department of Classics, University of Canterbury
Christchurch, New Zealand


In this eloquently written, artfully crafted and highly original book, Wiseman’s objectives are these: to demonstrate that there is a rich world of Roman myths, to trace its development from the eighth century BC to the late first century AD, and to reconcile with it a few elusive conundrums of Roman myth and religious institutions. But Wiseman also explores the comparatively unfettered knowledge and use of Roman myth in art, literature and political ideologies from late antiquity to the eighteenth century in order to challenge the idea of the ‘mythless Romans’—lacking divine myths on the order and scale of Greek mythology, and using historical myth in manner as idiosyncratic as it was unimaginative—as a modern construct imposed by nineteenth century scholarship. Everyone professionally engaged in the study of ancient Rome, or in myths of the ancient world, should read this book, even if, according to Wiseman, *The Myths of Rome* was written for a non-specialist audience.

This non-specialist pitch is facilitated by considerable didactic supporting material. Frequent intratextual references link discussion of myths and topics across chapters, which are conveniently subdivided by numbered text headings. The subject matter of the numerous plates and illustrations is either well captioned or discussed substantively in the text, but there are also thirty-one topics treated as digressions from the main text on grey-shaded pages. The endnotes (not marked in the text) are referenced with page numbers and key phrases and refer the reader mainly to primary sources. (Those interested in secondary scholarship must often cull it from the extensive but selected bibliography). In sum, everything possible has been done to assist the non-specialist, yet Wiseman assumes a basic knowledge of Roman history or at least the reader’s capacity to absorb a prodigious quantity of information at each sitting.

*The Myths of Rome* grows out of Wiseman’s previous scholarship. The organisation is chronological, meaning that the material is arranged ‘according to its probable age’ (p. 12). This results in some displacement in mythical time, as with the Romulus myth, which is not treated extensively until the late fourth and early third centuries. Wiseman contends that myths have a discernible beginning, a first telling, and thus he retells the myths of Rome as part of a dialogue with cultural, social, political, and historical circumstances. As in his earlier work, Wiseman emphasises the dramatic quality that characterises Roman ‘historical’ myth and its likely
development and dissemination through theatrical performance. What makes this book both stimulating and compelling is Wiseman’s tenacious focus on the cusp, that critical but elusive phase when historical figures became legendary, in order to show why these myths arose.

Despite claims to a wider appeal, this book is academic in terms of its subject and Wiseman’s interpretation of it. This is, however, Roman myth according to the author; the argument is implicit and nowhere does Wiseman actively debate or defend an issue. His treatment of just one exhaustively published topic, the enigmatic Argei, illustrates this point. The description of the sacraria Argeorum (‘Argive shrines’) and of the sacrifice of the Argei (‘straw effigies’) appears within the ‘Argive’ myth cycle (p. 25) and, in an alternate explanation, in the Hercules and Evander cycle (p. 31) in the same chapter. Using Servius’ commentary on the Aeneid and Servius auctus, Wiseman relates that the Argives came to be in Rome through Danae’s sons: Argos (killed and memorialised in the toponym ‘Argiletum’) and Argeios (though how his progeny came to have shrines is not explained). Alternatively, Hercules founded the ceremony of ‘sacrificing’ straw effigies of men in honour of his Argive comrades by casting them into the Tiber River. The notes (pp. 312f.) refer to the relevant ancient sources and to three major secondary sources where extensive bibliography on this subject (prior to 1997) can be found; however, there is but the faintest allusion to considerable scholarly preoccupation with the sacrifice of the Argei (p. 280). Even if it must be read carefully and used cautiously, this book is an eminently scholarly endeavour. Wiseman has an uncanny knack not only for exposing and clarifying Roman myths by grouping them into cycles but also for digesting copious detail to reveal meaning in variation. Using a broad base of literary, iconographical, and archaeological evidence, he focuses unwaveringly on what it tells us. The following review of the content of each chapter therefore sketches only some of the major points of the discussion.

Chapter 1, ‘The Triumph of Flora’ (pp.1-12), elucidates Tiepolo’s 1743 painting ‘The Empire of Flora’ and several other Renaissance masterpieces using their probable and then more widely read inspiration of Ovid’s Fasti. The point is clear: if we cast aside preconceptions born of nineteenth and twentieth century scholarship and cinematic representation, the world of Roman myth can be recovered. With Flora as an entrée into this world, Wiseman suggests that Roman myth is about liberty in both its political and personal senses for, as he frequently shows, Roman myths expose an undercurrent of fun and lack of inhibition that also permeated correlative religious activities (e.g., games and theatre). But, Wiseman reiterates, Roman history and myth are not mutually exclusive since a myth is ‘a story that matters to a community, one that is told and retold because it has a significance for one generation after another [whether it is in our terms] historical, pseudo-historical or totally fictitious’ (pp. 10f.). Thus Wiseman contends that Roman myth told Rome’s story, which was largely about liberty and the people.

The array of Greek myths attached to cities and places in Italy is the subject of chapter 2, ‘Latins and Greeks’ (pp. 13-36). As the now considerable body of
archaeological evidence shows, Rome (and by extension Roman myth) and Greek myth were roughly contemporary in their formative period in the ninth and early eighth centuries BC. Greek expansion into Italy and Sicily in the eighth and seventh centuries also had an overland route, as is substantiated by artifacts, toponyms, language, hero cults and religious practices, variant versions of myths and mythical ancestors. Using Servius’ commentary, Wiseman demonstrates this point through the myths themselves, which are related and interrelated as four cycles: (a) Trojan stories, (b) the Argonauts, (c) the Argives, Hercules and Evander ([a]-[c] are all analogues of exploration), and finally (d) Saturnus and Liber. In short, the seventh century BC tradition of Odysseus (and Circe) in Italy shows that Greeks brought their stories with them and that these continued to develop in their new homeland. We know the myths from later versions, but Wiseman is careful to indicate stories (e.g., the Palladion) whose multiple versions also betray their age. Finally, Wiseman links the myth of Saturn (Greek Kronos) to the Capitolium, to several deities of the Forum Boarium, to the grove of Semele and through her—and this is important for much of Wiseman’s argument for myths ‘by, of and for the People’—Liber.

With chapter 3, ‘Kings (and After)’ (pp. 37-62), Wiseman shifts to the stories that typify ‘Roman’ myth: the curious blend of legend and history pervasive in the surviving historical sources, not just in the pre- and early historical periods but, as Wiseman shows, throughout Roman history. Here the myths of the late regal period and the early republic, many of them concerned with securing the libertas (‘freedom, liberty, independence’) of the Roman People, are again grouped, or more accurately, disentangled, into cycles: the Corinthian origins of the House of Tarquin, the tale of Aulus and Caile Vipinas, the evidence and myths of Servius Tullius, and the myths and miracles surrounding Numa and the two Tarquins. The chapter closes with the sixteen tribes of Rome, and Wiseman draws attention to the most ‘mythical’ of them, the Aemilii, Claudii, Corneli, Fabii, and Horatii, to set the stage—and the relative age—for the myths of the republic.

Liber’s importance to the nascent republic is the subject of chapter 4, ‘The God of Liberty and Licence’ (pp. 63-86). Here Wiseman examines Liber’s ideological suitability for both interested parties (patricians and plebeians), noting from the outset the significant placement of the Liberalia (March 17) in the calendar. Underscored are Liber’s multiple spheres as a god both of physical, spiritual and sexual liberty and of social and political freedom—both patrician ‘freedom to’ and plebeian ‘freedom from’ (p. 67), as well as his close connection to ‘law’. In this chapter Wiseman draws important parallels with Athens and suggests that Romans’ own consciousness of these parallels shaped development in multiple spheres during the early republic: civic and political institutions, the prominence of the law, religion, and the myths themselves. To close the chapter, two sections tie in Liber’s other side; the world of ecstasy and sexual licence reflected in several springtime religious festivals and drama in which cavorting (by actors and ordinary Romans) in the manner of nymphs and satyrs was de rigueur.
Chapter 5, ‘What Novius Knew’ (pp. 87-118), opens with a pithy summary of the late fifth and early fourth centuries, juxtaposing triumph (the conquest of Veii) and humiliating tragedy (the Gallic sack of Rome) to set the socio-political scene. This was a world in which the turn of events gave the people better political leverage. The centrepiece of the chapter focuses on Novius Plautus’ creation known as the Ficoroni Cista and the story world of fourth-century Rome as revealed by bronze cistae and mirrors. Here Wiseman treats us to myths not otherwise attested and recreates a world of Dionysian drama in which Liber, satyr/nymph pairs, an easy mix of mortals and gods, ‘sexual frankness’ and epic farce predominate. Though this world is at odds with the view of fourth-century Rome in our (later) historical sources, Wiseman maintains that the seeds of the great hero tales of Rome were sown at this point (p. 118) and that the Roman people’s gods, amongst them Liber, Quirinus, Mars, the Lares, and Victory came into their own.

At the book’s midpoint in chapter 6, ‘History and Myth’ (pp. 119-48), Rome (Greek Rhome, ‘strength’) has by 275 BC superseded the power of her mythological mentor. So also the plebeians had made significant gains against the patrician oligarchy. Competition for power is replicated in the mythopoeic sphere: historical figures from past epoch-making events—the capture of Veii, the Gallic sack, the overthrow of the Tarquins—crystallised into heroes and new cycles of quasi-historical legend, suggests Wiseman (p. 126). Thus plebeian gains were symbolised and reinforced with temple dedications and promulgated more widely with bronze statuary representing Lucius Brutus and Marcus Camillus, heroes of the ‘liberation’ from the Tarquins. But Wiseman tells the stories of these heroes in two ways: first as tales in which quick-thinking plebeians save Rome in the face of patrician failure (the early fourth century version) and then as legends in which patricians (M. Furius [Camillus] and M. Manlius) save the day (the mid fourth century version). At this point the proliferation of detail surrounding the palace and familial politics of the Tarquins was used to promote the (mythical) roles of plebeian and patrician families alike. An aspect of late fourth-century Rome such as consular power-sharing is projected back onto the past in myths. Thus Wiseman lodges the cycle of foundation myths firmly in the wars of the late fourth and early third centuries; Remus (like Publius Decius Mus) had to sacrifice himself so that Romulus could found Rome, whose people were said to be a blend of Latins, Sabines and others.

In the third century BC came the myths about Roman values and identity that helped Rome rise from the ashes of Cannae (chapter 7, ‘Facing Both Ways’, pp. 149-78). Here are the stories of paradigmatic Romans revered for their fides (G. Fabricius and Marcus Attilius Regulus), for their modest, turnip-eating ways (Manius Curius), and for their willing self-sacrifice for the greater good (Cincinnatus). Romans’ religious devotio is reflected by numerous temple dedications; here Wiseman pays particular attention to those of Janus, Juturna, Fons and Flora, returning again to the world of gods debauching nymphs, which provided material for four and soon-to-be six sets of games. Conflict with Carthage inspired more temple-building, this time to imported deities (Venus Erycina and Magna Mater) and marked the beginning of fully
historical Romans with divine parentage (Publius Scipio). The triumph of Rome over Hannibal had modest but potent mythical implications famously summarised in Polybius’ description of Roman funerals. The influence of this ‘national’ thinking is simultaneously explored with reference to the American founding fathers. Even here Wiseman emphasises the theatrical element at funerals and Polybius’ identification of the use of theatre in Roman religion as a means of social control.

Chapter 8, ‘Power and the People’ (pp. 179-226), takes us from the battle of Zama to Augustus. Here the framework is completely historical and avowedly populist, but the chapter is also about (not necessarily exemplary) Romans whose deeds, demeanour, convictions—and, yes, historical circumstances—made some legendary, others mythical, and still others divine. Wiseman succinctly captures the degree of moral turpitude and brutality by recounting the careers of the great grandchildren of Gnaeus and Publius Scipio. It was during this period, he suggests, that much myth was forged; both political factions projected the image of socio-political struggle back onto the early republic and, with the assistance of contemporary (often eyewitness) authors, created the stereotypical Roman ancestors whose sound character and moral excellence contrasted sharply with that of their late republican descendants. In an age of unprecedented violence, Romulus’ fratricide resonated all too clearly such that Augustus drew on the more distant Aeneas as his mythical ancestor and Apollo as his tutelary god.

Few family histories show that truth is stranger than fiction (or myth) quite as well as that of Augustus (chapter 9, ‘Caesars’ [pp. 227-78]). Wiseman relates this well-documented and familiar tale (‘one of the most enduring myths of Rome’, p. 238) with a new twist simply by bringing the roles of women (as mothers and wives) and children to the foreground. The people still had a part to play in making and unmaking heroes and villains (‘For the People’s interests were vested in the princeps . . .’, p. 238), and as the audience for plays in which myths, both ‘ancient’ and contemporary, were a perennial hit. As Wiseman cautions, we cannot know how much popular drama influenced even reasonably reliable authors like Tacitus (‘. . . with such people [the stories] might just be true’, p. 258); and he offers a detailed synopsis of Seneca’s Octavia, as proof that plays must have been as powerful and compelling as modern film and television.

The final chapter, ‘The Dream that was Rome’ (pp. 279-308), brings the story forward in time by recounting not the afterlife of Roman myths but their reinvention in later ages. Wiseman credits initial transmission to Servius and especially to his contemporary Augustine, who in the City of God ensured the posterity of Roman myths by representing Romans of superior character and moral excellence as timeless exempla. Much later Romans’ civic virtue and libertas (still for some ‘freedom to’ and for others ‘freedom from’) became ‘stories that mattered’ in new eras and in strikingly diverse political contexts. Playwrights even ‘restored’ some of the tales to the stage, preserving new versions of old myths for modern Britain, Europe and colonial outposts in the newly rediscovered Americas. Roman ‘liberators’ were in due course (a logical inevitability) invoked for various revolutions until their submergence during
the nineteenth- and twentieth-century fixation with empires. Roman myth re-emerges once again with ‘toga plays’ (and novels) and their film and television adaptations. Though Wiseman makes no direct comparisons to the twenty-first century, readers will find that the myths of Rome resonate as clearly as ever, just as they did for Macaulay, Shakespeare, Machiavelli and back through time to their first telling.

SCOPIC ORGIASTS AND CATOPTRIC VISUALITIES

John L. Hilton
Programme in Classics, University of KwaZulu-Natal
Durban 4041, South Africa


In 1960 T. F. Carney produced a commentary for undergraduates on book 3 of Achilles Tatius’ novel, Leucippe and Clitophon.1 Carney’s intention may have been to produce an introductory reading text that featured blacks for students in what was then Rhodesia and Nyasaland, since it is in this book that the reader for the first time encounters the boukoloi, who are described (3.9.2) as ‘black-skinned’ (μέλανες . . . τὴν χροιάν). More recent research has argued that Achilles Tatius based this lurid episode on more or less contemporary events, coloured perhaps with elements drawn from an earlier Egyptian narrative, and featuring a sensational human sacrifice.2 Morales makes very little of this cultural, historical and literary context.3 Instead, in

1 T. F. Carney (ed.), Achilles Tatius: Leucippe and Clitophon, Book 3 (Salisbury 1960). Although hardly adequate by today’s standards, this is still the only introductory text on Achilles Tatius in English to my knowledge.


3 Alston [2] and Rutherford [2] are omitted from the otherwise extensive bibliography. Morales briefly recapitulates the debate on the religious nature of the sacrifice of Leucippe, however (p. 168 n. 27), and quotes K. Hopwood, ‘All that May Become a Man: The Bandit in the Ancient Novel’, in L. Foxhall and J. Salmon (edd.), Thinking Men: Masculinity and its Self- Representation in the Classical Tradition (London 1998) 195-204, for the similarity with the oath of the Catilinarian conspirators (p. 201).
her discussion of the revolt, she focuses her attention on the way the narrative presents the reader with an androcentric spectacle, Leukippe’s scheintod. This emphasis is in keeping with the overall focus on gender and the gaze in the book.

Parts of Vision and Narrative will already be known to those who have read Morales’ previous work on Achilles Tatius: a revised version of her Cambridge doctoral thesis (1997) forms the basis of the volume; her ‘Taming of the View’ article (1995) appears here as the sub-section ‘Women and Other Animals’ (pp. 184-99); and ‘Sense and Sententiousness’, an article in an edited collection (2000), now features as ‘Sightseeing in Alexandria’ (pp. 100-06). The focus of the original study has no doubt shifted in this time. The preface states that the ‘primary’ aim of this book is ‘to further our appreciation and understanding of this novel through a series of close readings of the narrative, and discussion of its texture and structure, themes and ideology’ (p. ix); however, it also makes the gaze ‘an organising principle’ (p. ix) in the narrative and sets out ‘to make a contribution to the cultural history of viewing’ (p. x). The reader will surmise that there is a certain tension between these two objectives and that what may have started as a monograph on Achilles Tatius (p. 1) has been overtaken by a wider-ranging investigation into vision, eroticism and gender in Greek literature at the height of the Roman empire. The obvious danger in a work with such different destinations in view is that it will arrive at neither. On the one hand, the present volume is not a traditional, comprehensive and systematic study of all aspects of Achilles Tatius’ novel (if that is still possible or indeed even desirable); for that to have been the case, in addition to the boukoloi episode mentioned above and the problem of cultural identity in the text, discussion would have been needed on the relationship between Achilles Tatius and the comic-realistic novel, the place of this text in the history of sexuality, the connection between Leucippe and Heliodorus’ Aithiopika, and the nature of literary parody, to name only a few salient issues.

On the other hand, one can envisage a more widely discursive treatment of vision and gender in the second and third centuries of our era than is offered here. Nevertheless, this is a wide-ranging theoretical study that makes important observations about Achilles Tatius and brings classical scholarship firmly up to date in the contemporary debate on the interrelationship between vision and gender.

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As Morales observes (p. 1), before now *Leucippe* ‘has been left on the shelf’ by critics, originally at least because of negative perceptions of its morality—so much is clear from the comments of Photius (87.66a.21; 94.73b.24; cf. Morales p. 73 and n. 117) and the omissions made by sixteenth-century translators (p. 7). To some extent the concerns of these early scholars were lessened by the didacticism and sententiousness of the work (p. 112 and n. 62), but even here and particularly today there are problems: the *sententiae* or rather *gnomai* (conveniently listed on pp. 109f.) are sometimes self-evidently hypocritical (p. 113), androcentric (pp. 113f.) or ethnocentric (pp. 114-17). For Morales this problem is connected with the literary status of the text: ‘Uncertainty about how to understand the moral attitudes of *Leucippe and Clitophon*, and whether or not it has a coherent moral agenda, is at the heart of debates about the extent to which Achilles strains the conventions of the genre or breaks them. It is an issue to which this book repeatedly returns’ (p. 7). In addition, ancient attitudes to sexual morality and identity were profoundly affected by their ‘visualities’ (pp. 21-23). Thus, in Morales’ view, our evaluation of this text depends to a large extent on a proper understanding of the way it handles ‘vision and narrative’. In this book the emphasis falls above all on vision rather than on narrative (there are, for example, eight subheadings under ‘vision’ in the index and none for ‘narrative’). This is no doubt appropriate since visuality and its relation to gender are the topics that are most original in this study.

Morales introduces the problem of vision in Achilles Tatius by contextualising ‘visuality in Graeco-Roman imperial culture’ and by tracing ‘some important continuities and differences between ancient and modern theories and representations of the gaze’ (pp. 8-35). Her subtle analysis of a mosaic from Antioch, illustrated opposite the title page of the book, shows the complexity of the visual dynamics at work in it (pp. 11-14). This section provides a brief survey of the mélange of Platonic and Stoic ideas of vision that were hotly debated in the second century, sets the intellectual context and touches on issues such as the corporality of the process of sight, its directionality, its connection with desire and self-knowledge, the role of social identity (whether educated or not, masculine or feminine, subjective or objective, displayed or revealed), and its similarities and differences with modern visualities (similar especially in relation to the gendered ‘metaphorics of the gaze’, pp. 32f.): ‘The gaze attempts to master and make meaning of the world’ (p. 35). Vision is often the subject of *gnomai* (1.9.4f.; 5.13.4; 6.6.2-4, 6.7.1-3) that draw on Platonic, Stoic, and pseudo-scientific atomist ideas about vision. The eye is ‘iconic’ in the novel (pp. 140-43).

The problem that Morales poses with regard to much of this visual material is whether it is deployed teleologically or not (pp. 36f.). Her answer is that the narrative is frequently polysemous or at least ‘bivalent’ (p. 43), as in the case of the opening description of Europa, which can also be taken as a depiction of Selene (an interpretation in part based on a textual crux at 1.4.2f.). The narrative is a ‘swarm’ of

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6 I. Bekker (ed.), *Photii Bibliotheca* (Berlin 1824).
‘Phoenician’ (that is, lurid and salacious) tales (pp. 48-60) with overtones of Platonic and Stoic philosophy, but with no ‘coherent and exclusive ideologies’ (p. 60). Platonism and Stoicism are not absent from the text but are frequently parodied and subverted (pp. 66f.). The narrative frequently reveals a theatrical or mimic character, and in book 2 (especially 2.35-38) delves into material derived from erotic handbooks that is characterised by ‘extravagance and obscenity’ (p. 75), particularly in the debate as to whether girls or boys are better able to provide sexual pleasure in kissing and intercourse. From the opening paragraph of the novel, which describes in sexual terms the sea traffic into the kolpos of the mother city, Sidon, readers are unsure whether or not they are reading a pornographic text (cf. p. 76). The narrative is often ambivalent, however, because of the way the world is read by the characters: Clitophon reads it as an erastes (especially in his tour of Alexandria, 5.1), Thersander as a ‘beast’, ‘a stereotypical jealous husband and bully’ (p. 83), Conops as a voyeur and polupragmon, and Callisthenes as a profligate (an akolastos).

The unity and coherence of the narrative is again at issue in the discussion of the parenthetic digressions in Leucippe, previously condemned as ‘irrelevancies’ that work against the coherence of the narrative. Morales makes a systematic study of these elements, particularly the gnomai that are interspersed throughout the work. She argues that these may have a comic function, as in the case of Thersander’s reaction to the rejection of his advances by Leucippe (6.19.1-5), or may ‘operate as instruments of deferral’ (p. 120) frustrating the reader’s desire for closure. This strategy Morales sees as ‘the basic resource of the novelistic genre’ (p. 121) and the ‘architectural principle’ of Achilles’ Leucippe (p. 126). It is exemplified above all in the ending of the novel, which notoriously finishes in Byzantium, rather than in Sidon where it begins—the narrative does not return to its opening framework. According to Morales, this is ‘designedly inconsistent’ (p. 144) rather than an indication of authorial carelessness, and part of the ‘hermeneutic patterns of the narrative itself’ (p. 147). In other words, the lack of closure at the end of the novel is in keeping with the same inconclusiveness elsewhere (for example, in the comparison between homosexual and heterosexual love and in the fables). According to Morales, this does not simply compound the problem. Instead, the reader is deliberately left unsatisfied about the outcome of the narrative, since lack of satisfaction is the ‘height of pleasure’ (cf. 2.36.1). The structure of the novel is purposefully not teleological.

Another major issue that Morales addresses is the gendered nature of Achilles’ discourse. She points out, for example, that Leucippe never lays down the law in sententious statements, as the male characters do, and that the novel is the ‘least

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9 See B. E. Perry, The Ancient Romances: A Literary-Historical Account of Their Origins (Berkeley 1967) 119 (and other references cited by Morales on p. 96f.).
emotionally gynocentric of all the Greek novels’ (p. 114). She begins her final chapter, ‘Gender, Gaze, and Speech’ (pp. 152-226) by observing that in terms of sexual experience there is little symmetry between Leucippe and Clitophon (p. 153). This lack of equivalence is most apparent in the directionality of the gaze in the novel, though this is not a simple matter. Leucippe is the target of male vision and ‘scopic asymmetry’ is a structural feature of the book, but this does not leave men unaffected by the visual experience. On the other hand, Leucippe is empowered through the exhibition of her body, but this is not a matter of her own volition. Moreover, the gaze in Leucippe is consumptive (women are often equated with food) and Clitophon is an ‘optical orgiast’ (p. 166). There is also considerable violence in the way Leucippe is viewed, especially in the ‘catoptric’ (p. 167) scene of her Scheintod at the hands of Menelaus (3.15), with its undertones of snuff drama, and in the emphasis on weapons in these descriptions. Similar violence occurs in the ekphrasis on the rescue of Andromeda (particularly her deathly pallor, 3.7.2) and in Achilles’ treatment of the myths of Philomela (5.3.4) and Syrinx (esp. 8.6.10). Furthermore, the anthropomorphic, metaphorical accounts of the sexual intercourse of the viper (1.18.3) and the genital inspection of the phoenix (3.25.7) are contextually linked to Leucippe and serve to ‘animalise’ her (p. 198). Finally, Morales attributes the emphasis on Leucippe’s sexuality and chastity to the popular male fantasy of the ‘virgin whore’ (p. 218). These gender stereotypes are, however, to some extent contested by the countertype of Leucippe in the novel, Melite (pp. 220-26).

The bibliography (pp. 232-58) is wide-ranging but almost inevitably not comprehensive. At a rough count it consists of some twenty-seven pages with about 700 entries, approximately 118 of which are interdisciplinary rather than strictly classical. These latter citations can be crudely broken down into the following categories: gender (42), literary theory (32), vision (30), the media (8) and psychology (6). Morales also has a good knowledge of French literature as her references to the

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11 Editors of journals will note with concern the rising numbers of chapters in books and the corresponding decline in journal articles cited in this book; Morales refers to 159 journal articles of all kinds (including articles on textual criticism and reviews) and no fewer than 136 chapters in books. Some errors have made their way into the bibliography. In particular, some edited books are not given their own entries, although normally they are. See, e.g., the entries for H.-G. Beck (1976), ‘Marginalia on the Byzantine Novel’, in Reardon (1976) 59-74 (Reardon 1976 is not in the bibliography, unless Reardon 1977 is meant); E. L. Bowie (1991)
flâneur, ‘the modernist urban viewer’ (p. 103), the sententiousness of eighteenth-century French fiction (p. 108), and the sixteenth-century French genre of poems on the body parts of women, the *blasons anatomiques du corps féminin* (p. 138 and n. 109), indicate. This is an ambitious book that succeeds in its aim of contributing to ‘the cultural history of viewing’ (p. ix). It brings classical scholarship up to date on a number of contemporary issues in the fields of gender studies and psychology. It also frequently delights in the rhetorical exuberance of Achilles Tatius that makes it such a pleasurable (and at times disturbing) text to read. As such Morales’ monograph is to be highly commended.

‘Hellenism in Writers of the Early Second Sophistic’, in S. Saïd (Saïd is not cited separately). D. H. Roberts, F. M. Dunn and D. Fowler (1997) lacks its title of *Classical Closure: Reading the End in Greek and Latin Literature*. P. L. Furiani’s article ‘Il Corpo nel Romanzo di Achille Tazio’, which is listed in the 2000-01 volume of *Ancient Narrative*, is cited as 2002 on p. 142 and as 2003 in the bibliography. In general the book is well produced, but occasionally references are incorrect (e.g., on p. 190 the reference to the phoenix, cited as 3.2.7, should be 3.25.7).
REVIEWS

Scholia publishes solicited and unsolicited short reviews. Short reviews to be considered for publication should be directed to the Reviews Editor, Scholia.


This elegant volume presents the first published English translation of a Greek work preserved in eleven medieval manuscripts under the name of Kleomedes and traditionally known as Caelestia or Meteora. The aim of the treatise is to survey Stoic cosmology and astronomy. It is best known today as the source of the fullest account of Eratosthenes’ technique for measuring the size of the earth, though this account only occupies a digression (1.7) and is sometimes dismissed as unreliable, just as the whole treatise has unfairly been called ‘disordered and often trivial’. What we have is only the small surviving part of a much longer survey of Stoic teachings. Of Kleomedes nothing is known save that he was a Stoic teacher in the Roman period (presumably in the eastern Mediterranean world). The present editors reject Neugebauer’s astronomical argument for a fourth century AD date, as they do the suggestion that Kleomedes refers to the equation of time (the annual variation in the length of the day due to the elliptical form of the earth’s orbit around the sun) and must therefore postdate Ptolemy of Alexandria. They prefer not to attempt a close dating, limiting his possible floruit to the period between Poseidonios (ca. 135-ca. 51 BC) and ca. AD 250 (pp. 2-4).

As the editors observe, Kleomedes assumes an importance greater than he probably deserves simply by the accident of being ‘the only work of “school” Stoicism from its period to survive intact’ (p. xi). He himself describes his two-part text as scholika (2.2) and scholai (2.7), terms both well rendered here as ‘lecture courses’. We do not know how long an ancient lecture typically lasted or how the text we have may relate to what was delivered orally. The present translation of about 40,000 words might take six or seven hours to deliver at a measured pace (much longer with elaboration and discussion), so two courses, rather than two lectures, is a reasonable guess. The translation (pp. 21-165) is based on Todd’s own edition of the text. The commentary is given in extensive footnotes on these pages. Also provided are an introduction (pp. 1-18), twenty-five diagrams at the end explaining the relevant spherical astronomy (pp. 168-92), an appendix on Poseidonios fragment 18 in

Edelstein-Kidd (pp. 193-204; translation at 199-204), a useful glossary giving the transliterated Greek equivalents of some 170 relevant scientific and philosophical terms (pp. 205-09), and a bibliography (pp. 211-21). The volume closes with an index of modern corpora (e.g., *SVF*) that include passages from Kleomedes (p. 223), a general index (pp. 225-30) and an *index locorum* (pp. 231-38). The general index is disappointingly short and in my view it is more helpful if an *index locorum* precedes a general index, giving the latter the final place in a volume so that it can be found most easily. The publishers are to be congratulated, however, for choosing footnotes in favour of endnotes (always inconvenient and these days typographically inexcusable) and on the overall production values of the volume: non-glossy paper, an elegant font (Janson) with increased line spacing and in the main text ‘old style’ or non-lining numerals (always easy on the eye), \(^3\) Greek type where warranted, and near-perfect proof-reading.\(^4\) The translation aims at readability rather than being closely literal. In Kleomedes’ astonishing tirade against the Epicureans in 2.1, for example, he declaims (in a literal rendering), ‘Will you not get rid of yourself . . . to the saffron robes and the concubines with whom you will pass the day on their couches . . . ?’. More fluently, the editors render this as ‘Will you not be off . . . to your saffron-robed whores, with whom you will dally on couches . . . ?’. That is typical of the accessible tone maintained in the English version; although it is a little too free for my taste, translators often have to make compromises if they do not want to lose their audience.

In the first ‘course’ (pp. 21-95), Kleomedes first deals with the nature and situation of the earth within the cosmos; then (1.2) the motions of the fixed stars and planets; (1.3) latitudes, seasons and the annual movement of the sun; (1.4) variations in the length of daylight according to latitude; (1.5) the spherical shape of the earth and (1.6) its position at the centre of the cosmos; (1.7) Poseidonios’ and Eratosthenes’ methods for establishing the size of the earth; and (1.8) the negligible size of the earth in relation to the celestial sphere and the irrelevance of parallax to observations other than those of the moon. Part 2 (pp. 99-165) opens with the longest sustained discussion in the work, a refutation of the Epicurean view that we should regard the sun as being as large as it appears to be (!) and a demonstration that it is very large indeed. There follow demonstrations that the sun is larger than the earth (2.2; though the earth, interestingly, contains most of the matter in the cosmos, 1.8) and that the other heavenly bodies are not the size they appear to be (2.3). The moon’s illumination is explained by the mingling of the sun’s light with it (2.4) and its phases by its movement relative to the sun and earth (2.5). Lunar eclipses are explained (2.6) by the earth’s shadow falling upon the moon. Apart from a concluding disclaimer by the author, which the present editors regard as genuine, the short appendix (2.7) on the movements of the moon and planets relative to the ecliptic and on the movements of Mercury and Venus relative to the sun may be an interpolation.

\(^3\) I differ in my opinion on this point from another reviewer of the volume: N. Sidoli, *BMCR* 2004.08.06.

\(^4\) I spotted only two errors: *hypotheses* for *hypothesis* (p. 13) and an uncorrected ‘pp. 0-0’ (p. 211).
All these passages amply illustrate the sophistication of ancient thinkers and the remarkable links between philosophy and science in the late Hellenistic and early imperial world. Kleomedes, however, is a philosophy teacher, not an astronomer, so his main concern is not to expound the complexities of the mathematics of that science but to communicate a ‘correct’ approach to cosmology. Physics for him must be prior to the interpretation of observed data (p. 8); otherwise we risk falling into error since astronomical observations are by their very nature consistent with divergent explanations. Thus he is not prepared to question received Stoic dogmas, for example, the geocentric universe and the infinite void surrounding the earth. Crucial to the understanding of his text is his relationship to the work of Poseidonios, who asserts this particular relationship between physics and astronomy in what we call fr. 18 but is actually a fourth-hand account of Poseidonios’ words made in the sixth century AD (pp. 193f.). The editors argue that Kleomedes widens the Stoic concept of truth from strict phantasia kataleptike (self-certifiable ‘cognitive presentation’) to ‘structures of argument within which such presentations are included as premises’ (p. 13) and that he makes this move because Poseidonios made it. As so often, Poseidonios proves pivotal to an understanding of Greek philosophy in the Roman empire.

The editors, experts in ancient science and Stoicism respectively, are to be commended warmly on their seamless collaborative effort and high scholarship. Kleomedes may not be an original or particularly subtle thinker, but his work, besides transmitting material we would otherwise not have, gives us additional insight into the place of Greek science in the public culture of the Roman empire and of the interest shown in serious science by Stoic philosophers. Bowen and Todd have fulfilled admirably their aim of bringing him to a wider public.

Graham Shipley

University of Leicester


Rhodes sets out to describe Greek history from the aftermath of the Persian Wars in 478 BC to the death of Alexander the Great. He has set his goal as follows: ‘I have tried to make it a straightforward account, but one which combines analysis with narrative, which combines other aspects of Greek life with political and military matters, and which shows clearly the evidence on which it is based and the considerations which have to be borne in mind in using the evidence’ (p. x). This starting point makes this book an unusual handbook for the classical period, though it follows traditional lines: after an introductory chapter, Rhodes guides us from ‘The Formation of the Delian League’ (chapter 2, pp. 14-21) to ‘Alexander the Great: Topics’ (chapter 25, pp. 359-83). An epilogue (chapter 26, pp. 384-87), a relatively concise bibliography (pp. 388-95) that partly summarises the useful ‘notes on further reading’ that conclude every chapter, and a sufficient index conclude the book.
With the exception of the introductory chapter 1, which outlines Greek history before 478 BC, the primary evidence used in every chapter is well documented in the notes. A very convenient feature is that, starting with chapter 2, every chapter is preceded by a time-line and a small list of the main events discussed in it. Rhodes completely fulfils his promise made in the preface to give a straightforward account by clearly showing the evidence on which it is based. At the same time this approach, valuable as it is, partly hides the problem involved with Rhodes’s method; the areas and events not covered by the largely Athens-centred evidence remain relatively underexposed. To some extent this has been compensated for by using epigraphic and numismatic evidence wherever possible, but this type of evidence is unfortunately not always made sufficiently clear. In chapter 2 Rhodes explains the difficulties related to the explanation for and meaning of the Delian League and the dominant position Athens reserved for itself in it. In the following chapter (pp. 22-30) he deals with the Peloponnese in the early fifth century, notably the controversy between Sparta and Argos, the emergence of various so-called synoecisms (amalgamations), and especially the developments of the complicated relations within Sparta. In chapter 4 (pp. 31-40) Rhodes covers Athens after the Persian Wars. It is the story of Themistocles, of Ephialtes and his reforms of the institutions, and of the reflection of political changes in early tragic poetry. The next chapter (pp. 41-53) discusses the Athenian empire in the mid-fifth century, namely the foreign policy of Athens between 460 BC and the beginning of the Thirty Years’ Peace in 446/5. Chapter 6 (pp. 54-70) discusses Periclean Athens from 462/1 to 433/2 BC, more or less encompassing with some exceptions (such as the war against Samos in 440-39) Athenian home policy in that period as well as the great works of art realised in that era. In chapter 7, ‘The Greeks in the West: The Rise of Syracuse’ (pp. 71-80), Rhodes pays special attention to the developments in Sicily but also to developments on the Apennine peninsula itself. Chapters 8 to 14 form the nucleus of this book; they tell the story of the Peloponnesian War in its various aspects and developments. The treatment of the various events and persons is factual and rather concise. Both drawings and aerial photographs help the reader to get a better picture of specific developments. I found the notes on further reading in these chapters to be extremely useful in building a more kaleidoscopic picture of persons, actions and notions involved. Here above all, Rhodes makes it particularly clear by the additional literature that he presents in these notes that practically nothing can or should be taken for granted and that virtually everything has at least two sides to consider. The rise and fall of the Athenian empire is epitomised in chapter 15 (pp. 172-88), which includes an interesting section on ‘Attitudes to the Empire’ (pp. 178-85) and another section, more or less related, on the period ‘After 404’ (pp. 185-87).

In chapter 16 (pp. 189-203) Rhodes introduces us to the fourth century. He distinguishes four sections within this century (three of which are included in this book, all of them related to the concept of a ‘common peace’): first, the period to ca. 360 BC, in which Sparta, Athens and Thebes in turn tried to dominate the Greek world under the watchful eyes of Persia; secondly, the period between 359 and 336 BC, in which Philip II of Macedon achieved a leading position, united the Greeks, and
prepared them for a war against Persia; thirdly, the period from 336 to 323 BC, in which Alexander III dominated events, and which culminated in the conquest of the Persian empire; and, finally, the period 323-304 BC, which was dominated by the struggle between the contenders for Alexander’s legacy. The first period is discussed in chapters 16 to 20. In chapter 16 Rhodes sketches the outlines of the prevailing notions and events of the first section of the fourth century, next treating the events in more detail from a Spartan (chapter 17, pp. 204-25), Athenian (chapter 18, pp. 226-43) and Theban (chapter 19, pp. 244-56) point of view. Chapter 20 (pp. 257-72) discusses internal affairs in Athens in this period. Inevitably this approach leads to repetition at the same time it shows that the same theme or event (such as the Battle of Leuctra) can play a role in different contexts. This method of work makes these chapters very instructive. A remarkable but particularly useful feature appears in chapter 17, an appendix entitled ‘Persia and its Rebels’ (pp. 221-25), which discusses various revolts during the reign of Artaxerxes II. Although those revolts have been mentioned previously and occurred during the reign of Darius II, it might perhaps have been convenient if Rhodes had also included here (again) the revolts of Pissuthnes and his son Amorges, the latter revolt especially because of its alleged (or supposed) repercussions for Athens in the final phases of the Peloponnesian War, if only to stipulate that such revolts (and Greek interests and even participation of Greeks) were not a phenomenon that started in Artaxerxes’ reign.

In chapter 21, ‘The Western Greeks from Dionysius I to Timoleon’ (pp. 273-93), Rhodes turns west again. In this chapter the Syracusan tyranny and the conflicts with the Carthaginians are treated as well as Timoleon’s efforts to liberate Sicily from both. The career of Philip II is dealt with in chapter 22 (pp. 294-322) with due emphasis on the interrelated political and military achievements. Noteworthy is that also this chapter concludes with an appendix: ‘Persia and the Greeks in the Reign of Artaxerxes III’ (pp. 323-27). This appendix also provides the reader with useful additional information. Philip’s Athenian opponent, Demosthenes, figures prominently in chapter 23 (pp. 328-44). Finance, institutional changes and politics are discussed. Here too is an appendix, a relatively short one, ‘Sparta’ (pp. 344-46), which summarises events there between 371 and 323 BC. Chapter 24 (pp. 347-58) is called ‘Alexander the Great: Sources and Outline’. The discussion of the sources is neat; the outline is, as might be expected, very sketchy. Rhodes covers in quick succession Alexander’s accession and his consolidation of the throne, the war against Darius III, the expedition after Darius’ death, and Alexander’s final year. Some of the incidents involved in this summary are treated in more detail in the previous chapter, which is devoted to some topics of Alexander’s rule: military matters, administration, behaviour towards subordinates, and aims and ideals. Here again Rhodes proves his mastery both to condense and elucidate complex problems in a relatively limited amount of space.

Rhodes has written a very accessible work on the classical Greek world, perhaps at places a little too specialised for the general public, but it is highly recommended and very suitable for undergraduates not only as an introduction to the Greek classical world but also as a textbook to illustrate the proper methodological
approach. In this respect the hardback edition is to be preferred, since the book invites frequent use. The book is well produced and I did not notice striking typographical errors. Of course, with an enterprise as challenging as to write a history of ‘the’ classical Greek world, one may always detect omissions or find that one’s own preferences should have been treated more fully; this book is no exception to that rule; however, such expectations would be unfair, the more so since the content of this book almost exactly matches the goals Rhodes outlines in his preface. In certain respects, due to the notes for further reading, the volume may even offer more. It certainly does not replace the ‘old school’ reference works (nor is it, I think, meant to do so), but it provides the reader with an accessible account of one of the formative eras of Greek history. It is, moreover, an introduction that deserves to be widely used. It provides an accessible account of classical Greek history from the aftermath of the Persian Wars in 478 BC to the death of Alexander the Great in 323 BC. The author describes the years that witnessed the flourishing of democracy in Athens; the establishment of the Athenian empire; the Peloponnesian War, which involved the whole Greek world; the development of Macedonian power under Philip II; and the conquests of Alexander the Great. His account combines narrative with analysis and deals with major social, economic and cultural developments as well as political and military events. Rhodes details the evidence on which his narrative is based, which includes inscriptions, coins and material remains, and outlines the considerations that have to be borne in mind in using this evidence.

Jan P. Stronk  
University of Amsterdam


John Godwin’s latest offering to Lucretian scholarship professes its aim to be to ‘introduce major figures of the ancient world to the modern general reader’ and to deal with ‘each subject’s life, works, and significance for later western civilisation’ (back cover). This prescription may seem a tall order for such a short book, but Godwin’s volume is thoughtful and impressively accessible. In just four chapters he covers an impressive range of material, offers pungent original analysis of several gripping passages of the *De Rerum Natura*, and makes more than clear how relevant Lucretius’ poem and philosophy are to the modern reader. The book is divided into four chapters, each seeking to deal with an issue central to the understanding of Lucretius’ complex but rewarding poem. Perhaps the most impressive chapter, simply because of the verve with which Godwin manages to compress so much knowledge into so few pages, is the first entitled, ‘The Writer and his World’ (pp. 9-46). As the chapter heading suggests, this opener aims to equip readers with everything they need to know to be able to tackle the *De Rerum Natura* in its context. A tall order, to be sure, but the chapter does not disappoint. Godwin opens by grounding the *De Rerum Natura* in what most would argue is its most important context—a work that seeks to
solve the big issues: the ethical, physical, epistemological and cultural concerns still discussed to the present day. These issues—death, the gods, happiness—are presented with great skill and economy by giving a very clear picture of not just why Lucretius wrote his poem but also why the area of thought we call ‘philosophy’ arose in the first place. Godwin also presents a good survey of the doctrines of Epicurus and his philosophical forerunners concerning these questions (pp. 13-34) as well as a valuable analysis of the various cares and concerns, personal and political, of Lucretius’ target audience (pp. 34-46). As a clear, cogent and basic introduction to the background of the *De Rerum Natura*, it is hard to find fault with this opening chapter.

In his second chapter (pp. 47-90), Godwin tackles head-on the question most likely to intrigue a newcomer to the genre of didactic and the *De Rerum Natura* in particular—why Lucretius chose to write in poetry. The chapter too opens with a fine overview of the relevant issues (pp. 47-56): the didactic tradition, the importance of the poet-figure in ancient society, and the need for original subject matter are all debated thoroughly. Godwin does, however, skirt the issue of Epicurus’ distaste for poetry. While this is perhaps understandable, given that the main focus of the book is Lucretius rather than his self-professed rerum inventor (‘discoverer of things’, Lucr. 3.9), Godwin’s main reason offered, that Lucretius could argue that ‘there is no reason why the devil should have all the best tunes’ (p. 52), sounds a little hollow. One of the most effective sections of the chapter follows (pp. 56-60), in which Godwin offers a decent explanation of the differences between English and Latin in linguistic terms as well as an impressively accessible setting-out of the basics of Latin hexameter and some excellent discussion of the interaction between metre and meaning in the poem. We are also given a brief analysis of Lucretius’ favoured types of argument (pp. 65-72). The summary itself is useful, but some of the examples are less so; the first example offered of an *a fortiori* argument (‘team A will win the cup as they have beaten team B who themselves beat team A’s opponents last month’, p. 69) may be a commonplace argument, but anyone who follows competitive sport will know that it is in no way comparable to the example that follows concerning height relations between three individuals. This is a minor quibble, however, with a very useful few pages of accessible explanation of Lucretius’ argumentative procedures. The chapter closes with a discussion of the influence of rhetoric on the *De Rerum Natura* (pp. 72-90). Again, Godwin provides excellent background detail on the importance of rhetoric in Roman education before moving on to analyse various Lucretian rhetorical ploys. There are good discussions of several of Lucretius’ more satirical passages of argument, most notably (pp. 75f.) the lengthy attack on the folly of the lover in book 4, and a sensitive reading (pp. 78-80) of the emotional manipulation inherent in the description of the cow searching for her lost calf at *De Rerum Natura* 2.352-70. Godwin ends the chapter with a lengthy analysis that aims to show all the various poetic techniques highlighted thus far at work in a single passage, 5.195-234 (pp. 89f.). Godwin does not skimp on attention to detail and is not afraid to take the newcomer (at whom the book is aimed) to the text to get to grips with the actualities of the Latin; the impact of individual items of vocabulary is frequently discussed as well as the more general themes of this Lucretian anti-teleological argument. As will inevitably
be the case with any lengthy passage of close critical analysis, not every point will
convince every reader, but the professed aim of showing Lucretius’ manifold talents
in action is undoubtedly achieved, and the discussion will no doubt send Godwin’s
readers hurrying to the original for more of the same. Sandwiched in the middle of this
is a summary of the whole poem (pp. 61-65), which readers new to Lucretius will find
indispensable during the chapters to follow.

In chapters 3 and 4 Godwin shows us much more of this ancient in action by
offering further close readings of several key passages of the De Rerum Natura.
Chapter 3, ‘The Greatest Show on Earth’ (pp. 91-117), focuses in particular upon what
he regards as the theatrical elements of Lucretius’ poem. He begins the chapter by
making a good case for the importance of theatre in Lucretius’ day and therefore the
likelihood that theatrically connected concerns influenced Lucretius while he was
writing (pp. 92-95). Lucretius himself makes use of the theatre on several occasions to
illustrate his arguments. His famous borrowing from Greek tragedy of Iphigeneia’s
sacrifice in book 1 is usefully contrasted with its tragic portrayal by Euripides
(pp. 101-04), and the examples he gives from the actual physical theatre buildings in
Rome are also clearly presented and explained (pp. 95-97). Godwin does not stop
there though; returning to the picture of the self-deluded lover in book 4 of Lucretius’
poem, he draws some interesting comparisons with Roman comedy (pp. 97-101)
before moving on (pp. 104-11) to offer an analysis of the ‘viewing’ experience in the
proem to book 2. This passage has often left readers uncomfortable since it seems to
revel in the misfortune of others. Godwin’s conclusion—that we are not encouraged to
enjoy the suffering we see but rather to make sure we are in the audience instead of on
the stage—is uncontroversial and convincing, but the passage does seem to have been
shoehorned in to fit with the overriding theme of the chapter. There is no more reason
to think of the theatre here than of the excellent explicatory framework that Godwin
gives of a scientist taking pleasure in discovering the workings of a deadly virus in
order to cure (without taking any pleasure in the deaths that it causes). The closing
section of the chapter, which characterises the De Rerum Natura as a tragedy
(pp. 112-17), is more successfully integrated into the theatrical theme and more
successful as a result.

In chapter 4, ‘The Naturalist and the Grim Reaper’ (pp. 118-35), Godwin, like
Lucretius, forces us to confront death in the form of the plague narrative with which
the poem closes. Just as Lucretius does not spare us the details, so Godwin confronts
us with the gruesome specifics of the text by offering a close reading of one of the
more stomach-churning parts of medical description we come across in the poem
(Lucr. 6.1199-1212; pp. 130-33), once more picking out detail after detail not only to
demonstrate Lucretius’ poetic skill but also to point out the fundamental ethical drive
of this part of the poem—the need to acquire the Epicurean ability to look death in the
face without flinching. It forms a powerful ending to the book and allows Godwin to
tie together the threads of philosophical and historical context and literary endeavour
that have been woven throughout each chapter. Overall this slim volume represents a
substantial achievement. In relatively few pages Godwin manages to pack in enough
information to enable a beginner to start to get to grips with one of the more difficult
poems in the Latin language. The few occasional slips or overstatements\(^1\) are understandable given the enthusiasm Godwin brings to his task. He has written an immensely erudite book, which nevertheless wears its learning lightly and forms an excellent starting point for anyone intrigued by the complex masterpiece that is the *De Rerum Natura*.

Emma Woolerton


Theophrastus is enjoying a long overdue revival in interest paid by classical scholars worldwide and a welcome addition to the re-edited texts now available is this third edition of the famed *Characters*. Not only has Rusten refashioned a number of versions in his translation of Theophrastus to capture exactly the right nuances in these long-influential sketches, he has also augmented the introduction and suggested a number of aspects of Theophrastus’ public lectures clearly mirrored in the vocabulary of each sketch, ‘gestures’ that surely must have enlivened the oral presentation to (so Diog. Laert. 5.37) 2000 enthusiastic students. Re-editing a major Greek text requires skill far beyond ordinary philology: it demands a control of historical and (in this instance) scientific contexts ranging from the morphological botany so brilliantly presented by Theophrastus in the *Enquiry into Plants* to sure command of the many details of Athenian economic and social life taken for granted in the *Characters*. And unlike most Loeb volumes, this one comes equipped with numerous explanatory notes so that the modern reader of whatever background and training can easily understand the allusions that pepper Theophrastus’ occasionally sad if universal lampoons of extreme behaviour present in ancient Athenian city life and rural habits and customs.

*Characters* 16, ‘Superstition’ (pp. 96-101), illustrates and demonstrates why an editor and translator must know the details of everyday life in the Athens of Aristotle and Theophrastus. Here occur dozens of specifics about sacred plants, spooky animals, weird if venerated customs to ward off evil things, real and imagined, and most importantly why Theophrastus’ stereotypical superstitious man would act as he did, in contrast to the ‘normal’ individual who might or might not act similarly. In these few pages Rusten provides fifteen notes either informing the reader of problems in the Greek or what is signified by a particular plant, animal, incantation, assumption, folkloristic custom sometimes wedded to pharmacology, practices of magic,

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\(^1\) On p. 36, for example, Godwin’s analysis of ‘Epicurus the victorious general who conquered the dragon religion . . . bringing back the booty which outdid all other booty’ seems to me to be stretching the actual Latin (Lucr. 1.62-79) somewhat.
mythological allusion as taken for granted by anyone in fourth century BC Greece, and the frequent use of words reflecting Theophrastus as the most famous student (ignoring Alexander) of Aristotle. Peripatetic terminologies loom and Rusten carefully details these; the notes are studded with relevant scholarship that will lead any reader into any subject among the many considered in Characters 16. Each of the remaining twenty-nine sketches receives similar treatment so that this new text and translation functions superbly on several levels. The text is very reliable (far better than that of Wimmer and certainly more trustworthy than that used in the first Loeb edition in 19291); the translation is very good (some questionable links to modern Jungian psychotherapy excepted); and the text incorporates the best readings from the most reliable manuscripts that have been consulted directly. A collection of ‘virtues and vices’ may not be out of place in our time when we seem to be subject to far more of the vices than the virtues in public life.

Cunningham provides an updated version of the text of Herodas that he edited and published in 1971 and certainly supersedes the now-reprinted edition of Headlam and Knox.2 Not surprisingly, Herodas has been the bane of some classicists and the darling of others since the subject-matter of these poems sometimes focuses on sex and how one procures it, especially if a woman lusts after a man. The Greek text itself emerged as a set of occasionally damaged papyri (the editio princeps of 1891 by Kenyon was simply a transcription with only the most obvious corrections3), and the text increased very slowly with the addition of fragments recovered at later dates. As Cunningham writes (p. xi in the 1971 edition), ‘external evidence concerning Herodas could hardly be scantier’ and the floruit reached in 2002 is basically the same as set down in 1971: Herodas was ‘Doric in origin, living in the first half of the third century, connected to a greater or lesser extent with Egypt, Cos, and Asia Minor’ (p. 182). That Herodas should be coupled with Theophrastus may strike one as arbitrary if not misguided, but the content of the Mimes fully justifies the pairing; much as folklore and magic figure rather prominently in the Characters, so too do sexual sorcery, would-be aphrodisiacs, and spell-casting form themes as these Hellenistic ‘desperate housewives’ attempt liaisons, plan seductions, concoct sexual stimulants, and turn up in Asclepian temple precincts for a spiritual cleansing that has little to do with cures of a pathology. Students of Hellenistic poetry will discover the contrasts in tone and theme but not in content compared with some of the Idylls of Theocritus, and they should take notice of how both poets use botanical and medical metaphors to telling

effect. The implied sex in Herodas is crude but certainly not pornographic, and one can speculate that this is exactly what is intended by the poet who slyly satirises the innate boredom of the lives of these women who seek sexual release from the grinding routines of simple survival in what appear to be urban settings in some Hellenistic city. Cunningham’s notes to the new Loeb Herodas are rather more sparse than he provided in his 1971 edition (which has no translation), but the 2002 Greek is far more assured and bears the marks of continued editing over the three decades that separate the two editions.

The ‘tailpiece’ in this Loeb edition is ‘Sophron: Mimes and Popular Mime’, edited with a translation (but no notes) by Cunningham (pp. 285-421), and these carry no notes. The range in time spans the centuries from classical Greece through the second or third century in the Greek-speaking half of the Roman empire; the themes are the familiar ones of slaves and parasites (human), planned poisonings, hopeful inheritances, straight sex with touches of the sadistic, and fully obscene language appropriate to the droll verses, mythological allusions and pseudo-Greek words punning dramatic presentations by noisy syllables alone—all typical of the genre. The translations are updated and reflect the Greek with no pandering to any leftover Victorian prudery characteristic of earlier ‘translations’ into English. Students seeking good pornographic verses are advised, however, to return to the far more blunt and far funnier lines in many of the comedies of Aristophanes. These Mimes are plain, unadorned and bereft of any zest that might speak to rollicking sex for its own sake, perhaps easily reflective of the gutter-talk so common today in modern English as it was on the streets of ancient Greece and the Greek-speaking eastern Roman empire. This Loeb omits Hipponax and Ananias, but these are now among the poets expertly edited and translated by Gerber in the new Greek Iambic Poetry.4

John Scarborough
University of Wisconsin, Madison


Sara Forsdyke covers the uses and abuses of exile as a political tool in the Greek world from the eighth century to about the fourth BC, but devotes one chapter to exile in Greek myth. In all eras she makes detailed use of case studies to prove her point. Exile is a political tool. It works to curb the power of the really or potentially powerful. Forsdyke has coined the term ‘the politics of exile’ to cover both exile as a form of political pre-emption or retribution and the internal manoeuvring that was practised after their flight into a distant land by those members of the Greek elite who hoped ultimately to return for political vindication. In the ancient Greek context, the

unique phenomenon of ostracism obviously plays an important role. Six chapters comprise the body of the work, with each chapter divided into sub-sections; there is an introduction (pp. 1-14) and conclusion (pp. 278-80). Two pages of acknowledgements are followed by a five-line chronology and two pages of abbreviations and conventions. Three appendices on the date of the Athenian law of ostracism, ostracism outside Athens, and exile in Spartan myth and history follow the conclusion (pp. 281-99). A thorough bibliography of both standard works on ancient exile and works specific to all aspects of the linked topics of exile and the practice of ostracism in the Greek world (pp. 301-25) is an indicator of the author’s wide reading and diligent scholarship. Forsdyke argues throughout for the validity of her thesis that Greek exilic practices were the result of what she terms ‘intra-elite conflict’ (p. 2 et passim) and that the introduction of ostracism under Cleisthenes was not so much an instance of the irresponsibility and irrationality of unfettered democratic rule as an attempt by the demos, the larger citizen body, to take control over and hence to prevent such intra-elite conflict. The sporadic enforcement of ostracism in the classical period would then have worked as a ‘symbolic institution’ (p. 149) that would remind an aristocratic or affluent aspirant to power of the ability of the common people to circumvent his potential to abuse such power and to control his potential for violent conflict with another such aspirant.

The first chapter, ‘Setting the Stage’ (pp. 15-29), covers intra-elite conflict in the early Greek polis. In chapter 2, ‘The Politics of Exile and the Crisis of the Archaic Polis’ (pp. 30-78), four early city-states (Mytilene, Megara, Samos and Corinth) are discussed with reference to the type of conflict that occurred and the measures taken by both winners and losers to maintain power. In much of her analyses, Forsdyke stresses that exile of the elite was seldom the result of revolt by the non-elite but rather of rivalry between powerful factions. She discounts literary traditions of mass expulsions and ascribes these to the normal type of mythical accretions that are attached to stories of the past rather than to fact. She shows in her analysis of the sources that the Cypselids of Corinth, for instance, ruled in a manner that was favourable to all parts of the citizenry, as did the oligarchies that preceded and followed them. In the case of Corinth, at least, she argues, intra-elite co-operation rather than expulsion of rivals was the norm.

The important third chapter, ‘From Exile to Ostracism’ (pp. 79-143), examines the change in the conceptualisation and practice of exile as a political tool in late archaic Athens, the era that saw the first adumbrations of ostracism as a means whereby the common people could control intra-elite conflict. Such a change she terms the ‘end of the politics of exile’, that is, of the kind of political exile enforced in the archaic period, with the taking of control over Athens by Cleisthenes, a phenomenon she is happy to term the Athenian ‘democratic revolution’ (p. 133). This discussion is preceded by three case studies (Cylon, Draco and the trial of the Alcmeonidae, pp. 80-90) and a discussion of the changes introduced under Solon and Pisistratus and his sons (pp. 90-132). Forsdyke is not afraid to give bold reassessments of the reliability, even the veracity, of her ancient sources, particularly of their interpretation of the acts and circumstances of various leaders. She cites, for instance,
Connor’s theory that the often-cited assertion by Pisistratus that he was the recipient of divine protection after he returned to the city accompanied by a woman dressed as Athena did not, and was not meant, to delude the Athenians into thinking that he was actually accompanied by the goddess. It was rather a case of ritual affirmation that would have been accepted by both Pisistratus and his audience as a visual representation of his newly reassumed power. Similarly, Forsdyke reconstructs (pp. 137f.) the alliance of Cleisthenes with the people, as recorded by Herodotus and Aristotle, as resulting from an appeal based on his past performance rather than on the promise of future democratic reform. Elsewhere (p. 52) Forsdyke rejects Aristotle’s interpretation of the slaughter of sheep by the tyrant of Megara, Theagenes, as a public demonstration of animosity towards the rich and argues for its stemming from Theagenes’ conflict with rivals for power.

The central fourth chapter (pp. 144-204) rewords the title of the book as its heading: ‘Ostracism and Exile in Democratic Athens’. Forsdyke first discusses the procedure of ostracism, indicating that notice was always given that such an exercise was planned. The voting itself took place in the equivalent of early March. This would have been a practical measure: men had to have time to get hold of a potsherd and needed further time to inscribe the ostrakon or to have it inscribed. That all did not write on the potsherd themselves is reflected in the famous story of the just Aristides who was asked by an illiterate farmer, who met him along the road, to inscribe the name ‘Aristides’ on a potsherd because he was tired of hearing people talk about him as ‘the Just’. Forsdyke rightly discounts the value of this story other than as an illustration of the fact that even illiterate citizens could have voted. Next she discusses ostracism as ‘symbolic institution’ or ‘collective ritual’ (Forsdyke’s term; p. 159). Ostracism in fifth century Athens was a ‘site for the active determination of collective identity . . . and . . . for the negotiation of the norms of the political community’ (p. 161). This meant that the basis of its application and its interpretation by ancient sources could change over time as Athenian perceptions of self fluctuated. Forsdyke next proceeds to examine some of the known cases of ostracism in Athens, which were much rarer than one might have thought, given the importance that it is given in ancient political discussion. She then considers some other forms of exile in fifth-century Athens, ending with a discussion of the practice of exile as a political tool under the oligarchies of 411 and 404 BC. In all cases, Forsdyke argues, the Athenian democracy controlled potentially violent political strife by the moderate enforcement of ostracism or other forms of exile.

Chapter 5, ‘Exile and Empire’ (pp. 205-39), predictably next extends its examination to the practice of exile as political tool under the Athenian empire and considers the extent of expulsions in inter-state politics. Forsdyke argues, again with recourse to case studies, that Athens actually sought to limit the use of exile as a political weapon in decrees imposing rules upon subject states even after the city had in some cases resorted to mass expulsions of the citizens of such subject states. The

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sub-sections of this chapter are wide-ranging and include aspects such as the views of Thucydides and Isocrates about the legitimacy of Athenian power, in which the political terminology of exile was employed to represent Athenian rule over other states as ‘just and legitimate’. The chapter ends with a discussion of literary examples of uses of two exilic myths. The myth of the return of the Heraclidae worked in oratory as a justification for the power Athens exercised over other states. The myth of autochthony was invoked by an author like Thucydides (1.2.5f.) to explain why Athens deserved its pre-eminence in the Greek world—that is, because it had always been there. Athenians were indigenous to Attica and Athens was receptive of exiles from other states, who then became part of this ‘autochthonous’ state. The sixth and last chapter, ‘Exile in the Greek Mythical and Historical Imagination’ (pp. 240-77), examines in some detail the representation of exile in some literary texts ranging from historians like Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon to theorising by Plato and Aristotle about ostracism. Aristotle’s view of the application of ostracism in democratic Athens implies that it was no different from the practice of the politics of exile under tyrants and oligarchs, with tyranny now being exemplified by the actions of the demos. For Forsdyke exile remained a key concept in the debate about ideal rule. The conclusion (pp. 278-80) briefly restates the author’s argument, which seeks largely to show that ostracism was not the bizarre anomaly it is sometimes judged to be but that, though it cannot be argued that it was either just or lenient, it did make sense as a means of political control that sought to ensure the smooth running of the state.

The work is commendably thorough but is rather difficult to read, perhaps precisely because of its attempts to be reader-friendly. In all cases Forsdyke first states her intentions for a chapter and briefly summarises it; sometimes she also recapitulates in mid-chapter (e.g., p. 186) and at the end she reviews what she has just written. The next chapter then starts with a short recapitulation of the argument of the previous chapter. Such frequent predictions and back-trackings become rather wearisome. Also, some infelicities of style occur. The authorial ‘I’ looms large; for example, ‘I’ or ‘my’ occurs ten times on a single page (p. 31). In discussion of concepts, the author allows herself the trite definition, ‘... all those who were not among the elite were non-elite’ (p. 12). Two pages later we have ‘exile events’, apparently for ‘occurrences of exile’. Typography and layout are generally good, but each of the first two paragraphs on the first page of the book (‘Acknowledgements’) have a typographical error. The last sentence of the conclusion ends on what sounds like gibberish: ‘What I am suggesting is that ... we can recapture [sic] some new perspectives on the practices and imaginary [sic] of the ancient Greeks’. Such solecisms mar an otherwise thorough monograph that deserves to become the definitive work on the topic of exile and ostracism in ancient Greece.

Jo-Marie Claassen

University of Stellenbosch

In this extended essay Hingley, author of the acclaimed *Roman Officers and English Gentlemen* (London 2000), deals with the question whether the term ‘globalization’ is more appropriate than the older ‘Romanization’ for describing the extensive cultural changes that occurred, especially in material culture, in the Roman empire in the early imperial period. The work is divided into six chapters with extensive notes and a lengthy bibliography. Most of the illustrations are drawings of archaeological sites.

Chapter 1, ‘The Past in the Present’ (pp. 1-13), is concerned with the way in which concepts in the modern world have interacted with and transformed our understanding of the character of Roman society. The evidence of literary texts has long been privileged above that of archaeology. In fact, before we approach the ancient world we must make our own world-view explicit. Chapter 2, ‘Changing Concepts of Roman Identity and Social Change’ (pp. 14-48) addresses the history of the term ‘Romanization’ and shows that it arose from a Eurocentric approach to history; much of recent writing on western imperialism consciously theorised about itself with reference to the Roman past. In particular, the influence of the geopolitics of their day on two great figures of the past, the German Mommsen and the Englishman Haverfield, is traced. But since the 1970’s the native element in the Roman empire has been given attention but mainly in a simplistic, dualistic, cultured/uncultured framework. Chapter 3, ‘Roman Imperialism and Culture’ (pp. 49-71), defines Roman elite culture especially as a standard by which barbarians were classified as outside the pale. Hingley finds little evidence of Roman cultural imperialism attempting to educate those on the outside. Chapter 4, ‘The Material Elements of Elite Culture’ (pp. 72-90), considers the evidence of archaeology more closely and analyses the physical conditions of life in the early empire. Chapter 5, ‘Fragmenting Identities’ (pp. 91-116), looks at the adoption of the features of Roman culture below the level of the elite. There are interesting remarks on the spread of literacy among simple soldiers and ordinary traders. The crucial question is raised as to how far the use of Roman artifacts in material culture can be used as a gauge of Romanization. Was their spread due merely to larger-scale production and improved means of distribution, in fact, to a type of ‘globalization”? Chapter 6, ““Back to the Future”? Empire and Rome” (pp. 117-20), maintains that previous approaches are largely outdated and unacceptable. The Roman empire was effectively a global civilisation that needs to be studied as such.

Hingley’s work is not easy to read. He regularly refers to the views of modern theorists of empire and of contemporary sociologists and economists. But this is usually done briefly in a sentence or two without demonstrating their applicability to the ancient evidence in detail, which is not particularly helpful. He is not entirely dismissive of the approaches of late-nineteenth and early twentieth-century scholars on the nature of Roman provincial culture and the question of Romanization, but again the positive aspects of their contribution need to be spelt out more clearly. His own
opinions are rarely highlighted and are often difficult to ascertain in the welter of quotations of the views of others in which they occur. They are quite often advanced as questions or hedged as tentative suggestions, suggesting that they need greater development. Is there room for advance? There is no doubt that the culture of western Europe (the East is consciously excluded) changed dramatically in the first two centuries AD (or does one now use the abbreviation IA, the International Age?).

The basic starting point is the fact that the Romans conceived of themselves essentially as a community of fellow citizens. The first approach to an understanding of Romanization would be a detailed study of the effect of the admission of non-Romans to citizenship. This needs to be done not only period by period but region by region as well. The next defining feature of Roman citizenship was in its form of government. What sorts of community—coloniae, municipia, ciuitates, pagi, uici (even in uici in remote areas we have local administrators setting up inscriptions in Latin stating their office and role in the village as if they were Roman magistrates)—were established and where, when and why? Not always a straightforward procedure; Cologne was founded because the empress wanted to have been born in a colonia. The societal factor was of great significance. What effect did service in the Roman army—not only in the legions but also in the auxilia and the fleets—have on soldiers and on the families they left behind or established in new areas? Other groups that emigrated, for example, traders, need analysis. Even slaves—what effect did service under a Roman master have on those who were fortunate enough to be manumitted and so able to start an independent life in the community? Thirdly, cultural factors. We hear of a school for the sons of noblemen in Autun and members of the provincial elite were having their sons educated at home or in provincial centres, like Marseilles, where Agricola went, or in Rome itself. How far did Roman education permeate and by what mechanisms? There is a tag of Virgil on a tablet in the camp of a Batavian regiment at Vindolanda on Hadrian’s Wall in Britain. Besides education, such fields as the law and legal procedure and interpretatio Romana in the area of religion need to be analysed with increasing sophistication. It is also essential to approach the problems of Romanisation diachronistically rather than synchronistically; not only those being measured, but the yardstick itself, were constantly changing. The Rome of Trajan was not the Rome of Augustus and, as we are constantly reminded, Trajan did not come from Rome but from Spain. Perhaps one should even remember that Augustus himself had a small Italian-town background. So, too, authors like Quintilian and Martial were Spaniards and the classic writers of the Augustan age were Italian—Catullus, Virgil, Livy. This may seem remote from the spade of the archaeologist, but it was archaeology that unearthed the tag of Virgil at Vindolanda. Globalization is made to refer especially to the material culture revealed by archaeologists. It is indeed a useful insight to show how Roman road-building and improved (and safe) facilities for transport led to an exponential spread of Roman-type merchandise across the empire. But how culturally neutral was it? Of course, the use of a terra sigillata dinner service by a provincial does not prove that he was adopting Roman dining habits. But technology has its effect upon lifestyle. There is a passage in the Mishnah where the sort of road to be made is specified: it has to be straight and
paved. Obviously the model is Roman, as well as the name: *strata*. Were people in Judaea impressed by Roman technology although they remained largely hostile to Roman culture?

One of the great values of Hingley’s work is his constant plea for the need to be aware of the enormous amount of cultural diversity evident in the Roman empire; he valuably suggests the detailed study of micro-environments as the way forward. It remains to be seen how profitable it will be to give up the old term ‘Romanization’ for ‘globalization’ with all the modern technological and ultra-sophisticated cultural implications that it contains. But the author has raised many deep issues in this work; one can only hope that he will develop them at greater length elsewhere.

Denis Saddlington


This collection of essays originated as a seminar for the faculty of Classics at Cambridge to foster dialogue between Greek and Roman specialists and to offer new directions for colonisation archaeology. The book, with its multiple perspectives and provocative arguments, is a thorough assessment and critique of previous scholarship and therefore a valuable addition to colonisation studies. The common goal is to ‘look critically at the whole question of “colonization” in the ancient world and unpack—or at least poke vigorously into—the cultural baggage we carry as westerners in thinking about this topic, focusing especially on the intellectual tool of analogy’ (p. 1). The articles concentrate on Anglophone scholarship and, while Greek topics are better represented than Roman, this is a conscious choice: Hurst explains in his brief introduction that Romanists have for some time considered the problems created by analogy, especially with respect to ‘Romanisation’, but Greek archaeologists and historians have only begun to discuss the impact of modern colonial analogies on their models and questions.

Sara Owen’s ‘Analogy, Archaeology and Archaic Greek Colonization’ (pp. 5-22), sets the context for the rest of the work by stating that the Modern European models of colonialism have presupposed relationships that have subsequently restricted our range of explanations of the ancient Greek material record and thereby restricted the ways in which we have approached Greek colonisation studies. The problem, as she sees it, is that modern analogy and the assumptions it presumes about what colonialism is, have never been analysed, explained or justified. ‘The assumption that asymmetrical power relationships, drawn along ethnic lines, existed in all “colonized” areas from the Late Geometric and Archaic periods onwards is one that still pervades much of the literature’ (p. 6). To counter this model, she offers her own research from Thrace to show that a Greek-centred view (Hellenisation) is flawed. In pre-contact Thrace, internal social changes prompted contacts with outsiders
(Levantines, Scythians and Greeks). The common, ‘civilising’ analogy to British India and other colonial relations only leads to incomplete, even false models about the relations between Greeks and ‘others’. In chapter 2, ‘The Advance of the Greek: Greece, Great Britain and Archaeological Empires’ (pp. 23-44), Gillian Shepherd explores how analogy with the British high empire (1880-1914) has influenced the scholarship of Greek Sicily and Magna Graecia and imposed a view of colonial inferiority that is only now being lifted. During the high empire, the British placed a premium on race and racial purity, which by analogy has been applied to colonising Greeks. The argument runs like this: Greeks were superior to all others, with Greeks from old Greece at the top and then Greeks from the colonies, other Aryans and then non-Aryans (Phoenicians) at the very bottom. The high empire also placed great value on fidelity (that is, cultural subordination) to the mother country. So too with the Greeks: colonials were always described as inferior to Old Greece, no matter their economic or military resources. She argues that this model prioritised Old Greece over the colonies and Greeks over indigenous peoples and that the evidence was manipulated to facilitate this; indeed, there was a tendency to ignore or explain as inferior crudities the real differences in the material cultures of the western Greeks.

In chapter 3, “‘Lesser Breeds”: The History of a False Analogy” (pp. 45-58), Anthony Snodgrass documents the inherent tendency of humans to turn to their own era for analogy. He shows how recent, or near recent, imperial experience subconsciously shaped scholarship about the past. For example, during Britain’s most expansive period of colonial growth (the high empire mentioned by Shepherd), when unlike earlier periods of European expansion there was a heightened sensitivity to differences in race and skin colour, contemporary scholars created models that accentuated racial and ethnic hierarchies. Even in the post-colonial period, scholarship used analogy to highlight subjugation and oppression of ‘lesser races’. Post-colonial scholarship has misapplied analogy ‘to concentrate on the “natives” and on the methods used to conciliate, assimilate, and govern them’ (p. 57). Snodgrass then deconstructs the false analogy to show why it was a bad fit in every way and why this Greek-centred focus on subjugation is misleading. He concludes that the earliest phase of European expansion, the phase of ‘first contact’, provides a more helpful model.

In chapter 4, ‘The Deceptive Archetype: Roman Colonialism in Italy and Postcolonial Thought’ (pp. 59-72), Nicola Terrenato critiques the tendency to view Rome as an imperial archetype. In western historiography, Roman expansion was regularly portrayed as a developmental model with its own absolute and paradigmatic value. Subsequently, Roman examples were used by modern colonisers and used to justify or at least explain European imperialist efforts to ‘civilise’ the world. Because of this, certain views about Roman expansion have become fossilised in the historiographic record, even axiomatic, such as the ideas that expansion was a process driven by Roman needs alone and consequently revolutionised the ‘less-developed’ Mediterranean. Even post-colonial views did not question the fundamental ‘truth’ of the Roman archetype and merely recast it in the negative light of subjugation. Thus, it has been nearly impossible ‘to view Roman expansion independently of its alleged
modern equivalent’ (p. 65). The way forward is to shift focus to the actors involved, Roman and ‘other’, away from the process of colonisation as an abstraction.

In chapter 5, ‘A View from the Americas: “Internal Colonization”, Material Culture and Power in the Inka Empire’ (pp. 73-96), Elizabeth DeMarrais examines the concept of Romanisation from the comparative referent of the discrepant experience of Inka colonists. The Inka data offers cultural parallels on the ways in which the archaeological data from ancient empires can be approached in terms of the ‘interplay of resistance and accommodation and the gradations of behaviour lying in between’ (p. 74). Since the Inka empire expanded in a shorter time and did not have the centuries that Rome did to consolidate, it offers an interesting comparison in terms of ‘Inkaization’. Although the Inka made extensive resettlements within the borders of the empire in order to manage internal security and in particular the administration of labour service, they never implemented a policy of ‘Inkaization’. Local groups, both relocated and indigenous, largely retained their local identity and only reconfigured what was necessary to make the most of new relationships. There was no top-down policy of assimilation, subjugation or resistance. In chapter 6, ‘Excavating Colonization’ (pp. 97-114), Carla M. Antonaccio seeks to reverse the scholarly focus on mainland Greece that often sidelines the western Greeks by exploring the broader framework within which archaeology is working in order to understand the intricate interplay between material culture and identity in the colonial context of Sicily. Through the concept of ‘hybridity’, or the fusion of different cultural elements, she teases out the ways in which identity manifests in material culture. Antonaccio concludes that hybridity was a common occurrence in Sicily (p. 111) and is a much more useful descriptor than the top-down or unidirectional development implied by ‘Hellenisation’ and other models linked to modern colonialism with their dichotomy of centre and periphery. A fusion of Greek and indigenous ideas shaped both Greek and indigenous experiences on the island often without any physical intermixing or intermarriage.

In chapter 7, ‘Colonization and Mediterranean History’ (pp. 115-40), Nicholas Purcell explores the connectivity of the Mediterranean region as an integrated ‘agrosystem’, as an alternative explanation for episodes of Greek ‘colonization’. Like the other contributors, Purcell argues that terms derived from modern colonial analogy, such as ‘Greece’ and ‘overseas’, even ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’, obscure the common motivating and organising experiences of the ancients; for him it is movement that counts, movement spurred by what he calls ‘aggressive opportunisms’ (p. 120). The risks inherent in Mediterranean agriculture (for example, seasonal drought, divergent soil quality, microclimates) encourage exploitative behaviours which maximise production and protect the producer. These opportunistic strategies can be deployed within communities at the expense of neighbours or beyond the community at the expense of outsiders. Competition is the rule and success creates greater opportunity, in the form of disposable surplus, which in turn leads to a need for redistribution. And the Mediterranean itself provides the perfect medium for redistribution and greater maximisation of surplus through access to new labour, new markets and new production. Even the commercial centre, the emporion, has a role in this agricultural
strategy by providing a redistribution nexus. Greek ‘colonization’ is therefore the extension of subsistence strategies by successful producers (elites) into new environments whose accessibility is one of their enticements. Thus, ‘connectivity’ to resources, to labour, to markets, determines success. This model applies to elites of both Greek and non-Greek origin; once a unit is connected, it taps into (and is tapped by) the Mediterranean maritime network and external aggressive opportunism comes into play. Only by understanding the system of regional connectivity as a whole, rather than as relations between coloniser and colonised, can we begin to explain the nuances of discrete, historical ‘episodes’.

Purcell’s conclusion that the term ‘colonization’ is not really applicable to the ancient world (pp. 134ff.) echoes the conclusions of all the contributors. All seem to suggest that ancient ‘colonialism’ was much more reciprocal than modern analogy has led us to believe. While many of its conclusions are open to debate (indeed, designed to create debate), the book succeeds in its objectives: each section not only explains the shadow still being cast by the modern colonial and postcolonial experience on the scholarship of the ancient world but also offers avenues for new directions and possible remedies for seeing the Mediterranean on its own terms. This twofold agenda of critique and direction is what makes this book such a welcome addition to the dialogue of Mediterranean expansion and ensures that it will become a standard reference for both specialists and the general reader.1

Timothy Howe

St Olaf College


‘There are many good books about the Etruscans, but a general survey of one major site is a comparatively unusual . . . departure’ (p. ix). Studies that concentrate on single cities, towns or areas within an identifiable civilisation may be compared to the biographical study of individual figures of a historical period. This volume follows an increasing but relatively novel trend and is to be welcomed, for it enhances overall knowledge of, in this instance, the Etruscans, by casting the spotlight on one particular element, here the city of Tarquinia that ‘has contributed more than any other site, with the possible exception of Cerveteri (Caere) . . . to an understanding of the genesis of Etruscan civilisation from its prehistoric roots to Romanisation . . . ’ (p. 1). Leighton has followed the chronological route for examining a site that encompasses the adjacent plateaus of Civita and Monterozzi, the latter the location of the modern town of Tarquinia but in antiquity one of the largest of the Etruscan cemeteries, indeed of antiquity (p. 27); today it is one of the most celebrated and visited for its painted

1 The text is clean: I found only one typographical error: the quotation from Kipling’s Recessional should read ‘Dominion over palm and pine’ rather than ‘Dominion over palm and line’ (p. 46).
tomb robbery and amateur excavation for financial gain preceded modern scientific exploration. Much has been lost from what were mostly acts of despoliation whose by-product was paradoxically to make ancient Tarquinia an inspiring subject for prose and poetry, examples of which are liberally incorporated into Leighton’s text (pp. 2-24). In chapter 2, ‘Origins and Growth’ (pp. 32-58), the great age of the site, which was inhabited from at least 3500 BC, is duly noted (p. 38). This is followed by discussion of the local Villanovan culture, roughly contemporary with the traditional foundation of Rome, established on Civita (pp. 39-44), and rapidly flourishing, if the quantity and standard of grave goods, amply illustrated (pp. 55, 57), is a sure indication. In chapter 3, ‘The Rise of the City State’ (pp. 59-85), the emergence of the more familiar Etruscan community between about 700 and 600 BC is discussed primarily through reference to the growing abundance of grave goods, of which numerous sketched illustrations feature. It was during this period that Tarquinia became an Etruscan city of some consequence, a phenomenon assumed to have ‘emerged as a result of contacts with Greek colonies, which introduced a new form of urban life and sophistication to a relatively undeveloped Villanovan society’ (p. 81). Leighton rightly observes, however, that this explanation is an oversimplification of the cultural advances occurring at this time, that Villanovan Tarquinia was a highly complex community, and that neither Greeks nor Phoenicians actually settled in this region. Yet it is precisely this combination of inherent and foreign factors that produced the civilisation labelled today as ‘Etruscan’ and that Leighton describes as the result of ‘interactive’ processes, within an increasingly ‘cosmopolitan world’ (p. 83).

The sixth century BC marks the high point of Etruscan culture and power in Italy, in which achievement Tarquinia played a leading role, aptly designated by Leighton as ‘Urbs Florentissima’ (chapter 4, pp. 86-136), ‘a new act rather than just a scene change’ (p. 86). Naturally enough, this is also the central part of the volume, the longest and most detailed chapter. Again there is much emphasis on the cemeteries and their growth both in size and in the sophistication of the tombs (pp. 86-94) and their grave goods. From these artifacts it is possible to extrapolate a great deal; those imported betray ‘the extent of trade’ (p. 94) with Attica, Ionia and further east (p. 98). A detailed discussion of the tomb paintings, ‘unsurpassed in the classical world other than by the frescoes at Pompeii’ (p. 100), a phenomenon that seems to originate in the seventh century BC and that continues to the early Hellenistic era, underlines the affluence or power of Tarquinia especially since ‘80% of all Etruscan painted tombs’ (p. 100) are situated here. Originality in imagery, however, common in the early stages, declined as the process perhaps became mass-produced and derivative. As the graveyards grew, so evidently did the city, its population estimated at between 8000 and 25 000 (pp. 126f.), the latter, perhaps more likely, being then on a par with the major cities of southern Italy and Sicily. Closely associated with Tarquinia was its harbour at Gravisca (pp. 128-31), both gateway to the outside world and entry point—
as was Pyrgi for Caere and Regis Villa for Vulci—for those luxuries, many of which found their way into the tombs. For a time Tarquinia’s control extended inland and south to include Rome (p. 132) and the ‘zone of political influence...' quite likely extended...as far as Lake Bolsena’ (p. 136). Chapter 5, ‘Tarquinia and Rome’ (pp. 137-82), is something of a ‘nachleben’, though Tarquinia was a Roman city for many more centuries than it was Etruscan. Achievements in this era have a tendency to be dismissed as having degenerated and therefore to lack real value. Rightly stressed is the danger that the ‘gloomy leitmotif of decline and melancholy nostalgia is...overstated and potentially misleading’ (p. 176). Besides, it is not historically accurate. In the face of overwhelming Roman military capacity, Tarquinia, prominent as she was among the Etruscan city-states, followed the wise course of the southern Italian Greek cities of reaching an equitable accommodation, which through the pax Romana far outweighed the uncertainties of continued independence.

Some editorial and authorial errors are evident; for instance, 64B (p. 5) = 65B (p. 164); an incorrect subheading (p. 45) may be noted; a comma has been missed (p. 62); ‘patresfamilias’ (p. 66; cf. p. 157) should not be italicized; and there is considerable inconsistent referencing of ancient literary sources. Livy, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Strabo, Tacitus and the elder Pliny are all cited in discussion (pp. 78f.): the first two are referenced in footnotes, but Strabo is footnoted only much later in the volume (p. 132), while Tacitus and Pliny are never featured. A further lack of precision in an otherwise closely argued text is evident when Leighton seems to be suggesting (p. 81) that Phoenicians settled in parts of Italy, a point reiterated, but which could easily have been avoided. Most illustrations have an indication of size but on one occasion (p. 97) ‘5cm’ has presumably been lost, while the unusual ‘leg-shaped perfume flask’ (p. 96) does not appear to have warranted inclusion (fig. 40); nor is there any reference to the funerary paintings of Poseidonia (p. 100) when these have similar symbolism to those contained in the tombs at Tarquinia. Further careless style makes a lituus ‘military regalia’ (p. 167). Tarquinia, along with other Etruscan cities, was rewarded for loyalty to Rome in the Social war (91-89 BC) by full citizenship ‘after’ 89 BC not ‘by’ (p. 175). Antoninus Pius (AD 138-61) was not emperor in the 160s (p. 176). Reference to other known examples of pincer-type city gateways, such as those at Syracuse, Megara Hyblaia or Selinous, which suggest close contact with these Greek states and Etruria, would have been more beneficial than a note (p. 169, n. 50) simply referring to another another modern work. Moreover, Leighton is simply incorrect to suppose, when at least half the soldiers in the Roman armies during the republican period were socii and Latins, that the ‘career path for a Tarquinian aristocrat may...have inclined towards the civic and religious, rather than the military route of his Roman equivalent’ (p. 162). On the contrary, it may be assumed that service in equestrian units was expected if not compulsory for all younger members of wealthy families in Tarquinia.

Although there is a great deal of technical detail regarding the various artifacts, often pottery contained in the many excavated tombs, Leighton cleverly maintains the possible waning attention of the reader by the use of sub-headings throughout each chapter, which often themselves read like the elements of an adventure story:

Richard J. Evans

Cardiff University
BOOKS RECEIVED

Books for review should be sent to the Reviews Editor, Scholia.


IN THE MUSEUM

Scholia publishes news about classical museums in New Zealand and articles on classical artefacts in museums. Information about classical exhibitions and artefacts is welcome and should reach the In the Museum Editor by 1 September.

THE JAMES LOGIE MEMORIAL COLLECTION, UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY

Alison B. Griffith
Classics Department, University of Canterbury
Christchurch, New Zealand

This year (2006) has brought many changes to the James Logie Memorial Collection at the University of Canterbury. We said farewell to our curator of twelve years, Roslynne Bell, and welcomed interim curator Penny Minchin-Garvin, whose first task was to pack up the entire collection while a new heat pump was fitted for the room. During this process we became aware of many unpublished items in the collection, in particular several works of ancient art on long-term loan from the Christchurch Art Gallery (formerly Robert McDougall Gallery), initially purchased in the 1970s to function as exempla in support of the then secondary school curriculum.

One of the most significant of these items is an incomplete, Egyptian, sandstone relief on which are represented two fecundity figures, or Nile gods.¹ They stand facing right and wearing a headdress of three papyrus plants on a reed mat, which identifies them as Nile gods of the North.² Each figure is shown with characteristic pendulous (left) breast and a sagging belly that overhangs a belt with three frontal strips which completely hide the genitals. Both figures wear a divine wig, a false beard with curved end, and a collar. The right arms and shoulders have not been fully rendered, though the hair of the wig is shown as if thrown over the right shoulder and hanging down the back. Each figure bears a tray of offerings—only the left one is fully preserved—with two libation jars, each topped with a lotus, on either side of a was-sceptre, whose top is eroded away. Hanging from the offering tray are

¹ Fig. 1: Christchurch Art Gallery Te Puna o Waiwhetu inv. no. 75/14 (Logie Collection: RMcdgl/2000/1); height 59.8 cm., width 42 cm., depth 4 cm. I am grateful to Neil Roberts, Director of Collections at the Christchurch Art Gallery, for his kind assistance on the acquisition history of these works and for permission to publish this relief. I also thank Jennifer Hellum of the University of Auckland for assistance with the hieroglyphs and Mr. Claus Jurman of the University of Birmingham for his identification of the likely provenance of this panel. For a detailed study of fecundity figures, see J. Baines, Fecundity Figures: Egyptian Personification and the Iconology of a Genre (Warminster 1985).

² Nile gods are sometimes referred to as ‘Hapi’, a personification of the Nile in flood.
arms holding a central cartouche with the name Nitiqret (Greek: Nitocris) surrounded on each side by a lotus and an ankh. The hieroglyphs above the left figure are was, ankh, an arm offering a loaf, and a fourth sign, only partially preserved, of a horned viper, and writing di.f.cnH w3s (‘May he give life and dominion’). Although no traces of paint remain, it is likely that this relief was originally painted.

As is apparent from examination of the sides, this panel was cut from its original context and was almost certainly part of a longer file of similar figures; however, its exact provenance remains unknown. It may be compared with wall reliefs of some of the twelve identified Osiris chapels at Karnak that proliferated during Dynasties 23, 25 and 26 (ca. 828-525 BC) and were associated with particular God’s Wives of Amun. The chapel of Nitiqret, daughter of Psamtik (Psammetichus) I, was located in the southwest corner of the precinct of Montu, which lay immediately north of the Temple of Amun.

Excavation of this chapel revealed traces of Nile god processions in two locations—on each side of the entrance wall, moving towards the entrance, and in the first room, where two files moved along the east, west and south walls towards the north. In both places a column of hieroglyphs preceded each Nile god, which rules out either for the McDougall relief. Two blocks featuring Nile gods and the name of Nitiqret were also found not in situ, but neither has been fully published. The panel may be compared to one in the Louvre (E.27208) with a cartouche of Shepenupet I, another God’s Wife of Amun.

Until recently there has been little comprehensive study of the Osiris chapels of the God’s Wives of Amun, whose proper identification—whether to Osiris or Amun-Re—and iconography are still matters of investigation. Further excavation and study of the many monuments to Osiris in and around the Temple of Amun is required

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3 Nitiqret was adopted by Amenirdis II in 656 BC, after much politicking by her father Psamtik I. This was famously recorded in a surviving stele: see R. Caminos, ‘The Nitocris Adoption Stele’, JEA 50 (1964) 71-101.

4 L. A. Christophe, Karnak-Nord 3: 1945-1949 III (Cairo 1951) 29-38, esp. 36f., 42f. and pll. 37-40. Similar reliefs in identical locations (framing the entrance and in the first room) were found in the chapel of Amenirdis I, which lies immediately east of the chapel of Nitocris (20-25).

5 Christophe [4] 117f. no. 22, 128 no. 29. The former block was reused in a wall abutting the gateway of Shoshenq I in the Temple of Amun; the second (part of a door jamb) may have come from an Osiris chapel.

6 Thanks are due to Claus Jurman for bringing this unpublished relief to my attention.

before we will have a more complete understanding of the context of this important relief.

An Egyptian amulet of translucent dark blue glass and uncertain date was given to the collection on long-term loan by Dr. Katherine Adshead to mark the occasion of her retirement from the Department of Classics at the University of Canterbury in 1998.\(^8\) This had been speculatively identified by the dealer as representing Isis giving birth to Harpocrates and is dated to the Ptolemaic period. Closer examination reveals a naked female with prominent round breasts and hands clasped around her ample belly in a deep squat with legs spread. Her eyes, nose and mouth are distinguished in an abstract manner and her elaborate headdress doubles as an aperture for hanging. Most curious is the surface of the back of the body, which is intentionally pitted. The contours of the whole resemble those of a frog, which further explains the amphibian-like pose and the zoomorphic legs apparent in the frontal view. The headdress, whose similarly dimpled texture and preserved left profile suggest a squatting frog, reinforces this impression.

These amphibian features exclude Isis altogether. Rather, it is the Egyptian goddess Heket\(^9\) who was associated with childbirth, particularly with the later stages of labour, and who was usually represented in various media as a frog or as a woman with a frog’s head. This pendant amulet constitutes a highly unusual but effective variant in the amalgamation of the position of giving birth with the back of a squatting frog to form a frog-woman. Women presumably wore these amulets during labour and birth, possibly in combination with amulets of Taweret, the female hippopotamus goddess who protected mothers during and after birth, or Bes, the dwarf-god also associated with sexuality and childbirth. Frogs were a symbol of fertility and regeneration in ancient Egypt because they seemed to spring up miraculously in prolific numbers from the mud left behind from the receding Nile floodwaters.\(^10\) The numerous extant frog-shaped amulets are generally green or bluish green in colour and are made of faience, stones with a green hue, glass and even bronze, though there are some examples in yellowish, black and white stone, and occasionally carnelian.\(^11\) Colour was a significant aspect in the potency of amulets such that green was associated with vegetation, birth and rebirth.\(^12\)

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\(^8\) Figs 2a-c: Logie Collection inv. no. 154/73; height: 22 mm. Charles Ede Limited, *Antiquities* 92 (1973) no. 29b (ill.), ref. no. E 904.


\(^11\) Frog amulets are found in museum collections worldwide; for the largest collection of these, see G. A. Reisner, *Catalogue Général des Antiquités Égyptiennes du Musée du Caire: Amulets* 1-2 (Cairo 1907-1958). Some frog amulets were recovered from mummy wrappings, but many are pierced lengthwise and double as seals.

\(^12\) Andrews [9] 100-06.
Heket also appears on rings, on apotropaic clappers and wands associated with childbirth from the Middle Kingdom onward, and on rods with apotropaic animal figures placed in the tomb to protect the deceased and ensure rebirth. She is thus equally associated with rebirth in the afterlife. A Middle Kingdom story in the Westcar Papyrus tells the birth of the first three kings of the Fifth Dynasty as triplets. Their mother, Rudjedet, is attended in her labour by the goddesses Isis, Nephthys, Meskhenet and Heket. Similarly, at Antinoë Heket was worshipped as the female counterpart of Khnum, who fashioned men on a potter’s wheel, and she was sometimes associated with Hathor and Nut. In the Pyramid Texts, Heket assisted the ascent of the deceased pharaoh, Pepy I, to the sky. She had a temple dating to the Ptolemaic period at Qus (Apollinopolis Parva), while another (still unlocated) at Her-Wer is referred to in a text from the family tomb of Petosiris (ca. 300 BC) at Tuna el-Gebel.

Figure 1. Christchurch Art Gallery Te Puna o Waiwhetu inv. no. 75/14
(Logie Collection: RMcdgl/2000/1). Egyptian relief.

Figure 2a. Logie Collection inv. no. 154/73. Egyptian amulet. Front.
Figure 2b. Logie Collection inv. no. 154/73. Egyptian amulet. Back.

Figure 2c. Logie Collection inv. no. 154/73. Egyptian amulet. Left side.
J. A. BARSBY ESSAY

The paper judged to be the best student essay in New Zealand submitted to Scholia by 1 September for the preceding year is published annually as the J. A. Barsby Essay. The competition is sponsored by the Australasian Society for Classical Studies. The Essay is in honour of New Zealand classicist J. A. Barsby.

ACADEMIC AND PYRRHONIAN SCEPTICISM: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

Donna-Maree Cross
2nd-year Classics major
University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand

There has been much debate about the Academic Sceptics and the Pyrrhonists since the writings of Sextus Empiricus (ca. AD 160-210) were discovered. Sextus clearly illustrates the conflict that existed between these two schools. The Pyrrhonists, especially through Sextus, sought to distinguish themselves as ‘true’ sceptics from what they saw as the ‘negative dogmatist’ Academics. But what key similarities and differences really existed between these two schools? This discussion will examine whether the schools had a common starting point, common methods, common results, and whether important differences distinguished each school from the other in antiquity. Sextus’ writings, in particular, provide the impetus for this investigation.

Historians commonly differentiate between the Pyrrhonian Sceptics and the Academic Sceptics as the two major branches of Greek scepticism. They were distinct and separate schools in antiquity. Aenesidemus was the founder, or at the very least the reviver, of the Pyrrhonian approach, which claimed Pyrrho of Elis (ca. 365-275 BC) as its originator. On the other hand, the Academic Sceptics belonged to the

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1 I would like to acknowledge the invaluable assistance and inspiration of Dr Dougal Blyth of the Department of Classics and Ancient History at the University of Auckland.

2 Sextus Empiricus lived sometime between AD 150 and 250. Without Sextus we would have many gaps in our understanding of both the Pyrrhonian and Academic sceptics. He is therefore an important source for this paper, especially his works: Against the Learned (Math.) and Outlines of Pyrrhonism (Pyr.).

3 C. L. Stough, Greek Skepticism: A Study in Epistemology (Berkeley 1969) 2f.

4 Aenesidemus was probably a renegade Academic. The Academy after Carneades was perhaps a more mitigated form of scepticism (there was some sense of knowing), and
Middle Academy (of Arcesilaus of Pitane, 315-240 BC) and the New Academy (following Carneades, 214-129 BC). They claimed Plato as their originator. It will become clear that it is important to distinguish between the Middle and New Academies at various junctures since they have their own points of similarity and difference. Sextus himself seems to treat Carneades’ stance as separate and different from Arcesilaus’ (Sext. Emp. Pyr. 1.3, 226).

The Academics and Pyrrhonists shared a starting point that sensory experience—as the source of our beliefs—cannot ensure or guarantee the truth of beliefs. Accordingly, neither school saw the abandonment of desire for knowledge (or certainty) or the suspension of judgment as defined by Sextus Empiricus (Pyr. 1.10) as a bleak prospect. This view contrasts with the dogmatic schools of antiquity. Greek Hellenistic scepticism, both Academic and Pyrrhonian, ‘renounce[d] the typical Greek philosopher’s ideal of knowledge as the basis for a well-lived human life’. Nevertheless, the two schools responded differently to this starting point. The Pyrrhonists saw it as sufficient reason to suspend judgment about all perceptual statements. Thus all perceptions were prefaced with ‘it appears’ (Sext. Emp. Math. 11.18f.; Pyr. 1.135, 195, 202). This approach produced ‘sense statements descriptive of experience and no more’ (that is, they are descriptions not to be trusted as reflecting what really is). This therefore favours an interpretation that the Pyrrhonists practised complete (or radical) epochē.

Aenesidemus may have wanted a return to a more radical form of scepticism. Cf. Diog. Laert. Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers 9.115f. There is much debate whether a line can be traced back directly to Pyrrho. See R. Bett, Pyrrho, His Antecedents and His Legacy (Oxford 2000) for an argument that Pyrrho had significant influence on later Pyrrhonism. Bett relies on Aristocles in Euseb. Praep. Evang. 14.18.758cd, the strongest evidence for Pyrrho’s influence: this indicates that Pyrrho taught suspension of judgment with the aim of tranquillity. It seems that Pyrrho’s method, which is a defining characteristic of Pyrrhonism, is a more likely origin than Aenesidemus’ contribution. Cf. M. Frede, ‘The Sceptic’s Beliefs’, in M. Burnyeat and M. Frede (edd.), The Original Sceptics: A Controversy (Indianapolis 1997) 5.

See also Sext. Emp. Pyr. 1.232-34 for Arcesilaus and Pyr. 1.220-35 for Carneades and his followers.


The aforementioned interpretation, however, should be questioned. Indeed, some have seen this mainstream interpretation as ‘fundamentally mistaken’ because ‘[n]o matter how ingenious [the Pyrrhonian sceptic] may be, the sceptic cannot avoid knowing things’.\textsuperscript{13} The rub is that we cannot avoid beliefs about evident things: when we act, it seems that we must assume that which we sense is true. In order to walk through the door in the wall, for example, some say that we really must believe—at the instant we go to walk through the door—that there is a door in the wall that we can walk through and we will not simply walk into a solid wall. Furthermore, Sextus distinguishes wider from narrower senses of belief, and states that only beliefs in the narrower sense are dogmatic (Diog. Laert. 7, 9f.).\textsuperscript{14} Thus, Sextus does think that a Pyrrhonian sceptic can have beliefs in everyday life (Sext. Emp. Pyr. 1.22). There is the suggestion that Pyrrhonian philosophical arguments (which lead from premises to conclusions, and thus seem to imply judgment and assent) against other schools’ doctrines are insincere (Cic. Acad. 2.78). This would be consistent with their approach to life, which entails no assent to the claim that reason has any intrinsic validity.\textsuperscript{15} But what it does not explain is how the Pyrrhonist argues about non-evident things, for that also involves premises leading to conclusions, which in turn entails inferences, assumptions, and belief (Diog. Laert. 9.102-04). Yet, while the Pyrrhonian position may have its problems in this respect, one can say at least that Pyrrhonism was a more stringent attempt at epochē and to that extent was a more radical scepticism than that of the Academics.

There is ‘no evidence’ that the Academics ‘advocated any linguistic reformulation of [the Pyrrhonian] sort’ in their response to the starting point.\textsuperscript{16} Instead, they turned to justifying claims in terms of how likely it is that they represent the truth. It was a matter of acting on what was plausible, probable or believable for the New Academy following Carneades (Cic. Acad. 2.108), or reasonable for the Middle Academy of Arcesilaus (Sext. Emp. Pyr. 3.158).\textsuperscript{17} In the New Academy, the idea was that, depending on the available time, the circumstances, and the importance of the matter, one could act simply on the basis that the impression is credible; or that it is credible and consistent; or that it is credible, consistent and tested.\textsuperscript{18} The result was that, while the impression may be wrong (Diog. Laert. 9.94) and thus not kataleptic (a ‘grasping’ of the truth)—in contrast to what the Stoics maintained—it was a justified assertion. Carneades treats this as a criterion: the impression may be

\begin{itemize}
  \item\textsuperscript{13} Frede [4] 1.
  \item\textsuperscript{14} See also Frede [4] 8f.
  \item\textsuperscript{15} See Cooper [8] 187.
  \item\textsuperscript{16} Stough [3] 64.
  \item\textsuperscript{17} Arcesilaus is similar in this respect to the Pyrrhonists, who likewise do not accept anything like Carneades’ criterion which relates to the likelihood of truth (as opposed to how to live practically).
  \item\textsuperscript{18} See M. Burnyeat, ‘Can the Sceptic Live His Scepticism?’, in Burnyeat and Frede [4] 33f.
\end{itemize}
false, but one should not distrust it because for the most part (a measure of assessment which goes back to Aristotle) it will be true and successful in life (Sext. Emp. Pyr. 7.175). This is like giving qualified assent or granting something as true with qualification (Cic. Acad. 2.59, 104; Sext. Emp. Pyr. 1.230; Math. 7.177f.), since drawing inferences seems to require assent; Philo held that this position entailed holding some opinion of what is plausible (Cic. Acad. 2.148). Therefore, the Academic sceptic assumes that we do more or less have access to the truth of the world, it is just that we cannot be absolutely sure (in contrast to the Stoics). This plausibility/probability criterion was explicitly rejected by the Pyrrhonists, for they did not want a criterion of how things are actually likely to be. This all suggests that the Academics were less rigorous in their application of epoché than the Pyrrhonists.19

Sextus maintains that a difference between the Pyrrhonists and Academics follows in that the New Academics brought enquiry to a definite conclusion.20 The accusation was that the Pyrrhonists held philosophical matters to be ungraspable or unknowable (Sext. Emp. Pyr. 1.226). This would amount to negative dogmatism, that nothing is knowable (Pyr. 1.2f., 226). At the very beginning of his Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Sextus decisively separates this approach from what he sees as the Pyrrhonian approach, which is to keep enquiry open (Pyr. 1.1, 4). The Pyrrhonists have not decided that nothing is knowable; their slogans are apparently not statements of dogma, because that would undermine their scepticism (Diog. Laert. 9.72-76; Sext. Emp. Pyr. 1.30, 200).21 The Pyrrhonists were concerned to avoid the conclusion that their attack on dogma is itself dogmatic (Pyr. 1.13-15).22 Sextus explains the sense in which Pyrrhonists are not dogmatic (Pyr. 1.33f): they hold no specific doctrines or dogmas,23 and no views that define them. According to Sextus (Pyr. 1.8), scepticism is an ability; and this ability is not descriptive of a philosophical position, or that certain behaviour is good. The method of procedure is not dogmatic; rather, it is neutral and in conformity with appearances (Pyr. 1.9, 17).24 The Pyrrhonists simply received the impression that assent was bad and suspension good in any given context; it was just the way it appeared to them and seemed more likely than the opposite at the time (Pyr. 1, 7). Sextus continues that in order to be a sceptical philosopher you must constantly enquire and consider questions and philosophy, and continue to do so as the Pyrrhonists do (Diog. Laert. 9.70; Sext. Emp. Pyr. 1.7).

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19 One should distinguish between the different responses to Carneades. First, it seems that Clitomachus (and Cicero) would argue that the criterion of plausibility is entirely consistent with complete epoché. Secondly, one should recall that Arcesilaus suggested that we act on what is reasonable (as opposed to plausible), which is closer to the Pyrrhonist’s impression in that it does not suggest that what is reasonable is more likely to be true.


24 Hankinson [22] 27.
Indeed, the word ‘sceptic’ seems to have originated with the Pyrrhonists not the Academics—although subsequently the term was applied to the Academics with increasing frequency. Furthermore, its etymology or original meaning was simply ‘enquirer’, which accords with Sextus’ expounding of the open-ended Pyrrhonian approach. One needs to question, however, whether the Academics really were negative dogmatists. First, Sextus notes that Arcesilaus decided as a matter of definitive fact that assent is bad in the nature of things, and that suspension is by nature good (Sext. Emp. Pyr. 1.233). But importantly Sextus does not include Arcesilaus amongst the ‘negative dogmatist’ Academics. Indeed, Arcesilaus is said by Sextus to have seemingly very much in common with Pyrrhonism, for he suspends judgment about everything as well (Pyr. 1.232). The two approaches are even said to be ‘practically one and the same’ (Sext. Emp. Pyr. 1.232; see also Cic. Acad. 2.59).

Turning to Carneades, Cicero suggests that perhaps he was a radical sceptic and that Carneades said that he does not even know whether he does not know (Cic. Acad. 2.28). On the other hand, Carneades concedes that the wise man sometimes holds opinions, that is, assents to impressions (2.59). There is a question, however, whether this was simply a hypothetical admission to advance the dialectical argument. In any case, while Sextus’ submission certainly suggests a difference between the Pyrrhonists and New Academics, one should question also whether or not the Pyrrhonists really were open-minded, continuing in their enquiries, especially given that *ataraxia* (‘tranquillity’, ‘freedom from disturbance’) meant that the Pyrrhonists maintained psychic quietude and no longer tried to know the unknown.

This leads one to consider a difference that relates to the end point of each school’s enquiries or ability. On the one hand, the Pyrrhonists saw the end point (not goal) as *ataraxia* (Sext. Emp. Pyr. 1, 12). Perhaps one could suggest that this really is doctrinal. Sextus tries to reject this interpretation by submitting that it is not a judgment, conclusion, causation argument, or doctrine. Rather, he explains that it is like the shadow following the body or the foam occurring on the horse’s mouth in a painting by a painter who throws the sponge at the painting out of frustration (Pyr. 1.26-29). The Pyrrhonists have the impression that giving up the search is what is needed, and *ataraxia* will fortuitously follow or result when you stop actively trying to get it. In contrast, there is no evidence that Arcesilaus or Carneades thought *ataraxia* was the ultimate end. There is no talk of *ataraxia* being the end point for any

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26 Antiochus was anti-sceptic, so this is more likely the truth of Carneades’ position.

27 See the dispute between Clitomachus and Philo/Metrodorus on this point (Cic. Acad. 2.78).

28 There is debate in the scholarship as to the extent of a Pyrrhonist’s *epoche*. For example, see J. Barnes, ‘The Beliefs of a Pyrrhonist’, in Burnyeat and Frede [4] 58-91.

29 This can be contrasted with the dogmatists, who think that answers to philosophical questions will free them from disturbance.
of the Academic sceptics even though ataraxia apparently follows suspension. It seems that Arcesilaus and Carneades saw suspension as the end point.\textsuperscript{30}

In seeking this suspension, both schools used the same method of arguing both sides of an issue. To demonstrate that no final and conclusive decision could be made on any philosophical matter, all arguments for a doctrine given by an interlocutor or dogmatic school were ‘counter-balanced’ with arguments advocating the opposite view (Cic. Acad. 1.45).\textsuperscript{31} Arcesilaus practised this (Cic. Fin. 2.2, 5.10) by using the technique of refutation that Socrates initiated; Carneades was known for it (Cic. Rep. 3); and the Pyrrhonists also employed this since they saw it as their ability to set appearances and ideas in opposition (Sext. Emp. Pyr. 1.8). There is perhaps, however, a difference underlying this. On the one hand, the Academics were most concerned to attack Stoics.\textsuperscript{32} As Stough points out, it would be ‘hard to overestimate’ the importance of Stoic philosophy as an impetus for the Academic sceptics. The contest between the two, especially when Carneades was the head of the Academy, ‘encouraged elaboration and refinement’ of the Academic position.\textsuperscript{33} The Academics were pleased to counter or dispose of the Stoic criterion of katalēpsis. On the other hand, the Pyrrhonists did not appear to focus on one school more than any others. The target of the Pyrrhonists was any dogma. They were concerned to rally against any school—Peripatetic, Epicurean, Stoic and so on—which claimed that they had discovered truth or knowledge (Sext. Emp. Pyr. 1); and they attacked all those doctrines—as well as their roots, that is, the underlying theories of knowledge—with intensity and equal dedication.\textsuperscript{34}

Consistent with this method of arguing both sides of an issue, Aenesidemus developed Ten Tropes or Modes, constructed around the idea of relativity of judgment (Diog. Laert. 9.79f.; Sext. Emp. Pyr. 1.36f.), which were meant to apply to all doctrines. The Five Modes of Agrippa aimed to be more comprehensive, showing that there could be no opinions on anything (Diog. Laert. 9.88f.; Sext. Emp. Pyr. 1.164-77); these were subsequently reduced to two Modes. This systematic analysis of sceptical argument was meant to be a comprehensive attack on dogmatism. It was the ‘first instance of a highly developed practice of argumentative enquiry, formalized

\textsuperscript{30} Hankinson [22] 29. Possible motives for this may be that the Academics were so committed to finding the truth that they would not be willing to believe anything less, and thus practised epoche until the truth was certain. This is reminiscent of Socrates, who found it shameful to think that you do know what you do not know (that is, culpable ignorance).


\textsuperscript{32} For Arcesilaus’ attack on the Stoic doctrine of the kriterion (‘standard’), see Cic. Acad. 2.40-42, 2.76-78; Sext. Emp. Math. 7.150-65, 7.248-60, 7.401-35.

\textsuperscript{33} Stough [3] 8.

\textsuperscript{34} For lists of doctrines attacked, see e.g. Diog. Laert. 9.90-101 (detailed); Phot. Bibl. 170b.
according to a number of modes or patterns of argument’.\textsuperscript{35} In this sense, it was a development: it was a more systematic system than that of the Academic Sceptics; perhaps it is the only point of difference between Arcesilaus and the Pyrrhonists.

One final similarity prevailed between the two schools, which is their effort at a practical orientation, albeit by different means. Both schools faced the argument that one could not live their respective versions of scepticism (Cic. \textit{Acad.} 2.24f.; 2.37f.), and both were concerned to combat it by showing workable solutions to the problems unearthed by their own epistemological criticism.\textsuperscript{36}

The Pyrrhonists consistently referred to their ability as a way of life,\textsuperscript{37} capable of supporting an active existence (Sext. Emp. \textit{Math.} 7.30). The idea was to move away from philosophical speculation, and to follow social convention without belief, and (current, superior) appearances with no judgment as to what really is the case (Diog. Laert. 9.104-07; cf. Sext. Emp. \textit{Pyr.} 1.121-24): they saw this as consistent with \textit{ataraxia} (\textit{Pyr.} 1.25-31).\textsuperscript{38} Appearance was the criterion for action.\textsuperscript{39} One thinks of the Clitomachean Academics and of the defensive argument that ‘involuntary assent to appearances, is compatible with suspending judgment about everything’ (\textit{Pyr.} 1.12, 1.192f., 196).\textsuperscript{40} Again, however, one has to ask whether one can follow social convention without belief, or follow appearances without making an assumption that they really are, in each instance, the case.

The Academics also sought to set their philosophical enquiries in a practical context; however, they responded with the criterion of probability—or reasonableness, for Arcesilaus (Sext. Emp. \textit{Pyr.} 3.158; \textit{Math.} 7.158). While an impression may be false, it is said that one should not distrust it because on the whole it will be true and successful in life; it is ‘truth-like’ (Sext. Emp. \textit{Pyr.} 7.175). Whether one can draw inferences without assenting has already been queried above. Maybe one should agree with Sextus’ portrayal that they were in fact assenting to what really is the case and did not just stick to appearances (Cic. \textit{Acad.} 2.98-105; Sext. Emp. \textit{Pyr.} 1.231). This would accord with Philo’s position on Carneades that the wise man would assent to appearances, that is, hold opinions about what is plausible (Cic. \textit{Acad.} 2.148). In any case, the New Academics adopted a different method, from that of the Pyrrhonists, of showing that their scepticism was liveable. In the end, however, both face questions over the success of their respective methods.

The Greeks took their scepticism very seriously. In antiquity there were two sceptical schools in particular: the Pyrrhonists and the Academic Sceptics. These are

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{35} Burnyeat [18] 28.
\item \textsuperscript{36} Stough [3] 4.
\item \textsuperscript{37} Hankinson [22] 14; Stough [3] 4.
\item \textsuperscript{38} It is unclear whether the Pyrrhonian sceptics attacked our ability to make inferences from both suggestive and indicative signs.
\item \textsuperscript{39} For guides to practical life, see Sext. Emp. \textit{Pyr.} 8, 11.
\end{itemize}
sometimes grouped together under the label of ‘Ancient Sceptics’, following the logic that although there are differences between the two schools, those differences are minor when compared to the difference between Ancient dogmatism and Ancient Scepticism overall.\(^{41}\) In antiquity, though, the Pyrrhonists were at pains to counter-balance any such logic with arguments that there are important differences that divide these two schools. The extent to which they did differ has been debated ever since.\(^{42}\) This paper has outlined the major similarities and differences between the two schools. It seems that the two schools departed from a common starting point, used the same method of suggesting the rival arguments, and were both concerned to show—though in different ways—that their scepticism could translate into an active way of life. Of the differences discerned, perhaps the most important is their fundamental divergence from their common starting point. It is exciting that it is their differences and individual intricacies that are being explored in the scholarship. It is an acknowledgement that they each at some point deserve attention for their own sake.


\(^{42}\) For example, Aulus Gellius claims that this issue was ‘an old question, treated by many Greek writers’ before him: see Bailey [31] 81.
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G. B. Cobbold is the author of Rome: Empire Without End (Wayside 2005) and Hellas (Wayside 1999). He holds an MA from Cambridge University and has taught in various secondary schools in the UK and USA. He is currently Assistant Headmaster and Chair of the Classics Department at Tabor Academy in Marion, Massachusetts.
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