CARTHAGO DELENDATA EST: AITIA AND PROPHASIS*

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Since Orosius, the presbyter, complained as early as the fifth century A.D. ‘sed mihi quamlibet studiose quaerenti verumtamen homini tardioris ingenii nusquam omnino causa tertii belli Punicī...eluxit’ (4,23,8), it stands to reason that neither the title nor the topic of this note can lay claim to being in any way new or original. ‘Carthago delenda est’ is at best a variant of the headings of two well-known articles — one by F.E. Adcock (‘Delenda est Carthago’, CHJ 8 (1946) 117–128) and the other by J. Burian (‘Ceterum autem censeo Carthaginem esse delendam’, Klio 60 (1978) 169–175) —, and the investigation intends, as these two scholars have done, to re-examine the events that led to the outbreak of the Third Roman–Carthaginian War and the ensuing destruction of Carthage.

Adcock as well as Burian failed to observe, however, that the available sources do not in fact substantiate the familiar dictum of Cato the Elder with which he allegedly kept on urging the destruction of Carthage after his return from a diplomatic mission to Africa.1 And although Little and Kienast expressed doubts about the authenticity of Cato’s saying as early as 1934 and 1954,2 it was left for Sylvia Thürlemann to prove in 19743 that its formalized version first appeared in English and French contexts at the turn of the 18th to the 19th centuries, and that it cannot be traced in the German-speaking countries until 1821.4

This much then for the title. But what about the problems with which it is associated, that is to say, the causes of the Third Roman–Carthaginian War and the ensuing destruction of Carthage?5 Following Thucydides in 1,23,6, one should perhaps differentiate even more clearly than has been the case before between the underlying and truest reasons for the war, the prophaseis, and the immediate causes of the war which were openly acknowledged, that is, the aitiae.6

Before this question is addressed, a short survey of the events may be useful, well-known though these may be.7 In spite of the stringent peace-terms which Rome had imposed on Carthage in 201,8 the city seems to have made a remarkably quick economic recovery (cf. App. Lib. 67). However, as early as 200, Massinissa, the king of neighbouring Numidia and an ally of Rome, took advantage of some indefinite territorial stipulations in the
treaty between Rome and Carthage (cf. Pol. 15.18.5) to extend his possessions at the expense of Carthage, which in terms of the same peace had been forbidden to wage war outside her own frontiers without the consent of Rome. Though Carthage repeatedly endeavoured to secure the mediation of the Roman senate in the recurrent border disputes, this body was evidently not inclined to assume the role of an honest broker. Not only was little done to check Massinissa's acts of aggression, but in fact the embassies sent by Rome to investigate matters on the spot seem in most instances to have decided all disputes in the king's favour.5 In 152 (?)10 M. Porcius Cato, the censor, also visited Carthage on one such delegation, and according to tradition he took to urging the complete destruction of the city after his return, on the grounds that it posed a constant threat to Rome. Although his opinion seems to have been shared by many senators (Pol. 36.2.1, cf. App. Lib. 69), P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica Corculum, consul in 162 and 155, who had probably been a member of the same mission11, allegedly took the stand that there was not only no valid, or just, cause for a war, but that Carthage must be allowed to continue to exist as a 'whetstone' or a 'counterweight of fear' to Rome12 which she needed for moral, that is, mainly domestic reasons.13 Events in Africa, however, finally decided the issue. After another outbreak of hostilities between Carthage and Numidia in 151, the so-called 'democrats'14 in Carthage, under the leadership of Carthalo and Hamilcar Sannis (or Saunites), decided in the winter of 151/150 (?)15 to resist Massinissa's encroachments by force of arms, albeit without Roman authorization. Since this was an obvious breach of the treaty of 201, the formal preconditions for an armed intervention by Rome were given and, hence, a iusta causa for a war against Carthage. This was duly declared in 149 and it was also decided to destroy Carthage for good, once the war was ended.

Unexpectedly the city withstood the Roman forces for three years, until its capture by P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus in 146, and according to the rather exaggerated information imparted by the ancient as well as many modern writers,16 it was razed to the ground and its site condemned to lie desolate for ever.

Such then a simplified outline of the events, as they are described in greater detail in, for instance, the Cambridge Ancient History17 or any of the well-known textbooks on Roman history.18 But what about the sources on which we depend for our knowledge of the Third Roman-Carthaginian War and which must be the point of departure of any investigation,19 unless, of course, one shares the opinion of some scholars, such as A.J. Woodman, that even historiography can be regarded as no more than a fictional genre?

Although the list of ancient sources takes up well-nigh a page in the Cambridge Ancient History,20 we have to rely mainly on the contemporary
history of Polybius — chiefly on book 36 which has, however, not been preserved intact —, the Libyca or Punic Wars of Appian (chapters 67–135) and the Periochae of Livy (chapters 47–52). According to Polybius — especially 36,9,4 — as also the derivative accounts of, for example, Appian21 (Lib. 69) Rome’s decision to go to war and to destroy Carthage was due to fear of that city,22 and, consequently, the reasons adduced in public were that the safety of Rome was at stake. And, indeed, this is the explanation found in many a standard work on Roman history even today. Thus M. Cary and H.H. Scullard maintain that ‘honest if misguided fear’ was the predominant motive for Rome’s behaviour,23 and Alfred Heuss has also offered the opinion, that distrust and fear, the result of a generally unsuccessful foreign policy, were the prime motivating factors for Rome’s stance against Carthage24. This theory is by no means invalidated, if we consider other statements by Polybius (36,2,1) and also Appian (Lib. 69;74;75), according to which the senate had long ago (πάλαι) resolved on war,25 but had waited for an appropriate occasion and a suitable pretext to make this step acceptable to the outside world (πρὸς τοῦς ἐκτός). And even in the account given by Livy, or, rather, his epitomator, which doubtlessly reflects the attempts of the annalists to justify Rome’s action against Carthage,26 we find the remark that there was as yet no iusta causa beli (Per. 48), that is, by implication, no plausible or ‘decent’ cause for war, and this remark was made by none other than Scipio Nasica in opposing Cato’s obstinate advocacy of war.27

There has been no shortage of attempts by modern historians to discover ‘rational’ motives for the seemingly ‘irrational’ conduct of Rome, as is obvious from the extensive bibliographies found in the works of, for example, Astin, Harris, Maróti or Huss.28 In this connection it has been pointed out repeatedly, that the ancient writers and, especially, Polybius (36,9), also mention motives other than that of Rome’s fear of Carthage alone.29

It was Theodor Mommsen who first argued that Carthage was destroyed for economic reasons, referring to the observations which the Roman mission of 152 is said to have made about the city’s wealth and resources.30 Although various scholars, such as Rostovtzeff, have shared this view,31 Adcock and Badian,32 among others, failed to subscribe to it, on the grounds that the sources are silent on this point,33 and that the Romans made no attempt after the war to colonize the site of the city or even to exploit its commercial facilities. ‘The whole myth of economic motives in Rome’s foreign policy at this time is a figment of modern anachronism’, thus rather dogmatically E. Badian in Roman Imperialism in the Roman Republic (p. 20), though Harris and Maróti have of late expressed renewed misgivings regarding this issue.34 As was to be expected, the latter once more called attention to the episode of Cato’s African figs — according to Pliny the Elder (HN 15,74–75, cf. Plut. Cato maior 27,1; Tertull. ad
Cato reputedly showed some fresh figs in the senate after his return from Carthage, claiming that these had been picked there three days previously. Although F.J. Meijer published an article on Cato’s figs some years ago, in which he came to the conclusion, that the figs must actually have come from Cato’s own estates in the vicinity of Rome, this is of no particular concern in the present context. What needs to be pointed out, though, is that Cato’s dramatic gesture was aimed first and foremost at demonstrating the proximity of Carthage (‘so near do we have the enemy to our walls: tam prope a moeris habemus hostem’), as is also evident from Pliny’s further reflections on the significance of the fig incident (cf. *HN* 15,76: ‘tanto propius Carthaginem pomo Cato admovit’).

Another hypothesis — in the default of other evidence, it can be no more than that — was advanced by Kahrstedt in the third volume of Meltzer’s *Geschichte der Karthager* (Bd. 3,1913,615–617; 642). According to this the actual cause of the war would have been one which a Machiavelli could have conceived: Carthage had to be destroyed, not because of herself, but because of her neighbour. If she became incorporated in Numidia, this state would gain in importance and, with Carthage as its centre, it might, in the event, attain the same political significance as the Attalid kingdom. Rome’s interests necessitated having either two weak states in North Africa or, alternatively, one weak state and another which had been converted into a province after its destruction (from p. 616). It was thus fear of Numidia rather than fear of Carthage which determined Rome’s actions.

Although this theory which even Adcock regarded as ‘seductive’ has found its adherents, it must be considered as untenable or, in the words of Badian, as ‘absurd in itself’. Massinissa whom the Romans had placed in control of all Numidia in 203, had been a faithful ally ever after, and his final dispositions showed that this remained so till the end, for on his deathbed, early in 148, he entrusted Scipio Aemilianus with the division of his kingdom and the arrangement of his succession (App. *Lib.* 105–109, cf. Pol. 36,16,10; Liv. *Per.* 50). What is more, the Numidian kingdom, which had basically been Massinissa’s creation, was anything but a well-established, stable organism, despite its size and ostensible power. Finally — and this is an important point — Polybius’ account (36,9) of the many diverging and mostly highly critical views circulating in Greece and the East regarding the war against Carthage, makes no mention whatsoever of a devious motive such as that which Kahrstedt ascribes to Rome.

It goes without saying, that the question has again been raised of late, in how far Rome’s policy towards Carthage was determined by what may conveniently be termed ‘imperialism’ or, rather, by considerations of pure expediency conditioned by reasons of state. This possibility is also suggested in two fragments from the writings of Diodorus Siculus (32,2 and 4,4–5), probably deriving from Polybius, as also in Plutarch’s *Life*
According to Polybius–Diodorus the year 168 was a decisive turning point in Rome's foreign policy: whereas Rome had shown clemency and consideration to vanquished peoples at the beginning of her world supremacy, she changed her attitude once she had conquered most of the inhabited world. From now on she sought to secure her predominance by fear and intimidation and by destroying the most eminent cities. And it was then that Corinth, Carthage and Numantia were annihilated and the Macedonian kingdom abolished, and many were cowed by terror.

There is no need to discuss the significance of the year 168 in Rome's conduct of her foreign affairs, if W. Hoffmann's observations on this topic in his paper on Roman policy in the 2nd century B.C. and the destruction of Carthage or the remarks by A. Heuss on the crisis of Roman imperialism in his Römische Geschichte are kept in mind. Suffice it to say, that W.V. Harris in his more recent discussion of the Third Roman-Carthaginian War, in a wider context than that of the conflict of Rome and Carthage, also came to the conclusion, that Rome's behaviour towards Carthage must, on the whole, be regarded as yet another instance of extreme ψαλαρχία (power-hunger). He then poses the rather rhetorical question: 'Did the leaders of the state then deceive themselves and suppose that the war was defensive? There is no strong reason to think so: rather they will first have made a rather cold-blooded war-decision which was however conditional, as Polybius implies, on the appearance of technical justification; this they duly found in 150' (p. 240).

As was remarked previously, it was Carthage which provided Rome with the desired justification or the desired pretext for declaring war in 149. In this connection the question must be considered once more whether the famous debate between Cato and Nasica about the fate of Carthage ever took place and, if so, whether Nasica can actually have advanced the argument of a 'counterweight of fear' when he spoke in defence of Carthage before the senate. Matthias Gelzer was the first to investigate this problem at length and his findings have been the basis of all further discussions. According to Gelzer the debate between Nasica and Cato involved questions of principle, reflecting entirely divergent views on Rome's foreign policy, a perception which is substantiated to a certain extent by the Greek historians Diodorus Siculus, Plutarch and Appian (Diod. 34,33,4/6; Plut. Cato maior 27,3ff.; Appian, Lib. 69). According to them Nasica reputedly declared, that Carthage must be saved for Rome's own sake, since the threat of a foreign power was necessary to maintain her internal stability. Although Gelzer's thesis has found wide acceptance in the secondary literature, it was stressed more recently by scholars such as Hoffmann and Bringmann that the desirability of a 'counterweight of fear' to promote internal concord in Rome can hardly have been a consideration as early as 150, and that the argument of the fear of external enemies as a factor of domestic
peace was probably an invention of later authors — possibly the Greek writer and philosopher Poseidonius — who opted for the fall of Carthage as marking the beginning of the moral and political decline of Rome.

As in the case of the year 168 there is no need to remark upon the significance of the year 146, which has been regarded as epoch-making in the history of republican Rome by ancient as by modern historians. As far as Nasica’s position in the years 152 to 150 is concerned, however, special attention should be paid to the Livian Periochae: in countering Cato’s demands Nasica allegedly pointed out that there was as yet no adequate or just cause for a war (‘nondum sibi iustam causam belli videri’), while urging that no rash decision should be taken (‘nihil temere faciendum’) (Per. 48). An echo of this is to be found in Polybius (36,2,1–4) who also refers to differences of opinion in the senate about whether war should be declared and this specifically with regard to a suitable opportunity and a reason which would appeal also to foreign nations. ‘For the Romans very rightly paid great attention to this matter — viz how their actions would be viewed by the outside world — (and) so on this occasion their disputes with each other about the effect on foreign opinion very nearly made them desist from going to war.’

It is an arguable point whether Nasica opposed Cato’s policy towards Carthage in principle, as Gelzer has claimed. Perhaps rather too much has been made of the debate between Cato and Nasica and of its political importance at the time. Yet one fact seems to be certain, namely, that there were two major groups or ‘factions’ in the senate prior to the outbreak of the Third Roman–Carthaginian War, which subscribed to the views of either Cato or Nasica on the Carthaginian question. As to who supported Cato and who Nasica, is a problem which is still to be clarified by the ‘republican’ prosopographers, despite some preliminary work done by Astin and also Ursula Hackl in this regard.

But to return to the starting point ‘Carthago delenda est: aitia and prophasis’: as W. Hoffmann remarked, it is still difficult to understand why Rome destroyed a city in 146 which had been debarred from any political initiative in terms of the peace of 201. According to him the ‘leitmotiv’ of Rome’s constant fear of Carthage as the underlying cause, which is firmly entrenched in the ancient tradition, fails to convince as do the attempts undertaken since the 19th century to interpret the political situation of the 2nd century B.C. in the light of contemporary perceptions and experiences, without any support from the ancient evidence.

Hoffmann as also E. Maróti, in a more recent article on the causes for the destruction of Carthage, have demonstrated that the general context is more complicated than the sources and their fixation on the conflict between Rome and Carthage would make us believe. Here a remark by Polybius may be taken as a point of departure. According to this, un-
rest and commotion (ταραχή και χίνησις) set in once more in the fifties after the whole world had been conquered and subjected by Rome in 168 (3,4,12). In the specific situation before the outbreak of the Third Roman-Carthaginian War this applied particularly to Spain in the West and to Macedonia in the East, where trouble was brewing yet again. The Second Celtiberian War which had flared up in 153, ended after two years with a peace that could at most be regarded as an uneasy one, and the rising of Andriscus in 150 showed only too clearly that even the war against Perseus had not been able to quell the extensive anti-Roman movements in the Eastern Mediterranean. Although all these events must undoubtedly have given rise to concern in Rome — here it must be remembered that Cato had served as a consular commander in the newly created provinces of Spain in 195, immediately after the Second War against Carthage, and that he allegedly continued to pay close attention to developments in that area even after he had left —, the question remains why the situation in Africa in particular was perceived as posing a distinct threat. If Rome’s real or alleged fear of Carthage is disregarded as a possible factor for the time being, then Massinissa and the position of his kingdom obviously come to mind, though not in the sense of Kahrstedt’s thesis. Now scholars such as Walsh and Astin have argued that Numidia under Massinissa cannot have given Rome any real ground for fear that it might become a rival capable of superseding Carthage. There are, however, some important aspects which merit some closer consideration: by the year 152 Massinissa had already reached the ripe old age of nearly ninety years. While his own ambitions seem at no stage to have held any immediate threat for Rome, there was no saying what might happen after his death, which could be anticipated in the near future. Since he had three legitimate sons — Micipsa, Mastanabal and Gulusso — apart from several illegitimate ones, the possibility of dynastic troubles could not be ruled out. These in themselves could have imperilled or even upset the precarious system of ‘check and balance’ which Rome had established in North Africa after the Second Roman-Carthaginian War, and misgivings about the future of the Numidian kingdom must thus have seemed justified. Considered as a whole, the situation at the end of the fifties, in Spain, Macedonia and North Africa, may therefore have conjured up memories of the Second Roman-Carthaginian War, when Rome was committed to fighting several wars on several fronts simultaneously, both in the West and in the East. Can it then be assumed that Cato and his followers were urging a ‘preventive’ war against Carthage, for which the breach of the peace treaty of 201 eventually gave the formal justification, to prevent another possible upheaval in Rome’s dominions from taking place? Although the sources do not provide any direct evidence for this theory, the two fragments of Diodorus which have already been mentioned (32,2 and 4,4–5) say explicitly that Rome was determined after 168 to secure her
predominance in the Mediterranean at any price whatsoever. But even this does not explain satisfactorily why the sources keep on dwelling on the fear of Carthage alone as the motivation for Rome’s harsh action.

Now, as others have observed before this, the fifty years that followed the end of the Second Roman–Carthaginian War were drawing to a close and, consequently, by 151 at the latest Carthage would be set free from obligations such as the annual payments of the war indemnity and the rendering of hostages which had enabled Rome to exert a certain measure of control over the domestic affairs of the city. The growing influence of the anti-Numidian and presumably also anti-Roman faction in Carthage (cf. App. Lib. 68 and 70) which had become increasingly noticeable since about 154/3, must, therefore, have been viewed in a serious light by observers in Rome. Disquieting though these circumstances were, there is, however, yet another aspect of the situation to be considered.

The literary tradition does not allow a definite judgement whether the impression gained by the delegates of 152 of the material well-being of Carthage — in the context of the ‘Furchtmotiv’ this is by no means insignificant — was deceptive and could only surprise people who had not seen Carthage previously. But is any further insight to be gained from the archaeological evidence? It is a rather astonishing fact that only marginal attention has been paid to this — a regrettable sign of the detrimental effects which the division of the ‘Altertumswissenschaft’ into separate disciplines has so often had. That Carthage had been able to resume its place as a mercantile capital of the western Mediterranean soon after 196, the year of Hannibal’s sufeteship, and that her revenue from the African hinterland must have risen at the same time due to the introduction of more intensive methods of cultivation, has been proved by archaeological work performed at Carthage and, among other locations, at Simitthu since the sixties. The international excavations conducted on the site of Carthage have revealed furthermore that the port facilities of this greatest maritime power of the western Mediterranean actually seem to have been fully developed only during the fifty years before the destruction of the city, and that the splendid multi-storeyed buildings erected at this time compare favourably with those found in the highly developed urban centres of the Greek and Roman world. In short: the surprising result of the archaeological campaigns has been that the acme of the city of Carthage seems to have been reached in the years between 200 and 146 B.C., contrary to the received and widely propagated general opinion of her decay after 201, and that the serious defeat which Carthage sustained during the Second Roman–Carthaginian War had by no means signified the beginning of the end. On the contrary: the frequently cited and as frequently questioned statement of Appian in Libyca 69 — according to this the fifty years after Zama had witnessed the steadily growing wealth.
of Carthage and a remarkable increase of her population and power — has now been fully confirmed.\textsuperscript{85} That Carthage was not only rich but also well armed, as Appian (\textit{Lib.} 69) and Plutarch (\textit{Cato maior} 26) have claimed,\textsuperscript{86} has likewise been corroborated by the results of the British–American excavations in the port area.\textsuperscript{87} Remains of shipsheps and plentiful naval material seem to substantiate what the \textit{Periochae} (47 and 48) and Appian (\textit{Lib.} 134) have to say in this regard.\textsuperscript{88} If we are to deduce from this that Carthage may have been preparing for a war by 150,\textsuperscript{89} her primary opponent must surely have been Rome, as is also implied by Appian (\textit{Lib.} 134), since a naval force would have been of little use against Massinissa.\textsuperscript{90} 

What conclusions are to be drawn from all these deliberations? In the situation of the late fifties the fear of \textit{Carthago rediviva}, or a resurgent Carthage, must have seemed more than justified from a Roman point of view, especially in the light of the experiences which Cato and his contemporaries had made during the Second Roman–Carthaginian War.\textsuperscript{91} The extreme measures taken were, however, only a manifestation of what Hoffmann and others have termed the new style of Rome’s foreign policy which was determined by considerations of expediency (‘utile’) rather than of morality (‘honestum’).\textsuperscript{92} Whereas Roman conduct had not been overtly imperialistic until 168, although even this is a much debated point,\textsuperscript{93} it then began to harden, and the final step of this development was a ‘mailed fist’ approach, that is, the application of brute force and the destruction of not only a declared enemy, but also of a potential adversary or of one who was considered — rightly or wrongly — as such.\textsuperscript{94} That this change of attitude was already obvious to contemporaries, is shown by what Polybius has to say in the context of the events of 146: ‘they — sc. the Romans — had struck the first note of their new policy (προοίμιον...τῆς δήσεως προσάρεσως) by their conduct to Perseus, in utterly exterminating the kingdom of Macedonia, and they completely revealed it by their decision concerning Carthage. For the Carthaginians had been guilty of no immediate offence to Rome, but the Romans had treated them with irremediable severity, although they had accepted all their conditions and consented to obey all their orders’ (36,9,7–8).

To conclude: in the Thucydidean sense the \textit{aitia} or immediate cause of the Third Roman–Carthaginian War was the infringement by Carthage of the peace treaty of 201.\textsuperscript{95} The underlying causes or the \textit{propháseis}, on the other hand, seem to have been partly Rome’s well-founded fear of the renascent Carthage\textsuperscript{96} and partly the distinctly less emotive considerations that had determined Rome’s foreign policy since the Third Macedonian War.\textsuperscript{97} During the crucial years 148 to 146 both Macedonia and Africa were finally organized as Roman provinces.\textsuperscript{98} On the significance of this we may cite E. Badian\textsuperscript{99}: ‘Macedonia had to be annexed after controlled independence had turned out disastrous: the Romans, on the whole, never
made the same mistake twice. The same — from the Roman point of view — applied to the small strip of Tunisia which was all that was left of Carthage and its empire’. The reason why Carthage was destroyed, as was Corinth in the same year, likewise appears not to have been a simple one. While the possibility of what B.L. Hallward has termed ‘the last desire of unsated revenge’ cannot be discounted entirely, both acts of seeming vindictiveness may have been rather a matter of cold policy, namely, to do away once and for all with centres of traditional anti-Roman leadership and, possibly, to set an example to be heeded by other potential troublemakers. In the event, however, it would seem that the injunction ‘Carthago delenda est’ and the controversy surrounding it cannot be regarded as a self-contained issue, concerning only African affairs.

Rather, the whole question must be considered within the broader context of the ‘new’ policy which Rome pursued since 168 (cf. Pol. 36,9,7; Diod. 32,4,5). Whether the ‘metus hostilis’ (Sall. Jug. 41,2) with which this was generally justified, was always a valid reason, is a moot point. Suffice it to say, that in Appian’s account of the rejoicings at Rome after the fall of Carthage (Lib. 134) it is implied that the deliverance of Rome from the ‘metus Punicus’ was seen as a guarantee of Rome’s supremacy in itself (χρονες ἔτερον ἄσφαλες) which ensured the safekeeping of the city (βέβαιον τὴν πόλιν ξαναχρονες). And this links up with the remarks by A. Heuss on the ‘defensive character of Roman imperialism’ and also with what Hobbes had to say on the Romans being essentially the ‘judges of the justness of their own fears.’

Notes

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1. Cf. Diodorus 34/35,33,3; Plut. Cato maior 27,2; Appian, Lib. 69; Zonaras 9,26 cf. Cass. Dio frg. bk. 21, Loeb: Cicero, Cato 18; Liv. Per. 48,49; Plin. HN 15,74; Vell. Pat. 1,13,1; Val. Max. 8,15,2; Flor. 1,31,4; Aug. De civ. D. 1,30; De Vir Ill. 47,8. This does not preclude, however, that the sententia ascribed to Cato does reflect the essence of statements made by him.


4. As a point of interest it may be noted that the formula ‘Delenda est Carthago’ or ‘Carthago delenda est’ seems to be the standard version in English as in the Romance languages (art. cit. 473 and n. 48), whereas ‘Ceterum censeo Carthaginem esse delendam’ has maintained itself as a fixed scholarly expression in German (art. cit. 475). Against this it may be remarked, however, that ‘Ceterum censeo Carthaginem delendam: remise en question d’un stéréotype’ was the title of a paper read by Michel Dubuisson at the 8th International Colloquium of the Groupe de contact interuniversitaire d’études Phéniciennes et Puniques held at Antwerp in November 1988 on the subject of the Punic Wars (to appear in Studia Phoenicia 11).

5. On these see, among others, W.V. Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, 1979, 234–240, or W. Huss, Geschichte der Karthager, 1985, 436–439, where most of the important literature on the topic is cited.

6. On this connotation of αἰτία and προφασίς cf. particularly A.W. Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, vol. 1, 1945, 153 (on Thuc. 1,23,6); ‘we may translate either of them by “cause”, even though the former is actually “an immediate cause of the war” and the latter a deep-seated psychological motive’ as also vol. 2, 1956, 267 (on Thuc. 3,13,1), and P.J. Rhodes remarks on ‘grievances’ (αἰτίαι) and ‘truest reason’ (αληθετατέ ρήματος) in ‘Thucydides on the Causes of the Peloponnesian War’, Hermes 115 (1987) 154–165, esp. 159ff. In passing it may be remarked, however, that Polybius and Appian, our main sources, both use the term προφασίς in the sense of ‘pretext’ rather than ‘cause’ in the specific context of the outbreak of the Third Roman-Carthaginian War (cf. Pol. 26,2,1; App. Lib. 1,69; 74).

7. See, e.g. E. Badian, Foreign Clientelae (264–70 B.C.) (= FC), 1958, 126–130, or, more recently, W. Huss, op. cit. (n. 5) 425–457, with a discussion of the position of Carthage as a client state of Rome and also of the causes, the preambles and the course of the Third Roman–Carthaginian War.


9. Thus, e.g., B.L. Hallward, CAH 8, 1930, 473, although this view is not shared by S. Albert, ‘Bellum iustum’. Die Theorie des “gerechten Krieges” und ihre praktische Bedeutung für die außereuropäischen Auseinandersetzungen Romans in republikanischer Zeit, 1980, 51, n. 205. What needs stressing here, is that, according to Polybius (31,21,6), ‘the Carthaginians always came off second best with the Romans, not because they had not right on their side, but because the arbitrators were convinced that it was in their own interest to decide against them’.


13. For a review and detailed analysis of the versions in which Nasica’s argument of a ‘counterweight of fear’ have been transmitted cf. A.E. Astin, op. cit. (n. 10) 276.

Errington, *The Dawn of Empire. Rome's Rise to World Power*, 1971, 262, prefers to regard them merely as 'a more militant group of politicians who derived their support from the People and cultivated popular favour' (cf. p. 262 and p. 296, n. 10). But whatever the case may be: their activities (see, e.g., App. *Lib.* 68; 70) cannot have failed to cause misgivings in Rome.

15. Thus A.E. Astin, *op. cit.* (n. 10) 51.270, whereas W. Huss, *op. cit.* (n. 5) 434, posits: 'wahrscheinlich im Frühling des Jahres 150'.


21. Thus E. Badian, *FC* (n. 7) 131, contra W.V. Harris, *op. cit.* (n. 5) 237.271 (the reference given here is to P. Pédech, *La Méthode historique de Polybe*, 1964, 195).

22. On the theme of *metus Punicus* see now the scholarly discussion by H. Bellen, 'Metus Gallicus — metus Punicus': *zum Furchtmotiv in der römischen Republik*, *AAWM* 195, 1985, and also the pertinent remarks by K. Bringmann in a review of this work in *Gymnasium* 96 (1989) 188f.


25. On this cf. W.V. Harris, *op. cit.* (n. 5) 235 and nn. 2 and 4. Although Harris claims, on the basis of Polybius' (and Appian's?) accounts, 'that the Senate made its war-decision (it is not clear whether...formally or informally) long before 149', and 'that the war was decided on long in advance', he has to concede that it was actually the war between Carthage and Massinissa in the winter of 151/150 (cf. A.E. Astin, *op. cit.* (n. 10) 51.270) that determined the outcome of the controversy between Cato and Nasica and their respective supporters (thus also R.M. Errington, *op. cit.* (n. 14) 265ff.). * Pace P. Garnsey et al.* in 'Thessaly and the Grain Supply of Rome', *JRS* 74 (1984) 39, it is therefore misleading to say 'that the Senate was resolved on war by 152 or 151'. According to Appian (*Lib.* 74) the recruitment drive 'throughout Italy' did not take place until the outcome of the hostilities in North Africa had become known. That it was, in fact, the consuls of 150 who put the question of war to the senate, even though the formal declaration did not take place until 149, is considered possible by A.E. Astin, *op. cit.* (n. 10) 271, with reference to Liv. *Per.* 48. This assumption would obviously leave enough scope for the extensive military preparations to be deduced from Appian, *Lib.* 75. (On these see also F. Garnsey et al., *loc. cit.*)

26. Cf. E. Bádian, *FC* (n. 7) 131f. 133f. As if H. Bellen, *op. cit.* (n. 22) 7f., has duly pointed out, the motive of fear with which the annalists tried to justify the wars of Rome may be traced back to Fabius Pictor (cf. Pol. 1,10,5–8).
27. On this see also F.E. Adcock, art. cit. (p. 79) 125.
29. On this see particularly F.W. Walbank in an article entitled ‘Political morality and the friends of Scipio’, JRS 55 (1965) 3.8-11.
32. F.E. Adcock, art. cit. (p. 79) 117f.; E. Badian, Romn.n Imperialism in the Late Republic (= RI), 1971^2, 20f., cf. also A.E. Astin, op. cit. (n. 5) 272f.
33. Appian (Lib. 69), in fact, states explicitly that Carthage seemed an object of apprehension rather than of jealousy (οὐ ζήλου μᾶλλον ἐφόβου) to the envoys of 152.
34. W.V. Harris, op. cit. (n. 5) 239 and n. 4; E. Marótì, art. cit. (n. 19) 225.
36. Thus, for instance, F.E. Adcock, art. cit. (p. 79) 111.125.
37. Art. cit. (p. 79) 118.
39. On Pol. 36,9 see, especially, F.W. Walbank, art. cit. (n. 29) 1-16.
41. Thus W. Hoffmann, art. cit. (n. 41) 340, n. 80 (= WdF 46, 223, n. 80), cf. also F.E. Adcock, art. cit. (p. 79) 126; W. Huss, op. cit. (n. 5) 438 and H. Bellen, op. cit. (n. 22) 6f. 33f.
43. Cf. W. Hoffmann, art. cit. (n. 41) 209-394 (= WdF 46, 178-230); A. Heuss, Römische Geschichte (n. 18) 116-123.
44. On the problem of whether the term ‘imperialism’ can justifiably be used in the context of Roman history, cf. E. Erdmann, "Römischer "Imperialismus" — Schlagwort oder Begriff?", GWU 28 (1977) 461-477.
45. Thus, e.g. M. Gelzer, 'Nasica Widerspruch gegen die Zerstörung Karthagos', Philologus 86 (1930-31) 290 = Kleine Schriften 2, 1963, 64; K. Bilz, Die Politik des P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, 1936, 31; F.E. Adcock, art. cit. (p. 79) 127; A.E. Astin, op. cit. (n. 10) 274, u. 2.
47. Cf. W. Hoffmann, art. cit. (n. 41) 209-394 (= WdF 46, 178-230); A. Heuss, Römische Geschichte (n. 18) 116-123.
49. Cf. W. Hoffmann, art. cit. (n. 41) 340, n. 80 (= WdF 46, 223, n. 80), cf. also F.E. Adcock, art. cit. (p. 79) 126; W. Huss, op. cit. (n. 5) 438 and H. Bellen, op. cit. (n. 22) 6f. 33f.
50. Cf. W. Hoffmann, art. cit. (n. 41) 341 and n. 84 (= WdF 46, 225 and n. 84); K. Bringmann, 'Weltanschauung und innere Krise Roms im Spiegel der Geschichtsschreibung des zweiten und ersten Jahrhunderts v.Chr.', Antike und Abendland 23
If I (1977) 37, and also U. Hackl, 'Poseidonios und das Jahr 146 v.Chr. als Epochenjahr in der antiken Historiographie', Gymnasium 87 (1980) 154-165.


Although it has again been claimed by F.W. Walbank, art. cit. (n. 29) 6f., and J. Malitz, op. cit. (n. 34) 364-367, that the 'counterweight' argument was, in some form or other, the essence of Nasica's opposition, A.E. Astin, op. cit. (n. 10) 280, shares the opinion mooted by D. Kienast, op. cit. (n. 2) 132: 'Thus if Nasica used the idea at all, Kienast is probably right in supposing that he employed it merely as a rhetorical "topos", which was elaborated by writers of a later generation in the light of Rome's subsequent misfortunes.'

Thus W. Hoffmann, art. cit. (n. 53) 151-166, and H. Bellen, op. cit. (n. 22) 5-7.

On this complex of questions see also A.W. Lintott, 'Imperial Expansion and Moral Decline in the Roman Republic', Historia 21 (1971) 626-638, with a discussion of Nasica's attitude on pp. 632-638.

Cf. U. Hackl, art. cit. (n. 46) 19f.

61. Cf. also D. Kienast, op. cit. (n. 2) 130; W. Huss, op. cit. (n. 5) 438.

62. Cf. A.E. Astin, op. cit. (n. 10) 53f. 280f., and U. Hackl, op. cit. (n. 46) 27, according to whom Scipio Aemilianus supported Cato rather than Nasica (pace E. Badian, FC (n. 7) 132, n. 1), though A.E. Astin, Cato the Censor, 1978, 127, restricts himself to the remark that Cato's point of view was shared by other leading men, 'unfortunately not named'.

63. Art. cit. (n. 41) 309 (= WdF 46, 178).


66. Cf. Cic. Div. in Cae. 66 as also E. Marótí, art. cit. (n. 19) 226 and n. 34.


68. For Massinissa's age see App. Lib. 71; Pol. 36,16,2; et al.

69. On the evidence of App. Lib. 61 the antagonism between Massinissa and Carthage was considered to benefit Rome in that it guaranteed the settlement of 201; cf. also H. Bellen, op. cit. (n. 22) 27f. 30, and the references given by him in n. 110.

70. On this aspect see especially D. Kienast, op. cit. (n. 2) 130.132; W. Hoffmann, op. cit. (n. 41) 335 and n. 67 (= WdF 46, 216 and n. 67); P.G. Walsh, art. cit. (n. 67) 160, and H. Bellen, op. cit. (n. 22) 32f.

71. For the possibility of Cato's urging a 'preventive' war see also P.E. Adcock, art. cit. (p. 79) 124, though he considers this in another sense, namely, that of 'preventing the impossible' — a war by Carthage against Rome with Numidia on her flank.

72. On the general political situation at the end of the fifties see also M. Gelzer, art. cit. (n. 50) 29f. = 69f., and E. Marótí, art. cit. (n. 19) 226f.

73. As regards Carthage per se, a fragment from Cato's speech De bello Carthaginensi (H. Malcovati, Oraforum Romanorum Fragmenta3, 1967, fr. 195) may perhaps be relevant: 'The Carthaginians are already our enemies; for he who prepares everything against me, so that he can make war at whatever time he wishes, he

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is already my enemy even though he is not yet using arms.' That this argument was quite compatible with Cicero's wide formulation of the rights of a state to defend itself and its friends, has been remarked by P.A. Brunt, 'Laus imperii' 177 (in: *Imperialism in the Ancient World*, ed. P.D.A. Garnsey and C.R. Whittaker, 1978).

74. Cf. also Pol. 36,9,7 on Rome's change of policy after 168.
77. See also H. Bellen, *op. cit.* (n. 22) 32.
78. Thus W. Hoffmann, *art. cit.* (n. 41) 536 (= *WdF* 48, 217), with specific reference to Cato. This seems to have been a lapsus stili, unless he disbelieves the ancient authors, according to whom, Cato served as quaestor in Africa under P. Cornelius Scipio, the future Africanus. (On Cato's quaestorship and the discussions around it see A.E. Astin, *Cato the Censor* (n. 62) 12-18.)
80. On the evidence of Fenestella (H. Peter, *HRRel.* 2,80f., fig. 9 = Suec. *Vita Terr. 1*) Rome apparently had not demanded the opening of the Carthaginian ports to Italian ships in 201.
82. I am indebted to Dr. B. Rüger, Rheinisches-Germanisches Museum, Bonn, for this information.
85. Cf. F. Rakob, *MDAI* (R) (n. 83) 10; *Gymnasium* (n. 83) 502f., and *Bild der Wissenschaft* (n. 84) 106.
86. That Carthage was reputed to be the wealthiest city in the world at the time of her fall, is also asserted by Polybius (18,35,3).
88. Although D. Kienast, *op. cit.* (n. 2) 126, is of the opinion that the naval material which Carthage had at her disposal — for references to *vis navalis materiae* see *Per.* 47 and 48 — was intended for the enlargement of her merchant fleet ("an den Aufbau einer Kriegsflotte gegen den Willen Roms dachte man wahrscheinlich nicht"), its availability seems to have stood the Carthaginians in good stead at the time of the Roman siege (cf. Strabo 17,3,15, p. 833; App. *Livy* 121). And although W.V. Harris, *op. cit.* (n. 5) 235 and n. 1, summarily discards the evidence of the *Periochae* concerning both naval material and later actual warships, E. Badian, *FC* (n. 7) 133, n. 5, was right in remarking that 'the evidence is not decisive: the Carthaginians certainly had the few warships they were allowed by the treaty (Strabo 17,3,15; cf. Livy 36,42,2), and these are not mentioned in this connexion either.'
89. See also A.E. Astin, op. cit. (n. 10) 274, for the opinion that 'The stocks of arms surrendered to the Romans, as well as the ability to field a large army against Massinissa, testify to lengthy preparations for war.'

90. Thus also E. Maróti, art. cit. (n. 19) 227, with reference to N.A. Mashkin, VDI 28 (1949, II) 54 (non vidi), as against H.H. Scullard, A History of the Roman World 753 to 146 B.C. (n. 18) 309.

91. As H. Bellen, op. cit. (n. 22) 20–24, has demonstrated convincingly, it was first and foremost the battle of Cannae in August 216 that had given rise to Rome's fear of Carthage, the metus Punicus. And that Cato had served as military tribune in the Second Roman-Carthaginian War and participated in the battle of the Metaurus (207) — cf. A.E. Astin, Cato the Censor (n. 62) 6–7 — is a fact which is overlooked only too readily.

92. W. Hoffmann, art. cit. (n. 41) 330.334 (= WdF 46, 208.213f.); cf. H. Bellen, op. cit. (n. 22) 33 and n. 127. For the apt English rendering of the Roman terms cf. E. Badian, RI (n. 32) 1.


94. On this change of attitude see also A.E. Astin, op. cit. (n. 5) 274 and Cato the Censor (n. 62) 284f., where it is posited, however, that a change in attitude is not the same as a deliberate decision of policy (p. 285).

95. See, e.g., E. Badian, FC (n. 7) 134; W. Hoffmann, art. cit. (n. 41) 309 (= WdF 46, 179); A.E. Astin, Cato the Censor (n. 62) 128f.

96. Thus A.E. Astin, op. cit. (n. 5) 274–276, and Cato the Censor (n. 62) 284–285, and also, in the light of the new archaeological evidence, F. Rakob, Gymnasium (n. 83) 503; Bild der Wissenschaft (n. 84) 106, while W.V. Harris, op. cit. (n. 6) maintains that it was mainly φλάσκεια which determined Rome's behaviour, although defensive thinking may have played a significant part in the actual decision.

97. That Carthage, with Corinth and Numidia, was the victim of a Roman policy progressively more savage through disillusionment with milder techniques of diplomacy, has also been remarked by P.G. Walsh, op. cit. (n. 67) 160.

98. That Macedonia was not formally annexed until 146, is maintained by D.W. Baranowski, art. cit. (n. 93) 449 and n. 6.

99. RI (n. 32) 21.

100. CAH (n. 9) 472.

101. Cf. D. Kienast, op. cit. (n. 2) 133, with reference to Justin. Epit. 34,2,6 in the case of Corinth; E. Badian, RI (n. 32) 20, and also A.E. Astin, op. cit. (n. 5) 52, n. 3.

102. Thus A.E. Astin, Cato the Censor (n. 62) 286f., according to whom 'everything suggests that this question was considered largely as a self-contained issue, taking account of the likely consequences of alternative possibilities, but not with reference to broader policies or more distant goals.'

103. A detailed discussion of the way in which the solution of Rome's African problem interlocked with events in the East and also in the West would exceed the scope of this paper. It may suffice here to draw attention, yet again, to the more extensive studies by W. Hoffmann and R.M. Errington of Rome's foreign policy during the second century B.C. (for the titles see nn. 41 and 14, above) and of Roman Foreign Policy in the East 168 B.C. – A D. 1, 1984, by A.N. Sherwin-White.


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**Addendum:**

K.-W. Welwei's study 'Zum “Metus Punicus” in Rom um 150 v. Chr.', *Hermes* 117 (1989) 314–320, did not come to my attention until the foregoing paper had been submitted for printing.
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