In this article I wish to study two relationships, namely xenia, guest-friendship or hospitality, and philotes, friendship. The demands of the arete-standards with their emphasis on success hold such unquestioned sway in Homeric society that they pervade non-competitive relationships also, but an active element of cooperation will, nevertheless, be found. Let us look first at the word philos. I am, as will be clear, greatly in debt to Professor A.W.H. Adkins' article 'Friendship and Self-Sufficiency in Homer and Aristotle'. 1 My aim essentially is to analyse in this article the consequences of the conclusions reached by him. These conclusions are in my opinion so momentous as to bear repeating and reinforcing.

Professor Adkins gives a summary of the usages of the adjective philos to refer to parts of a man's own body, his possessions, his family, his friends and some close dependants. He then sums up: 'The agathos . . . finds himself practically autonomous in a largely hostile or indifferent world, the nearer sections of which, being equally autonomous and in actual or possible competition with him for the produce of a not very fertile land, are quite as likely to be hostile as indifferent. I have tried to show elsewhere 2 that the qualities which the chieftain needs to survive in such a world are those commended by the Homeric use of arete. But no man can survive by his strength alone, without tools, possessions and associates: what things (so to speak) can the Homeric agathos rely on? He has his own limbs and psychological functions, his tools, weapons, possessions and portions of land; and he has his wife, children, servants and other dependants. On these he can rely, or should be able to; apart from these, only on those with whom he has entered into relationships of philotes or xenia. Human beings have no rights qua human beings in Homer, only in virtue of some definite relationship whether relationship from birth, from direct economic dependence, from marriage, or from some other cause. The rest of the world is indifferent or hostile; it competes.'

'If we try to imagine this situation as the agathos must have seen it, the reason for the range of the Homeric usage of philos becomes clear. In a hostile or indifferent world, the persons or things on which his survival depends must appear to him sharply defined from the rest of his environment. He is, accordingly, likely to use some word to demarcate these things from things in general: a man (or society) is likely to classify his experience in the manner which seems most significant to him. It is evident that philos in Homer demarcates in precisely this manner, and it should be equally evident that for this very reason no English word will render accurately the Homeric philos. We are not acutely conscious of possessing a limited stock of persons and things on whom our very existence depends. The Homeric agathos is; and it follows that his possession of them is of the utmost importance to him. I stress the word 'possession'. He has these persons and these things which he can employ to ensure his continued existence.

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These things are his own: all else is hostile or indifferent, and the possessive affection he feels for what is *philon* is based on the need and desire for self-preservation. These good things, *agathā*, he possesses; and since the belief that human beings should be treated as ends-in-themselves rather than as means is totally un-Greek, there is no reason why persons and things should be thought of differently.¹⁴

*Philos*, then, is that which is felt to be in a non-hostile or actively friendly relationship with oneself. The emotive power of *philos* would have to be experienced to be understood with anything approaching accuracy. We, living so long after the actual circumstances which gave *philos* its significance, can only employ our imagination. The *agathōs* was obliged to maintain his *aretē* and defend successfully his *timē*, a word which embraces a man’s honour and everything, including possessions, which gave him status. The demand that he perform this task was absolute. No social organizations existed to protect him if he failed. It was his task, and he must perform it. ‘The rest of the world,’ says Adkins, ‘is indifferent or hostile; it competes’. To maintain oneself in a competitive environment, one must also maintain a permanent state of preparedness, of tension. In this atmosphere, the *agathōs* had one class of people and objects upon which he felt he could normally rely—those that were *phila*. In the presence of these, he could be relaxed and could allow the otherwise continual state of tension to seep from him. The *agathōs* must have experienced deep pleasure and joy in the presence of this relaxation. It is difficult for us to imagine; we can only say that the emotive value of that which allowed the *agathōs* to relax in his competitive, tension-riddled world must have been truly immense. *Philos* means ‘that in the presence of which one is relaxed’ and its powerful emotive force was derived from the very circumstances in which the *agathoi* lived.

An *agathōs*, as Adkins mentions, will term *philos* parts of his own body (e.g. his own hands⁵), his possessions (e.g. his house⁶), his family,⁷ his dependants (e.g. a nurse⁸) and his friends.⁹ The word *philos* may be used of these things and people in relation to an *agathōs* not only by the *agathōs* himself, but also, descriptively, by someone outside the actual relationship.¹⁰

Menelaus wonders:

‘But why does *philos thumos*, my heart, debate these things?’ II.17. 97.

but in describing the killing of Xanthos and Thoos by Diomedes, Homer can say:

‘He deprived both of them of *philon thumon*, their own lives.’ II.5. 155–6.

The fact that *philos thumos* was a formulaic usage may have had some influence here, but nevertheless it is of interest.

Equally, Achilles can say to his mother:

‘But now I shall go, so that I may meet with Hektor the destroyer of that *philēs*, dear, head.’ II.18. 114–5.

Here the head referred to is not his own but Patroklos’. It is quite obvious from this, without any further considerations, that the terms of reference and the dividing line were fundamentally different for a Homeric Greek as compared with those that we use. It seems probable that the sharpness of this division
between what is *philos* and what is non-*philos* was a factor which contributed to the lack in the Homeric Greek of any real sense of his own identity and individuality, which Snell discusses in his *Discovery of the Mind*. The existence of one such sharp distinction in his mind would hinder him from awareness of any other demarcation, such as that of the self from any other person.

It is very easy to understand the sharpness of this division between what is *philos* and what is in competition. The latter is associated with a constant need for tension and wariness. The *agathos* had to be on the watch always, not only for physical attack but for a slight. He had to beware not only of a deliberate attempt to ‘do him down’ but also of any act or word which by implication affected him adversely. By contrast, in the presence of what was *philon*, he could relax. Under these circumstances, what was *philon* would be experienced as a thing of delight, warmth and joy—each of these emotive features being even more powerful by virtue of the contrast.

The clear-cut definition of this dividing line between that which is in competition and that which is *philon* can be seen in passages where the adjective *philos* is retained at a stage where it is no longer meaningful. Adkins discusses the passage where, in the underworld, Odysseus sees ‘hateful Eriphyle, who accepted valuable gold in exchange for *philos*, her husband’. Od.11. 326–7.

The categories are so clearly divided that the transference of a person or thing from one to the other is a difficult procedure. As Adkins says, ‘These relationships have a very objective character. Once they have been established, their existence does not depend on the inclinations of those who are involved in them’. Of course, here formulaic usage may play some part in the retention of the epithet.

Some favoured people are described as *philos*, dear, to Zeus or to the gods. This implies that a man is held in favour or supported by the gods, and a wish for a man’s success may be expressed as a wish that he may be *philos*, dear, to the gods. When a man is *philos* to the gods, they will grant him wealth and success, and his achievement is felt to be directly related to the amount that the gods *philou* him.

*Philos* is used of people or things which belong to one, and with which one should be able to feel relaxed in that one is not in competition with them; so, also *philon* is used of things or actions which are not alien, which are natural to one’s character or the mood of the time. *Philon* refers to actions which involve no special tension or effort—actions which come naturally, ‘in the presence of which one feels relaxed’.

When Agamemnon, inspecting his troops, rebukes Diomedes, he says:

‘Why do you skulk about, why do you watch the bridges of war (the space between the two battle lines)? It was not *philon* for (your father) Tydeus to skulk about like this, but he fought with the enemy far in front of his *philoi* companions.’  Il.4. 371–3.

He is referring to what it was natural for Tydeus to do in these circumstances. This appears, too, in a usage in the Odyssey. Nausikaa tells her maids not to run
away from Odysseus as he is a wretched wanderer, and Zeus protects xenoi, strangers, and beggars. She adds:

‘Giving costs little and is philē.’  

The same comment is made by Eumaeus to the disguised Odysseus. Giving comes naturally to them. The action does not involve the tension of the conscious effort of acting outside one’s own character. Of course, the question of what is consistent or inconsistent with one’s own nature would not arise for the Homeric Greek, who was, as has been mentioned, not aware of himself as an individual and not given to self-analysis. He would merely recognise that the emotional background to various actions, one of tension or relaxation, corresponded to that which he perceived in his dealings with people and things around him, and he would therefore use the same word to describe it.

Adjectives compounded from philos also are used to express the idea of a natural tendency, that with which a man feels at home. The Phaekians are famed for their ships and knowledge of sailing and thus they are philēretmoi, lovers of oars.

The phrase ‘to be philon, dear, to someone,’ which refers to a wish or plan, shows philon in the aspect of a reflection of the mood of a moment. Iliad 4.17 shows an instance of this expression:

‘If by any chance this is philon and sweet to everyone.’

The idea of ‘that with which one feels relaxed’ is related to that which is congenial, which one naturally welcomes. A philon plan is one which is acceptable in that it does not arouse the tension of opposition.

The linking of philon with ‘sweet’ or ‘pleasant’ recalls to mind the emotive factor which is involved in philos. Adkins refers to ‘... the emotive aspect of philos which is far more powerful than that of ‘own’ in English, in proportion as the needs of the Homeric agathos are far more evident and urgent. The distinction between philos and ‘dear’ or ‘friend’ (in addition to the difference in range of application) is that we, with our very different society and presuppositions, include much more generosity in our view of friendship. The word (philos) is quite untranslatable, for it is locked firmly in the Homeric situation.

That which in a strongly competitive world gave man security, and in the presence of which he could relax from the tensions of constantly maintaining his position in the world, must, as I have mentioned, have had an unimaginably strong emotional content for the agathos. It would involve the sense of possession, affection, warmth and pleasure. That which it was philon for him to do, would similarly involve a relaxed freedom from strain which, again, amidst the tensions of continual competition would imply an element of pleasure.

Twice, when Polydamas proposes retreat as the sensible course, Hektor says:

‘You are no longer saying things that are phila to me.’  Il. 18. 285; 12. 231.

And the same phrase is used by Paris to Antenor when he proposes handing Helen back to the Greeks. The implication is that the remarks are not such that the respective hearers would naturally and relaxedly accept them. Instead, they set up the tension of opposition.
Athene, disguised as Mentes, advises Telemachos to take some action to deal with the suitors as, she says, he is no longer a child. This could have been received as an insult, as it implies that Telemachos is not fully exercising his aretë. But Telemachos replies:

‘Stranger, indeed you say these things to me, thinking philà things, like a father to his child . . .’  

*Od. 1. 307–8.*

The opposite to ‘thinking philà things’, is ‘thinking kaka’ and this does not mean that the thoughts or plans are kaka, evil, for the man who makes them but rather for the man he is plotting against. Thinking kaka implies plotting the destruction or downfall of someone. By contrast, thinking philà is to make plans which are favourable for another, in the presence of which he feels relaxed—which, that is, he finds acceptable.

And this, of course, is what a father does for his son. The phrase, then, does not analyse the attitude of mind of the man who thinks or plans. It is doubtful whether that would be possible for a Homeric Greek. It is emphasized repeatedly by Adkins that intentions are irrelevant: only the results count. The intentions of the man who thinks or plans are therefore irrelevant. The point lies in the effects that they have and whether these effects are kaka or philà to the man affected, in terms of their immediate emotive effect on him, which will also be related to their practical influence upon his standing in the world. Though an active spirit of co-operation is not necessarily implied in doing or thinking philà, in one passage it does seem to be involved. Nestor tells Telemachos and ‘Mentes’ of his leaving Troy:

‘We sailed together, going away from Troy, the son of Atreus (Agamemnon) and I, knowing philà to one another.’  

*Od. 3. 276–7.*

‘Knowing’ implies something more lasting than ‘thinking’, and reciprocity is introduced by ‘to one another’. Though active co-operation in all likelihood was present, the actual words describe only the effect they have on one another.

When a man goes among a people whom he does not know, it is important for him to be philos to them, relaxedly acceptable. As Odysseus goes among the Phaeikians, at first their reactions are unsure and Athene, thinking philà, cloaks him in a mist and makes him invisible. Odysseus prays that he may come among them philon . . . and elecinon, pitiable, and Athene later claims to have answered that prayer,

‘and set you up as philon to all the Phaeikians’.  

*Od. 13. 302.*

Clearly, there is a lack of the warm, personal, emotional element of, for instance, the English ‘beloved’. For Odysseus to be philon implies that the Phaeikians will be naturally disposed to accept and receive him and that he will not by any act or personal characteristic arouse their hostility. Yet, as has been remarked, for the Homeric agathos, there must have been a powerful emotional aspect to anything which allowed him to relax his constant vigilance against an intensely competitive world.

The lack of a necessarily warm or personal content in philos can be seen also in the usage of the verb philein. Many instances of the verb occur in the context of
entertaining a guest. It is clear that a man need not be an established xenos, guest-
friend, of the agathos before the latter philei him. The word philēin, to treat in a
relaxed, non-competitive manner, may be used of the act of offering a meal to a
complete stranger who has just entered one's house. Similarly, Diomedes claims
to be a philos xenos of Glaukos because their families have a xenos-relationship,
although Diomedes and Glaukos themselves have just met for the first time on
the battlefield. The incident emphasises again the sharpness of the demarcation
of philoi from non-philoi. Diomedes suggests that they should no longer fight
each other although they belong to different sides in the war. The Homeric Greek
knew no patriotism, only personal loyalties to his philoi and it would naturally
seem folly to fight against a man who philei him. It would, in fact, be impractical
in the extreme, as it would challenge the only basis for security that the Homeric
Greek knew. Alkinos says to Odysseus, when he has spoken of the gifts he
would offer him:

'The xenos, stranger, and the suppliant are in the place of a brother to a man.'

Od.8.546–7.

They are treated as though they were blood relatives, part of the family, a source
of security to the agathos and in need of his protection. Essentially, they are not in
competition. Odysseus, challenged to a competition of games with the Phaeakians,
agrees to compete with everyone except Leodamas, though it was he who
instigated the challenge:

'For this man is a xenos, guest-friend to me. Who would fight (compete) with
one who philei him?'

Od.8.208.

The word xenos, of course, covers the one who entertains as well as the one who
is entertained. Alone in a strange land, Odysseus is totally dependent on his host,
and it is clearly folly to compete with him, even in games. The games must have a
winner and serve therefore to display aretē and win timē, honour. Odysseus
cannot, in his precarious situation, afford to step outside his philotēs-relationship
even for a moment. If he won, his host's timē would be lessened and he would be
angry. If he lost, his own timē would suffer and this he could not easily accept.

The relationship of xenia, hospitality or guest-friendship, is basically self-
seeking. It is essential for the survival of an agathos that he has a circle of non-
competitive people around him, and the wider that circle spreads the greater is his
security. To travel in his own country and in other countries, the agathos needs a
net-work of xenoi, guest-friends, who will provide him with the basic necessities
of life. In an exclusively competitive society, there would be no reason to
maintain a man who is outside the field where he can maintain himself. But a
recognition in an agathos that he may himself need the same facilities to be
offered him at some time leads him to provide for others so as to establish a
framework within which his own needs will be catered for in a non-competitive
way. Co-operation, thus, is identical with enlightened self-interest. Yet, despite
this self-centred basis to the xenos-relationship, certain features are non-self-
seeking in their outward manifestation. For example, apparently all comers can
request hospitality. Entertainment is given and only then is the visitor questioned
regarding his identity. Thus, although the host’s timé is enhanced by the number of guests he entertains, it still remains that the question whether the xenos has or has not the capacity to return the favour is not considered until after the hospitality has been offered. Anyone may receive it. Athene, disguised as Mentes, is asked whether she is in fact a xenos of Odysseus’ household only after she has been given a meal. Nestor asks Telemachos and Mentes their identities only after they have shared his feast, and the phraseology of his questions makes it clear that Nestor envisages the possibility not only that they may not repay his hospitality but that they may even be pirates come to prey on him. He says:

‘Strangers (xenoi), who are you? Whence do you sail the wet paths (the sea)? Is it on some business or are you wandering aimlessly like robbers over the sea, who wander, risking their lives and bringing evil to others?’

Od. 3. 71–4.

They may, he thinks, even be actively hostile (bringing kakon, evil) yet still he gives them food and drink.

Though the creation of a network of xenoi was a way of insuring oneself against disaster and shoring up one’s own power by the creation of debts which had to be repaid, the repayment was not as mechanical and mercenary as this may look. Pure reciprocity does operate. Repayment is themis, custom. It may, however, be more of a chain reaction than a narrowly reciprocal relationship. When Telemachos and Peisistratos in book 4 of the Odyssey come to Menelaus’ house, he is already entertaining a large party of guests. Eteoneus reports the arrival of two new guests and asks whether he should send them away to find hospitality elsewhere. Menelaus tells him not to talk like a fool.

‘Indeed, we two came here, eating of the generous hospitality of other men …’

Od. 4. 33–4.

Since they have enjoyed the hospitality of many on their long journey back from Troy, this debt is repaid not directly to their hosts but to other passers-by. Of course, it must have been connected with the pursuit of areté, in that giving to guests places the recipient in an inferior position, so that to repay by giving in turn is the response of pride and the restoration of the lessening of one’s timé implied in one’s having been in the position of recipient of a favour. The host increases his sphere of influence:

‘For the xenos, guest, remembers the host who provides philotés, hospitality, for all time.’

Od. 15. 54–5.

Thus the increase in influence is made by creating a circle of xenoi who, remembering his favours, are capable of bearing witness to his wealth and entertainment and, if they have the means, will feel the need to do the same in compensation.

Both host and guest gained something from the relationship, the former through the creation of a network of xenoi, guest-friends, for himself and the increasing of his timé, and the guest more immediately by having his needs catered for and gifts presented to him. Interestingly enough, the prospective guest felt no need to be other than honest about the practical advantages, short
and long-term, which were involved for him. Odysseus, who is so often to be seen
in the position of a *xenos* in the Odyssey, shows an extremely pragmatic attitude.

He says to Alkinoos:

‘If you were to bid me stay here for a year and were to summon an escort and
give me glorious gifts, I also would wish for this and it would be very
profitable to arrive at my native land with hands quite full. And I would be
more *aidios*, an object of respect, and more *philos* to all men whoever saw
me returning to Ithaka.’


His words are *eminently practical*. If Alkinoos invites him to stay for a year and
gives him impressive gifts, he would agree that it would be more ‘profitable’
because he would then present a much more impressive appearance (*aidoioteros*)
when he got home. People would also be more inclined to *philein* him as he would
visibly possess the means to *philein* in his turn; he would be *phileros*.

The feature of *xeneia*, the gifts offered by the host to his guest, was a very
important one. Odysseus specifically asks the Kyklops for a *xeneion* as soon as he
meets him, for such giving

‘is the custom of guest-friends (in this case, hosts).’

*Od.**9. 268.

The gifts increase the *timē* of the host inasmuch as they are a physical proof of his
wealth and power. It also increases the *timē* of the recipient. Odysseus’ coun-
companions are jealous because he has received so many offers and gifts, and they say:

‘To such an extent is this man *philos* and honoured by all men whoever
inhabit the city or land that we come to. He brought many lovely treasures of
booty from Troy.’

*Od.**10. 38–41.

Odysseus is *philos* because he has the means to return hospitality, and *timios*,
honoured, because his *timē*, possessions, have been increased.

The importance of the feature of exchange of *xeneia* can be seen not only in the
fact that Odysseus instantly demands one as a proof of *xenia* as soon as he
confronts the Kyklops, but also in that when Glaukos and Diomedes meet in
battle and discover that they are *xenoi*, they exchange their armour as a proof of
their *xenia*. However, even in the context of *xenia*, the gifts should balance each
other out. Homer says:

‘There, moreover, Zeus the son of Cronos took away the *phrenes*, mind, of
Glaukos in that he exchanged with Diomedes the hundred oxen for the
worth of nine.’


Thus, even in the context of such a friendship to exchange an object of greater
value for something worth less is sheer folly, for it amounts to a voluntary
acceptance of a lessening of *timē*.

If one provides hospitality for a *xenos*, one *philei* or *xenizei* him. A man who
provides such hospitality is *philos* to the one entertained. In describing Axylos,
Homer says he was

‘rich in possessions and *philos* to men. For living in a house on the road, he
used to entertain (*phileesken*) everyone.’


He is *philos* to men because (gar) he *philei* all comers. The man entertained may
be called *philos*, too, but only if he has the capacity to return the hospitality. All
guests are *xenoi*, but only those who are able themselves to *philein*, who have the possessions out of which they may *philein* others, can be called *philoi*. To quote Adkins: ‘The comer may be termed *philos* only prospectively if he is an equal (*Odyssey* 1.158 where Telemachos does not know who his guest is), not at all if he is unlikely ever to be able to *philein* in return.’  

‘Non-agathoi could use *philein* of the benefits they conferred on their dependants, e.g. Eumaios *philei* the ‘beggar’ (*Od. 14. 388*), and is addressed as *philè* (115, etc.); but menial services performed by the dependants in return would not be characterized by *philein*, and Eumaios does not address the ‘beggar’ as *phile.*’ This, too, is to be expected. That which is *philon* is that in the presence of which one can feel relaxed, upon which one can rely in a basically hostile or competitive world. To be assigned the term *philos*, a person or thing must possess the emotive value which goes with it. It must therefore have the potential to belong to the class of that which is in competition. It must have the potential to threaten or to belong to someone who could threaten. A person who does not have the means to reciprocate hospitality, neither has the means to compete or threaten nor is he important enough to be *philos*, to belong, to another who is in competition. Therefore, that he does not in fact compete is insignificant—it carries no particular emotional concomitant. One is relaxed in his presence but this has no attendant emotion of warmth or pleasure.

The mixture of co-operation and self-interest in the xenia-relationship is succinctly described by Adkins and it is worthwhile once again to quote at some length:

‘In Homer, then, there are two aspects of the *philotes*-relationship, expressed by *philos* and *philein*. When the chief concern of the *agathos* is to secure his own continued existence, a *philon* object, whether animate or inanimate, is something he can rely on to use for his own preservation. But *aretè*, the quality of the *agathos*, is shown also in protecting one’s dependants whether permanent residents or transients; and *philein*, which, as we can see from the examples quoted above 40 includes giving food, lodging and protection to transients, characterizes this activity, at all events in its less violent manifestations.’

‘If one considers only the usage of *philos*, such *philotes* appears entirely selfish: but clearly one does not *philei* a man from immediately selfish motives: when one *philei* a man, who has come from a distance, he is the immediate beneficiary. In normal circumstances, he cannot be a benefactor when he is in a strange land. *Philein* is to bring a person within (or if he is already a *philos*, to continue him within) a circle of co-operation whose members have the right to feel mutual reliance, and a right to whatever basic necessities are available for consumption. When one *philei* a member of one’s own *oikos*’ (household), ‘the pattern is the same: *philein* is to do useful services for a man not in order to make him immediately more useful to oneself, but simply to secure his own existence in his own interest. It is not, of course, an altruistic act. It makes, and is intended to make, the other person a *philon* object on whose help one can rely when one needs it, perhaps at some distant time if he is a *philos* from some distance, almost at once if he is a member of the same *oikos*. *Philein* is an act which creates or
maintains a co-operative relationship; and it need not be accompanied by any friendly feeling at all: it is the action which is all-important.\textsuperscript{42} It has been mentioned that a host increases his sphere of influence by entertaining xenoi. The number entertained will give an outward indication of his wealth and position in life, and therefore forms part of his timē. It also, as Adkins has indicated, increases the circle of his philoi and in this way too it builds up his timē. The connection between philotēs and timē is shown in several passages.

In Book 9 of the \textit{Iliad}, Aias complains to Odysseus of Achilles' behaviour, in refusing to yield to their entreaties:

‘He pays no attention to the \textit{philotēs} of his companions with which we \textit{etiomen}, honoured, him above the others beside the ships.’ \textit{Iliad}. 9.630–1.

\textit{Philotēs}, friendship, then is a means by which one may tiein, honour, an agathos.

Similarly, Odysseus urges Achilles to abandon his anger:

‘For friendliness is better; cease from strife which contrives evil, so that both young men and old of the Argives may honour you more.’ \textit{Iliad}. 9.256–8.

\textit{Philophrosune} is ameïon, more advantageous, because if this course is followed, it will bring Achilles increased timē from the other Greeks. Obviously, since to offer a man timē is, apart from providing him with the immediate necessities of life, the best way to promote his interests in the context of Homeric society, to tiein a man is, in a sense, co-operative and thus comes under the heading of philotēs.

Aias calls to his brother Teuker that their faithful companion Lykophron has just been killed:

‘He who came from Kythera to our home and whom we \textit{etiomen}, honoured, in our home as much as we did our parents.’ \textit{Iliad}. 15. 438–9.

Even in the case of one’s parents, it is one’s duty to tiein a person who is philos. As would be expected in Homeric society, the vocabulary for the activities of parents with respect to their children tends to emphasize the practical aspects of looking after them rather than any idea of affection involved (trephein, to nourish, bring up, and its derivatives) and their performing this action creates a debt that the child should repay. Thus, Homer comments when Simoeisios is killed at a young age that he has not repaid his \textit{threptra}, the cost of his upbringing, to his parents.\textsuperscript{43} Even in this context, the Homeric Greek must protect his aretē. To provide sustenance for one’s child and to receive no return for it is, in effect, a lessening of one’s timē. One of the ways of redressing this imbalance is for the children to tiein their parents, and this honouring will be materially expressed. Here also, then, tiein is a part of philein.

Odysseus advises the other Greek leaders not to depart from Troy, in case Agamemnon should turn round and vent his anger on them:


Not only is a king’s anger great, but he also has the power to follow up the impulses of his thumos, because he has timē, honour, and possessions, from Zeus who \textit{philei} him. When a god \textit{philei} a man, he grants him wealth and success\textsuperscript{44} and
this increases his \textit{timē} and gives him the power to impose his will on those whose \textit{timē} is less.

Agamemnon, speaking to Nestor of Achilles, says, 'The worth of many people now is the man whom Zeus \textit{philesei} from his heart, as now he \textit{eteise} (honours) this man and has brought the army of the Achaians low.' II.9. 116–8.

Once again, the \textit{philotēs} of Zeus means the provision of active help. He increases Achilles' \textit{timē} by making the war follow the course that Achilles wants in order to highlight his own prowess. To be \textit{phileisthai} by the gods, therefore, because of the increase in \textit{timē} makes a man worth many other men put together.

In entertaining a guest, too, \textit{philotēs} would amount to increasing his \textit{timē}. When Telemaque arranges for all attentions to be paid to Theoklymenos until he is free to entertain him himself, he asks Peraios to \textit{philein} and \textit{tiemen} him.\footnote{When the disguised Athene expresses a desire to return to her ship, Telemaque urges her to stay so that 'you may go to your ship, rejoicing in your \textit{thumos}, heart, with a gift, \textit{timēen}, valuable, and very beautiful, which will be a treasured possession for you from me, a gift such as \textit{philoi xeinoi}, hosts, give to their \textit{xeinoi}, guests.' \textit{Od.} 1. 311–3.}

The notion of increasing \textit{timē} is also involved in the giving of gifts to \textit{xenoi}, as has been mentioned.\footnote{The opposite of \textit{philein} someone is to \textit{atimazein}, dishonour him. When Odysseus, disguised as a beggar, thanks Eumaios for his hospitality, Eumaios replies, '\textit{Xeine}, guest, it is not my custom, not even if a lesser man than you were to come, to \textit{atimesai} a guest. For all guests and beggars are from Zeus. Our giving costs little and is \textit{phile}, natural.' \textit{Od.} 14. 56–9.}

To refuse to give anything to the beggar is to deny him \textit{timē}. Later in Book 14 Odysseus says that by leaving him in tattered clothing the swineherds \textit{atimazousi}, dishonour, him.\footnote{The gifts offered to a beggar would not, even in a rich man's household, amount to more than scraps of food and drink, in order to keep him alive, for the gifts were in proportion to the amount of \textit{timē} a man already possesses or, in the case of foreigners and strangers, is presumed to possess. Such \textit{timē} as a beggar has is not in fact his own, but is given to him by Zeus. Discussing the reference to Zeus as the \textit{epitimētōr} of strangers and suppliants at \textit{Odyssey} 9. 270 f., Adkins\textsuperscript{49} says, 'The Homeric \textit{hikeis} (suppliant) . . . has no `debitum honorem' unless Zeus gives it to him'. The word \textit{epitimētōr}, he continues, signifies 'one who gives \textit{timē} or puts \textit{timē} upon someone who would not otherwise possess it'.}

\textit{Philein} and \textit{kēdesthai} are a frequent combination.\footnote{\textit{Kēdesthai} is to experience \textit{kēdos} on someone's behalf\textsuperscript{50} and clearly one would accept the trouble only for those who are \textit{philoi}, in a non-hostile relationship to oneself. Apart from the relationship involved in \textit{xenia}, the Homeric Greek felt no urge to co-operation with those who were not \textit{philoi}. For him the demarcation between \textit{philoi} and...
those in competition was so sharp that the need to distinguish among his philoi between those for whom he felt love and those who were simply non-hostile was wholly overridden by the need to distinguish between philoi and non-philoi. "Every relationship from sexual passion to guest-friendship is denoted by philotēs. The reason is evidently not that the Greeks were unusually warm friends or unusually cold lovers, but that a different aspect of these relationships is denoted by philotēs." There was so much emotive content in a word expressing something with which they did not have to feel the tensions of competition that no need was felt to evolve another term to distinguish emotively those who were in one's immediate family and a man whom one met by chance.

Agamemnon, wishing to make amends to Achilles for taking Briseis, offers him many gifts, including the hand of one of his daughters in marriage:

'I have three daughters in my well-built hall, Chrysothemis, Laodike and Iphianassa; of these let him take whichever he wishes and lead her home to Peleus' house as his philē bride, without his having to offer any gifts for her.'

Il. 9. 144–7.

He may pick any one of these three girls whom he has never seen before, and by the act of choosing, he would make her philē. Yet the same word applies to describe Andromache in Book 6, in the delightful picture Homer gives us of her marriage, where she is shown in a loving relationship with Hektor and she is already the mother of his son. The fact that this woman is 'on his side', a part of what is philon to him, already carries so strong an emotive connotation that the agathos felt no need to search for another word to express his feeling.

The division between philoi and non-philoi was so sharp that the terms were not readily abandoned. Adkins cites the example of Eriphyle who is said to have accepted gold as a price for selling her philon andra, 'dear', or rather, 'own' husband.

Similarly, when Lykaon, begging Achilles to spare his life, bases his plea on a claim to have broken bread with him while his prisoner, Achilles, even as he kills him, acknowledges the claim:

'But, philos, even you must die.'

Il. 21. 106.

Again, the uncompromising nature of this division can be seen in Achilles' words to Phoinix in Book 9 of the Iliad. Phoinix has been pleading with Achilles to abandon his anger against Agamemnon and accept his gifts. Achilles replies:

'Do not by grieving and mourning disturb my thumos, purpose, while bringing pleasure to the hero son of Atreus, Agamemnon. Nor is it necessary for you to philein him so as not to be hateful to me who philō you.'

Il. 9. 612–4.

A man's philoi should philousi, treat in a non-hostile manner, only those who are also philoi to him, otherwise, by overstepping the sharp dividing line between philoi and non-philoi, they become echthroi, enemies. To philein a man is actively to promote his interests. If Achilles' philoi promote the interests of a man who is not philos to him, they are building up resources which could potentially be used against Achilles. Therefore, they are acting against Achilles' interests and are his
In the course of the same embassy, Odysseus and Aias urge Achilles to accept compensation for the loss of time which he suffered in losing Briseis. She had been philē to him and it was his duty to protect her and hold on to what is his. Agamemnon has forced him to fail in this duty and his time suffered accordingly. Agamemnon in any event was supposed to be one of Achilles' philoi and should therefore have been promoting his interests instead of breaking them down. Altogether, Achilles has seen a deep inroad made upon his philoi. The line dividing philoi and non-philoi has been breached and Achilles must have felt threatened. The intensity of the mistrust and fear which he experienced must have been directly proportionate to the very sharpness of the division which Agamemnon has overridden. Achilles cannot feel that the offence is repaired by Agamemnon's offer of compensation, though those who are not immediately and emotionally involved think that it is reasonable. Achilles is left to feel that his philoi are acting as echthroi, enemies, in urging on him a course which he feels is against his interests. It must have been a bewildering situation for him.

As has been mentioned, xenia falls outside this demarcating line in that all comers are treated as if they were philoi, whether they are or not. It has been seen, too, that this is in response to the demands of the general situation in the Homeric world, but it is nevertheless an interesting aspect of this world, from the point of view of this study.

Judging from the general atmosphere of the Odyssey and Odysseus' attitude as he arrives in strange countries, the Homeric world has already evolved into a state where, because of the necessity of hospitality in a society so decentralized and lacking in communal organisations, xenia has come to be so widespread that strangers could feel relatively safe when travelling even in foreign lands. Xenia is the basis for such security as travellers could feel in the essentially individualistic world, and the confidence with which Odysseus requests hospitality must have been produced in him by the high degree of certainty that he will receive it. The Odyssey shows too that for Odysseus and the Homeric Greek the world is divided into those who are philoxeni, favourably inclined towards xenoi and who will take up a non-hostile attitude to strangers, and those who are not philoxeni. Polyphemos is not, and this is probably an important reason why he is regarded as being uncivilized, quite apart from his otherwise barbaric behaviour.

When Odysseus is stranded on Phaiekia, he says:

‘Alas! To what men's land have I come? Are they savage, wild and unjust or philoxeni, and is their mind god-fearing?’

When they land in the country of the Kyklops, too, Odysseus tells the rest of his men to stay behind while he and his own crew go to find into which of these two categories the inhabitants fall.

Despite the seemingly widespread prevalence of philoxenia, it still remains that a lack of it was not condemned by a term relevant to the dominant aretē-standards, such as kakon or aischron. Instead, such a lack is characterised by an accumulation of terms relevant to the co-operative sphere, and correspondingly
less forceful. These terms are to some extent reinforced by being linked also with a respect for the gods. A man, then, may be expected to be either philoxenos and to have a regard for the gods (theouleis), or to be lubristês, a man of excess, agrios, wild or savage, and ou dikatos, unjust. A charge of lubris became a very strongly emotive term for later Greeks and already carries a tone of condemnation, even if not the absolute condemnation of the dominant social code. It is used of the suitors' conduct on three occasions. But as in the case of nemesis, a charge of lubris produces only an atmosphere of disapproval, and if the charge is successfully defied, lubris cannot be effectively condemned. To be agrios is to react with aggression and violence even where this is not necessary or advisable, but this, too, does not carry absolute condemnation. Achilles is agrios in his behaviour towards the body of Hektor, yet he remains agathos. A man who is not philoxenos also has no dikê, he does not assign their rights to others, in order to secure his own, but, instead, asserts his own by forceful means. All these considerations would be strong terms of condemnation in a co-operative sphere, but they are irrelevant to the aretê-standards, which are concerned only with whether or not a man succeeds in his chosen course of conduct. Nevertheless, these passages do seem effectively to divide the Homeric world into those who are civilized and those who are not, in what are certainly co-operative terms. A civilized man has a regard for the gods and accepts strangers into a non-hostile relationship, whereas the uncivilized man allows no restraint to be laid on his violent behaviour.

It is interesting that the suitors, though frequently condemned for offences against co-operative standards, did feel the force of philoxenia and they remonstrate with one of their number. Antinoos, because of it. Odysseus, disguised as a beggar, goes round to the suitors and begs food from each of them. Only Antinoos repulses him with abuse and violence. Odysseus silently returns to the threshold of the hall and sits down: then he bursts into a complaint against Antinoos. He ends with a prayer:

‘But if anywhere there are gods and avengers of beggars, may the end of death come upon Antinoos before his marriage.’ Od.17. 475–6.

One would expect that this verbal attack by a homeless wandering beggar on an agathos would have been resented by his fellow agathoi. Perhaps they are struck with awe by the numinous nature of his curse as he invokes not only the Olympian gods but the chthonic Erinyes, the Furies. However that may be, when Antinoos tells Odysseus to sit in silence or he will have him bodily thrown out, the rest of the suitors feel nemesis, and one says:

‘Antinoos, it was not good that you struck the wretched beggar, a fatal action if he is some god of the heaven. And the gods, who can take all kinds of shapes, visit cities in the likeness of foreign strangers, surveying the lubris and eunomia of men.’ Od.17. 483–7.

The aretê of the suitors is lessened only when they are worsted by Odysseus in the contest of the bow and in the final battle. Meanwhile, with impunity, they may consume another man's goods and prey on his hapless wife and son. It is his duty to stop them and to protect his family and his failure to do so reflects upon him
and not upon those who cause him to fail. Co-operative values need mean nothing to the suitors until they are reinforced by the dominant code. In these circumstances it is interesting to find this defence of the beggar on their lips.

There was a feeling that a stranger is an unknown quantity and must, therefore, be treated with respect in case he turns out to have the resources to avenge himself for any mishandling he receives.

I have already discussed this as a contributory cause for the regard the Homeric Greeks paid to strangers and as one reason for their regarding them as being under the protection of the gods. Here this same fear of the unknown power of a stranger is expressed in different forms. The gods, the suitor says, wander about the earth in disguise and may in such disguise come to claim hospitality. Therefore, all strangers must be treated with respect, just in case! Clearly, this is equivalent to the fear of reprisals involved in the handling of strangers, merely being expressed in religious and therefore more awe-inspiring terms. The fact that it could be expressed in this way bears witness to the strength of the fear.

It is interesting, too, that the suitors themselves refer, in the context of philoxenia, to a contrast between hubris and eunomia, a state of good order. Eunomia, as Adkins points out, requires the exercise of some co-operative values. There is clearly some awareness, even in the suitors, that to make the world a safe place for strangers to travel in goes a long way towards establishing a stable society and is a valuable civilizing influence. It is important in establishing such stability and security as existed in the unruly free-for-all of an entirely success-orientated society. Eunomia is a state where nonoi or customs of the people are fixed and respected. The state of eunomia is important, especially in later Greek thought, as an indication of a civilized and ordered society, a sign of a prosperous city. The suitors in these words recognize philoxenia as a nucleus of social order.

Philotês will lead men to act in co-operation in other ways too. Athene tells Nestor that she has accompanied Telemachos on his journey to give him the benefit of an older man’s advice, but the younger men who make up Telemachos’ crew, undertake this journey because of philotês for Telemachos. Philotês would lead Achilles to fight together with the other Greek agathoi. Philotês, treating others as philoi, leads one to pursue their interests and to advance them.

Besides being used to describe the relationship between philoi, and xenoi, philotês is also used of a truce, a suspension of active hostilities in war. When the Trojans and the Greeks are trying to settle a truce, individuals say to each other: ‘Again there will either be evil war and dreadful battle or Zeus is setting up a truce between both sides. Zeus who is the arbiter of war among men.’

Il.4. 82–4.

There is either active warfare or philotês. The fact that the same word may be used for this neutral absence of active hostility between enemies and a positive relation of friendliness reveals once again the sharpness of the division, in the eyes of an agathos, between the competitive and non-competitive part of the

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world around him. Book 3 of the *Iliad* concerns the making of such a truce and the phrase ‘ratifying *philotês* and firm oaths’ is regularly used of forming such an agreement.  

*Philotês* is the state of suspended hostility and the ‘oaths’ are the solid agreements and oaths in the name of the gods that back it up. Yet despite these oaths and solemn ceremonial, the truce fails as Pandaros cannot resist shooting an arrow at Menelaus when Athene tempts him with so convenient a chance of success. One cannot feel that a truce stood much chance of being ratified in a society where such emphasis was placed on personal success, and where there is little or no social organisation that could override the individual demands.

*Pista*, firm, oaths are possible only where there is some basis for relying upon one another, some basis for mutual trust. Achilles, speaking to Hektor in Book 22, expresses this clearly:

‘Just as firm oaths are not possible for lions and men, nor do wolves and lambs have a *thumon*, heart, in concord, but continually they plan *kaka* for one another (to each other’s disadvantage), so it is not possible for you and me to *philein*, act in a friendly manner, nor will there be oaths for us two before either one of us has fallen and sated Ares, the warrior with the bull’s hide shield, with his blood.’

Il.22. 262–7.

‘Firm oaths’ require a desire to pursue the same ends in the participants. If they plan *kaka* for each other, if they are plotting each other’s downfall, as do lions and men, wolves and sheep, there can be no *philotês*. There is no basis for cooperation. However, although the truce made in Book 3 did not succeed, it is a favourable sign that one should be mooted, that an absolute physical defeat of one side by another is not a necessary end of the conflict.

The other major usage of *philein* is in relationships between men and women. In the great majority of cases, it refers to sexual intercourse between them, but this, obviously, is not an essential element of *philein*. The word implies rather the full aspect of treating a woman in a non-hostile manner, feeding, supporting and protecting her. When sexual intercourse is referred to, in the vast majority of cases an additional word or phrase is added to show that the physical act is to be understood. For example, the word ‘bed’ is combined frequently with *philotês*.  

Forms of the verb ‘mingle’ or ‘engage in sexual intercourse’ are used also.  

Where these additions do not occur, a more general sense for *philein* is appropriate.  

To make physical love to a woman is obviously one aspect of one’s behaviour towards her, if she is felt to be non-hostile, someone with whom one may feel relaxed. This, too, in a society where people are regarded as a means to an end rather than as ends in themselves would be an important feature of one’s treatment of a woman who is *phîlê*, a part of one’s possessions. To deny this to a woman is do deny her the *timê*, honour, that belongs to her as a woman, especially if one takes another woman in her place. Thus, in this context also the opposite of *philein* is *atîmazein*, to dishonour. By making love to a concubine, Phoinix’s father denies *timê* to his wife who, in virtue of her position as mistress of the house, has more claim to be *phîlê*. Phoinix says of his father:
'He became very angry with me over his lovely-haired concubine whom he himself kept treating as philē, and kept dishonouring his wife, my mother.'  
Il.9. 449–51.

There is no sanction forbidding a man to do this to his wife, provided, again, that he succeeds in doing so, as Phoinix' father does because he manages to expel his son, who had set himself up as his mother’s protector. A woman’s timē is dependent upon the protection of it afforded by her menfolk. She has no means of asserting it for herself.

There is no sanction in Homeric society against sexual relationships outside marriage, and philein may be used equally of marital and extra-marital relationships, whether sexual as in the case cited above11 or generally. Achilles, making his complaint against Agamemnon, says:

‘Or do the sons of Atreus alone philousi their wives? For every agathos and sensible man philēei and cares for his own woman, as I phileon this woman from my heart, though she was a prisoner of war.’  
Il.9. 340–3.

One may philei equally a wife or a 'prisoner of a man's spear'. Philein implies taking its object into a non-hostile relationship with oneself and treating it in this way. Part of philotēs for a woman is to protect her from the rest of the world, because a man loses timē if he does not keep everything philen intact.

Menelaus failed to do this in Helen's case and now Agamemnon has caused Achilles to fail also, though both equally had tried to philein their respective women.

It is clear that philein, though it is based on self-interest, is wholly co-operative in action. Particularly in the Odyssey, philoxenia is seen to lay the foundation of a civilized and secure society. Once men have grasped that truly enlightened self-interest lies in fact in a policy of co-operation, the world has taken a major step towards community and social organisations, and this step Homeric society has already taken as far as concerns the relationship of xenia and philotēs.

NOTES

1. CQ 57 (N.S. 13) 30 ff.
3. Here Adkins refers to his article “Honour” and “Punishment” in the Homeric Poems’, BICS 1960, 23 ff.
4. ‘Friendship and Self-Sufficiency’ 32–3 (cf. n.1).
5. E.g. ll.18.27; cf. also Od.8.178; 9.413; 22.68; 19.401; 21.433.
6. E.g. Od.18.421; cf. also Od.8.277; ll.2.178; 6.91; 12.221.
7. ll.4.155; cf. also Od.1.94; 22.99; 23.86; 2.88; 9.207; ll.3.138.
8. E.g. Od.20.129; cf. also Od.22.480; 4.722; ll.5.413.
9. E.g. ll.5.529; cf. also Od.7.76; 9.466; 19.301; ll.6.224; 6.67.
10. Compare e.g. Od.8.178 and Od.21.433; ll.6.91 and ll.12.221, ll.22.388 and ll.7.271.
13. Cf. p. 19 where this is seen as a possible explanation of the difficult line ll.21.106.
14. E.g. ll.6.318; 10.527; 1.74; 11.611.
15. Od. 10.2; 24.92; ll.20.347; 24.61; cf. Adkins, Moral Values and Political Behaviour 19–20.
16. Od.14.440; and Priam wishing that Achilles may come to a bad end, says: "May he be as much philos to the gods as he is to me; soon the dogs and vultures would eat him as he lay." II.22.41-3.

17. II.14.491; 2.668-70.

18. Od.3.218-24; II.7.203-5.


22. Od.7.39.

23. Od.5.386; other instances of such compound adjectives can be found at II.1.122; 16.65; Hom. Hymns 4.333; 2.102.

24. Cf. e.g. Od.1.82.

25. 'Friendship and Self-Sufficiency' 33-34.

26. phlan kai hêrû — cf. also II.7.387.

27. II.7.357.

28. Cf. Merit and Responsibility 42; on this passage, however, see also A.A. Long, 'Morals and Values in Homer', JHS 110 (1970) especially 130-1.

29. Cf. also p. 10; for 'doing philâ' see Od.15.359-60; 24.210.

30. Cf. e.g. Merit and Responsibility 35.

31. Od.6.313-5.

32. Od.6.327: Priam prays in similar terms when he goes to face Achilles, who is actually an enemy. II.24.309.

33. II.6.224.


35. Od.24.286.

36. II.6.230 ff.


38. CQ 57 (N.S. 13) 35 n.1.

39. 'Friendship and Self-Sufficiency' 30-7.

40. These are II.6.14-15; Od.15.201-1; Od.8.208-11.

41. Here, Adkins refers to Merit and Responsibility 35.

42. CQ 57 (N.S. 13) 35-6.

43. II.4.478.

44. Cf. p. 3.

45. Od.15.543.


50. II.9.342; 642; 1.200; Od.3.223; 14.146.


52. Adkins, Moral Values and Political Behaviour 18.

53. II.6.482.

54. 'Friendship and Self-Sufficiency' 31; cf. Od.11.326-7 and cf. n. 12.

55. Consider too the basis for treaties of alliance in classical times, and Plato Rep. I 331E.

56. II.9.342.


60. II.24.41 and 53.

61. Cf. also Adkins, Moral Values and Political Behaviour 20.


64. Merit and Responsibility 172.

65. Od.3.363.

66. II.16.282.
67. E.g. II. 3, 73, 94, 256.
68. E.g. II. 14, 207, 109; 15, 32; 3, 445; Od. 8, 202.
69. E.g. II. 2, 232; 3, 445; 15, 33; Od. 8, 268, 271; 18, 325.
70. E.g. II. 9, 340 ff.
71. II. 9:450.
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