MACEDON AND ATHENIAN POLITICS IN THE PERIOD
338 TO 323 BC

by J.E. Atkinson
(University of Cape Town)

The defeat of the allied Greek forces at Chaeronea in August 338 BC was for Athens a major disaster—1,000 dead and a further 2,000 taken prisoner by Philip (D.S. 16, 86,5)—and whilst the fearless talked of fighting to the end, the war was over. This calamity administered a short sharp shock to the body politic: extraordinary measures were proposed for the defence of the city and there was a popular movement to appoint the mercenary commander Charidemus to act as general through the crisis. However ‘the best people’ were alarmed at this proposal and appealed to the Areopagus to intervene—not to protect the traditional democratic forms, but to get this special commission given to Phocion, and not Charidemus. The Assembly was prevailed upon to prefer Phocion. Significantly Plutarch describes the men who clamoured for the appointment of Charidemus as rowdies and revolutionaries. As these and similar terms occur in complaints voiced by Aeschines, Demosthenes and Hypereides about disorder in Athens, we may be sure that Plutarch is reflecting the view of Phocion’s contemporaries and sympathisers; and if we take this episode as historical, it appears that we have here evidence of a division in Athenian politics along the lines of class.

The issue was not now between democrats and oligarchs as it had been in the last decade of the Peloponnesian War, since the oligarchies of 411 and 404 made oligarchy an unthinkable political option in the fourth century. However, though any Athenian who wished to be taken seriously in the political arena was obliged to profess his commitment to democracy, the democratic constitution was vulnerable since it could be presented as too cumbersome for crisis management and a liability in defeat. Hence the political crisis of 338, Eucrates’ law of 336 for the defence of the democracy, and Athens’ acceptance of oligarchy in 322. But discussion of the politics of this period has tended to concentrate on the division between pro- and anti-Macedonians, despite the difficulty of establishing which label is applicable in every case.

In this paper I shall question the centrality of the Macedonian issue in Athenian politics. Obviously there were occasions from 338 when Macedonia must have dominated any debate in Athens, and the casualties of Chaeronea kept the memory of that disaster alive, but equally obvious are the extended periods when there was little immediate reason for the Athenian Assembly to worry about the Macedonians.

After Chaeronea there was a general awareness in Athens of the danger of provoking an armed confrontation with Macedon, but a common desire to hit back if the opportunity arose. Thus in 338 the Areopagus acted to prevent Charidemus taking a generalship and promoted the appointment of Phocion to
a special position with emergency powers (Plut. Phoc. 16, 4); in 336, when it became plain that Philip's assassination had not liberated Greece, Athens surrendered to Alexander without any military action (D.S. 17, 4, 4 sq. and A. 1, 1, 2-3); in 335 Demosthenes persuaded the Assembly to send help to Thebes, and the Thebans received gear but no troops; and when Alexander attacked Thebes Athens sent ten envoys to congratulate him on his safe return from Thrace (A. 1, 10, 3). Alexander demanded the surrender of eight prominent Athenians as hostages, but was persuaded to reduce his demand to the exile of Charidemus. Charidemus escaped to the Persian court, and perhaps at the same time Ephialtes left Athens to join the Persian forces in Asia Minor (C.R. 3, 2, 10 sq., D.S. 17, 30, 2-6 and 25, 6 sq.). Both men had a record of active opposition to Macedon: Charidemus, a mercenary captain, had been nominated 'strategos' after the disaster at Chaeronea, and earlier Ephialtes had ferried money in from Persia and was described as a demagogue (Dinarchus 1, 33; Plut. Mor. 847 F). These two were, then, militant anti-Macedonians, who had enjoyed considerable popular support, and their departure from Athens is an indication that they could not now count on the sympathy of established political leaders. Alexander's sack of Thebes cooled the hot-heads and from 335 the political scene seems to be characterized not so much by a division between pro- and anti-Macedonians as by a consensus that direct military action against Macedon was not a practical strategy, and that a more pragmatic policy was required.

When Alexander opened hostilities in Asia Minor in 334, Athens was given a little respite from his attentions, but problems arose when Athenian prisoners of war taken at the Granicus were shipped to Macedonia to do heavy labour: this demanded a response from Athens, since that was no way to treat non-barbarian prisoners of war. But Alexander somewhat blunted the Athenians' reaction by sending 300 panoplies to Athens as a thank-offering to the goddess Athena (A. 1, 16, 7). It was only in the spring of 333 that the first recorded Athenian mission to secure the release of the Greek prisoners of war reached Alexander, and they were fobbed off with a promise that the matter would be attended to when the Persian war was over (C.R. 4, 1, 9; A. 1, 29, 5-6). As Alexander was in danger of losing control of the Aegean at the time, we should consider the Athenian approach as low-key. The next recorded appeal to Alexander was in the spring of 331, and then he obliged by agreeing to release the prisoners of war, or, as Arrian has it, only the Athenian prisoners (3, 6, 2: contrast C.R. 4, 8, 12). Not everyone would have rejoiced at this clemency, since mercenaries could be a destabilising influence in a city, and Athens was presumably held responsible for seeing that her citizens who were released from Macedonia did not engage in further actions against Macedonia and the Corinthian League.

Another indication that Athenian policy towards Macedon was cautious from 334 lies in the references to secret missions made to the Persian court. When Darius was defeated at Issus, in 333, an Athenian, Iphicrates, was amongst the
Greek envoys captured in Darius' camp. The Athenians had to work on the assumption that Alexander might be defeated by Darius, but they made contact with the Persians through the son of an illustrious mercenary, rather than through a prominent Athenian politician, whose capture by the Macedonians would be more compromising. Not surprisingly Greek envoys to Darius' court were captured after the battle of Gaugamela and again the Athenian envoy was not a prominent political figure.

Speech 17 in the Demosthenic corpus was perhaps not written by Demosthenes but gives a clear example of the hawkish talk that was fashionable in 331 BC. This speech reflects the frustrations of ordinary Athenians, or perhaps one should say that it played on their frustrations. The tone is hawkish, but the argument carefully supports the existing order: Macedon had established tyrannies in Messene and Pellene, and now was the time to oppose these tyrants and to resist interference with the constitutions of League cities. The establishment of tyrannies meant arbitrary executions and other outrages: in Pellene it meant revolution, as citizens lost their property to slaves, and it meant dictatorship, the dictator being in this case a professional wrestler. The speaker goes on to appeal to the propertied class, reminding them that the original treaty had guaranteed that there would be no land redistribution, no summary confiscations, no debt cancellation, no manumission of slaves and no revolution.

Another line of the argument is that Alexander had not hesitated to use force and Athenians, as a matter of pride, should not tolerate this. Greeks and barbarians feared to incur Athens' enmity; the Macedonians should be taught a healthy respect for Athens. The orator cites as the most insulting and outrageous contravention of the treaty the recent appearance in the Peiraeus of a Macedonian trireme. The Macedonians wanted to use the Athenian shipyards for the construction of ships for the federal fleet: the speaker rejects this as an imperialist plan, but does not argue why it would be imperialist.

A third important section of the speech refers to the interception of corn ships from the Back Sea—perhaps in 332—by Alexander’s ships. No one living in Attica could fail to appreciate the danger of a blockade to starve Athens of corn, and here the speech puts the most telling argument in favour of armed resistance to Macedonia.

There is no mention of war in Asia, and no clear suggestion is made as to what should be attempted in Greece. The speech is generally a defence of Athenian traditions—one of the traditions being a superiority complex—and the speaker also defends the establishment figures against the nouveaux riches, Macedon’s agents and fellow-travellers.

The clearest evidence of reluctance to clash with Macedon comes in 331, when Agis III initiated an uprising against Antipater: there was a popular movement in favour of mobilising a fleet to assist Agis, but Demades, who is later attested as being on friendly terms with Antipater, indirectly squashed this move by persuading the people that the money should rather stay in the theoric fund and be used to the direct benefit of the citizens (Plut. Mor. 818 E–F).
Demosthenes made hawk-like noises (Plut. Dem. 24, 1), but did not exert himself to push Athens into war, for Aeschines soon after the event was able to talk of Demosthenes' silence on the subject (3, 165–6). It has been suggested that Demosthenes was related to Demades, but the evidence is fragile, and it certainly could not be maintained that Demosthenes was only reticent in deference to a relative, for it seems that he took active measures to placate Alexander, whether after or in anticipation of Agis' defeat: his friend Aristion was despatched to make contact with Hephaestion and then Alexander, and to deliver a letter seeking reconciliation—a term that is ambiguous, covering inter-state as well as personal relationships.

Agis' rapid demise justified the Athenian decision not to get involved in the war, and Athens benefited from her non-intervention as Alexander made conciliatory gestures (A. 3, 6, 2 and 16, 8). Nevertheless the failure of this resistance movement provided ready material for politicians in Athens to attack those who had opposed active support for Agis. It was in this context that Aeschines revived, or was manoeuvred into reviving, the action against Ctesiphon, which turned into an indictment of Demosthenes' vacillating and ineffectual record, in particular from the time of the battle of Chaeronea. The trial of Ctesiphon and the trial of Leocrates for treason, also in 330, lend weight to the old orthodoxy that policy vis-à-vis Macedon was an essential element in the labelling of any Athenian political 'party' in this era.16 The orthodoxy was questioned by Sealey (JHS 76 (1956) 80 sq.) and Badian (JHS 81 (1961) esp. 32). Nevertheless this labelling goes on, presumably inspired by the desire to establish that Athenian politicians were fundamentally patriotic, for whilst the fallacy of interpretation by anachronistic analogy is taboo, the fallacy of ethical positivism thrives: thus E.M. Burke characterizes Lycurgus and Demosthenes as 'adamant anti-Macedonians', says that 'patriotism, with Macedon as the focal antithesis, was at the heart of that (Lycurgan) programme', and argues that it was Demosthenes who trapped Aeschines into reopening the case against Ctesiphon in 330 so that he could exploit the trial to reinvigorate opposition to Macedon, and Fordyce Mitchel argues that, whereas there was no agreement on tactics, Athenian leaders were essentially at one in looking for the dissolution of the Macedonian empire.18

Mitchel rejects the idea that Aeschines was pro-Macedonian and dismisses Tarn's theory that the trial of Ctesiphon was staged by 'friends of Macedon' to exploit the embarrassment of their opponents. He takes Aeschines' miserable failure to muster 20% of the jurors' support as an indication that Aeschines acted from personal pique and miscalculated his own powers of persuasion.19 It may be that the value which Mitchel attaches to patriotism has led him to overestimate the importance of foreign policy in Athenian politics in 330, for his presentation of the trial leaves out a crucial element in the story, as 330 marked a grave domestic crisis, primarily because corn rose in price to 16 drachms a medimnos (Dem. 34, 39), against the usual price of 5 drachms, and the corn shortage continued into 329 as domestic production was very low. People
had to queue to collect their ration of corn, and many were trampled underfoot
as the unruly broke line and surged to the front; bread prices were controlled,
and the old law that no Athenian citizen or metic could convey corn to any port
other than the Peiraeus was strictly enforced (Dem. 34, 37).

The mining industry ran into a bad spell between 330 and 328, which may be
explained by Alexander's redeployment of the wealth he had taken from Persian
treasures and the competition of the mint which Alexander established in
Sicyon in about 330. Furthermore a number of building projects seem to have
come to an end in about 330—notably the shipsheds and arsenal at the
Peiraeus, the Panathenaic stadium, and the theatre of Dionysus, and, whereas
new projects were initiated, the transitional period must have been unsettling for
those involved.

The surviving speeches from the trials of Ctesiphon and Leocrates reflect the
tensions in Athenian society in 330. Aeschines prosecuted Ctesiphon for
irregularities in his proposal to honour Demosthenes in 336, but used the
occasion to attack Demosthenes for building up a false reputation as an
opponent of Macedonian militarism. Both Aeschines and Demosthenes lashed
out freely with accusations of corruption and bribe-taking, and Demosthenes
underlined the economic implications of his policy: the war he advocated in 340
made goods cheaper and more plentiful in Athens than they were in the
'peacetime' conditions of 330; he blamed the doves for the current shortages
and high prices (18, 89); then in dealing with his trierarchic law of 340
Demosthenes stressed his concern to save the poor from oppression, and he
related his struggle against the wealthy, who tried to buy off his reform proposals
(102-9). In attacking Aeschines, Demosthenes played on his wealth: Aeschines
had become a greasy horse-breader, with Alexander's help (320). Given that the
subject was policy vis-à-vis Macedon, one might be surprised at the high
incidence in Demosthenes' speech of the antithesis rich-poor.

Lycurgus' case against Leocrates similarly related directly to much earlier
events, for this prosperous business-man was charged with treason for his
actions after the battle of Chaeronea. Leocrates had quit Athens and interfered
with the supply of corn to Athens, first by misinforming the Rhodians so that
they stopped shipments of grain to Athens, and secondly by engaging in the sale
of Epirote corn to Corinth instead of Athens (Lycurgus c.Leocr. 18 and 26).
Lycurgus broadened his attack to cover all horse-breeders and chorus patrons
and lavish spenders (139-140), and went gunning for aliens, slaves and the
disfranchised.

Two other themes play an important part in the speech: first is a fundamentalist
advocacy of loyalty to the state, and in support of his aggressive patriotism he
quotes lengthy passages from Homer, Tyrtaeus and Euripides: this call to
patriotism in a state not under immediate military threat is surely illiberal. The
second theme relates to democracy, or more precisely the demos, and the laws,
terms that appear constantly in the speech and are often linked. Lycurgus is
not eulogising democracy as the facilitator of open debate and the means to
accommodate divisions of opinion: he is talking rather of the people as a united front, defending a well-established code of laws, not only for their own preservation but also as a divine mandate (146). Again Lycurgus' standpoint is illiberal.

Lycurgus's attitude is intelligible against the background of the domestic crisis of 330, and the external menace was not simply Macedonian militarism but also, at a more political level, the unsettling effect of the long history of civil unrest that had rocked other cities in Greece. These disturbances have been well reviewed by A. Fuks in a series of articles in which he shows how Isocrates and Plato observed and reacted to the problems. Features of Isocrates' experience were stasis, murders, robberies, cancellation of debts, redistribution of land, and the revision of constitutions. The growing divide between rich and poor upset the social order and caused the abuse of political power. E. Ruschenbusch has argued that Aristotle misrepresented political unrest in Greece and that class warfare was not the characteristic of politics in the fourth century, but whatever the general pattern of Athenian politics in the fourth century, it seems to me that the crises which dotted the period 338 to 323 threatened the political and social order, and exposed fundamental divisions in Athenian society which were concealed in more tranquil times by the veneer of conventional political exchanges.

As various new factors came into play when the next crisis hit Athens in 324, we can interrupt the narrative at this point to consider certain general features of the political history of the late 330s and early 320s. There was an interaction between the dominant problem in foreign affairs and the socio-economic stresses that developed in Athens.

In the speeches of this period there is a heavy emphasis on patriotism: for instance, in Lycurgus' speech against Leocrates; and the threat of Macedonian aggression served to oblige the Athenians to present a common front. Politicians advocated a variety of strategies ranging from open defiance to collaboration and accused their opponents of selling out to Macedon, but none would openly reject patriotism in favour of absorption into the Macedonian empire. There were positive disincentives to overt collaboration, including Eucrates' law of 336, which re-enacted earlier provisions against the dissolution of the democratic constitution and introduced a new clause dictating the loss of all citizen rights for any Areopagite who should participate in any government set up after the dissolution of the democracy, and the warning was re-emphasized by the erection of a statue of Demokratia by the Boule in 333/2 and the sacrifices offered to Demokratia by the generals in 332/1 and 331/0. However patriotic the rhetoric, many politicians were accused of being in the pay of Macedon and were referred to as Macedon's mercenaries: such charges were levelled against Demades, Euxenippus, Demosthenes and Aeschines, and Phocion was credited with a steady refusal to accept Alexander's offers. We can accept as fact that Alexander did attempt to buy political leaders and clearly some Athenians yielded to the temptation, which suggests that, at least from 334, the menace of
Macedon was less of a reality than its presentation in patriotic speeches.

Policy decisions taken in this period reveal a concern to avoid military action that would be suicidal and an equal concern to avoid the imposition of a puppet regime which might be obliged to harass or outlaw its opponents. A middle course was followed: measured resistance, asserting Athens' determination to remain autonomous, but stopping short of provocative acts that would justify military intervention by Macedon. Thus walls, shipsheds and a naval arsenal were built, and probably soon after Chaeronea Lycurgus organised the reform of the ephebate, obliging all 18 year olds to enrol for two years military training and service.28

The practical effect of the reform on the ephebate was that Attica was protected against surprise attacks, the Periclean principle that Attica should not be defended against infantry and cavalry was abandoned and, at the same time, military action was to a certain extent ritualized. Arguably this form of national service made active involvement in hostilities less likely. Experience had shown that ad hoc mobilisation of the citizen army created existential situations with unintended political outcomes.

The reconstituted ephebate was, therefore, a form of measured resistance to Macedon, and in support of this strategy Lycurgus sought to stimulate the economy by an extensive public works programme, including the construction of shipsheds and walls, and perhaps also by the enforced sale of unworked farm land, which both raised money for the state and made extra land available to those who wished to invest in agriculture.29

Lycurgus' economic policy of mobilising wealth for construction projects and his policy of avoidance of a military confrontation with Macedon clearly had a very different effect from that of Pericles' strategy in the Peloponnesian War. Pericles' policy disrupted agriculture and led to the closure of the mines at Laurium, whereas Lycurgus promoted a strengthening of the Athenian economy. Pericles saw Sparta as a challenge, whereas Lycurgus and his supporters and like-minded leaders saw the threat of Macedon as the means of uniting Athenians under the conservative leadership of their own class. In other words, I suggest that just as Isocrates saw the Persian king as the figure who could unite Greeks in opposition to him, so there were Athenian leaders who saw that hostility to Macedon could be worked up to unite the Athenians.

The economic problems of this period may explain another feature of the political scene, a feature which is all the more striking in view of the chauvinist tone of speeches on foreign policy.

Athenian politicians were generous in their promotion of proposals to extend property rights to aliens in this period,30 and even to accord citizenship to non-Athenians.31

There was good cause to reward entrepreneurs who had helped to ferry corn to Athens when supplies were low, and if wealthy metics were encouraged to make Athens their permanent home, that could only strengthen the position of the Athenian aristocracy.

43
In the aftermath of Chaeronea, Hypereides even proposed that all metics should be made citizens (Plut. Mor. 848 F–849 A) and this could have benefited up to 10,000 (the number supposedly counted in the census of c.317 BC: Athenaeus 6, 272 C). Though the measure was apparently not passed, this amazingly drastic plan adds to the picture of the political crisis of 338/7. For enfranchisement on this scale, plus the manumission of 150,000 slaves (Hypereides, Frag. 18), may have been intended to sound so drastic as to compel the citizens to unite to work out a more conservative solution to the crisis.

If Hypereides intended his proposal to be taken seriously or was hoping for some compromise, we need not assume that his concern was to promote radical democracy, for any metics enfranchised would have been classified according to the normal property qualifications and would thus not have constituted a united group within the body politic, and experience would have taught the metics that privileges were revocable, and this would have inhibited the expression of radical views: metics once enfranchised might have been expected to adopt a passive political attitude.

Finally one more feature of Athenian politics in this period was the attack on wealth accumulation and conspicuous consumption. This occurs constantly in the forensic and political speeches, together with a careful defence of wealth modestly acquired and patriotically invested, and the preoccupation with the affairs of the rich is reflected in the incidence of court cases directed against entrepreneurs. Hypereides says that the prosecution of mine lessees at one stage became so common that investment in new mines ceased altogether, but at the time of his speech for Euxenippus, some time about 330, a court ruling against such intimidation had encouraged the development of new mines (Hyp. 4, esp. 36).

R. von Pöhlmann, noting Demosthenes' invective against wealth, saw Demosthenes as a member of the bourgeoisie, who nevertheless fostered the masses' hostility to capitalism. Though we cannot accept Pöhlmann's brand of modernisation of Athenian history, we can accept the paradox in the orators' attack on the wealthy, and it may be interpreted as a defensive political tactic. The political establishment was badly shaken by the disaster at Chaeronea in 338, and the shortage of corn that was desperate in 330 and continued for a few years created a situation that threatened political stability. Against this background Athenian leaders attacked vulgar greed and conspicuous consumption and supported a policy of redistributing wealth in a limited way, and in so doing presumably hoped to neutralize any incipient radical movement. Lycurgus' rhetoric was directed at uniting the people with chauvinist arguments. He called for unquestioning defence of the democracy, and, as we have noted, his concept of democracy was highly illiberal, with the emphasis on the citizen's obligation to be steadfastly loyal to the laws, traditions embodied in patriotic literature and the ephebate oath.

In fine, Lycurgus and most members of the upper class, despite their personal differences and disagreements on a variety of issues, were set against
military adventurism and were apprehensive about the potential political power of the poorer citizens: Lycurgus' defensive measures and economic programme were a constructive alternative to risky campaigns and chauvinist speeches and attacks on unpatriotic materialists were to appeal to the sort of people who in 338 had clamoured for the conferment of emergency powers on Charidemus.

Of course this is not to say that Lycurgus' opponents viewed the issues in the same light. Propagandists tend to have ill-justified faith in their powers of persuasion and to be locked into focus on their own picture of political realities; one has to record that Lycurgus failed by one vote to get the conviction of Leocrates (Aeschines 3, 252-3) and, as is well known, Aeschines could not muster even 20% of the jurors' votes. When personal animosity was the real reason for so many political trials, the jurors became cynical (cf. Lyc. c. Leocr. 3) and were inclined to acquit when a man had been convicted in a preliminary hearing before the Areopagus (Dinarchus 1, 54 sq; cf. Lyc. c. Leocr. 52). The forcefulness of the patriotic oratory was weakened by the memory of the inglorious apologies made to Philip and Alexander in 338, 336 and 335, and by the welter of accusations of bribe-taking.

Lycurgus' reforms and development programme were successful enough in staving off stasis, and the war was averted, but the political order was unstable and its frailty was exposed in the crisis that developed after Lycurgus' death in 324, when Leosthenes' arrival in the Peloponnese heralded a fresh confrontation with Macedon, Harpalus' unwelcome arrival in Athens led to many prominent figures being charged with bribery, and Nicanor's proclamation concerning the return of exiles struck at a vulnerable point in the Athenian economy. Diodorus explains that Athens was almost alone amongst the Greek states in viewing the return of exiles as unwelcome, for Athenian cleruchs on Samos would have to restore the island to the Samians (D.S. 18, 8, 6-7). The economic importance of Samos to the Athenians explains their general concern to retain control of the island; Athenian cleruchs had been settled there apparently since 361, and Athens presumably did not want to have to find land for returning settlers. Demosthenes apparently bought time on the issue of Samos, for the question whether Athens was to retain control of it was unclear to Antipater in 322, and was decided in the Samians' favour by Perdiccas.

Demosthenes was the central figure in the scandal over the misappropriation of part of Harpalus' treasure. Badian, in his detailed discussion of this episode, presents Demosthenes as 'caught in the web of his own intrigues', for he had compromised himself by participating in secret negotiations with Leosthenes (Hypereides c.Dem. 12-13) and by leading the mission that negotiated with Nicanor (Din. 1, 81 sq.).

When the scandal broke, 'the people' clamoured for the prosecution of the bribe-takers and hustled the Areopagus to complete the preliminary investigation, but as the procedure dragged on, Dinarchus' impression seems to have been that indignation had given way to apathy (3, 3, 14 and 15), and in the case of the minor offenders the jurors were presumably reluctant to satisfy the
Thus the outcome of the trials was not a victory for radicalism or rabid anti-Macedonian sentiment. Indeed the prosecutions for the misappropriation of Harpalus’ loot could have been exploited as a conciliatory gesture in dealings with Alexander. However, Athens had given aid and recognition to Leosthenes, and though it was possible in the spring of 323 to obviate war, the death of Alexander administered another shock to the Athenian political system. Athens was forced to decide whether or not to risk war, but Lycurgus was dead, Demosthenes in exile, and Phocion at a disadvantage over against Leosthenes, who had the means to fight, and Hypereides who had the political advantage of having been a prosecutor in the bribery trials. Caution was abandoned and Athens opted for war. Diodorus Siculus’ account of Athens’ decision to start hostilities echoes Plutarch’s account of the bid to give Charidemus special powers after the disaster at Chaeronea in 338, for in 323 the men of property advocated a quietist policy, whereas demagogues stirred up the masses and incited them to vote for war (18, 10, 1).

To sum up, the crises of the period 338–323 exacerbated what I think can fairly be described as class differences, and Alexander’s destruction of Thebes produced a consensus amongst most political leaders that active military resistance to Macedonia was not a practical option. Chauvinist speeches and the Lycurgan programme of reforms and building and defence projects was aimed at avoiding military adventures and easing tensions within Athenian society. Lycurgus’ political statements were illiberal, indeed almost ‘fascist’, and were motivated by a concern to strengthen the position of the liturgical class. As Alexander disintegrated and the political establishment in Athens was shaken and divided by the Harpalus scandal in 324, radical leaders urged the poorer citizens to use their voting power and opt for war. That class was significant in this change of policy is indicated by the fact that when Macedon re-established control over Athens, Antipater disfranchised some 12,000, and left with full citizenship only the 9,000 who satisfied a property qualification of 2,000 drachms. I presume that Lycurgus would have approved.

NOTES

1. A version of this paper was presented at the conference of the Classical Association of South Africa held in Durban in January 1981. In the source references I abbreviate Diodorus Siculus as D.S., Curtius Rufus as C.R. and Arrian as A.
4. It is not my immediate concern to defend the use of the term ‘class’ in the context of Athenian political history; suffice it here to refer to the discussion of this issue in E.M. Wood and N. Wood, Class ideology and ancient political theory, Oxford 1978.
6. Cf. C. Mosso’s observation that ‘even after Chaironea the attitude towards Macedon was not the sole principle on which Athenian opinion was divided. It was however an essential factor . . .’ (Athens in decline, London 1973, 84).
7. Labels such as μισαλέξανδρος (Aesch, 3, 73), μεσοφιλίππος (Aesch, 2, 14) and μακεδόνικος (Plut. Dem. 24, 2; Alex. 36, 8) have to be treated as cautiously as similar labels bandied about during the Peloponnesian War, on which see W.R. Connor, ‘The New Politicians’..., Princeton 1971.

8. D.S. 17, 8, 5–6 and Plut. Dem. 23, 1; the sources may mean that Athens sent armour and not weapons.

9. A. 1, 10, 4–6; Plut. Dem. 23, 4; the sources differ on the number of men whose surrender Alexander demanded.

10. A. 2, 15.2, with my Commentary on Curtius Rufus’ ‘Historiae Alexandri’ Books 3 and 4, Amsterdam 1980, 261 and 465–5, where I suggest that, if Iphicrates was accompanied by Arisogeiton, the latter was not the famous son of Cydinachus.

11. A. 3, 24, 4 with my commentary on C.R. 3, 13, 15.


15. Jacoby FGH no. 135/6, F.2; Aesch. 3, 162, with Dem. 1, 4 and 2, 1 for the use of διάλογος and καταλογος in diplomacy. On the collaboration of Demothenes and Demades from 335 see A. Lirgou, GIF 30 (1978) 27–46, known to me indirectly.


17. Cf. G.L. Cawkwell’s observation in his “Eubulus”, JHS 83 (1963) 67: ‘... it is easy to pass to classifying politicians as pro- and anti-Macedonian. This may be improving, but it is not history’. For the political influences that worked on rival presentations of Demothenes from the mid-nineteenth century see H.B. Dunkel, CP 33 (1938) 291 sq., reprinted in Philip and Athens, edited by S. Perelman, Cambridge 1973.


22. c. Leocr. 20, 142, 149 and 150 in particular.


26. [Dem.] 17, 11, Hyperides 4, 22.

27. Plat. Phoc. 38 and 30, Hyperides 4, 21 sq.; Dinarchus 1, 28 sq.; Dem. 18, 41 and 320 and 19, 145.


30. IG ii, 237, 342, 351, 425, 360, 343 with J. Péceira’s discussion in The formula for the grant of enktesis ... , Prague 1966.

31. IG ii, 237, 350, and 405; Aeschines 3, 85; Dinarchus 1, 43.

32. Cf. D. Whitehead, The ideology of the Athenian metic, Cambridge 1977, esp. 57 sq. on Lysias, the metic Dinarchus expressed support for the Areopagus (1, 7 sq.) and eulogised Athens’ ‘egalitarian and democratic traditions (1, 37 sq).

33. Geschichte der sozialen Frage ..., Munich 1925, i, 255.

34. J.K. Davies in the Introduction to his APF argues that liability for liturgies may be taken as the criterion for defining membership of the ‘upper class’ and notes as of particular relevance Polit 1291 33–4. Such a legalistic definition cannot give us the whole picture and we lack the evidence to decide how the men in the middle of the social spectrum recognised their class
affiliation. Nevertheless Davies provides us with a rough working definition, since eligibility for liturgical services is clear evidence of relative wealth.


36. RE 1A, 2216. The absence of the cleruchs eased the pressure on the core supplies in Athens, and continuing concern with guaranteeing adequate grain supplies is reflected in the decision of 325/4 to plant a colony on the Adriatic and the honours paid in the same year to a Cypriote from Salamis for his help in the past when corn was short: IG ii², 1629 170 sq. and IG ii², 360.

37. D.S. 18, 18, 6 and 9; significantly Hypereides and Dinarchus are silent on the outcome of Demosthenes' negotiation with Nicander.


40. As Badian noted (JHS 81 (1961) 32 and 35), neither the prosecutors nor the accused constitute a homogeneous group on the evidence available to us. The scandal gave opportunity for the settling of old scores, thus it is not surprising that Hypereides was a prosecutor and Aristogeiton one of the accused, and that Aeschines' friend Pytheas was a prosecutor while Demosthenes was on trial. The untidiness of the politics of the trials was reflected in the length of time taken by the Areopagus over the preliminary investigation (Dinarchus 1, 45), the acquittal by the jury court of some of those listed by the Areopagus and the setting of fines below the statutory level (Din. 1, 60 and Hyp. 5, 24).

41. The prosecutor Pytheas was a 'genuine radical' (Mitchel), likewise Stratocles (Ferguson Hell. Athens 13), but so too was Aristogeiton (Mitchel) and he was one of the accused; Pytheas was an ardent anti-Macedonian (Treves) and thus a suitable co-prosecutor with Hypereides, but not if one follows J.A. Goldstein, who describes Pytheas and Menesaechmus as pro-Macedonians (The letters of Demosthenes, Columbia Univ. Press 1968, 55 and 224–6).

42. Cf. D.S. 17, 111, 1. Not surprisingly Hypereides described the situation differently at the time (6, 10).
Acta Classica is published annually by the Classical Association of South Africa. The journal has been in production since 1958. It is listed on both the ISI and the SAPSE list of approved publications.

For further information go to: