HOW ARE THE MIGHTY FALLEN?

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The collapse of the great Bronze Age Greek centres about 1200 BC in mainland Greece provides ancient historians with one of their most fascinating problems.1 To solve it definitively on present evidence is impossible, and even to engage in its heated controversies may be rash; all the same, I believe that by starting with a systematic and analytical archaeological survey of what was destroyed or remained, proceeding to an examination of the contemporary Near Eastern texts, and then analyzing the evidence of linguistic developments and tradition, we can emerge not triumphant but at least reasonably certain who was not responsible for the catastrophe and with a fair idea who was, and how it came about.

At the risk of stating the obvious I shall remind myself of the limitations of our evidence before I begin the survey. For what was destroyed and what survived the historian relies on the archaeologist. He must therefore contend with an inevitable over-concentration on pottery, the one virtually indestructible artefact. He must be aware of the perpetual danger of arguing from silence simply because of archaeology's geographical haphazardness, for many sites lie undiscovered and many more lie inaccessible under modern towns or in remote areas. And he must recognize that there are profound difficulties of chronology, since the dating of pottery depends so heavily on subjective estimates of stylistic advances between a few fixed points, which may themselves be suspect. After all, if a pot is found in a grave with a datable scarab, who is to say that the scarab had not been in the family for 200 years before it was buried with the newly deceased and with a dinner service which he had purchased only a few days before his death? Relative chronology too is suspect because artistic developments in the ceramic art need not have been equally fast at different places which were nevertheless equals in other branches of material culture which have not survived. Then again there is a certain naivety for the historian in the archaeologists' tripartite divisions and sub-divisions, based on the hypothesis that everything has a beginning, a middle and an end. Thus for the Bronze Age we have the first tripartite division into early (EH), middle (MH), and late Helladic (LH), then LH I, II, and III, then LH IIIA, B, and C, then LH IIIC I, 2, and 3, and so on.2 Not only are further superfine subdivisions almost certainly spurious for historical dating at a distance of over 3000 years, but the fact that LH IIIB, for example, is followed by LH IIIC and not by some more distinctive

1. All dates given in the text will be BC unless otherwise stated.
2. Risking the fulminations of the ceramic experts, I offer the following rough chronological guide to the reader: LH I (16th century), LH II (15th), LH IIIA (14th), LH IIIB (13th), LH IIIC (12th and early 11th), 'Submycenaean' (11th), proto-Geometric (c. 1025-900): further subdivision I regard as spurious accuracy for historical purposes.
designation, however relevant this may be to a student of ceramic history, does
less than justice to the magnitude of the archaeological and historical break that
occurs at the end of LH IIIB, i.e. about 1200, when almost all the great power-
centres of Bronze Age Greece were destroyed and even the art of writing
disappeared. And finally, even if we remain aware of all these things, we must
still be on our guard against the greatest non sequitur that bedevils objective
study of the Bronze Age, namely the assumption that a homogeneous material
culture as revealed by archaeology implies a homogeneous political structure
—an unwarranted assumption that is accepted as an article of faith by those
many scholars who cannot approach the Bronze Age unprejudiced by the
influence of the Homeric epic.

The fact that Schliemann read the Iliad and proceeded to find Troy and then
Mycenae (rich in 16th-century gold) does not make the Homeric Iliad gospel-
truth for the Bronze Age, however biblical its influence may have been on
classical Greece. Archaeology in general and the Linear B tablets in particular
have revealed beyond doubt that the Homeric epic belongs to an era which had
no conception of the vast scale or complexity of bureaucratic palace-states, and
yet so deeply ingrained is the tradition of a Panachaean War against Troy under
the leadership of Mycenae that the name Mycenaean is almost universally used
of the whole Late Bronze Age civilization even today, some twenty-five years
since the decipherment of the tablets. That Bronze Age Greeks of the 13th
century had something to do with the destruction of Troy, which could only
have been Troy VIIa, is all we can be certain of from the story-line of the Iliad,
whose value to the historian is not for the Bronze Age but for its very different,
less spectacular, totally illiterate but orally very imaginative successor, the Dark
Age which cloaks Greece in the mists of illiteracy until the art of writing
reappears some 500 years later in the late eighth century. But I have argued this
case more fully elsewhere. It must suffice here to state that neither the Homeric
Iliad by itself, nor the Homeric Iliad combined with the homogeneity of material
culture revealed by the archaeology of Bronze Age Greece which began at
Mycenae because Schliemann had read the Iliad, is evidence of a Mycenaean
empire even of the Argolid, let alone throughout the rest of Greece. In
examining the power-centres of the late 13th century I shall therefore forget the
Iliad and reject the obsession with Mycenae and the misleading, prejudicial term
‘Mycenaean’, except where I quote from the works of others. I shall speak
instead of Helladic Greece or of ‘Achaeans’ as its inhabitants—one of the three
generic words used by Homer to distinguish Greeks from Trojans (the other
being ‘Argives’ and ‘Danaans’, not ‘Mycenaean’), though in using any
common name we must be careful not to imagine a strong sense of ‘Greek’
nationality at this time (as indeed we are warned by Thucydides’).

Freed from mischievous preconceptions we can now proceed to the first

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question: what was destroyed and what remained? What is needed is a survey and an analysis of all the Achaean sites in the 13th century, and we are fortunate to have the former in Hope Simpson’s *A Gazetteer and Atlas of Mycenaean Sites.* It is the result of its fortunate author’s travels in Greece in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and it provides a most useful basis for the following survey, which I have supplemented by more recent publications. What it lacks is analysis. After 194 pages of gazetteer there is only one of analysis, p. 195, where a ‘Partial Index to Certain Major Features’ lists ‘Fortresses (Major),’ ‘Fortified Settlements and Minor Forts etc,’ ‘Palaces (Major),’ ‘Megaron Structures,’ ‘Roads’, ‘Shrines or religious centres etc.’ and ‘Tholos Tombs (Mycenaean).’ This one-page analysis is not only inadequate but inaccurate and gravely misleading. Hope Simpson’s criteria for a ‘palace’ are bits of cement floor or fresco, regardless of other evidence. Under ‘Fortified Settlements and Minor Forts’ there are power-centres many times the size of Mycenae alongside microscopic fortlets on tiny hillocks. The list of tholos-tombs similarly fails to distinguish between sizes: it has great ones like the so-called Treasuries of Atreus and Minyas at Mycenae and Orchomenos undifferentiated from tiny little hives that a swarm of bees would have found claustrophobic. It also omits important tholos-tombs mentioned in the gazetteer while including sites for which the gazetteer mentions no tholos-tombs. In short, useful as the gazetteer is, the analysis is hopelessly inadequate. And even the title of the work is misleading. The expression ‘Mycenaean Sites’ at once reveals the usual prejudice, which is immediately confirmed by turning the page and finding Mycenae as site no. 1, despite the fact that the very evidence which Hope Simpson so painstakingly collected shows that Mycenae was by no means the largest site in the Argolid, let alone in the whole of Bronze Age Greece. What is needed is an unprejudiced analysis of the relative sizes of the sites, their fortifications and their tombs, and in what follows I am going to talk not of ‘palaces’ but of ‘power-centres’, fortified areas that were attacked and, with a very few exceptions, destroyed about 1200. I ask the reader to forget the *Iliad* for the time being and concentrate on these 13th-century power-centres as we survey mainland Greece not from Mycenae outwards but from north to south, from Thessaly down through Phocis and Locris, Boeotia, Attica and so into the Peloponnese. If it does nothing else, this method will help us to be objective; or if further justification is needed for choosing a starting point other than Mycenae, few scholars would argue that, if the wave of destruction was caused by migrations by land, its direction could have been other than southward from the remote North-West of Greece. And in that case the first sufferer would have been Thessaly.

Remembering always that Thessaly has not been well explored and that there

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5. R. Hope Simpson, *A Gazetteer and Atlas of Mycenaean Sites,* University of London Institute of Classical Studies, Bulletin Supplement no. 16, 1965. (The numbers which I give in brackets in the text after a place-name refer to that site’s number in Hope Simpson, whom the reader should consult for bibliography: I shall give references only to more recent publications that are particularly relevant to my purpose.)
may therefore be an even larger than usual number of pieces missing to
complete the jigsaw-puzzle picture in that region, we can proceed to examine the
two major power-centres which have been discovered. One is in the area of the
modern town of Volos on the north of the Pagasetic Gulf. At Kastro (480) there
are impressive mediaeval fortifications on this naturally defensible position, but
archaeology has also produced what Hope Simpson calls a 'Mycenaean' palace,
evidenced by painted plaster walls. Pottery of all LH periods has been found,
but especially from the 15th to the end of the 13th century, when there is
evidence of a great fire. In other words it appears that the fortified power-centre
of the Achaeans was destroyed in the early 2nd millennium BC—a pattern which we shall see repeating itself throughout
Greece. On the other hand it appears that it was only the power-centre which
was destroyed. There is evidence of continued occupation of the surrounding
settlement areas with no layer of destruction between the latest LH levels and
the proto-Geometric, named after the new pottery style which began to evolve
in the second half of the 11th century. As to grave evidence, the royalty in the
later 15th century were almost certainly buried in the nearby tholos-tomb (a
particularly early one which has produced rich finds of the LH IIB period) and
in other LH II tholos-tombs nearby at a place appropriately called Toumba
(483), whereas later rulers seem to have been buried in a slightly less important and
more spectacular set of tombs (7½ m in diameter) at Kastraki (484), which contained
LH III vases. Perhaps then these Kastraki tombs were the last resting places of a
dynasty whose palace and fortress at Kastro were destroyed about 1200, even
even though its former subjects continued to live on in the area. The only other
evidence of destruction from Iolcos is from the low promontory of Pevkakia
(482), which was probably its ancient port. It has the remains of an imposing
building with walls 1 m thick, but it has little pottery after LH IIIB and may well
have disappeared at the same time as the citadel. If so, it could be that the citadel
itself was destroyed not by an attack from the West by land but from the sea,
possibly by other Achaeans who were not averse to doing on the west coast of the
Aegean what they are supposed to have done to Troy on the east? It is
possible, though only one of many possibilities.

The other major power-centre in Thessaly is about 23 km north-west of
Volos, and it is huge. Its name is Petra (499), a promontory jutting out into Lake
Karla and opposite an island of the same name. The circuit-walls of this great
settlement ran for nearly 5 km, which make it very much larger than the next
largest fortified power-centre of Bronze Age Greece, namely Gla in Boeotia.
Gla (402) has a perimeter wall nearly 2 miles long, which is itself some 10 times
larger than that of Tiryns in the Argolid. And when we reflect that Mycenae
itself is only slightly larger than Tiryns, I think these statistics put Mycenae in its

6. R. V. Schroeder, *Ancient Greece from the Air*, London, 1974, 78–80 (with aerial photographs);
proper place as one of the smaller power-centres of 13th century Greece and unlikely therefore to have been the capital of a Panachaean empire. The fortified area of Petra dwarfs that of Mycenae and all other Late Helladic settlements in Greece. Unfortunately hardly any excavation has been done, but LH III sherd s have been found widespread over the whole surface area enclosed by the 5 km perimeter-walls, and traces of Achaean houses and cist-graves (though not tholos-tombs) have been found on the surface. What would be revealed by a full-scale excavation no-one can tell, but on the available evidence it may be that Petra was a much later settlement than Iolcos or than those in the Argolid. Most sherds in the area are later LH IIIA and mainly LH IIIB, i.e. about 1350–1200. There is nothing later than LH IIIB, and therefore it is possible that Petra was destroyed about the same time as Iolcos.

Besides the two great power-centres of Iolcos and Petra three other places are classified as fortified by Hope Simpson for Thessaly. The first is a dubious example of a fortified acropolis with remains of Cyclopean walling but sherds mainly of classical and hellenistic date at Nevestiki (485), on the north-east edge of the fertile plain of Lechonia: the area enclosed by the ancient walls is about 200 m by 150 m, i.e. about the size of Tiryns. The second is Ktouri (537), a high, conical hill with LH IIIB sherds in close association with Cyclopean walling. It was a small fortress with a perimeter of only 250 m, but it too seems to have been abandoned about 1200 to judge from the lack of LH sherds later than IIIB: it seems to have been reoccupied and refortified only in classical times. The third is Pyrgos (541), plausibly identified with ancient Arne-Kierion. It has a little hill that was definitely fortified about 900, but the discovery of a Late Bronze Age settlement at the foot of the hill may suggest that the fortress had been occupied in the 13th century too.

So much for fortified places in Thessaly. A quick glance at the sites of tholos-tombs shows a few more places which evidence Achaean penetration of the region in the Late Bronze Age. At Marmariani (508), north of Lake Karla, there is a mound with seven small tholos-tombs with a nearby settlement, and their use both in LH III and proto-Geometric times may suggest continuous occupation of the neighbouring small settlement which is dated 1400–1100 and was possibly unaffected by the general collapse of 1200. At Kouphe Rachis (545), well inland in the foothills of the Pindus mountains, a more impressive tholos-tomb suggests the existence of an undiscovered power-centre nearby: the tomb is quite early (LH II), like the earliest ones in the Volos area, and its chamber measures 9 m in height and 9 m in diameter, with a covered entrance 9 m long. At Goura (552), well south in the foothills of Mt. Othrys, there is a disused lime-kiln which was once an LH III tholos-tomb containing some bronze tweezers now in Kalamata.

Such then is the evidence for Thessaly, which makes me think of Norman England—a few heavily fortified power-centres with a large number of unfortified settlements. But before we proceed southward down the Spercheios valley into Phocis and Boeotia, I hasten to add that that is the only respect in
which I am making this comparison. I shall also remind myself that these divisions of Greece into Thessaly, Phocis, Boeotia etc. are anachronistic, being no more relevant to Bronze Age Greece than the terms England or Wales would have been to an Ancient Briton.

In passing from Thessaly into Phocis we can pause at Thermopylae, where the Greeks built their wall in the immortal attempt to stop the Persian advance in 480. And when we read Herodotus' account of this famous exploit, we notice that he speaks of the wall of 480 as having been built from the ruins of an ancient wall 'which the Phocians had built through fear when the Thessalians came from Thesprotia to settle in the Aeolian territory which they now possess; for believing that the Thessalians would attempt to subdue them, the Phocians took this precaution and at the same time diverted the hot springs into the entrance, in order that the place might be broken into clefts.... Now this ancient wall had been built a long time and the greater part of it had fallen through age, but they determined to rebuild it and in that place to repel the barbarians from Greece'.

Was this perhaps a Late Bronze Age wall, similar to the one we shall see at the isthmus? I think it very likely that it was, and I shall discuss its implications later.

From Thermopylae, turning south west, we arrive at the headwaters of the Cephissus, and can either follow that river's course south-eastwards down into Boeotia or continue south to the headwaters of the Pleistos and descend its steep valley until we come to Crisa (447). Here we find a major fortress of the Late Bronze Age in a very powerful position—an acropolis occupying a long, rocky spur projecting outwards from Mt. Parnassus and overhanging the northern valley of the River Pleistos in great precipices. The site of Crisa dominates the whole gulf which bears its name and the routes inland up the river valley, both the upper road via Delphi and the lower road along the valley bottom. The precipices made fortification unnecessary on the southern and eastern sides, but on the northern and western sides there are remains of extensive Cycladic circuit-walls built of massive blocks of stone, one of which is about 9 feet long and 5 feet high. The area enclosed by the fortifications is about 350 m north-south by 300 m east-west, not including the western spur, which brings the total area to some 100,000 square metres. And here we find the Thessalian pattern repeated. Crisa was older than Petra and occupied continuously from the MH period (i.e. before 1600) down to LH IIIB, and a small megaron has been found in LH I—a pattern of occupation similar to that of Iolcos in fact. Like Iolcos and Petra it seems to have thrived most mightily in LH IIIB, and it is to the 13th century that the Cycladic fortifications most probably belong. Here again therefore we see a need to fortify a stronghold in the 13th century but to no avail, for it was abandoned, like Petra and Iolcos, about 1200. Crisa moreover is not only the largest fortified site in the area but also the largest settlement, and both disappear at the end of the thirteenth century.

The area of Boeotia which we should have reached earlier by following the Cephisus valley after passing Thermopylae is more like the Argolid than Thessaly or Phocis in that it has not just one or two major power-centres in a large area but a heavy concentration of fortified strongholds and settlements. The names Orchomenos (396), Gla (402) and Thebes (416) are well known, but there are other great LH sites with only their more modern names, such as Eutresis (417), yet they are not inferior in size. But what can we make of Hope Simpson’s analysis? When is a palace not a palace but a fortress, when is a fortress not a palace but a fortified settlement, and when is a fortified settlement not a fortress or a palace, with all that those terms imply? He gives Gla alone as a fortress, Orchomenos and Thebes as palaces, and most of the other Boeotian places on Map A as ‘fortified settlements’, a category in which he lumps together microscopic sites like Chantsa (404) with such giants as Eutresis (417) and Haliartos (409), the latter perhaps second only to Orchomenos of all Boeotian sites in density of population.

Hope Simpson’s theory is basically that Orchomenos (396) was the political power-centre for the whole area of Lake Copais, and that Gla (402) was a major fortress acting as its main barracks and headquarters for a chain of smaller fortresses round the northern and eastern sides of the lake where the waters of the rivers Cephisus, Melas and the rest were channelled in order to drain the lake to the agricultural advantage of Orchomenos. It is an interesting theory. That there was a system of draining Lake Copais is clear enough: there remain signs of a clever network of drainage channels which controlled the depth of the marshy lake and no doubt gave Orchomenos some usefully fertile land. The outlets are, as he states, on the north-eastern side of the lake, and it certainly seems likely that the smaller ‘fortified settlements’ of Pyrgos (399), Aghia Marina (403), Chantsa (404), Aghios Ioannis (405) and Stroviki (400) were, together with the great ‘fortress’ of Gla, in control of the drainage system (whether jointly or severally). He can point moreover to the tradition in Pausanias and Strabo that the lake was drained by the Minyans of Orchomenos, for what these late sources are worth. As to Orchomenos itself, it was a big settlement covering an area of some 500 m east-west by 200 m north-south, say something well over 100,000 square metres. It has its great tholos-tomb, the so-called Treasury of Minyas which is so like the so-called Treasury of Atreus at Mycenae that it has been argued that both must have been built by the same architect. It has excellent pottery too, continuously from LH II to the end of LH IIIB, i.e. 1500–1200, and there are plaster walls which make Hope Simpson declare it a palace. And so it probably was, until its destruction c. 1200. But does a piece of plaster mean that Orchomenos was the only place with a ‘palace’, the only seat of a wanax in this whole area in the 13th century, or, in my terminology, the only political power-centre?

The only other Bronze Age site in Boeotia which Hope Simpson allows to

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8. Strabo IX, 415; Pausanias, 1, 9, 3; VIII, 33, 2; IX, 38, 8.
have had a palace is Thebes (416), and again he is probably right that the impressive-looking building on the part of Thebes known as the Cadmeia was a palace. The Theban palace however, unlike that of Orchomenos and the power-centres of Thessaly and Phocis which we have examined, was destroyed not at the end of LH IIIB but at the end of LH IIIA, a century earlier. Clearly then the destruction of Thebes is not attributable to the same cause or causes responsible for the wave of destructions of 1200 that irrecoverably swept away the foundations of the Greek Bronze Age civilization in mainland Greece. On Hope Simpson’s assumption that the plastered palace shows the lord of Orchomenos to have been the overlord of the whole of Boeotia in the 13th century, it should be a rebellious vassal-king of Orchomenos who destroyed the lord of Thebes about 1300 and acquired for Orchomenos the overlordship of Boeotia for the next hundred years. And interestingly enough, if this is what happened, he did not destroy the settlement at Thebes but only the palace: the settlement shows continuous habitation not only through the period of destruction of the palace c. 1300 but also through the general wave of destruction of 1200, right down in fact into the ‘sub-Mycenaean’ period of the 11th century.

So far then, so good. Hope Simpson’s hypothesis is a neat one. Thebes rules first, is destroyed as a political power-centre (though not as a settlement) about 1300, and its place as overlord of Boeotia is taken by Orchomenos. But what of all the other places on the map of Late Bronze Age Boeotia? If I look up ‘Gla’, for example, in Desborough’s *The Last Mycenaean and their Successors*, or indeed in almost any other book on Bronze Age Greece, I find that it contained a building-complex which is called a ‘palace’. Hope Simpson says it is a barracks. Who is right? Is a bit of plaster at the former enough to make Orchomenos a political power-centre and Gla a mere barracks, despite the vast size of the latter’s fortified area and the complexity of its buildings? If Orchomenos benefited from the drainage of the lake, so too did Gla, which actually controlled it. Moreover I must question the assumption that the benefits were solely agricultural. Could they not also have been defensive? Let the water back in, and Gla becomes a vast, moated castle, a far safer and stronger power-centre than Orchomenos. And if Hope Simpson is right in making Gla a mere barracks for Orchomenos, why is it that Bronze Age roads found leading from Gla lead not to Orchomenos but southwards and south-eastwards across the drained marsh—in fact, in the very opposite direction? It seems to me therefore that Gla is just as likely to have been an equal, perhaps a rival, of Orchomenos as a political power-centre in the 13th century. And if Gla and Orchomenos were rival power-centres and had built their 13th-century fortifications to protect themselves from each other, the weakening effect of continual warfare could well help to explain their inability to survive whatever force destroyed them both around 1200 along with all the fortified places

surrounding Gla and the coastal fortress of Kastri, which could have been her port.

To the south of Lake Copais the pattern of destruction is the same. Haliartos (409), a vast and heavily fortified site near the edge of the lake, and Eutresis (417), a place of similar size to the south-west of Thebes, both found their walls inadequate to defend them at the end of the 13th century. Indeed, in contrast to the by then unfortified settlement of Thebes, the great power-centre of Haliartos, continuously occupied throughout the Bronze Age but fortified possibly only in the early 13th century, was so utterly destroyed about 1200 that the site was not reoccupied until the 6th century. What then can we make of Hope Simpson's theory that Orchomenos was the only 'palace' with all that that implies—a theory based on a bit of plaster. Orchomenos may well have had a palace, but is a plastered palace the sine qua non of a power-centre with an independent king in the turbulent days of the 13th century when so many fortifications were going up everywhere? The king of Gla, for example, if he lacked a plastered palace, may perhaps have been more concerned with efficiency than beauty—a mediaevalist rather than a Sybarite. I believe that at least Gla, Haliartos and Eutresis were as likely to have been independent and rival power-centres of Orchomenos in the 13th century as dependencies. Thebes I do not include because she could not defend herself. Her fortified power-centre had been destroyed a century before by one of her rivals, not necessarily Orchomenos but possibly Gla or Haliartos or, most likely, Eutresis, which was the nearest. And that, paradoxically, was why the settlement of Thebes survived the wave of destruction that overcame all those places that were power-centres and were fortified: the settlement of Thebes survived because it could not defend itself, a fact that must surely have some bearing on the nature of the forces responsible for the destruction of all those that could, which include not only the big four, Orchomenos, Gla, Haliartos and Eutresis, but all the smaller fortified sites around Gla.

Turning now to these smaller ones, can we be sure that even they were dependencies even of Gla? After all, their smallness is only relative to the vast size of Gla itself. Compare them instead with the great place-names of the Argolid, and we see their size in very different perspective. Aghios Ioannis (405), for example, with a fortified area over 200 m by 100 m, is larger than Tiryns, which itself is only slightly smaller than Mycenae. Similarly Pyrgos (399), though half-way between Orchomenos and Gla, need not have been a dependency of either of them: it had its own large settlement on an acropolis heavily fortified with Cyclopean walls. I can easily picture a large number of independent power-centres, engaging in perpetual warfare in a highly formalized manner in which they not only weakened each other but lost the ability to act effectively and powerfully together against whatever forces overwhelmed them all about 1200. If, for example, their warfare was confined to the ruling aristocracy which played by the rules of a highly formalized war-game akin to mediaeval chivalry, their inability to hold out against a mass of
invaders, not necessarily very large numbers of invaders but only relatively large numbers who did not obey the rules, is readily explicable. And if the invaders were basically of the same stock as the mass of non-noble inhabitants of the settlements, we can readily understand why an indefensible settlement like Thebes survived the destruction of the fortified power-centres. But I shall return to this possibility after completing the survey of the power-centres in the rest of mainland Greece.
Continuing southwards we have Attica beckoning from the south-east, or we can go south-westwards and cross the isthmus into the Peloponnese. Let us take Attica first, an area which in terms of power-centres was more like Thessaly than Boeotia or the Argolid with their great concentrations of fortresses, for while there is no shortage of 13th-century settlements in Attica, there is only the one great stronghold—Athens itself (348). There are remains of Cyclopean walls on the south-western side of the Acropolis, and a secret passage leading to a reservoir on the north side, a feature which is exactly paralleled at Mycenae and Tiryns. Burials took place on the northern and western slopes of the Acropolis in both chamber-tombs and cist-graves, but significantly the pottery from the less defensible side, which was also more vulnerable to attackers by land from the north and west than from sea-borne attack, is almost entirely from LH IIIA and B, i.e. the 14th and 13th centuries. At the transition to LH IIIC (c. 1200), when the power-centres further north are being destroyed or abandoned, we find the fountain being constructed, the secret passage built, the defences of the Acropolis strengthened, and the houses on the northern slopes abandoned. Settlement now shifts to the fortified area of the Acropolis itself in LH IIIC, i.e. the early 12th century, and here for the first time we have evidence of continuity of habitation in a fortified power-centre until proto-Geometric times. Unlike all the great fortresses further north, and the little fortress nearby at Aghios Christos (369), Athens actually survived the wave of destruction that passed over mainland Greece c. 1200. Moreover, we know that the danger cannot have lasted very long because the fountain did not long remain in use. It soon fell into disrepair and became full of rubble mixed with bits of LH IIIC pottery, but evidently not before it had served its purpose and played its part in keeping the defenders of the Acropolis safe from whatever forces destroyed the other, greater LH III fortresses further north and further south. And we find that legend supports archaeology in the tradition that Athens became a refuge for dispossessed Achaeans from other, less fortunate power-centres, particularly the Pylians who were supposed to have fled to Athens and from there to have led expeditions to make new settlements across the Aegean. But I shall leave legend for now, and be content with the archaeological evidence that Athens was one of the few major power-centres to have survived—perhaps the only one.

One possible explanation for Athens' ability to keep her head while all around her were losing theirs is that the main thrust of the forces of destruction was directed into the Peloponnese, where we find evidence of an attempt to defend the one really defensible position by the construction of a 13th-century Cyclopean wall (63) at the isthmus of Corinth. Some 2 km of this wall remain, running westwards from the Saronic Gulf. Its late 13th-century date is ascertained from the LH IIIB pottery in the wall-filling, and its purpose—to hold back an attack from the north—is evidenced by the projecting towers on the north side and the fact that the builders took advantage of the terrain to make the ascent from the north as steep and difficult as possible. Hope Simpson suggested that the wall was designed to defend only a small group of settlements
lying to the south of the plain of Corinth (nos. 64, 62, 56, 61, 57), but Bronner’s
more recent investigations show that it must be accepted as a north-facing wall
that ran right across the isthmus. 10 At any rate, whatever it was designed to
defend, whether the whole Peloponnese or a small group of settlements or both,
its failed to withstand the wave of destruction which came from the north c. 1200.
All the small communities mentioned by Hope Simpson are devoid of pottery
later than LH IIIB, except Old Corinth itself (56), which has some IIIC. They
were apparently wiped out by whatever forces destroyed the wall, and the road
was then open to the Argolid with no fortified settlement to oppose the
destroyers until they reached Mycenae itself. En route a prosperous but not very
large settlement at Zygouries (48) came to an abrupt end to judge from the large
quantities of LH IIIB pottery found there and the total absence of anything
later. Then we come to Mycenae itself (1). Archaeology shows that this was not
the first time it had been attacked. Earlier in the 13th century the outer
settlement had been destroyed by some enemy or other, but the citadel with its
great walls held firm. After that the walls had been strengthened and a granary
constructed—a sure indication that more trouble was expected. But it was of no
avail against the forces of destruction of c. 1200. The great walls are over-
whelmed, the citadel penetrated, and the whole place engulfed by a fire that
destroys the palace. Only one small area of the acropolis manages to hold out
and struggles to maintain itself into LH IIIC, but it too succumbs c. 1150 or
slightly later, when the granary too is burnt. Such then was the end of another
Late Bronze Age Greek power-centre—the most famous because of the Iliad
and Schliemann’s discoveries of the wealth of its shaft-graves of the 16th
century, but by no means the largest power-centre either in Greece as a whole or
even in the Argolid.

After the final destruction in the 12th century Mycenae is occupied only on a
very reduced scale: graves appear on previously sacred areas or housing sites,
and the whole place sinks into obscurity. Tiryns (8), so near and yet undeniably
a place with both fortifications and a palace, the seat of a king, falls at the same
time as the destruction of the greater part of Mycenae c. 1200, though
significantly it does not appear to have been extinguished by this catastrophe as
was formerly believed: more recent excavation has unearthed an LH IIIC
settlement at Tiryns which evidently continued to use the two underground
passages which had been constructed by earlier defenders to reach a water-
supply outside the fortifications. Now Tiryns is slightly smaller than Mycenae
and it was not therefore Tiryns that I had in mind when I stated above that
Mycenae was by no means the greatest power-centre even in the Argolid, despite
the fact that it has given its name to the whole Bronze Age Greek civilization.
The place I was thinking of was one that is even closer to Mycenae than Tiryns.

10. O. Bronner, ‘The Cyclopean wall at the Isthmus of Corinth and its bearing on Late
Bronze Age Chronology’, Hesperia 35, 1966, 346–62; also his Addendum to the above, Hesperia
but is never seen in its true perspective because its importance, so obvious to the
unprejudiced eye, has been eclipsed by the Homeric tradition of the greatness of
Mycenae. The modern name of this place is appropriately Palaiokastro (7),
and though it is only 10 km to the south-east of Mycenae—only half as far away
as Tiryns—its great Cyclopean walls enclose an area which is not only far larger
than Tiryns and Mycenae but larger than any fortified site of the Late Bronze
Age with the exceptions only of Gla in Boeotia and Petra in Thessaly. Its ancient
name was Midea, and it is very close to the great warrior-graves of Dendra
which produced the famous bronze panoply complete with boar's-tusk helmet
of about 1400. Clearly these tombs will have belonged to the great power-centre
of Palaiokastro, which occupied the summit of a tall conical hill about 300 m in
diameter and its lower, western slopes. The surrounding walls, datable to the
13th century by the LH IIIB pottery found inside them, exemplify the shift of
emphasis from the pyramid-mentality of building great tombs for the dead to
the construction of great fortifications for the protection of the living that is
visible everywhere in Late Bronze Age Greece in the later 14th and early 13th
centuries. But great as they were, the walls of Palaiokastro failed her just as the
walls of Tiryns and Mycenae failed those smaller neighbours at the end of the 13th
century, and though some low-level occupation continued there for perhaps 75
years after the destruction of the fortifications c. 1200, even this petered out in
the late 12th century and the place was next occupied only in classical times.11

Next we must look at Argos (12), the place that gives its name to the whole
region of the so-called Argolid and whose inhabitants, the Argives, are
synonymous with 'Achaeans' and 'Danaans', the other generic words for the
Greeks as distinct from the Trojans in the Homeric epic. But was Argos a
power-centre in the late 13th century, the only period when Troy could have
been destroyed by Bronze Age Greeks? Unfortunately the archaeological
record is unclear. Hope Simpson put Argos in his list of fortresses and quoted
Volgraf's claim to have found Cyclopean walls in the 1920s. Desborough on
the other hand does not seem convinced by Volgraf's evidence, and it must
remain doubtful that Argos was a major fortified stronghold in LH IIIB. No
'palace' is recorded, and the most we can say with safety about Argos at this
time is that it was the site of a Late Bronze Age Greek settlement which was
possibly, though not convincingly, fortified in two areas. What does seem
certain is that Argos, like unfortified Thebes in Boeotia, survived the wave of
destruction that overwhelmed the great fortified power-centres nearby—Palai-
okastro, Tiryns and Mycenae. The evidence of chamber-tombs at Argos shows
continuous occupation throughout LH III, i.e. from c. 1400 to beyond 1100,

11. For the LH IIIIC settlement at Tiryns see AR, 1963–4, 8; 1964, 5, 11; A. M. Snodgrass,
The Dark Age of Greece, Edinburgh, 1971, 29, 361. For Dendra see A. Persson, New Tombs at
Dendra near Midea, Lund, 1945, 3–16, fig. 1 (reconstruction of acropolis); E. Vanderpool, 'News
Letter from Greece', AJA 67, 1963, 280, fig. 8 pl. 63 (the panoply in situ as found);
J. Chadwick, The Mycenaean World, Cambridge, 1976, 161, fig. 64 (the panoply cleaned and
restored, as now set up in the Nafplion Museum).
and though there appears to have been a change in the settlement area during this period, it was not in 1200 but at the transition from LH IIIC to sub-Mycenaean and proto-Geometric, at least a century later. One day there may well be found evidence of a palace and so forth, but on the basis of present evidence it appears that if Argos had been a major power-centre in Late Bronze Age Greece, it had ceased to be so by the late 13th century, and perhaps, as in the case of Thebes, its very defencelessness spared it from the fate which overtook its neighbours whose walls enabled them to offer resistance to the destroyers of c. 1200.

The wave of destruction that swept over the fortified power-centres of the Argolid left only a small remnant clinging onto a tiny part of the Mycenaean acropolis for another fifty years or so and perhaps a larger number at a relatively out-of-the-way fortress to the south-east of Nauplion (9) at Asine (19), whose vast Cyclopean walls do seem to have protected it just as the walls of the relatively out-of-the-way Athens had protected her acropolis. But unlike Athens, Asine did not continue in occupation into Geometric times but petered out during LH IIIC. Occupation seems to have persisted, weakened, until about 1100, when its inhabitants perhaps went east to Asia Minor along with the many other migrants who crossed the Aegean to find new homes in the east in the Dark Ages. Perhaps too Asine's relatively remote position meant that she was not exposed to the full weight of the destructive forces of c. 1200—the suggestion I made to account for Athens' survival. Certainly the invaders, if such there were, had many other places to go to. From the apparently unfortified Nauplion it would be tempting to ignore the determined defenders of Asine and sweep upwards towards Epidaurus. To the south of Epidaurus the small fort of Kastro (Kandia: 26), a tiny acropolis with fine Cyclopean walls and with settlements spreading over its steep southern terraces, seems to have fallen in LH IIIB and not to have been reoccupied for two and a half centuries at least. To the north stood another but larger fortified settlement at Vassa (25), commanding both the road leading inland from New Epidaurus to the Plain of Dimaina and the coastal route northwards. But here again LH IIIB sherds are the latest, and it seems as though Vassa too was destroyed about 1200.

So much for the Argolid. To the south and over the mountains lies the fertile Eurotas valley, the plain of Laconia where Dorian Sparta ruled supreme in classical times. Or we can go south-west via modern Megalopolis to the fertile plain of Messenia which Sparta was to conquer in the seventh century. Both areas were heavily populated with Achaeans settlements, and both suffered catastrophe about 1200.

Taking the Spartan plain first, we have evidence of a huge Late Bronze Age Greek settlement from Beattie's excavations of the Menelaion (95) in the late 1950s. We have another not far away at Palaiopyrgi (98) only 5 km south of Sparta, and although (in spite of its modern name) there seems to be no evidence

12. A. M. Snodgrass, op. cit. (n. 11), 363 (resettlement re-sited perhaps about 1100).
of fortification, the vast size of the settlement area of some 200,000 square metres, combined with its proximity to the famous Vapheio tholos-tomb of about 1450, suggests that we have here a power-centre. If Palaiopyrgi lacked walls, perhaps it relied solely on its army in the 13th century just as unwalled Sparta was to do in classical times. Or perhaps there is a fortified power-centre waiting to be discovered in this still ill-explored part of Greece. All we can be sure of is that the great settlements at both Palaiopyrgi and Menelaion were destroyed at the end of the 13th century, the latter so completely that only one
LH IIIB house remained at all well preserved after the place had been engulfed by fire.\textsuperscript{13}

As for the rest of Laconia there are but few fortified sites. There is an LH settlement, possibly walled, at Aghios Vasilios (99), about 2 km south of Palaiopyrgi, and there is a seemingly important acropolis with Cyclopean walls, possibly of LH III date, at Geraki (105), which lies to the east of Aghios Vasilios. There is also a considerable settlement with traces of circuit-walls at Panayiotis (118), about 5 km from the sea, and there is a further one almost on the sea at Aghios Stephanos (120), some 2 km south of Panayiotis. All these places show signs of continuous occupation since the EH period, but all end with the end of LH IIIB with the exception of Aghios Stephanos, the nearest to the sea, where some LH IIIC pottery has been found. Perhaps its very remoteness saved Aghios Stephanos for a while, but it too peters out in the 12th century and is not reoccupied thereafter until classical times. The only other possible LH III fortification known to me in that area is evidenced by some apparently Cyclopean masonry at the very remote site of Tigani (131) well down the west coast of the Mani, but there is nothing from which to date it. In conclusion then we can say that the great LH III settlements so far discovered in Laconia appear to have succumbed to the destroyers of c. 1200 as did all the forts with the exception of the remote Aghios Stephanos. And we can note two possibly significant points: (a) that in Laconia the lack of fortifications was no guarantee of safety as it seems to have been for Thebes and Argos; and (b) the one fortress in Laconia which survives the general catastrophe of c. 1200 is near the sea, as were Athens in Attica and Asine in the Argolid.

From Laconia we must now cross the Taygetus mountains into the great, fertile region of Messenia, 'good to plough and good to plant', the south-western part of the Peloponnese that the Spartans were to subjugate some five centuries later. It is often surmised that this area was attacked not by land but by sea, but we can postpone consideration of this theory until we have looked at the possibilities of invasion by land. Imagining then an invasion across the isthmus into the Peloponnese, we can see a bifurcation of the ways at modern Tripolis. Supposing now that some invaders went south into the Eurotas valley and Laconia, let us follow others who may have turned south-westwards via Megalopolis into the heavily populated areas of the Cyparissia and Pamisos valleys, and of course Pylos itself.

The Pamisos valley, approached as I have suggested, has no obstacle to the invader, and since most of its Bronze Age Greek settlements have no pottery later than LH IIIB, we can presume that they were abandoned, never to be reoccupied, c. 1200. And the same is true of those settlements that lay down the eastern coast of the westernmost prong of the Peloponnese that was so easily entered from the Pamisos valley—places like Nichoria (182), Vigitza (185) and even the fortified Aghios Elias (189), all of which disappear from the

\textsuperscript{13} Desborough, op. cit. (n. 9), 88.
archaeological record about 1200. But the Cyparissia valley is a very different proposition from the unfortified Pamisos. The invader from inland would come first upon Malthi (242), a large, fortified acropolis dominating the tributary Soulima valley. The size of its lower town and its two tholos-tombs shows Malthi to have been a place of some consequence. Indeed, it seems to have been inhabited from the earliest Bronze Age times, to have flourished in LH I–IIIB (i.e. c. 1600–1200), but then to have stopped dead to all significant intents and purposes, for although there are a few sherds to suggest slight occupation in LH IIIC, there is very little later than c. 1200, the date of the general collapse. From Malthi the way is open down the Cyparissia valley as far as the two great fortified settlements of Elleniko (or Mouriatadha: 236) and Peristeria (235). Peristeria is one of a range of heights on the southern ridge of the valley, whose precipitous sides make the place impregnable from the north. There are two tholos-tombs as well as buildings of c. 1600 and others dating from 1400–1200, and, like Malthi, Peristeria was obviously a place of importance on the valley route to the interior. The only easy approach is from the southern side, where a neck of higher ground leads to the village of Moira, and this fact may support those who believe that Peristeria was a northern bastion of Pylos; but it is far from proof. As to the other great fortress in this area—known as Elleniko or Mouriatadha, only 3 km from Peristeria—it may have been even more important a settlement. Its vast circuit-walls resemble those of Gla in Boeotia, and it has a ‘megaron’ type of building (complete with painted, plaster walls) that suggests the home of a great lord.14 Again it has been supposed that Elleniko, like Peristeria, was a dependency of Pylos, but we cannot take it for granted any more than we can accept the theory that Gla was a dependency of Orchomenos in Boeotia.

As to Pylos itself (197), which probably was the ancient name of the great palace-complex excavated by Blegen at Ano Englianos since there is a modern Pilos not far away, we have there another site that was in constant occupation from before 1600 to the end of the 13th century, when its destruction was accompanied by the fire that baked the Linear B tablets about 1200. Curiously it appears that the place was fortified as early as LH I, the 16th century, but the extent of erosion prevents our knowing for sure if Ano Englianos was also fortified in the 13th century. Hope Simpson finds it ‘illogical’ to suppose that a settlement fortified in LH I or II would not have been fortified in the dangerous times of LH IIIB, especially in view of the fortifications of Elleniko and Peristeria to the north. And he may be right. On the other hand it appears that there may have been unfortified power-centres in Laconia, and it could be argued that Pylos was the administrative centre of a large area whose barracks were at Elleniko and Peristeria—an arrangement similar to that which he hypothesized for Orchomenos and Gla in Boeotia. But despite the finds of

tablets at Pylos I am very dubious that Elleniko and Peristeria were nothing more than fortified dependencies of the king of Pylos, whether Pylos itself was fortified or not. Moreover I am not convinced that Pylos was attacked and destroyed from the sea.

Palmer and Chadwick both argue that some of the Linear B tablets from Pylos reveal an expectation of a great attack by sea, but I agree with Page in being extremely sceptical of this theory. After all, what is there but a list of a few oarsmen and details of some companies of troops stationed in agruably coastal places? These tablets in themselves neither prove that the attack which destroyed Pylos came from the sea nor that any special attack was expected. The numbers of coastguards, if such they were, are relatively small. The aggregate of all ten commands listed by Chadwick is less than four times the number of carpenters recorded in connexion with one town alone (tablet 51, An20): it need be no more than a routine watch against pirates. As to the much-quoted tablet no. 53 (An12), which lists some oarsmen going to Pleuron (wherever that may have been), there is nothing to indicate a military connexion. What seems to me extraordinary is that five different places have to unite to provide 30 men, the complement of one small ship. If the provision of so few coastguards and rowers from so many places is a preparation against a great sea-borne invasion, it is bureaucracy gone mad. Moreover there are at least two powerful indications that the wave of destruction which engulfed nearly all the power-centres of Bronze Age Greece at the end of the 13th century had nothing to do with the sea. The first is that several of the sites which do survive in LH IIIC—Athens (348) and Perati (367) in Attica, Asine (19) in the Argolid, Aghios Stephanos (120) in the Mani—are on or very near the coast. The second, and more important indication as far as Pylos is concerned, is the evidence of refugee movements from mainland Greece to Íthaca, Cephalonia and other Ionian islands (325, 328, 332, 335, 338, 339, 340)—a fact which surely argues for the relative safety of the seas for the Achaeans fleeing from a catastrophe which must therefore have come by land. And finally, to return to the question of the relationship of Pylos to the northern fortresses, we must remember that there was at least one fortress much nearer than Elleniko and Peristeria. This nearer fortress is Kanalos (203), a place only 3 km from Ano Englianos, with tholos-tombs and signs of a massive circuit-wall. Perhaps if Pylos was unfortified in the 13th century, it is to Kanalos that the king fled for refuge when his palace was attacked; but if so, it did him no good since this site too was abandoned about 1200 and not reoccupied until classical times. Or it may be that Kanalos was independent, for sheer proximity need not imply dependence in Bronze Age Messenia any more than the adjacent fortified houses of the Maniot villages of the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries AD mean even that each village was united against its

neighbours, let alone that all the similar villages were combining to defend themselves against some external peril: on the contrary, each separate village was divided against itself by familial blood feuds which made neighbouring houses the bitterest enemies and necessitated their fortification with the great towers that can still be seen today. 16

To complete this survey of mainland Greece in the Late Bronze Age we are left with two main areas: (a) North-West Greece (north of the Corinthian Gulf), including Aetolia, Acarnania, Ambracia, Thesprotia and Epirus; and (b) the north-western Peloponnese, i.e. the areas known later as Elis, Achaea and Arcadia. Both these areas have mountainous, inhospitable interiors, of which I suggest that the former produced the destroyers and the latter received a large number of those refugees who did not escape by sea.

Beginning with North-West Greece, I can say little about Bronze Age civilization there because little has been found: it was no less remote and backward an area in the Bronze Age than in classical times. And if the fact that little has been found means that little was there, that is what I should expect if the traditional view is right and the destroyers came from there. I should also expect what little has been found to have been destroyed about 1200, and that in fact is the fate of the biggest and most strongly fortified settlement in those regions. This is Xylocastro (Mesopotamos: 318), an acropolis on a conical hill surrounded by three lines of ancient walls, of which the outer is Cyclopean, datable by the 14th- and 13th-century sherds found on the hill and by the later burial mounds placed against it. Xylocastro shared the fate of Crisa, and if we compare their catastrophe at the end of LH IIIB with the flourishing of the settlements on the offshore, ‘Ionian’ islands which produce the wealth of LH IIIC material that bears witness to an influx of refugees from the mainland, we see more clearly than ever the unlikelihood that the wave of destruction which overwhelmed the mainland power-centres at the end of LH IIIB came by sea rather than by land.

Turning to the north-western Peloponnese we find relatively few ‘Mycenaean’ sites in the 13th century but a remarkable increase in numbers in the 12th, i.e. after the catastrophe of c. 1200 which swept away the power-centres of the rest of the Peloponnese. Those of the 13th century were mainly on the flat, coastal area, as was Xylocastro in North-West Greece. In Elis there was a little group of 13th-century settlements in the lower Alpheios valley just as there was in the Cyparissia valley to the south. Of these only one, Klidhi (257), was definitely fortified. It has great Cyclopean walls overlooking the coastal routes from its high hill, and it was obviously a place of importance. Some fine ‘Mycenaean’ pottery has been found from a burial mound adjoining the site, but since there are no remains after LH IIIB until classical times, we can label Klidhi as yet another Bronze Age Greek power-centre which suffered the almost universal

catastrophe of c. 1200. One other site further up the coast at Pontikastro (258) may have been fortified too, but if so, its walls did not prevent its sharing the same fate as Klidhi and most of the other sites in the area, though reoccupation at Pontikastro was not so long delayed as at Klidhi, and people seem to have been living there again in the late 11th century.

Looking next at coastal Achaea, we have one outstanding fortified site at Kalograia (282), some 20 miles south-west of modern Patras and more or less on the borders of classical Achaea and Elis. Its immense walls, remarkably well preserved for a length of 200 m on the north-western side, are in some places as much as 10 m high and 5 m thick, with at least one L-shaped tower jutting out 7½ m from the curtain wall—an advanced technique in the history of fortification. The site had a long history of occupation dating from the EH period, when it was apparently destroyed by fire. But it was reoccupied in MH well before 1600, and it was clearly a place of great importance in LH IIIA and B (1400–1200), a period from which there is an abundance of fine pottery. Almost certainly this is the place referred to as Teichos Dymaion by Polybius and as Dyme by Pausanias, whose stories about it are remarkable for their pornographic nature. In LH IIIB it was clearly a great power-centre, rivalling in size those of Boeotia and the Argolid whose fate it shared about 1200, although Hope Simpson turns out to have been wrong in saying that there was no reoccupation until Geometric times. More recent evidence shows that the site was soon reoccupied and continued to be held strongly into the 12th century, until it was finally deserted c. 1125. It is interesting to note that the reoccupation dates of the 12th century are of a type popular in Cyprus after the migration to that island of refugees from mainland Greece in the general catastrophe of 1200. It appears that the Achaeans at Kalograia abandoned their fortress at that time, but they soon returned from their places of refuge (either in the Ionian islands, where similar pottery has been found, or from the mountains of the interior), and managed to keep the place going for another 75 years or so until a second catastrophe overwhelmed them and resulted in the burning of their resettlement. As to the northern coastal strip of the Peloponnese between Kalograia and classical Sicyon, here too there are relatively few Late Bronze Age sites, and it will not therefore be surprising if the bulk of the destroyers were similarly attracted to the more extensive and fertile lebensraum and plunder of Corinthia, the Argolid, Laconia and Messenia. On the other hand it will not be surprising if the relative unattractiveness of the north-western Peloponnese made it a place of refuge for displaced persons from the more attractive areas, and that is exactly what we find in the archaeological record, incomplete though it is.

The trouble with this area is that it is no more hospitable to archaeologists than it was to the majority of Bronze Age Greeks before necessity forced them

17. Polybius IV, 59; Pausanias VII, 17 ff.
there, and the mountainous mass of the north-western Peloponnese is but poorly explored. All the same, what evidence there is indicates the disappearance of settlements such as Orchomenos (85) in the south-eastern part of Arcadia, which would have been more readily accessible to a wave of northern invaders sweeping down into the southern and south-western Peloponnese from the isthmus c. 1200, whereas the more remote areas of the North-West Peloponnese not only continued to be occupied by Bronze Age Greeks but became places of refuge for those driven out of the lowlands. The evidence so far is mainly from tombs rather than settlements as such, but the majority of the tombs of North-West Peloponnese are LH IIIC and 'typically Mycenaean inhumations in small chamber-tombs'.

At Prostovitsa (296), for example, LH tombs have been found containing exclusively post-catastrophe goods of LH IIIC 1–2, i.e. of the 12th and early 11th centuries. Then inland of modern Patras there are several more sites with solely or mainly 12th-century pottery: Agrapidhia (288), LH III C1–2; Koukoura (289), behind the Achaia-Klauss wine-factory (LH IIIB–C2); Kallithea (291), which produced the famous pair of bronze greaves (LH IIIB–C2); Chalandritsa (293), also LH IIIB–C2; Aghios Athanasios (298), which even has a tholos-tomb of LH IIIB–C; Gourzoumisa (299) of similar date and therefore straddling the time of the general destruction; Lomboka (300), an extremely remote site with LH IIIC chamber-tombs; Vromonera (302), also with chamber-tombs of LH IIIC; and many others, not all of which are marked on the 12th-century map. But sufficient have been noted to illustrate the continuing and increasing Achaean penetration of this remote area of North-Western Peloponnese where Late Bronze Age notables continued to bury their dead in the traditional way, even if their greatness was gone and they were forced to live in caves like Bonnie Prince Charlie's unpertinent adherents among the Lairds of Scotland.

At this point we can usefully combine the evidence of archaeology with that of linguistics, which shows that very similar dialects were spoken in Arcadia and in Cyprus in classical times. They were so similar in fact that they are labelled together as 'Arcado-Cypriote', and it is no fortuitous coincidence that Arcadia and Cyprus were the two main areas of refuge for the displaced Achaean
mainland Greece after the catastrophe which overthrew their power-centres c. 1200. Archaeology reveals a considerable influx of Late Bronze Age Greeks into Cyprus, as into Arcadia, about this time. There had been very close contacts between LH Greece and Cyprus throughout the previous two centuries at least, expressed most clearly by Cyprus' imports of 'Mycenaean' pottery, but about the beginning of the 12th century we find Enkomi being fortified with massive walls of the type that had been built in mainland Greece in the late 14th and the 13th centuries, and although Cyprus itself was overrun by the so-called 'Land and Sea' peoples who destroyed the Hittite empire in Anatolia and swept over the whole of the Levant until they were stopped by Ramses III of Egypt sometime in the first quarter of the 12th century, the immigration of Achaean refugees from mainland Greece in the years following 1200 obviously made a sufficiently deep impression on Cypriote culture for the dialect to survive the devastation of the 'Land and Sea' peoples and to continue right down into classical times. Even more amazingly, not only the dialect but a linear, syllabic form of writing Greek survived there too. Linear B disappears forever from mainland Greece when the destruction of the great palace-bureaucracies c. 1200 removed the need for bookkeeping; but the cultural influence of the Achaean refugees on Cyprus was evidently so great that we find a hybrid form of Linear B, an extraordinarily clumsy method of writing Greek, existing in Cyprus even in classical times alongside the Phoenician alphabetic script, the sole script in which the art of writing reappears everywhere else in the Greek world from the late eighth century after five centuries of illiteracy—a fact which is even more remarkable in view of the closer proximity of Cyprus to Phoenicia.

The pattern that emerges from our survey of the fortified strongholds of the late 13th century (or 'power-centres' as I have usually called them) is one of almost universal destruction c. 1200. We have seen movements of refugees both by land and sea. Those who sought refuge by land went either to the remote areas of the North-West Peloponnese or else to those few power-centres that survived, principally Athens. Those who fled by sea went both westwards and eastwards—westwards to the Ionian islands and southern Italy, 20 eastwards to various Aegean islands but especially to the sanctuary of Cyprus, 21 and even to Tarsus on the Turkish coast north of Cyprus. 22 We have also seen the political geography of Late Bronze Age Greece in better perspective because we ignored the Iliad and started not from Mycenae but from north to south. In our journey we saw power-centres elsewhere that were so incomparably larger than Mycenae that it becomes hard to believe in a Mycenaean empire even in the Argolid, let alone throughout Greece. Moreover it seems to me highly doubtful that any one of the power-centres of Boeotia was suzerain of all the others, or that in any area the majority of the power-centres need have been dependencies.

20. For the evidence that the Gulf of Taranto was a major place of refuge, see Lord William Taylour, Mycenaean Pottery in Italy and Adjacent Areas, 1958; Desborough, op. cit. (n. 9), 215–16.
rather than independent rivals. The great fortifications of the 13th century need not have been a response to an external threat to the Bronze Age Greek civilization but a reflection of endless, internecine conflicts between rival power-centres which so weakened them that they were easy prey to whatever forces were responsible for their collapse like a row of ninespins c. 1200.

In propounding this theory I am in the good company of Thucydides, who contrasted the ‘feebleness of antiquity’ with the strength of the great powers of his own day.\(^\text{23}\) He emphasized the apparent lack of unity in early Hellas, and the lack of a common name. He cites the Trojan War as the one exception to the rule of disunity and feebleness—an exception that had to be allowed because the Homeric \textit{Iliad} was gospel evidence to the fifth-century Greeks. But Thucydides lacked the benefits of our archaeology and the finds of Linear B tablets which prove how very little knowledge of its ostensible period is preserved in the Homeric epic, and which therefore allow us to doubt the value of Homer as evidence for a Panachaeus expedition. Comparative studies of oral epic have shown how a relatively small Greek participation in a great event could have been inflated out of all recognition into a full-blown Panachaeus war of ten years against Troy under the leadership of the lord of Mycenae.\(^\text{24}\) I therefore feel justified in refusing to allow the Homeric \textit{Iliad} to admit even Thucydides’ one exception to the general disunity of Late Bronze Age Greece.

Now I suggested earlier that the reason for the inability of the 13th-century power-centres to withstand the destructive forces of c. 1200 was not only that they had weakened each other by perpetual wars and raids but that their warfare was probably as formalized as their bureaucracies, and therefore incapable of resistance to forces who were players rather than gentlemen. I am thinking in terms of what happened on St. Crispin’s Day, 1415 AD, at the little village of Agincourt in northern France. The flower of French chivalry, too gentlemanly or too stupid to have learnt the lessons of Crécy and Poitiers, came riding down upon King Henry’s much smaller forces in confident expectation of victory. But Perfidious Albion, realising that he could never win by playing according to the rules, dismounted his knights and used his longbowmen to shoot down the knights of France and their horses before they could thrust even a single lance into an English hide. The result was an overwhelming English victory which cost the lives of only 13 dismounted knights and 100 infantry. The French, in contrast, lost 5000 knights of noble birth killed, plus a further 1000 noblemen taken prisoner. Now I am not saying that the Achaeans Greeks fought like the French at Agincourt while their destroyers of c. 1200 fought like the English. I am simply giving an example of the inability of a military caste to learn new lessons, and if we need evidence that the Late Bronze Age Greeks were stultified in the formality of their warfare, we may have one example in their use of the war-chariot, a subject which I have discussed elsewhere.\(^\text{25}\)

\(^{23}\) Thuc. I, 3.
\(^{24}\) M. I. Finley, ‘The Trojan War’, \textit{JHS} 84, 1964, 2 ff. (and bibliographical references).
\(^{25}\) Greenhalgh, \textit{op. cit.} (n. 3), 7-62.
That Bronze Age Greeks used the war-chariot is undeniable. Indeed, it was one of the few basic facts known about their ostensible period by the Homeric bards, who make the war-chariot the sine qua non of every nobleman just as they make bronze the universal material of arms and armour, although the Homeric spear-type is not the universal single lance of the Bronze Age nobleman throughout the Late Bronze Age from 1600 to the collapse of c.1200 but the pair of javelins, which were the weapons of the Geometric Age warrior. The Linear B tablets so far found at Pylos, while not showing chariot-bodies as those at Cnossos do, reveal in series ‘Sa’ that the palace had in store at least two hundred pairs of wheels. Representational evidence from mainland Greece also shows a profusion of war-chariots from the 16th century down to the 12th. For an early example (besides the shaft-grave stelae of Mycenae) we have the engraved gem from Vaphio in Laconia, which shows a chariot thundering into battle with a lancer preparing to thrust out with his long spear as his driver closes with the enemy. And we have similar representational evidence of chariot-borne lancers from the very end of the 13th century, close to the date of the general collapse. Now this is not of course the Homeric method, which I believe to have been the result of heroizing on the part of the Dark Age bards who knew that the war-chariot had been a feature of Bronze Age warfare but had no idea how it had been used: they therefore transferred to the contemporary racing-chariot the role of the mounted horse of their own day. That the Achaean noblemen fought as lancers from massed chariots at speed and did not use them for the absurd taxi-service depicted in Homer is clear enough from the Hittite texts, particularly the so-called Tawagalawas letter of the late 14th or the early 13th century and the First Tablet of the Crimes of Marduwatts, which belongs to the reign of Arnuwandas IV (1220–1190). The former reveals that the brother and another relation of an Achaean king visited the Hittite capital as young men to be schooled in the art of chariotry by the greatest masters of chariot-warfare in the Near East. The latter complains of an Achaean buccaneer Attarsijas who fought against the Hittites with a force of 100 chariots and 1000 infantry. Now the Hittite method of chariot-warfare—the massed charge of chariot-borne lancers—is clearly attested by the Egyptian reliefs depicting the Battle of Kadesh (Quadesh) in 1288, and whatever Anderson may say to try to prove the practicality in any age of the absurd role of the war-chariot as depicted in Homer, I cannot imagine the chariot-borne warriors of the Achaean Attarsijas stopping their chariots, jumping out, and standing with javelins...
poised while the Hittite chariots thundered down on them at full speed (especially as they lacked the benefit of the English bowmen of Agincourt). I know it is argued that the terrain of the Greek mainland is not suitable for massed chariot-attacks, but even without the evidence of the Vapheio gem for a chariot-borne lancer charging the enemy at full speed, I can point to the special clearance of the ground at Phalerum by the Pisistratids so that their allies, the Thessalian cavalry, would be able to operate to the best advantage against the Spartan expeditionary force under Archimolus in 510. Nor is the formalization of warfare limited to its equestrian aspects. Even hoplite warfare had rules of the game according to the description which Herodotus makes Mardonius give to King Xerxes: 'the Greeks seek out their fairest and smoothest piece of ground and go down to it and fight'. All the same, formalization is more likely to be connected with chivalry, and I suggest that the formality of Late Bronze Age Greek warfare is a very probable factor in the collapse of 1200. Formalized warfare is all very well as long as both sides play by the rules, but let a new enemy appear who cares more for victory than honour and the result can be another Agincourt.

And now for the ultimate question: who were these ungentlemanly enemies who caused the great power-centres of 13th-century Greece to collapse like ninepins in the catastrophe of c. 1200? When I said at the beginning that I thought that we could be sure who was not responsible, I was referring to the most fashionable candidate of recent years, the so-called 'Land and Sea Peoples' who overwhelmed the Hittite Empire and nearly all the Near Eastern powers, including Cyprus, until they were finally stopped by Ramses III when they reached Egypt. The self-congratulatory texts of this Pharaoh refer to three great waves of invaders from the north in years 5, 8 and 11 of his reign, and Bronze Age Greeks have been thought to have joined these movements after being themselves displaced by them. As to their joining them, the attempt to identify the 'Denyen' or 'Danuna' of the Medinet-Habu inscriptions relating to the invasion of year 8 with 'Danaans', one of the three Homeric words for 'Greeks', is not only linguistically difficult but geographically impossible, since

32. Hdt. V, 63.
34. Egyptologists disagree about the date of the accession of Ramses III, which varies between 1205 and 1180. All we can say with certainty therefore is that the three invasions which he repelled reached Egypt within a seven-year period during the first thirty years of the 12th century. If they were earlier rather than later in that period, it means that they could have overrun Cyprus before the influx of Achaean refugees from mainland Greece, and the remarkably long-lasting cultural impact of that Greek immigration would therefore be more readily understandable than if the 'Land and Sea Peoples' had swept over the island after the bulk of the Greek refugees had arrived, though there may of course have been an intermittent flow of Achaeans to Cyprus throughout the greater part of the 12th century. If on the other hand a later date for Ramses is correct, it makes the cultural impact of the Achaean refugees on Cyprus more remarkable since it would have to survive the 'Land and Sea Peoples' some twenty or thirty years after the main immigration of displaced Greeks following the mainland catastrophe of c. 1200: it would also make the 'Land and Sea Peoples' even more unlikely candidates for the cause of that catastrophe.

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another inscription indicates that the Denyen/Danuna were a dynastic kingdom in Syria. Similarly doomed is the attempt to identify as ‘Achaeans’ the Aqiyyawasa, who appear among the list of ‘northerners coming from all lands and from all countries of the sea’ as allies of the Libyan king whose attempted invasion of Egypt was stopped by the earlier Pharaoh Merneptah at a date which Egyptologists put as early as 1231 and as late as 1215. In this case the ‘identification’ is condemned on both linguistic and medical grounds, since the Aqiyyawasa are specified as being without qrnt and we have yet to find a circumcised Greek.35

So much for the attempts to find Greeks among the ‘Land and Sea Peoples’. What is more important is that the attempts to prove that Bronze Age Greeks west of Asia Minor suffered from their invasions are similarly ill-founded. In the first place, the self-congratulatory inscriptions of Ramses III fail to mention any places, Greek or otherwise, west of Asia Minor, and although this is an argument from silence, it is an unusually cogent one in a case where a Pharaoh was obviously keen to emphasize the greatness of his own victory by compiling as long a list as possible of those powers which had succumbed to the invaders whom only he had been able to stop.36 And Bronze Age Greeks in the form of the Ahhiyawa of the Hittite records were clearly in close diplomatic contact with all the kingdoms of the Near East: indeed, one Hittite tablet has the King of Ahhiyawa (most plausibly identified as Rhodes) grouped with the Kings of Egypt, Babylon and Assyria as being of equal rank with the Hittite Emperor, and though the tablet also shows that the ‘King of Ahhiyawa’ was afterwards deleted from the list, he was clearly sufficiently important for the original scribe to have thought of him in such terms in the reign of Tuthalijas IV (1250–1220).37 It is therefore significant that his name is omitted from Ramses’ list of powers destroyed by the ‘Land and Sea Peoples’, especially in view of our archaeological survey of the political geography of mainland Greece. That survey gave us two compelling arguments against a destruction by sea-borne invaders: (a) that it is coastal places like Athens which survive while the far greater power-centres of inland areas like Boeotia are utterly annihilated, and

35. The texts relevant to the attempted identifications of Greeks among the invaders are set out with bibliographical references by Page, who convincingly demolishes all the arguments (though he does not go into the problems of the disputed chronology for either Ramses III or Merneptah): op cit. (n. 15), 21–3. It should also be noted that Egyptologists disagree even about the term ‘Sea Peoples’: see A. Nîkî, ‘The Identification of the “Sea Peoples” ’ (followed by comments by R. D. Barnett, M. S. Drower and R. A. Crossland), Bronze Age Migrations in the Aegean (‘BAMA’), ed. R. A. Crossland and A. Birchall, London, 1973, 203–7.

36. Part of the description of the main invasion in year 8 of Ramses III reads thus: ‘No land could stand before their arms, from Hatti (the Hittites’), Kode (Cilicia), Carchemish, Arzawa (a powerful kingdom of south-western Asia Minor intermittently subject to the Hittites), Alasiya (Cyprus) onwards’. See A. Gardiner, Egypt of the Pharaohs, Oxford, 1961, 284; J. A. Wilson, Ancient Near Eastern Texts relating to the Old Testament, ed. J. B. Pritchard, Princeton, 1955, 262. For the location of Arzawa, see Page, op. cit. (n. 15), 8–10. For the equation of Alasiya and Cyprus, see O. R. Gurney, op. cit. (n. 29), 52 and fig. 1 (map).

(b) that the refugees took to the sea and made for the evident safety of islands and coastal sites both in the west and the east—a curious choice if the seas were alive with the forces of destruction.

Rejecting therefore the ‘Land and Sea Peoples’ or any other sea-borne destroyers as the forces responsible for the general catastrophe at the end of LH IIIB, we can consider the two remaining (and not necessarily mutually exclusive) possibilities, that the collapse was the work of invaders by land or the result of an uprising of the local, subservient populations against a ruling class. The traditional identification of the destroyers was the Dorians, but although a glance at a dialect map of classical times bears witness to the spread of Doric in the Dark Ages not only over the whole of the Peloponnese (except for Arcadia) but over Crete, the southern Aegean islands and the southern part of Asia Minor’s Aegean seaboard, it has recently been argued that there was no ‘coming of the Dorians’ because they were in the Peloponnese already. Moreover, even among those scholars who keep to the theory of a Dorian migration into the Peloponnese from another part of Greece—universally admitted to be the remote areas of the North-West—it is often argued that they came into a vacuum created by some destroyers who came and went, leaving no traces. According to Finley, for example, Doric was ‘a dialect which emerged separately in the more isolated northwestern region of the Greek peninsula, outside the Mycenaean sphere, before it was brought into southern Greece and Crete’, and he adds that ‘the eleventh century is as good a guess as any for the date of that movement’—a singularly cavalier statement for an historian to make.38 For Finley the destroyers were those useful red-herrings called the ‘Sea Peoples’, but for Bouzek they are ‘European tribes from the Balkans’, who ‘attacked Mycenaean Greece in the thirteenth century BC and after several attempts destroyed its citadels, towns and country settlements’ and then, instead of colonizing, ‘probably amassed their booty and went further east to Anatolia, where the Hittite empire fell soon after Troy’. In other words, Bouzek’s destroyers of the Achaeans power-centres c. 1200 were the ‘Land’ part of what became the ‘Land and Sea Peoples’ who were responsible for the destruction of the great kingdoms of the Near East until Ramses III stopped them when they reached Egyptian territory. ‘Only after the Mycenaean power had been broken [thus], concludes Bouzek, ‘could the Dorians enter the depopulated country (in the late twelfth century BC) and—after many further wars—establish themselves as rulers in most parts of the Greek mainland’.39

What I fail to understand is why, if the Doric dialect was the result of migration into the Peloponnese, the Dorians about whom there is an ancient tradition of invasion are less favoured candidates for the destruction than miscellaneous ‘hit-and-run’ peoples about whom there is no tradition at all.40

Chadwick points to 'the desperate efforts of archaeologists to turn up something, however insignificant, that could be labelled Dorian', and he scorns 'theorists who have speculated on the possibility of major linguistic replacement by people whose material culture was so meagre that they everywhere abandoned it in favour of the culture of the conquered'.\footnote{41} Forgetting Thucydides' wise observation on the limitations of archaeological evidence as a reliable guide to the comparative strengths of Athens and Sparta in the fifth century,\footnote{42} he describes the supposed coming of the Doriens as 'archaeologically speaking, a non-event: the pretended Doriens remain totally invisible, for they brought with them neither iron, nor dress-pins, nor cremation, nor even any recognisable pottery. Archaeologically they do not exist; and it has been shown how the Proto-Geometric style of pottery grows out of Submycenaean, so that in areas such as Attica and the Argolid there seems no longer to be a sharp line of division at the end of the Mycenaean age, for all that the palaces and palatial arts, like wall-painting and writing, disappear.\footnote{43}

Now whether or not Chadwick is right that archaeology has produced nothing identifiable Dorian is a vexed question which I shall not go into here because it is irrelevant.\footnote{44} Quite apart from the possibility that they may have had distinctive but rapidly biodegradable artefacts—rugs or something of that sort—the limitations of archaeology are such that we need not expect even a conquering and settling migration to leave evidence for the spade. We need only consider the Slavic penetration and settlement of the Peloponnese in the Byzantine period, from about 600 AD. We know of this movement from the mediaeval Chronicle of Monemvasia and from Slavic place-names, but there was no archaeological evidence whatever until fairly recently, when a cemetery of their urned cremations was found by chance on the site of the new museum at Olympia.\footnote{45} I am therefore unimpressed by the argument from archaeological silence against a Dorian invasion of the Peloponnese some 800 years earlier. What does impress me is the Monemvasia Chronicle's description of the result of the Slavic invasion on the existing Byzantine Greek population, whose

\footnote{41. \textit{J. Chadwick, 'Who were the Doriens?'}, \textit{PP}, CLXVI, 1976, 105–6.}
\footnote{42. Thuc. 1, 10 (a very acute observation, although the use which Thucydides makes of it here is not of course a relevant argument against my comparison of the sites of Mycenae and other Late Bronze Age power-centres as an indication of their relative importance and power since the uniformity of material culture in the Late Bronze Age is so universally admitted that the whole period has been labelled 'Mycenaean': what is interesting about the particular use to which Thucydides applies his wise observation about the misleading archaeological contrast between Athens and Sparta here is that some 5th-century Greeks obviously doubted the Homeric tradition).}
\footnote{43. Chadwick, \textit{op. cit.} (n. 41), 104.}
\footnote{44. A. M. Snodgrass, 'Metal-work as evidence for immigration in the late Bronze Age', \textit{BAMA} (see n. 35), 209–13, argues against the violin-bow fibula as evidence: contrast the comments on J. Bouzek. \textit{ib.}, 214.}
reaction was exactly what our archaeological survey shows to have been the reaction of the Bronze Age Greek population when a similar catastrophe overwhelmed them c. 1200 BC: those who escaped the massacre fled from the oncoming Slavs, some to the mountains, others to coastal strongholds like Monemvasia, others to islands, others again as far as Italy and Sicily.

But Chadwick is against not only a Dorian invasion but any invasion at all. He blames the conveniently ubiquitous ‘Land and Sea Peoples’ (totally without literary, traditional or archaeological evidence of any activity of theirs west of Asia Minor) for so weakening the Late Bronze Age power-centres by disrupting their economies that they collapsed and so allowed the subject peoples, in the Peloponnesse at least, to revolt against the small ruling class, which was all that the relatively small citadels of Mycenae etc. were designed to protect. These subject peoples, he says, were the Dorians, and thus he solves at one blow the problems of where they could have come from in sufficient numbers to impose their dialect, why they apparently had no archaeologically distinct culture of their own, and why the ‘Mycenaean’ language of the Linear B tablets appears to show a demotic alongside a katharevousa Greek, of which the former is now labelled proto-Doric and Doric is argued to have been a reversal of the trend in the katharevousa to East Greek forms.46

To take the last point first, if we can accept that the study of Linear B has reached the pitch of accuracy which Risch and Chadwick claim for it and that proto-Doric is now visible in a demotic form, it must destroy the linguistic necessity for a Dorian migration into the Peloponnesse on the grounds argued by Finley: ‘Doric is the one classical Greek dialect that requires us to assume an actual migration into Greece: some of the peculiar word formations and phonetics cannot be explained, on strictly linguistic grounds, as an evolution of the Greek of the Mycenaean period’.47 If now Chadwick is right in saying that the collapse of the palace-bureaucracies of the Peloponnesse halted the development of Linear B towards the East Greek dialect of classical times, it must be admitted that a migration of new settlers is no longer necessary to account for the reassertion of the West Greek —ti— again the otherwise seemingly inexorable development to the East Greek —si— in final or prevocalic position. On the other hand it does not follow that a Dorian migration which is no longer a necessity is no longer a possibility. If, for example, the majority of the common folk of the Peloponnesse spoke ‘proto-Doric’, the reason could be that they had come originally from North-West Greece, the very area from which c. 1200 our Dorians could have come, speaking much the same basic language which now halts the aristocratic development of that same basic language into what was eventually to become what is known as Eastern Greek. The evidence of ‘proto-Doric’ in Linear B is not therefore evidence that the

47. Finley, op. cit. (n. 38), 72.
'Dorians' who claimed to have conquered the Peloponnese under the leadership of the Heracleidae had been there all the time.

As for Chadwick's other arguments against a Dorian invasion, the argument from their 'archaeological non-existence' has already been undermined by the Slavic parallel. All that is left therefore is his argument from the vast numbers of migrants which would have been needed to change the whole dialect of a region. 'Where', he asks, 'in north-western Greece is there room enough for the tens of thousands of migrants needed to cause these changes? For it must be observed that the north-west shows no sign of having been depopulated by this movement; such a fantastic population explosion is surely beyond the realm of probability'. But this argument is no more valid than the others. On his own assumption that the Linear B Greek was developing into East Greek only through its use by a relatively small ruling class while the local population kept to proto-Doric, we scarcely need tens of thousands of invaders to stop that development. Besides, even if he is wrong about the existence of proto-Doric before the collapse and Doric is solely a development of migrants, how much do we know about North-West Greece to be sure how many people may have lived there? And if their move southwards was under the pressure of some movements into North-West Greece from further north (as seems very likely in view of the evidence of pressure on Epirus and Macedonia by the Lausitz people at this time), why should we look for signs of depopulation in North-West Greece, especially in view of the Slavic parallel which shows that population movements need not be archaeologically obvious?

Now the relevance of the tradition enshrined in the mediaeval Chronicle of Monemvasia to the Slavic invasions of the Byzantine Peloponnese suggest that we should not dismiss too lightly the persistent Greek tradition of a Dorian invasion of the Peloponnese, however much it may have been dressed up as the Return of the Heraclids. By all means let us suspect the details of such traditions, as indeed we are right to suspect the details of the Homeric poems as a guide to their ostensible period. But let us not reject the fundamentals: that Bronze Age Greeks had something to do with the destruction of Troy, and that there was a Dorian invasion of the Peloponnese. Indeed, I believe that the absence of Dorians from the Homeric poems is attributable to the fact that everyone knew that the Dorians were the primitive destroyers of the Bronze Age. That was why the Dorians had to find a distinguished ancestry for their leaders that would legitimize their conquest of the Peloponnese. They therefore chose a super-hero, Heracles no less, but their constant sensitivity about the past remained evident.

48. Chadwick, op. cit. (p. 41), 109. (On the size of 'great' population movements in antiquity it is interesting to observe the smallness of the possibly exaggerated numbers of 'Land and Sea Peoples' killed and captured as given on the self-congratulatory inscriptions of Ramses III, Year 11: the grand total of both sexes is only 4,227, a number which makes Chadwick's assumption that 'tens of thousands' of migrants would have been required to cause linguistic changes in the Peloponnese seem somewhat excessive.)

49. N. G. L. Hammond, 'Grave Circles in Albania and Macedonia', BAMA (see n. 35), 194.
in many ways, such as the Spartan kings’ insistence that they were not Dorians but ‘Achaeans’.  

But in concentrating on the Peloponnese, we are losing sight of the rest of mainland Greece—the very mistake which Chadwick makes. I shall therefore return to my archaeological survey of the power-centres of the late 13th century, their almost universal destruction c. 1200 and its aftermath. This survey has already proved to my own satisfaction who was not responsible for the destruction. Having now dismissed the supposed archaeological and linguistic objections to the traditional Dorian invasion of the Peloponnese as the destructive agency, I shall review the archaeological evidence again to see if it combines with tradition and linguistic evidence to give us a tentative indication of the whole destructive movement throughout mainland Greece—a movement to whose destructive significance Chadwick allows himself to be blinded by the fact that humble potters continue to make the same sort of pots after 1200 ‘for all that the palaces and palatial arts, like wall-painting and writing, disappear’.  

For all that LH IIIB pottery went on to develop into the LH IIIC style and continued to flourish in some areas, the fact remains that virtually all the great power-centres of the Late Bronze Age were destroyed about 1200, and with them went the complex, bureaucratic systems of government revealed by the Linear B tablets. The whole economic organisation on which the glories of the age had depended now collapsed, and where occupation continues in a power-centre into LH IIIC, it was a mere shadow of what had gone before except only at Athens, the one fortified power-centre of any consequence whose defences held firm against the forces of destruction.  

The pattern of the destruction and its aftermath is immediately seen by comparing maps A and B. On the map of ‘Early Dark Age Sites’ (Map B) all the sites marked are in occupation after 1200. Those marked with a circle were also occupied before, e.g. Iolcos, Mycenae, Tiryns, but this does not of course mean that there was no major collapse at these places: we have seen how all those three were smashed as power-centres about 1200, even though a few people either clung on or returned to live there shortly afterwards in a much humbler style. If we compare the lower part of the Peloponnese and Boeotia on maps A and B, we find that the heavy concentrations of 13th-century power-centres have vanished from the 12th-century map. If we then look at the islands of Cephalonia and Ithaca and the remote area of North-West Peloponnese on Map B, we see a large number of squares with crosses inside them which indicate (usually through the evidence of tombs) sites which were occupied for the first time in the LH IIIC period: these sites begin and end in the LH IIIC/sub-Mycenaean period, i.e. in the rump of the Late Bronze Age in the 12th and 11th centuries, while others (marked with crosses) had been inhabited before but

50. E.g. Cleomenes’ famous retort to the priestess on the Athenian acropolis: ‘Woman, I am no Dorian but an Achaean’ (Hdt. V, 72).
51. Chadwick, op. cit. (n. 41), 104.
peter out by the end of the 11th century. Seeing these two maps side by side in the knowledge that neither linguistics nor the possible lack of identifiably 'Dorian' artefacts need cause us to doubt the tradition of a destructive movement of primitive settlers from North-West Greece, we can see where the Achaean survivors fled for refuge from invaders whose path can be traced in the great white areas on Map B, exactly as we traced it in the archaeological survey—from North-West Greece eastwards and southwards into Thessaly, Phoci, Locris and Boeotia, then down through western Attica (where only Athens itself survived because her rapidly constructed north-western defences held firm), and so across the isthmus with its north-facing wall and into the Argolid (where the continuity of occupation shown on Map B was not uninterrupted, except for a few die-hards on a bit of the acropolis at Mycenae and perhaps a greater number at Asine, a coastal fortress which seems to have escaped the full force of the destruction), then down into the heavily populated areas of Laconia and Messenia.

Now the relatively short time-span of the destruction—measurable in years rather than months, a long time to live through but too short a time to be a process of gradual disintegration—suggests one great movement of peoples into areas possibly weakened already by internecine warfare between rival Achaean power-centres, though not necessarily a uniform movement of one single group of North-West Greeks. I envisage a chain-reaction set in motion by the pressure of southward migrations of the Lausitz type into Macedonia and Epirus, and while I am very wary of accepting the details of traditions rather than their general significance, I believe there are one or two passages which are entitled to an unusual degree of confidence in the light of our archaeological evidence. The first is the passage in Herodotus where he describes the Greeks' preparations to hold the pass of Thermopylae against the Persian invasion of 480. I have already suggested that the ruined wall which they rebuilt could have dated from the end of the 13th century—about the time of the north-facing wall which archaeology has revealed at the isthmus. Herodotus says that the old wall at Thermopylae 'had been built through fear by the Phocians when the Thessalians came from Thesprotia to settle in the Aeolian territory which they now possess.' In other words, he says that Thessaly became Thessaly by an invasion of a tribe known as the Thessaloi from Thesprotia in North-West Greece. This then could have been one link in the chain-reaction caused by pressure on Thesprotia from further north. For another we can turn to Thucydides, who tells us that 'in the sixtieth year after the fall of Troy the Boeotians, having been expelled from Arne by the Thessalians, settled in the country formerly called Cadmeis but now Boeotia: a portion of the tribe already dwelt there, and some of these had joined the expedition to Troy.' The combination of these passages of Herodotus and Thucydides gives us a picture of displaced Thessaloi moving from North-West

52. Hdt. VII, 176.
53. Thuc. I, 12.
Greece into Thessaly and this displacing Boiotoi from the western part of the Thessalian plain down into what became Boeotia.

Thucydides next mentions the Dorians. "In the eightieth year after the Trojan War the Dorians, led by the Heracleidae, took the Peloponnesus."\(^{54}\) Now the linguistic affinity between the Thessalian and Boeotian dialects in classical times suggests that these two tribes at least were as closely connected culturally in their primitive way as tradition has it that they were geographically adjacent in North-West Greece. Then came the Dorians 'twenty years later'. The exactness of Thucydides' dating of these movements can of course be ignored, but the general significance is valuable: that these movements are said to have taken place not long after the Trojan War, which, to judge from the archaeological dating of Troy VIIa (which is the only candidate for a destruction in which Late Bronze Age Greeks could have taken part) was early in the second half of the 13th century. That in turn fits well enough with our archaeological date for the collapse of the power-centres at the end of LH III B. Not long after the Trojan War we have two tribes of North-West Greece destroying the Achaeian power-centres of Thessaly and Boeotia—the Boiotoi of western Thessaly, peripheral to ‘Achaeans’ Thessaly, being pushed south into Boeotia by their not very dissimilar neighbours from further west, the Thessaloi, who not only displace the Boiotoi from western Thessaly but move into eastern Thessaly too and destroy the Achaeian power-centres there. Then not long after that, according to Thucydides, we have the Dorians conquering the Peloponnesus. Where did they come from? I suggest that they came from still further up in North-West Greece, and that just as the Thessaloi pushed the Boiotoi down into Boeotia, it was the Dorians who, under pressure from the southward movements of peoples from still further north, had pushed the Thessaloi out of Thesprotia and then continued southwards themselves. Finding themselves unable to move into Thessaly, into which they had pushed the Thessaloi, or into Boeotia, into which the Thessaloi had pushed the Boiotoi, the majority swept down towards the Peloponnesus while a small minority remained in the area which became Doris—a signpost back to their place of origin in the North-West. On their route south the mainstream of the Dorians ravaged western Attica but failed to destroy Athens itself, partly because Athens was so strongly fortified but also because the thrust against Athens was weakened by the more tempting prizes of the Peloponnesus, with its larger concentrations of booty as well as its richer \textit{lebensraum}. And so the Dorians swept over the north-facing wall at the isthmus and overran the Argolid, Laconia and Messenia.

Such is my hypothesis—inevitably an oversimplification of a much more complicated set of movements, but basically sound in its adherence to traditional, archaeological and linguistic evidence, none of which admits of ‘Sea Peoples’ or even Bouzek’s land armies of hit-and-run northerners (whom their creator can only get rid of by sending them east by unspecified means to become

\(^{54}\) \textit{loc. cit.}
the 'Land' part of the 'Land and Sea Peoples'). As to Chadwick's argument that the Dorians were in the Peloponnese already in the form of proto-Doric subject peoples whose rulers used a katharevousa Greek that appears in the Linear B tablets along with evidence of a demotic that kept the Doric -ti- rather than the more refined -si- which 'Mycenaean' Greek appears to share with classical East Greek, I maintain that the arrival of primitive North-West Greek conquerors speaking a similarly primitive Greek with -ti- rather than -si- (the traditional Dorians in fact) was responsible for arresting the apparently highly significant linguistic development from -ti- to -si-. The Achaeans users of -si- either died or fled, some to Arcadia, others to Cyprus, where the classical dialect-group known as 'Arcado-Cypriote' is said to be linguistically closest to the 'Mycenaean' katharevousa of the Linear B tablets.\textsuperscript{55} In Arcadia the classical dialect developed from 'Mycenaean' without being impaired by Doric influence because of the remoteness of the area. In Cyprus I suggest that the 'Mycenaean' continued even more strongly because of the large immigration of Achaeans refugees who may well have arrived at a time when Cyprus had been devastated by the 'Land and Sea Peoples' and who were therefore able to impose and preserve their old culture and language with all the determination of ex-patriate Englishmen whose English is often purer (or at least more constant) than anything spoken at home: indeed, the Greeks of Cyprus were still writing in a linear, syllabic script akin to Linear B even in classical times despite the obvious advantages of the Phoenician alphabet which prevailed everywhere else in the Greek world.\textsuperscript{56} But apart from Arcadia and Cyprus the dialect-groups of the Greek mainland could have developed locally from the basic demotic which the migrating conquerors brought with them from North-West Greece. North-West Greek, the Aeolic of Thessaly and Boeotia (areas belonging to the same dialect-group though with different dialects and no doubt sub-dialects too) and Doric all seem to have closer affinities with each other in classical times than with Ionic, whose development to -si- could well reflect the failure of the Dorian invaders from North-West Greece to destroy Athens or to ravage eastern Attica, which became places of refuge for displaced Achaeans from other areas and therefore contained a higher proportion of -si- speakers, who later took this peculiarity to Ionia. But Athens and Attica were not a poor, remote, inhospitable inland area like Arcadia, and therefore their 'Achaean' dialect did not remain so unaffected by Doric and subsequent external

\textsuperscript{55} Chadwick, \textit{op. cit.} (n. 41), 113; A. Bartonek, 'The place of the Dorians in the Late Helladic World', \textit{BAM} (see n. 35), 306.

\textsuperscript{56} Similarly in classical times the ex-patriate Messenians preserved their dialect and customs with national fervour: when in 371 Epaminondas freed Messenia after some 300 years of subjection to Sparta and invited back the descendants of all those Messenians who had fled to Sicily, Italy and Africa to escape the Spartan conquest, those who returned to their ancestral home 'had neither departed in any way from their local customs nor lost their Doric dialect', which Pausanias also states to have been the purest in the Peloponnese even in his own day (c. 150 AD): Pausanias, IV, 27, 11; Plutarch, \textit{Moralia}, 194B.
influences as did that of Arcadia, which was so very insular and inward-looking in the Dark Ages.

But if the Thessaloi, Boiooi and Dorians were fairly similar North-West Greek peoples belonging to the same, primitive dialect-groups from which their different classical dialects developed through the Dark Ages once they had moved into Thessaly, Boeotia and the Doric-speaking Peloponnese, I think that archaeology shows a difference in their relationships with the populations of the areas into which they moved. Our archaeological survey showed that only fortified settlements seem to have been destroyed in Thessaly and Boeotia whereas unfortified ones, e.g. Thebes, seem to have escaped destruction by virtue of their very defencelessness. This suggests to me that the North-West Greeks who destroyed the Late Bronze Age power-centres in Thessaly and Boeotia had a greater affinity with the existing inhabitants (other than the Achaean aristocracy and those who helped to defend them) in those areas than the Dorians had with the peoples of the Peloponnese, where so many unfortified settlements were destroyed as well as the fortified power-centres. This difference could well be based on nothing more than distance, for even if the pre-Dorian demotic of the Peloponnese shared –

\[ti\]– with the Dorian conquerors, it need not mean that the Dorians looked upon distant –

\[ti\]– speakers as blood-brothers (or would have done so even if they had spoken identically in every other respect too). I therefore suggest very tentatively that the archaeological evidence for a different treatment of unfortified settlements in Thessaly and in, say, Laconia could indicate different origins for the apparently similar servile populations which we find in those regions in classical times.

A difference between the movement of the Boeotians at least and that of the Dorians in the areas where we find them after the Dark Ages which followed the general collapse of the Achaean power-centres of c. 1200 is also reflected in the Homeric epic, where Boeotians figure so prominently among the Greeks who go to Troy whereas the Dorians are totally ignored. This, in turn, may be connected with Thucydides' observation that there were Boiooi already in Boeotia before the movement that was caused by the displacement of the Boiooi of western Thessaly by the Thessaloi (themselves pushed into Thessaly by Dorians on my hypothesis). Admittedly this statement by Thucydides about existing Boiooi in Boeotia may be nothing more than an inference from the *Iliad* Catalogue, which suggests an incongruously large Boeotian involvement in the Trojan War. And the Boeotian emphasis of the Catalogue could be attributable to nothing more than a great deal of hard work on the part of Boeotian bards in the Dark Ages to please their patrons, for Boeotia was a great place for epic poetry in the Dark Ages as Hesiod and the many traditional stories show. All the same, it is interesting that our Dorians never appear in the Homeric *Iliad* whereas the Boeotians are prominent. And this contrast reinforces the suggestion of archaeology that there was an affinity between the pre-catastrophe inhabitants of Boeotia and the Boeotian destroyers of the LH IIIB power-centres (but not the defenceless settlements) of Boeotia as in Thessaly. With the
Dorians, in contrast, it was a different matter. They moved a great deal further
than the Thessaloi from Thesprotia and the Boiotoi from western Thessaly,
both of which tribes were closely peripheral to the Achaean world. The Dorians
moved all the way from North-West Greece down into the Peloponnese, and I
suggest that there was little sense of kinship between them and either the rulers
or the ruled of the Peloponnese, for all that the ruled may also have ended
their third-person plural present indicative active in -ti rather than their rulers'
-si, and may indeed have been very little different anthropologically. For this
reason so many apparently defenceless settlements are destroyed in the
Peloponnese, not only the fortified power-centres of the Achaean ruling-class.
And because everyone knew that the primitive Dorians had destroyed the Late
Bronze Age civilization in the Peloponnese (even if potters continued to
produce similar types of pots for a while), not even the most syncopatic bards
could include them in the epic of the Trojan War. They therefore went one
better in their attempt to provide themselves with a distinguished ancestry,
made their kings Heraclids, and invented stories about the defeat of
Agamemnon’s descendants by the Heraclids in order to legitimize their
conquest. As for Chadwick’s thesis that there was no Dorian conquest or even
migration because the Dorians were in the Peloponnese already, ‘a subject
people ... who had for so long lived under the heel of the Mycenaean
aristocracy’, 57 it is surely incredible that a theme of such ageless popularity for
celebration in epic poetry as the liberation of a subject people apparently failed
to stir the otherwise fertile imaginations of the Dark Age bards. 58

Having now decided who were definitely not the agents of destruction c. 1200
and having reinstated North-West Greeks as the most likely candidates, I am
wondering why the apparently unfortified settlement area at Argos shows no
evidence of disruption at that date and why die-hard defenders of fortified
Mycenae and Asine were able to hold out for the greater part of the next
century. For an explanation I shall re-examine the most likely motives of the
destructive invaders of the Peloponnese of c. 1200. I have already suggested
lebensraum and plunder as twin goals of the Dorians who were pushed out of
North-West Greece by the southward movements of other peoples from further
north. I argued that these Dorians, having pushed the Thessaloi into Thessaly
and thus (indirectly) the Boiotoi into Boeotia, found themselves excluded from
those areas and so swept on southwards, with the main thrust of their movement
directed across the isthmus and into the Peloponnese. At this point I suggest a
chronological distinction between plunder and lebensraum as the primary
motive. Let us suppose that the Dorians were happy to continue sweeping
southwards, smashing and plundering as they went, until they could get no
further. That would account not only for the widespread destruction of power-

57. Chadwick, op. cit. (n. 41), 112, 115.
58. Chadwick is clutching at a straw in his reference to Heracles’ service to Eurytheues, op.
centres (the centres of booty and organised opposition) but also for the continuity of habitation of an unfortified settlement area such as Argos (which was apparently not a power-centre c. 1200), the ability of the defenders of Asine and the few die-hards of Mycenae to hold out for another two or three generations, and the evidence of LH IIIC communities at Tiryns and elsewhere. In Attica and the northern Peloponnese the Doriens smashed, plundered, and moved on. Athens of course had the further advantage of being slightly out of the way and therefore avoiding the main thrust of the movement which was attracted by the wealth of the Peloponnese: that accounts for the continuation of her power-centre. The Argolid on the other hand had a much larger number of power-centres, was exposed to much heavier attacks, and suffered a much greater smashing and plundering. All the same, I suggest that the Argolid was not immediately settled by any significant number of Doriens.

Because there were more rich pickings in the southern Peloponnese, the destroyers did not bother to besiege the remnant of the defenders of Mycenae, or waste their energies on the larger numbers who manned the walls of out-of-the-way Asine, or annihilate an unfortified settlement area like Argos. They swept southwards, down into the plains of Laconia and Messenia where they destroyed and plundered anew. But then they stopped moving, not only because there was nothing but sea further south but also because they had found the most attractive plains for settlement. And because they settled here instead of moving on, they destroyed not only the fortified power- and plunder-centres but also the unfortified settlements of Laconia and Messenia. The Argolid, in contrast, was spared Dorian settlement on a large scale until the choice plains of Laconia and Messenia had been settled in sufficient strength to cause further migrants from North-West Greece to settle further north in the Peloponnese (or even to cause some northward expansion of Doriens from Laconia). I suggest that this saturation of the southern Peloponnese took the greater part of a century, and that the Argolid was not settled by Doriens in any great numbers until the later 12th century, the date of the final collapse of Mycenae. As more and more Doriens came to settle in the Argolid at that time, they not only finished off Mycenae but overran the settlement areas of Argos (which archaeology shows to have changed about 1100) and persuaded the Achaeans still at Asine and elsewhere that the time had come to leave the Peloponnese for good and sail to new homes in or across the Aegean. Asine is certainly abandoned about this time, and the succeeding century sees the beginnings of the migrations to Asia Minor.

My final question is what traditions did these Greeks take with them? To try to answer it, I ask another: is it coincidence that 'Argives' and 'Achaeans' are the two principal generic words for Greeks as distinct from Trojans in the Iliad? I suggest that the reason for 'Achaeans' is simply that it had been the generic term for all Greek-speakers in the Bronze Age—the Ahhijawa of the Hittite tablets, which were surely not referring to the mainland Greek kingdom but to an island near Asia Minor, most probably Rhodes. And if I am asked why classical
Achaea is where it is, I reply that it is in the North-West Peloponnese, the area which archaeological and linguistic evidence shows to have been a great place of refuge for 'Achaeans' fleeing from the forces of destruction which entered the Peloponnese c. 1200. And if it is then objected that the classical dialect most akin to the 'Achaean' of Linear B tablets is 'Arcado-Cypriote', not 'Achaeo-Cypriote', my reply is that archaeology shows the lowland, coastal areas of western Achaea to have had many LH IIIC sites in the 12th century, just as the offshore 'Ionian' islands do. I suggest that in North-West Peloponnese the settlement of invading tribes which drove the Achaeans into the mountain fortresses of Arcadia did not occur until about the same time that the Dorians got round to settling the North-East Peloponnese, i.e. the Argolid. And just as the Dorian settlement of the Argolid was signalled by the final destruction of the die-hards at Mycenae, so too the settlement of the more attractive, coastal part of the North-West Peloponnese by other North-West Greeks was signalled by the second destruction of Kalograia, the fortress on the Corinthian Gulf in classical Achaea (whose name had already been established).

So much for Achaeans: the generic word for Greek-speakers in the Bronze Age but geographically limited to part of the North-West Peloponnese during the Dark Ages. The use of 'Argives' as a synonym in the Iliad is even more thought-provoking, and I make the following suggestion very tentatively in the hope that its inevitable detractors will not allow it to blind them to the possibly greater value of the main part of this article. I suggest that the basis of the story of a Panachaecean expedition led to Troy by the lord of Mycenae/Argos (in the regional sense) was laid in the Argolid in the period between the Dorians' destruction and plundering about 1200 and their further destruction and settlement which took place the greater part of a century later. I suggest that among the two or three depressed but imaginative generations of Achaeans which hung on in the Argolid after the cataclysm of 1200 there were bards who made a living by singing of past glories, no doubt vastly exaggerated as was appropriate to the task of cheering up the wretched descendants of the mighty fallen. Little did they think that dozens more generations of bards would build on their foundations in Ionia and create the massive Homeric epics which show so little knowledge of its ostensible period—a knowledge indeed that was very probably deficient even in the 12th century once the great power-centres had been destroyed. But however little true Bronze Age material filtered through the centuries into the Homeric epic as we know it, the 12th-century bards of the Argolid had established Mycenae in particular and the Argives in general so firmly in the foundations of the story that they survived unimpaired to support the vast superstructure of an Iliad which is almost entirely Ionian in composition.
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