LEPIDUS’ ROLE AFTER THE IDES OF MARCH

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In July, 43, Cicero wrote to M. Brutus referring to the opportunities lost in the days after the murder of Caesar. He bewailed that instrumentum regni delatum ad Lepidum et Antonium . . . .

Allowing for the natural bias inherent in the word regnum, it is undeniably true that by April, 44 the consul Antony was firmly in control: one brother, Gaius, was praetor; another, Lucius, a tribune; and in his hands were both Caesar’s money and Caesar’s memoranda. Antony’s ability is undisputed, even by his enemies, and his power, therefore, is not unexpected. But what of M. Lepidus? His contemporaries and many modern scholars are agreed in condemning him as a weak, shifty creature. If this is a true assessment, then his predominance is surprising. However, it must be remembered that the contemporaries whose private opinions we now have were his political enemies. An analysis of the events immediately following Caesar’s murder and the part played by Lepidus gives in my opinion a rather different picture, one that makes his importance greater and more understandable.

The exact order of events on 15th, 16th and 17th March, 44 is by no means easy to disentangle, partly because it was a period of confusion and partly because two of our sources have telescoped the events of 15th and 16th into one day. The main details can, however, be discerned. The immediate reaction, of course, was one of sheer panic - the conspiracy having been kept with remarkable secrecy, nobody knew exactly what was happening, who the assassins were or even who had been killed. Consequently the senators

3. Cicero called him inconstantior (Brut. 24,4); Brutus referred to him as homo ventossissimus (Jam. 11,9,1). Both agreed he possessed levitas (Brut. 3,1 and 18,2). A typical modern view is that of Syme, RR 166; ‘fairy character’. W. E. Heitland, Roman Republic, Vol. 3,287, referring to 49, calls Lepidus ‘weak-kneed’, presumably because he stayed in Rome and supported Caesar. Since it was by no means certain early in 49 that Caesar would win, it is difficult to see the force of this statement.
5. App. B.C. 2,118, Dio 44,20 and Nic. Dam. Vit. Caes. 25,9ff. all agree on the confusion. Some senators were killed, according to Appian, and there was even a rumour that the whole Senate was being slaughtered by gladiators, presumably the ones collected by D. Brutus and used by him as a private army. Florus 2,13,94 is obviously wrong when he says the plot was widely known.

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fled for their lives, a course of action in which they were joined by Antony, who disguised himself as a slave to avoid capture. If he saw the assassins rush out he could gain little comfort from the fact that they included both Caesarians and former Pompeians, all of whom Caesar had trusted.

The conspirators also found themselves at a loss. Deprived of a senatorial audience to whom to explain their behaviour, they briefly spoke to the people outside, then took themselves, plus gladiators and slaves, to the Capitol to decide what to do. This was both a symbolical Hellenic gesture of liberation and also ensured their safety.

In fact, the only *nobilis* who seems to have behaved with any presence of mind was Lepidus, at the time Caesar’s *magister equitum* and also a proconsul of Gallia Narbonensis and Hispania Citerior. He planned, however, to go there in person when Caesar left for the Parthian campaign. His whereabouts at the time of the murder are not completely certain – Appian places him in the Forum, Dio (more correctly, in my opinion) in the suburbs, ready to leave Rome. Whatever the circumstances, however, he acted with commendable firmness when he learnt what had happened. Running to the island in the Tiber where he had a legion of soldiers, he transferred them to the Campus Martius to be ready for whatever orders Antony as consul might issue. His choice of the Campus was obviously a strategic move, for the Senate had met in an annexe to Pompey’s Theatre there, and D. Brutus’ gladiators had been stationed in the Theatre itself.

His action reveals two things. Firstly, he apparently did not believe the rumours, current earlier, that Antony had plotted Caesar’s death. Secondly,

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6. Dio 44,22; Plut. *Ant.* 14. Antony would certainly have been killed but for M. Brutus’ objection.
9. App. *B.C.* 2,118; Dio 44,19. If Appian is right, then Lepidus may have been attending the ceremony at which Cassius’ young son assumed the *toga virilis*. However, since the other conspirators had also attended (to allay suspicion), it seems very unlikely that Cassius, although a kinsman, would have invited him, particularly if Cicero is right when he said Lepidus hated his relations by marriage (*Brut.* 3). Dio’s version is plausible.
10. Plut. *Caes.* 67 says that Lepidus as well as Antony hid as soon as the murder was known, which would not be surprising. However, in view of the fact that no other author mentions Lepidus’ flight, and neither does Plutarch himself in his other Lives, it seems more likely that Plutarch has made a mistake, automatically assuming in this one Life that Lepidus behaved the same way as Antony and the other senators.
11. A plot by Antony and Dolabella had actually been reported to Caesar, who refused to be worried (Plut. *Ant.* 11; *Brut.* 8; *Caes.* 62). Cicero, however, claimed that Caesar attacked Antony in the Senate after an attempted assassination (*Phil.* 2,29,74). Cicero also accused Antony of complicity in the Ides of March plot (*ibid.* 2,14,34) and this was why Trebonius drew him aside at the crucial moment. Plutarch (*Ant.* 13) says Antony was indeed approached by Trebonius in 45, but was uninterested. On the other hand there is a
he did not contemplate individual action. Lepidus on the whole was a natural second-in-command rather than leader, and the situation was too confused and uncertain for him to do anything but seek the other loyal Caesarians, particularly the consul, with whom he had co-operated in 49.

The importance of his support cannot be over-emphasised. From Antony’s point of view, he had no real reason to expect such loyalty. Antony had apparently thought of betraying Caesar himself, and so had Dolabella (whose appointment as suffect consul Antony had opposed). Dolabella in fact initially sided with the conspirators, more from opportunism than the fact that he was Cicero’s son-in-law. Some, indeed, of Caesar’s murderers were his former officers and friends, and Brutus was brother-in-law to both Lepidus and Cassius. Moreover, Lepidus had already indicated his dislike of Antony’s attempt to crown Caesar at the Lupercalia. It would not be unreasonable, therefore, for Antony to suspect that Lepidus would desert him now, and had he thrown his support behind the conspirators, or acted on his own initiative, Antony would have been quite unable to stop him. Indeed, even with Lepidus’ support Antony was still worried by the strength of his enemies, particularly D. Brutus and the army he would gain as soon as he assumed the governorship of Cisalpine Gaul. Almost immediately he planned to take this province himself.

On the night of the 15th Antony summoned a meeting of Caesar’s supporters at which Lepidus, Balbus and Hirtius (consul designate for 43) were present. The conspirators had spent the afternoon conferring with their fellow senators on the Capitol, and as a result messages had been sent to both Antony and Lepidus seeking some sort of reconciliation. The Caesarians had to decide how they would react. Hirtius counselled moderation (probably

general consensus in the sources that the conspirators at the time considered killing Antony as well as Caesar, and Antony’s behaviour on 15th certainly indicates that he thought he too would be a victim. Cicero’s second Philippic is noted for its almost hysterical abuse of Antony, which makes its complete authenticity suspect.


13. *Cic. Phil.* 5,14,38 and 13,8,17. There seems no point in Cicero’s lying about this matter, although on both occasions he was trying to woo Lepidus away from Antony, since everyone would know whether he spoke the truth or not. Nic. Dam. 21 has a different version in which Lepidus acted far more equivocally, but Nicolaus’ main source was probably Augustus’ own memoirs, and therefore likely to be biased against the former Triumvir.

14. *Cic. fam.* 11,1,1. Although the date of this letter from D. Brutus to M. Brutus and Cassius is still disputed, it was undoubtedly written soon after Caesar’s assassination. See also App. *B.C.* 2,124.

15. Nic. Dam. *Vit. Caes.* 27,106; App. *B.C.* 2,122. These two writers are our main source for the events of the next two days.
because his consulship would thereby be safeguarded) and Antony agreed. Lepidus, however, demanded vengeance.\textsuperscript{16}

The difference in reaction is striking, but the reason is obvious: Lepidus had an army, and could therefore afford to be more belligerent. For the same reason he had been able to act decisively when he heard of Caesar's death. He may indeed, as Dio claims,\textsuperscript{17} have been anxious to gain power through provoking a war, but there is no reason to believe he did not genuinely regret Caesar's death. He must also have been prompted by an awareness of the feelings of his fanatically pro-Caesarian soldiers and also of the veterans,\textsuperscript{18} who were motivated at least in part by a fear that Caesar's acts regarding military colonies would now be rescinded.

Antony, on the other hand, was worried by the potential if not actual strength of his enemies, and so, for the present at least, favoured moderation. A return message of co-operation was therefore sent to the conspirators, but the night remained one of confusion. The veterans roamed the city threatening revenge, while the conspirators' friends visited senators urging support, and both to counteract this and to control the situation Lepidus moved his soldiers into the Forum. At the same time Antony possessed himself of Caesar's money and the State papers (to which he could claim a consular right).\textsuperscript{19}

The next day was spent in gathering further support, to give each side additional bargaining power. The praetor Cinna made a public speech condemning Caesar as a tyrant, as did Dolabella in his new role as consul. That Antony did not oppose his assumption of this office indicates his willingness to compromise.\textsuperscript{20} Finally Brutus and Cassius, surrounded by senators and guarded by gladiators and slaves, descended to the Forum to address the people and then returned to the safety of the Capitol. Antony meanwhile summoned the Senate for the next day, and the conspirators were invited to be present. They declined the invitation, which was not altogether surprising, for Lepidus' troops occupied the Forum and Caesar's veterans were in an ugly mood. In fact the veterans joined forces with the civilians to attack Cinna as he approached the Temple of Tellus for the meeting on 17th.

Lepidus finally ordered his men to restore order, which effectively de-

\textsuperscript{16} Nic. Dam. \textit{Vit. Caes.} 27,106.
\textsuperscript{17} Dio 44,34.
\textsuperscript{18} Presumably Lepidus' soldiers stood behind him not because he was M. Aemilius Lepidus, but because he had been Caesar's magister equitum; cf. Syme, \textit{RR} 179: 'they followed Lepidus not from merit or affection but only because Lepidus was a Caesarian'.
\textsuperscript{19} cf. Syme, \textit{RR} 107; Th. Mommsen, \textit{Staatsrecht} 23, 1,88, with reference to Dio 53,30: Augustus handed over the State papers to Cn. Calpurnius Piso, his fellow consul in 23 B.C., when he was close to death.
\textsuperscript{20} cf. Broughton 317.
monstrated to the assembling senators that only he and his army, and indirectly Antony, could control the situation. Cicero indeed later complained that no-one dared stay away from the Senate, or speak his mind freely once there, for fear of armed veterans. The latter accusation is certainly untrue, for the senators on the whole were strongly anti-Caesarian, at least at the beginning. Ti. Claudius Nero proposed special honours for the tyrannicides, with all the implications this carried, a proposal which Antony countered by pointing out that if Caesar were indeed a tyrant then all his acta, including naturally his magisterial appointments, were invalid. The senators were consequently invited to resign their offices, and Dolabella, seeing which way the wind was blowing, promptly changed sides to support Antony.

While this was going on a crowd began demonstrating outside the Temple, some demanding vengeance and others peace, and the noise became sufficiently loud for Antony and Lepidus to be called out of the meeting to deal with the situation. (Obviously Lepidus was involved because he controlled the army.) The desire for peace may have been genuine, but it was also prompted by Republican bribes and the fact that Brutus and Cassius had summoned a contio on the Capitol at which they justified their killing of Caesar but, more important, promised not to undo any of Caesar's acts, especially the foundation of military colonies. It was important to woo the veterans in the audience, and calm their fears.

Both Antony and Lepidus addressed the crowd, and Appian gives what purports to be their speeches. It is, of course, impossible to know how accurately this has been done, but he certainly correctly represents the attitudes of the two men. Antony pointed out that, as consul, he had to think of the common good, while Lepidus moved into the Forum, groaning and weeping, and stressed his desire not merely for peace but also for revenge.

Thus he sought to please both camps, including his soldiers in the Forum. It was now, Appian says, that those in favour of peace, knowing he was ambitious (what Roman politician wasn’t?) offered him the position of pontifex maximus, vacant since Caesar’s death. After an initial hesitancy

21. Lepidus may also have been prompted by the fact that a L. Cinna had helped his father in the abortive rebellion of 77 (Suet. Jul. 5).
22. Cic. Att. 14,14; Phil. 2,35,89. See also Dio 44,25.
23. But see also Syme, RR 100.
25. App. B.C. 2,137ff; Dio 44,34. Brutus later sent his speech to Cicero, who commented on its lack of fire (Att. 15,1a). The Senate also realised the importance of military support, and issued a decree confirming those colonists who were already settled in the possession of their land (App. B.C. 2,135).
27. Ibid. 3,132; Drumann 1,67; Broughton 333.
Lepidus agreed. The office was undeniably an important one, conferring both *dignitas* and *potestas*, and would have been particularly desirable to Lepidus in view of the fact that his most illustrious ancestor, the consul of 187,28 of whom Lepidus was constantly reminded, had held the position from 180 to 153/2.29

The demonstrators were apparently appeased, for Antony and Lepidus returned to the Senate, where Antony reminded the senators of the riots that had already taken place, and pointed out that Caesar's soldiers would never allow Caesar to be declared a tyrant.30 It was left to Cicero, in an unholy alliance with Antony, to propose a solution – an ἄμυηστα (Cicero said he used the Greek word)31 to satisfy the Republicans, and ratification of all Caesar's *acta* to satisfy the Caesarians. Antony's attitude was one of goodwill and a desire for reconciliation, according to his enemy.

The conspirators could now safely descend from the Capitol, but still had doubts, and only after Antony and Lepidus had sent their sons as hostages did the Heroes venture to mingle freely with the citizens of Rome they had liberated. Brutus naturally went to Lepidus, his brother-in-law, and Cassius to Antony, and to seal the *concordia* each host entertained his guest at dinner that evening.32

Antony was now in a commanding position, thanks to a very large extent to the military backing supplied by Lepidus, and therefore he was happy to co-operate in the appointment of Lepidus as pontifex maximus. The exact date is unknown, but obviously it must have happened fairly soon.33 To ensure success, Antony arranged for the pontifices to elect Lepidus, rather than risk a popular election,34 which suggests that Lepidus' acceptance was

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28. RE 1,552–3, 'Lepidus' No. 68.
29. The importance of ancestry for achieving this office has been fully discussed by F. Münzer, *Römische Adelsparteien*, 359 ff. It is significant that the three contenders who after Caesar's defeat at Dyrrchium argued over who would succeed Caesar on his expected imminent death were Lentulus Spinther, Domitius Ahenobarbus and Scipio (Caes. *Bell. civ.* 3,83,1; Plut. *Pomp.* 67; *Caes.* 42). All could boast an ancestor who had been pontifex maximus.
32. According to Dio 44,34 the conversation must have been somewhat strained. Antony asked Cassius if he still carried his dagger, to which Cassius replied yes, ἐν γε καὶ σο τυραννήσαι ἐπιθυμήσεις.
33. Dio 44,53 records it in a chronologically vague list of Antony's actions, including his attitude to Octavian. Cicero knew about it in July (*Att.* 16,5) and the inauguration took place in November (*ibid.* 16,11).
34. In the early Republic the pontifex maximus had been popularly elected, and by the *lex Domitia* of 104 the same procedure was followed for the pontifices. This law was abrogated by Sulla, but in 63, when Caesar was interested in the position of pontifex maximus, Labienus restored the priestly elections to the people. There is no evidence that
seen as a betrayal of Caesar by those who sought revenge. Antony as a pontifex could have secured the office for himself—Dio says he was afraid of Lepidus' power,35 and certainly his agreement indicates an awareness of Lepidus' importance. However, since Lepidus had already made it clear that he intended to co-operate, it is more likely that Antony was motivated by a desire to reward Lepidus for services already rendered and at the same time ensure that the services continued in the future. For the same reason he arranged a betrothal between his daughter and Lepidus' son, the traditional Roman method of cementing amicitia.36 Antony the consul with constitutional power was now united with Lepidus the proconsul with military power, and Lepidus was delighted with the arrangement.37

Antony and Lepidus were thus firmly linked in the public mind, and obviously they worked in harmony. Caesar's public funeral and the reading of his will on 20th March led to mass hysteria and a riot in which Brutus and Cassius were confined to their houses in fear of their lives and an unfortunate tribune, Helvius Cinna, was killed in mistake for the praetor who had, on 16th, been rash enough to denounce Caesar. Even the non-political Atticus had realised the danger of agreeing to Antony's demand.38 The probable result had certainly been calculated by Antony and Lepidus, for the violence lasted several days before Lepidus' soldiers restored order, which suggests he was in no hurry to act. Despite the amnesty he was still loyal to Caesar's memory.

Antony introduced a lex to authorize his action. Lepidus' successor, Augustus, years later claimed that Lepidus sacerdotium ... civilis motus occasione occupaverat (Aug. Res Gestae 10). This official view was naturally followed by the loyal Velleius Paterculus with his forto creatus (2,63,1). See also Liv. Per. 117; and generally, Mommsen, Staatsrecht 2, 1,31, n. 3; Drumann 1,85; Rice Holmes, The Architect of the Roman Empire, 2f.; Syme, RR 477. On the age qualifications for the office, see Mommsen, o.c., 32.

35. Dio 44,53. Another possible claimant was Octavian; Dio 44,5,3 records that before Caesar's death the Senate voted that his son, should he beget or adopt one, should be appointed pontifex maximus. This explains, at least in part, Augustus' later complaints. On the problem of the authenticity of the senatus consultum recorded by Dio see the notes of J. Gage2 and H. Volkmann3 on Res Gest. Div. Aug. c. 10. It may be noted in passing that in Octavian's case likewise a 'derivatory' claim might have been made to the priesthood his adoptive father had held; cf. RGDA c. 10: populo id sacerdotium deferente mihi, quod pater meus habuerat; Serv. ad Aen. 11,768: olimque sacerdos: aut quia vetus sacerdos aut culius etiam maiores sacerdotes fuissent, quibus apud veteres in sacra quoque succedebatur; and further J. Marquardt, Römische Staatsverwaltung 3, 229 f., and pertinent notes. On presumable reasons for the strong formulations in RGDA c. 10 (and, hence, Liv. per. 117 and Vell. 2, 63,1) see W. Schmitthenner, Oktavian und das Testament Cäsars 9, n. 3, and 62, n. 3.

36. ibid.

37. Cic. fam. 12,2,2 (addressed to Cassius): tuus enim necessarius affinitate nova delectatur.

38. Cic. Att. 14,14. Cassius had opposed the suggestion, but once again (as in the earlier suggestion to kill Antony as well as Caesar) Brutus disagreed.

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So too, but more obviously, were the ordinary Romans, to whom a policy of conciliation with Caesar’s murderers was obviously anathema. Another outburst of violence accompanied Antony’s killing in early April of Amatius, self-styled grandson of Marius, who set up an altar on the site of Caesar’s funeral pyre where sacrifices were offered to Caesar as a god. The violence included a plot against Lepidus’ life, probably the one inspired by Caesar’s freedmen mentioned by Cicero. Romans would remember how, in the days immediately after Caesar’s murder, he had advocated vengeance; now he was obviously associated in everyone’s minds with Antony and his policy of apparent appeasement.

Lepidus finally left Rome not long after these events, at Antony’s suggestion. Antony was now secure enough not to need his support in Rome, and it is easy to imagine that Lepidus’ continued delay in the city no longer suited the consul’s plans, which undoubtedly admitted of no rival. While military support was still essential, Antony obviously preferred troops directly loyal to himself, not Lepidus. However, Lepidus did not become a back number, for he was asked to arrange peace with Sextus Pompey in Spain, an important and urgent task. Sertorius had made it abundantly clear in the 80’s and 70’s that a general in Spain could be, at the least, of great nuisance value to a government in Rome, and there was a strong possibility of war between Sextus and Antony, with the added danger that Sextus might make common cause with Caesar’s assassins and/or the Senate. Lepidus, as governor of Hispania Citerior, was in a good position to try appeasement, but it was by no means a task for a weak, shifty creature such as Lepidus has been portrayed as being, for Sextus had seven legions to Lepidus’ four, and had already defeated Asinius Pollio in Hispania Ulterior. Spain, of course, was traditionally strong in Pompeian clients.

At first Lepidus obviously had little success. Cicero reported on June 27th that Sextus showed no sign of surrendering, but by July 5th a truce was imminent. Finally Lepidus succeeded in negotiating an agreement by

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39. App. B.C. 3,2. L. R. Taylor, The Divinity of the Roman Emperor, p. 84, suggests that Antony had no desire to give Octavian, Caesar’s heir, the added advantage of being divi filius.
40. Cic. Att. 14,8 and 14,5 ( . . . ista quidem Caesaris libertorum coniuratio . . . )
41. cf. Syme, RR 109f.
42. App. B.C. 3,4; Dio 45,10.
43. Cicero discussed what Sextus might do at length – in Att. 14,1; 4; 8; 13 and 22; 15,20 and 22. In 14,13 and 15,20 (written in April and June) he considered the possibility of joining Sextus in the civil war he thought inevitable. D. Brutus also thought of joining Sextus immediately after the murder (fam. 11,1).
44. For Sextus, Cic. Att. 16,4. Six of the legions were in Hispania Ulterior. For Lepidus, App. B.C. 3,46.
45. Dio 45,10
46. Cic. Att. 15,22, 15,29 and 16,1.
which Sextus recovered his father's property, bought and squandered by Antony, terms which Antony himself had suggested (obviously as a token of good faith). It says much for Lepidus' powers of persuasion that he was able to convince Sextus that his bitter enemies should be trusted to keep faith.

His mission accomplished, Lepidus retired to Gallia Narbonensis, where he stayed until, with Antony, he re-entered Italy to join with Octavian in the Second Triumvirate. His right to be included came from the loyalty and practical support he gave Antony, without which Antony could not have held his ground after Caesar's murder in 44 or his own defeat at Mutina in 43. It is beyond the scope of this present article to enlarge on Lepidus' actions in 43. Antony apparently never had any doubts of his loyalty. In March he wrote to the consul Pansa claiming both Plancus and Lepidus as his allies. Lepidus endorsed this view. That the alliance remained firm is revealed by the fact that the only towns in Cisalpine Gaul which supported Antony were Bononia, Regium Lepidi and Parma, the first of which was in the clientela of the Antonii, while the other two had been founded by a commission chaired by M. Lepidus (cos. 187). Moreover, at Mutina Antony was helped by a cohort belonging to M. Iunius Silanus, who had been sent by his brother-in-law Lepidus, though with apparently equivocal orders. After Mutina Antony continued to assert his alliance with Lepidus, so that their ultimate union at Forum Iulii should have surprised no-one. Only once did Lepidus apparently waver - when he told Plancus he would help him oppose Antony, and it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that this subterfuge was suggested by Antony.

I have not tried to present Lepidus as a towering figure or wholly resourceful man. That would be impossible. What I hope to have done is to have shown that, at least in 44 and 43, he was by no means a negligible force and that his actions on the whole were consistent. Plutarch said that most of the Aemilii rose to power by merit and good fortune. Lepidus had the good fortune to possess an army on the Ides of March, but with it he acted skilfully and consistently in support of Antony and (indirectly) of the Caesarian faction.

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47. Cic. Phil. 2,26,27 and 29; Dio 45,9; App. B.C. 3,4.
48. Cic. Phil. 13,19,43 and 44; fam. 10,31,4. Antony described Lepidus as plissimus.
49. Cic. fam. 12,5,2.
50. Dio 50,6; Suet. Aug. 17.
51. Cic. fam. 10,30,1; Dio 46,38.
52. ibid. 11,13,3.
53. ibid. 10,15.
55. I am grateful to Dr. Ursula Vogel-Weidemann of the University of South Africa for her comments which have been incorporated into the footnotes.
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