A MESSAGE FOR AMPHIPOLIS

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In the winter of 424—423 Brasidas reached the Strymon bridge at Ampipolis late at night, forced the crossing (aided by treachery), and occupied the suburban area outside the walls, taking a number of prisoners. He then pitched camp, although local opinion held that an immediate assault on the city would probably have succeeded; but he was waiting for the gates to be opened by his friends inside. Within Ampipolis the pro-Athenian party forestalled the opening of the gates and, in conjunction with Euæles, co-strategos with Thucydides in Thrace, sent a call for assistance to the latter, who was with a squadron of seven triremes at Thasos. Thereupon Brasidas offered moderate terms of surrender, inviting the defenders either to remain in the city, in full possession of their proprietary and civic rights, or to depart within five days with their property. The terms were accepted. Late in the afternoon Thucydides reached Eion at the mouth of the Strymon, three miles from Amphipolis, only to learn that Amphipolis had just surrendered to Brasidas. Thucydides secured Eion, but went into exile as a result of the loss of Amphipolis.¹

Attention has been concentrated on Thucydides' part in and responsibility for these events,² to the almost entire exclusion from the reckoning of Euæles and those in the city. Apart from suggestions that Euæles was incompetent and was probably prosecuted,³ not enough questions have been asked about the happenings at Amphipolis itself,⁴ and in particular the volte face of the pro-Athenian majority in the city. We are told that this group, because of its numerical superiority,⁵ gained the ascendancy over the friends of Brasidas, stalled off the opening of the gates, and despatched the urgent call to Thucydides.⁶ At this stage their calculations will have been something like this: they knew how long it would take for the message to reach Thucydides and for him to arrive in response to it; they were confident of their ability to keep the situation under control, both

1. Thuc. 4. 103—107; 5. 26. 5.
3. Grote, l.c.; Classen-Steup, o.c. 4, 303; Gomme, o.c. 3, 579, 585, 587.
4. Westlake, o.c. pass., makes some observations on this aspect, but is mainly concerned to show that Thucydides has attempted an (unsuccessful) apologia.
5. Thuc. 4. 104. 4: κρατηστες τι πληθει.
6. ib., 4. 104. 4.
internally⁷ and externally⁸ until his arrival; and they knew that his arrival was likely to be decisive. What is of particular significance is the fact that Brasidas knew these things as well, and indeed it was precisely because of this that he hastily offered favourable terms.⁹ It was, therefore, common cause that in the absence of treachery Brasidas could not hope to take the city by assault in the estimated time available;¹⁰ and treachery could safely be ruled out for the present. To all appearances, then, there was nothing for the defenders to do except to keep an eye on Brasidas’ friends and to wait for Thucydides. And yet, some ten hours after the despatch of the message,¹¹ Amphipolis surrendered, and in so doing anticipated Thucydides’ arrival at Eion by a very narrow margin, if indeed at all.¹² What happened during these few crucial hours to drive the pro-Athenian party from confidence to despair,¹³ and to carry Brasidas from

7. There is something odd about οὐχὶκα in 4.104.4. Why was the opening of the gates forestalled ‘for the present’? The implication that the attempt could have been renewed, and this time successfully, does not agree with the exposition of the motives which prompted Brasidas to offer moderate terms. Cf. n. 9.

8. Opinions as to the military force available in Amphipolis range from ‘gar keiner oder einer sehr geringen militärischen Ausrüstung’ (Classen-Steup, o.c. 4, 302; cf. Gomme, o.c. 3, 577) to ‘(the major role which) Eukles and his garrison played in the initial resistance to Brasidas’ (Bradeen, Historia IX, 266). That there were some troops there is certain, for there was a detachment at the bridge: Thuc. 4.103.5. Nor is it clear (pace Classen-Steup, o.c. 4, 165) how τὸν ταύτη ξυμάχαν φιλακην πλέονα κατε­σθενον (4.82) means anything at all if it does not mean that reinforcements were sent. How does one ‘keep a closer watch’ on an ally without sending someone to do it? At any rate Brasidas, whose friends will have kept him posted, did not think an assault was possible that night, even during the maximum confusion prevailing in the city after the fall of the bridge. See also Gomme, o.c. 1, 16 ff., on the difficulties involved in taking any walled town by assault. Amphipolis had walls, although these did not extend to the river (4.103.5)—hence the fall of the bridge.

9. Thuc. 4.105.1: ‘Brasidas was afraid of the naval reinforcements coming from Thasos. Furthermore, he learnt that Thucydides, because of his possession of the right to work the gold mines in the region, had great influence with the mainlanders. For these reasons he was anxious to secure the city immediately, if possible, because he foresaw that Thucydides’ arrival—by encouraging the Amphipolitans to believe that he would raise naval and land forces to save them—would eliminate the possibility of their surrender’. This boils down to saying that to Brasidas the decisive event would be Thucydides’ arrival. And in the context Brasidas expected it to happen, in other words he thought that the town could and would hold out. In short, he believed that he could not take Amphipolis by assault at all, and that he could not even do so on terms unless these were accepted before Thucydides arrived.

10. It is not certain that he could have done so even if Thucydides’ arrival had been delayed. In the entire winter campaign of 424—423 he had to make a fight of it on only three occasions: Sane and Dium, which held out (4.109.5); and Lecythus in Torone (see below). Cf. also n. 8 fin.

11. See n. 12 and p. 178 below.

12. Graves, Thucydides IV (1888), 271, takes the imperfect κατέπλευν (4.106.3) to mean that Thucydides was sailing in to Eion at the very moment when Amphipolis surrendered. Cf. 4.106.4: ἀπετρ.

13. The suggestion of Papastrau, ‘Amphipolis’, Klio N.F. 24, Beilieft (1936), 17, that ‘die demokratische Partei’ ... ‘angesichts der feindlichen Übermacht den Mut verlor’ is not supported by Thucydides, and in any case does not explain the sudden volte face.
pessimism to victory?

Thucydides purports to answer this question, but we are entitled to scrutinize his account closely, for we are, after all, dealing here with his own defence. The case for a Thucydidean *apologia* has recently been argued,\(^14\) and no more is needed here than a brief reply to Gomme's assertion:\(^15\) that he makes no attempt at self-defence; that to have done so would have meant the (to him) unpalatable inclusion of autobiographical material; and that it would have thrown Amphipolis out of scale with the rest of the book. None of these contentions is secure. Thucydides in fact makes a number of statements in his defence;\(^16\) he is certainly autobiographical here, for it is precisely at this point that he gives the greater part of all the personal data in the entire work;\(^17\) and as for his 'scale', he compresses the crucial events from the receipt of Brasidas' terms up to the surrender into some thirteen lines of text,\(^18\) which is scarcely in focus with his account of Torone, where, having already said that Brasidas' speech was much the same as that which he had made at Acanthus, he nevertheless proceeds to devote some seventeen lines to a summary of it.\(^19\)

Thucydides distinguishes three stages in the reaction to the proposals. In the first stage there was the beginning of a change of heart on the part of \(\pi\omega\lambda\omega\iota\), which must mean those who had saved the gates during the night.\(^20\) Two things caused them to hesitate: the fact that only a few of the citizens were Athenians, the rest being of mixed origin; and the presence of relatives among the suburban prisoners taken during the night.\(^21\) In the second stage they began to look upon the proclamation as reasonable by comparison with what they had feared. In exposing the considerations which led them to this view, Thucydides continues to press the distinction between the Athenians and the rest. The Athenians would gladly depart, for they realized that they faced a worse fate than the rest; and also because they would not be losing their rights; and also because they were being unexpectedly reprieved from danger.\(^22\) In the third stage the friends of

\(^{14}\) Westlake, *o.c.* *pass.*

\(^{15}\) *o.c.* 3, 584.

\(^{16}\) Thuc. 4.104.5: his immediate response to the call for help and his estimate of the possibilities; 4.106.3 f.: his swift arrival at Eion and the importance thereof; 4.107.1 f.: his measures securing the position at Eion, and their successful outcome. See also n. 77.

\(^{17}\) The material in n. 16, together with 4.104.4: his *strategia* in Thrace, his patronymic, his authorship of the 'History', and his presence at Thasos; 4.105.1: his interest in the gold mines and his influence in the region. Elsewhere he gives only 1.1.1.: his reasons for composing the 'History'; 2.48.3: his contraction of the epidemic disease of 430; 5.26.5: his exile after Amphipolis and consequent opportunities for research.

\(^{18}\) 4.106.1 f. Cf. the text of Classen-Steup, *o.c.* 4, 208 f.

\(^{19}\) 4.114.3 f. Cf. the text of Classen-Steup, *o.c.* 4, 222 f.

\(^{20}\) 4.106.1. Cf. 4.104.4; 106. 2.

\(^{21}\) 4.106.1.

\(^{22}\) *ib.*
Brasidas began openly advocating acceptance of the proposals. They judged it opportune to do this because they detected a change of heart, and also because they saw that the majority was no longer prepared to listen to Eucles. The proposals were then accepted.\textsuperscript{23} With these few words Thucydides dismisses the most critical debate in the campaign of 424 — 423. It was a campaign with far-reaching consequences, and those consequences were triggered off by the fall of Amphipolis, as Thucydides himself well knew.\textsuperscript{24} It was a campaign which was won by debates, and yet Thucydides would have us believe that the debate which began it all was of less importance than Brasidas’ recapitulation at Torone of what he had said at Acanthus.

The essence of Thucydides’ account is that there were two groups within the majority, the Athenians and the rest; and each group is supposed to have reached its decision to capitulate by a different route. The assertion that the population was heterogeneous must obviously be accepted,\textsuperscript{25} but we are not well-informed as to the composition of the non-Attic element, for Thucydides simply says that it was ‘mixed’.\textsuperscript{26} He is, however, rather more specific when he discusses the conspiracy to open the gates, for he says that the conspirators were made up of settlers from Argilus, together with certain people who had been won over by Perdiccas and the Chalcidians.\textsuperscript{27} The important point is the mention of the Argilians, not only because they were the prime movers of the conspiracy,\textsuperscript{28} but also because their cause of complaint is ascertainable, and emerges as something peculiar to them and not shared by the rest of the population. For Thucydides’ assertion that Argilus was always suspect, and was always plotting against Amphipolis, should be linked to the compulsory cession of land which Argilus had (probably) given at the founding of Amphipolis in 437 — 436.\textsuperscript{29} This would explain why it had always been hostile. The fact that Thucydides mentions only Argilus by name, makes it the prime mover of the conspiracy, and gives something of its background, suggests that the Argilian settlers in Amphipolis\textsuperscript{30} were the only substantial element

\textsuperscript{23. 4.106.2.}  
\textsuperscript{24. 4.108.1 ff.}  
\textsuperscript{25. Cf. Diod. 12.32.3.}  
\textsuperscript{26. 4.106.1: ξυμμετακτον. Thucydides is terse here, although the distinction between the two groups is basic to his presentation. He is, by contrast, rather more expansive on the ξυμμετακτον ἐθνες of Acte: 4.109.4.}  
\textsuperscript{27. 4.103.3.}  
\textsuperscript{28. 4.103.4.}  
\textsuperscript{29. On the fiscal evidence for this see Nesselhauf, ‘Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Delisch-Attischen Symmachie’, Klio, N.F. 17, Beiheft (1933), 55 f., 131 ff. Cf. Gomme, o.c. 1,211 f., 277 f. Nesselhauf also postulates an earlier cession by Argilus, at the founding of Brea circa 445, but this may no longer be secure if Woodhead, Class. Quart. xlvi (1952), 57 ff., has rightly located Brea well west of the Strymon.}  
\textsuperscript{30. They worked in close conjunction with their compatriots in Argilus itself. The latter went over to Brasidas and led him to the Strymon, where the first part of the plan, the betrayal of the bridge, was successfully carried out: 4.103.4.}
in the conspiracy; for it would seem that 'those who had been won over by Perdiccas and the Chalcidians' were not numerous enough to warrant their separate nomination. The conspiracy was far from being a sudden arrangement, having been under consideration ever since Brasidas' arrival in the north, some three months before. Yet during this time no one worth naming had been attracted to the Argilian cause, which suggests that the majority was resolute in its pro-Athenianism. It was also resolute in action, for although it could have had only the briefest notice of the fall of the bridge, it was able to frustrate the long-matured plan to open the gates. As for its ethnic origins, the suggestion that it was mainly Ionian receives some support from the fact that the previous (unsuccessful) foundation at Enneahodoi (=Amphipolis) in 465—464 was settled by οὕτων καὶ τῶν ξυμάχων, which implies mainly Ionians, at any rate at that time; and it is not unlikely that the pattern was preserved in the second foundation of 437—436. If, then, the bulk of the population was Ionian, some weight should be given to this fact in assessing the strength of its pro-Athenian sentiments.

But the more important question is the divergence of interests, for this is the basis of Thucydides' case. This raises the question of the status of Amphipolis, and here it is not easy to decide between a colony, a cleruchy, and an independent state allied with Athens, for each of these possibilities has its supporters. A colony, if it could be securely postulated, would, of course, convict Thucydides of a serious obfuscation, and indeed it is possible that he himself at least lays the foundation for such a conviction. He says that Brasidas' offer was made to Ἀμφιπολίται καὶ Ἀθηναίοι τῶν ἐκόντων, which is meant to suggest that the Athenians were not Amphipolitans. But he contradicts this when he gives the terms of the offer, for in his context both choices were made available to both groups alike, which implies that the Athenians possessed civic rights; and indeed he says immediately afterwards that the Athenian minority were citizens.

31. 4.103.4. Cf. Classen-Steup, o.c., 4, 205, 88 f. Gomme's difficulty, o.c., 3, 576, is unrealistic.
32. Tod, Greek Historical Inscriptions (1948), 2, 150. Cf. Gomme, o.c., 3, 578. Papastrau, o.c., 17, misunderstands Thuc. 4.103.3.
33. 1.100.3. Cf. 4.102.2. Cf. also Diod. 11.70.5.
35. 4.105.2.
36. The first alternative was: ἐπὶ τοῖς ἄμεσοι τῆς Ἰσης καὶ ὄμοιας μετέχονται μένειν — to remain, in possession of their property and participating in equality.
37. 4.106.1: ἡ σαρξ Ἀθηναίων ἐμπολίταιν. Westlake's detection (o.c., 280 n. 4) of a distinction between the Athenians to whom terms were offered (105.2) and the Athenians who formed a minority of the population (106.1), the former being temporary residents and the latter colonists, is not supported by Thucydides. In the context of 106.1 it is quite
Furthermore, although it has been assumed that it was only the Athenians who took advantage of the alternative offer allowing them to depart with their property, this does not seem to be well-founded, for Thucydides (deliberately?) uses neutral language when he speaks of those whom he received at Eion after the capitulation. This authorizes the supposition that the refugees included non-Attic elements, for Thucydides, anxious as he undoubtedly was to press the distinction between the two groups, would not have failed to specify them as Athenians if this had been the case.

In the final analysis, however, the crisp issue is whether the two groups were in fact motivated by different considerations when they decided to surrender. And here I suggest that Thucydidean sophistry has contrived to obscure the fact that there was only one decisive consideration, and that it was common to both groups. At the outset attention is again directed to the resolution of the defenders during the night, and to the view which they then took of the situation, a view which Brasidas shared. In the light of this it is postulated that some new factor must have intervened during the day, and must have been of decisive weight. It should be said right away that this new factor is not to be found in the reasonableness of the terms, for this aspect was apparent as soon as the proclamation was made, and yet it still needed an anxious debate, lasting some hours, before either the Athenians or the rest were persuaded. It is worthwhile referring here to the parallel case of Torone, where, after it had gone as far as the admission of Brasidas by his friends, the Athenian garrison of some fifty men, accompanied by Toronean supporters, took refuge in the ramshackle fort of Lecythus. Brasidas invited the Toroneans to return to their homes unharmed, and also offered to let the Athenians depart with their property. The Athenians rejected the offer, and so apparently did the Toroneans, for Brasidas then delivered one of his usual conciliatory speeches. Thucydides does not say whether the Toroneans were persuaded by this, although his silence, in contrast with the generally detailed nature of his account of Torone, suggests that they were not. At all events the garrison at Lecythus, which was in a much less favourable position than the defenders of Amphipolis, was able to hold out for two days, and even then clear that only citizens took part in weighing up the offer; there were admittedly two groups, but, in the light of ἡ λειτουργία τῶν ἀθηναίων ἔργων (105.2) were temporary residents, they do not fit in anywhere: they did not possess Amphipolitan citizenship, yet in the context of 105.2 they were offered the choice of retaining it; and they took no part in weighing up the offer. Alternatively, if the Athenians who weighed up the offer (106.1) were the temporary residents, then the Athenians who possessed citizenship either had no part in the weighing-up, or weighed up on the same basis as ὅς ἔλεγεν ἡμικροτῖον (L.c.) — in which case ἡ λειτουργία μὲν ἡ ἐπιμολέσεως τοῦ δὲ πλέον ἔξωμεν ἡμετέρων is meaningless, for it was then a distinction without any consequences.

38. Grote, o.c. 6, 188 ff.
39. 4.107.1: δὲ κατὰ τὰς συνθέσεις.
was only dislodged by an accident.46

The clue to the crucial new factor is, I believe, to be found in the equation:

\[ \text{où προσδεχόμενοι βοήθειαν ἐν τάχει = κινδύνου παρὰ δόξαν ἀφίεμενοι.} \]

If these two expressions amount to the same thing, Thucydides has in fact told us that the defenders as a whole did not expect speedy relief, and this consideration, the abandonment of their belief in his timeous arrival, is the vital factor; for it, and it alone, represents a fundamental change in their thinking. The other considerations were all known when it was decided to resist: the obvious and inevitable presence of relatives among the prisoners; the Athenian expectation of worse treatment than the rest; and the realization of the non-Athenians that defeat would expose them to danger.48 But in spite of knowing all this they had decided to resist, and they had done so because the chances seemed good. And the question is: why did the chances no longer seem good? Or to put it another way, why did they think that something, which in fact did happen, was not going to happen? For there can be no doubt that Thucydides did arrive in time, in the sense that he was at Eion quite soon enough to have reached Amphipolis before its possible capture. He may, as he says, have come at speed, but in that case he, perhaps, did even better than they expected. Why then did they lose heart long before the time when they expected him?

I think that Thucydides himself supplies part of the answer. He says that when he received the message he hastily set out, with the intention of reaching Amphipolis before its capitulation,49 if possible; failing which he hoped to secure Eion.44 This is a curious statement, for it may well be asked how he happened to know, at this stage, that capitulation, rather than capture, was the prospect facing Amphipolis. The message had, after all, been transmitted at a time when the defenders had had no reason to anticipate anything but an attack by Brasidas. Presumably, therefore, it would have said, in effect: Come at once, for we are about to be attacked. There was nothing in this to suggest to him that favourable terms were going to be offered. It is true that Brasidas had already won over Acanthus and Stagirus by somewhat similar techniques,45 and this was no doubt known to Thucydides. But there was not yet any reason to see these cases

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40. 4, 113-116.
41. 4.106.1.
42. There is also an equation here, for there is again no material difference between the expectations of the two groups. The Athenians wanted to escape an unpleasant fate. But the fact that it might be more unpleasant is surely beside the point, for the others also wanted to escape unpleasantness. Thucydides can scarcely mean that the Athenians would have opted for resistance if they could have been certain of receiving only the normal ration of unpleasantness.
43. πρὶν τὶ ἐνδούματι.
44. 4.104.5.
45. 4. 84—88.
as the beginning of a pattern; and indeed it was subsequently clear to him that the fall of Amphipolis was the decisive, and in fact the only significant, origin of the chain-reaction which followed. 46

If Thucydides is inaccurate when he says that he hoped to forestall the capitulation of Amphipolis, there is no permissible criterion by which he should be credited with the alternative intention (which he does not claim) of forestalling its capture. It follows that in fact he did not have in mind the saving of Amphipolis at all. And I believe that this is precisely what he himself has told us, for he puts his evaluation of the strategic importance of Amphipolis as follows: Although the Spartans had gained access to Athenian allies as far as the Strymon, they could not go any further without control of the bridge, because the river formed a great lake above the city, while in the direction of Eion they were watched by triremes. 47 To Thucydides, therefore, three factors had existed to keep Brasidas out of the trans-Strymon region: the lake, the Eion-based naval patrols, and the Strymon bridge. He had presumably decided that one of these factors, the naval patrols, could safely be suspended while he was at Thasos, 48 but when he learnt of the fall of the bridge he concluded that Amphipolis could not be held. For in his view the walled city of Amphipolis itself was not an independent element in the trans-Strymon defence system, being maintainable only as long as the bridge was secure. He may very well have been mistaken in this, and both Brasidas and the defenders certainly thought he was, 49 but nevertheless this is what he believed. In the result, therefore, it is perhaps unnecessary to ask how he could have anticipated the capitulation of Amphipolis, for on his line of reasoning this was a foregone conclusion once the bridge had fallen. It is, therefore, postulated that he left Thasos hoping only that he would be able to secure Eion. And the suggestion is that he conveyed this assessment to the defenders at Amphipolis, and that it was because of this that there was the sudden realization that help was not on the way. As to the method by which his message was transmitted to Amphipolis, Gomme gives a valuable hint when he suggests 50 that the message from

46. 4. 108.
47. This evaluation is given in the context of the reaction at Athens to the fall of Amphipolis (108.1), but this part of the 'reaction' is clearly Thucydides' own assessment. He says (i.e.) that there was great alarm at Athens, for the following reasons: (a) because of the value of Amphipolis as a source of ship's timber and revenue; and (b) because of the strategic importance of the bridge. The Athenians are, therefore, supposed to have said, in effect: We are alarmed because we have lost Amphipolis with its resources, and also because the fall of the bridge has opened the road to our trans-Strymon allies. But in the context (and in the opinion of Brasidas) they should have said: And also because the fall of Amphipolis has opened the road to our allies.
48. The reasons why he was at Thasos are not material here. As to these, see Grote, o.c. 6, 191 ff.; Classen-Steup, o.c. 4, 301 ff.; Gomme, o.c. 3, 584 ff.
49. Cf. Gomme's assertion, o.c. 3, 587, that 'the loss of the bridge was not decisive...'; Brasidas could not have held on to it, if Amphipolis had stood firm against him.
50. o.c. 3, 579, 734.
Amphipolis to Thasos was sent by signalling of some kind. For if this was possible, so was the converse.

It should first be asked whether it would have been possible for a messenger to have reached Thucydides, and for the latter to have made his preparations, set sail, and got to Eion, all within the time available. The starting point is πρὸ ἔως, by which Thucydides designates the time when the Argilians conducted Brasidas to the Strymon bridge. This cannot have been much before dawn, for Brasidas had had a rather full programme that night; and dawn was late, for it was winter. After this several things happened before the message to Thucydides was despatched: Brasidas forced the bridge and occupied the suburban area; refugees streamed into Amphipolis; Brasidas halted his army, sent his men foraging, and pitched camp; the Argilian attempt on the gates was made, and defeated; and (after, we may assume, at least some discussion) the message went off. Some of these events were no doubt contemporaneous, but it is reasonably certain that it was no longer πρὸ ἔως. At the other end of the period in question, Thucydides reached Eion ταύρη τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ὀψε, and, therefore, late in the afternoon. An allowance of ten hours would not be ungenerous, that is, from circa 7 a.m. to circa 5 p.m.; and for good measure it can be assumed that Thucydides went off the moment the baton was handed over, thus leaving the full ten hours available for sailing. As for the distance which had to be covered in this time, Thucydides says that Thasos was about half a day's sailing from Amphipolis; which, given that the harbour was on the northern point of the island, means a distance of some fifty miles. Now Rodgers

51. 4.103.4. This reading of Classen-Steup, o.c. 4, 205, instead of the predominant πρὸ ἔως of the MSS., is criticised by Graves, o.c. 268, but the sense seems to demand it. Why should the Argilians have merely conducted Brasidas 'well on his way' to the bridge? They accompanied him because he did not know the way, and also to ensure that the final arrangements for the betrayal of the bridge were carried out. But either reading will in any event do here. Cf. n. 53.

52. It was already dawn, according to Adcock, CAH 5, 244.

53. At dusk he was at Bromiscus, where he took the evening meal. He then pushed on some twelve miles to Argilus, which then defected from Athens; this presupposes some sort of speech by, or discussion with, Brasidas. He was then conducted five or six miles to the bridge. All this happened in stormy weather, with light snow. Cf. Gomme, o.c. 3, 575 f.

54. This seems certain in view of 104.4: παρεισαυσυ μετὰ Εὐκλέως.

55. 4.103.5, 104.1-4.

56. Gomme, o.c. 3, 586, allows twelve hours, but reduces it to ten (o.c. 3, 734) in answer to Cadoux's suggestion that the return journey could have been completed in that time. But see below.

57. 4.104.4: τῆσσαρος ἡμέρας μᾶλλα ταῖοις.

58. Lehmann-Hartleben, Die antiken Hafenlagen des Mittelmeeres (1923), 59, 73, 81, 95 ff., and Plan XIV.

59. Greek and Roman Naval Warfare (1937), 43, 45 and n. 12. One knot = 1.153 statute miles, ib. 31. Rodgers' work, at least on the speed of triremes, has attracted support. See Gomme, o.c. 1, 19 n. 2.
has calculated that a trireme was capable of 7.8 knots over a short distance, with a top cruising speed, over a stretch of five or six hours, of 5.3 knots; squadron speeds, however, would have been less. This means that Thucydides could not have got to Eion in less than eight hours, allowing him a top cruising speed all the way, and making no adjustment for the lesser speed of a squadron. This leaves some two hours for the messenger who went from Amphipolis to Thasos, which is plainly impossible. It would, therefore, seem that signalling is an unavoidable assumption, and indeed the assumption is, in the light of Riepl’s investigations, relatively easy in two respects: the widespread use of fire- and smoke-signals at this time, and their transmittability over considerable distances by means of relays. The difficulty is their ability to convey messages of some complexity, for there are obvious technical differences between a simple Enemy here and the Amphipolitan Bridge fallen, enemy here, or the Thucydidean Cannot save Amphipolis, proceeding Eion. But Riepl, although inclined to be sceptical about complex transmissions in the fifth century, nevertheless concedes that as many as four separate facts could be transmitted, while Gomme seems prepared to go even further. And it is perhaps not even necessary to assume any appreciable complexity here, for there was no difficulty at this time with pre-arranged signals, among which Enemy at gates and Coming/Unable to come find an obvious place.

61. It was considered an achievement when Miltiades sailed from Elaeus (in the Chersonese) to Hephaestia (on Lemnos) in a day, Herod. 6.140.1. The distance from Thasos to Amphipolis approximates closely to that from Elaeus to Hephaestia.

62. I am indebted to Mr. J. Hawkins of St. Andrew’s College for the observation that if Thucydides’ squadron already had a full summer’s sailing behind it, its speed would have been appreciably reduced by underwater fouling. But I do not rely on this fact, for I concede drawing-board conditions throughout.

63. If the messenger went by trireme he would have needed at least eight hours. But this requires a second squadron, stationed presumably at Eion, for which there is no evidence. Dispatch boats were slower than penteconters, and the latter could make about 7.5 knots over a short distance, and some 8 knots under sail: Rodgers, o.c. 51. But even allowing a dispatch boat the speed of a penteconter under sail, at least five hours would have been needed. And all this assumes favourable conditions, maximum, and even supra-maximum, speeds, and the immediate departure of Thucydides.

64. Das Nachrichtenwesen des Altertums (1913), 46 ff. If Gomme, o.c. 3, 579, had had access to this work he might have been less tentative in suggesting that ‘the use of signals was commoner … than is generally supposed’.

65. Riepl, o.c. 57 ff., discussing Herod. 7. 182 and Thuc. 3.80.2. It is by no means clear that ταύτα … παρανομάζειν ποταμόνιον (Herod. l.c.) can be diluted as easily as Riepl believes. Herodotus’ meaning can only be that the Greeks at Artemision were informed, at the very least, of the encounter with the Persians at Scithus, the loss of two Greek ships, the grounding of the third, and the escape of its crew. There is certainly an indication of sophistication in the Plataean ‘jamming’ of Peloponnesian signals: Thuc. 3.22.7 f.

66. Riepl, o.c. 60.

67. Gomme, o.c. 2,240, 284, 367, 3,491, referring to Thuc. 2.9.41; 3.22.7 f.; 80.2; 4.42.4. Something can also be made of Thuc. 8.102.1.

68. Riepl., o.c. 54 ff.
The discouraging message was received at Amphipolis fairly early in the day, for it makes its appearance in the second stage of the proceedings. And it was after this, in the third stage, that the Argilians noticed that τὸ πλήθος was no longer listening to Eucles. From this we may conclude that Eucles was still counselling resistance, although his must have been a lone voice by this time, for in the context τὸ πλήθος implies both the Athenians and the rest. But the question is this: If Eucles did not share Thucydides’ pessimism, why did he not do something about it? He had a garrison under his command, the city was still in his hands, and with a nucleus of troops to back him up he might still have attracted some civilian support, as the fifty Athenians afterwards did under much less favourable conditions at Torone. There seem to be two possible answers. It may be supposed that τὸ πλήθος implies everyone, including the garrison, in which case Eucles had a mutiny on his hands. Thucydides’ reticence here would be understandable, for his message will have precipitated it. This possibility gains some support from the attitude of the Argilians, for they were very careful to lie low until it was perfectly safe to show their hand, which perhaps means until there was no longer an organized force on the scene. Alternatively something can, perhaps, be based on Papastravou’s belief that Eucles, although an elected strategos, was there in a civil capacity as φύλακς τοῦ χώριου, or governor. It is to be noticed that Thucydides, when introducing Eucles, describes him as ‘Eucles the strategos, who was there as phylax of the place’, while he himself was simply ‘the other general in the Thracian sector’. It is

69. *pace* Westlake, *a.c.* 283 n. 3.
70. It is even possible that τοῦ παρόντος Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοῦ (instead of simply τοῦ Εὐκλέους) οὐκέτα ἀκροφύμονον (106.2) is intended to emphasize that it was a general who was being disobeyed; and by this means Thucydides could console himself with having not quite suppressed the truth, as he could also do with his deceptive, but ultimately informative, presentation of the decisive new factor.
71. 4.104.4.
72. Papastravou, *a.c.* 16 and n. 3, 48. The argument is based on Harpocrates’ apparent equation of φύλακς with ἐπίσκοπος. Cf. Busolt-Swoboda, *Griechische Staatskunde* (1926), 2.1355 n. 2. Westlake, *a.c.* 280 n. 3, relies on Thuc. 4.5.2. for the rejection of φύλακα τοῦ χώρου as an official title, but the argument founders on the assertion that Demosthenes ‘held no office’ at Pylos. Demosthenes in fact held a roving commission not unlike that (Herod. 6.132 ff.) which had taken Miltiades to Paros. Thucydides says, 4.2.2 ff., 3.1, that Demosthenes, although a private citizen, was authorized to accompany Eurymedon and Sophocles and to use their fleet for whatever purpose he deemed fit. It was in terms of this mandate that he insisted (despite the opposition of the generals) on putting in at Pylos. Therefore, when Thucydides says, 4.5.2, that after fortifying Pylos the Athenians ‘left’ Demosthenes there with five ships αὐτὸν φύλακα, it may very well be argued that they ‘left’ him because he held the office of civil phylax.
73. 4.104.4.
74. It is no answer, *pace* Classen-Steup, *a.c.* 4.301 f., simply to brush aside the difference in nomenclature, for if it had merely been a matter of the two generals making *ad hoc* arrangements for a division of the command, one might have expected similar language to that used elsewhere, for example Thuc. 6.62.1.
also worth noticing that the initiative in deciding to send a signal to Thucydides was taken by the defenders as a whole, acting in concert with Eucles; and it is precisely at this point that Eucles is described as a phylax. A civilly employed Eucles is also possible in the light of Brasidas' expectation that Thucydides would be the one to levy both naval and land forces, and indeed the whole tenor of the account seems to suggest that everyone was simply waiting for Thucydides—the military commander. But it is not necessary to decide between a mutiny against General Eucles and the ineffective protests of Governor Eucles, for on either basis—and indeed even if he was a military commander not facing a mutiny—Eucles had lost control of the situation. This was imputable to Thucydides' mis-assessment of the position, and it may have been this, rather than his absence at Thasos, that formed the gravamen of the charges against him. And in presenting his defence he has, while not suppressing the truth altogether, contrived to obscure it in a number of ways, and in particular by casting the emphasis on the distinction between the Athenians and the rest, a distinction which is, in the framework of these events, artificial and irrelevant.

75. 4.104.4: πέμπουσι μὲν Ἐυκλέους.
76. Cf. n. 9.
77. It is not certain, pace Classen-Steup, o.c. 4.215, that φιλακη ... τις βραχέα (103.5) is pejorative. Thucydides says: 'The town was some distance from the crossing, and at that time the walls did not extend (as they now do) down to the river; but (ἐκατέρωθεν) a detachment was posted there'. Does this not perhaps mean that he, as the responsible officer, had done what he considered necessary to compensate for the absence of walls? At any rate the possibility that he here launches a veiled attack on Eucles is refuted by what immediately follows: Brasidas' easy forcing of the bridge because of treachery, the weather, and the unexpectedness of the attack. Which is more of an apology than an accusation.
Der entscheidende staatsrechtliche Vorgang beim Zerfall des Alexanderreiches bestand darin, daß sich die beamtete Gewalt der führenden Diadochen in souveräne Herrschaft verwandelte. 323 war diese Gewalt in der Reichsordnung von Babylon festgelegt worden. Der offizielle Übergang zur Souveränität erfolgte 306/5, als Antigonos und sein Sohn Demetrius Poliorcetes den Königstitel annahmen und Ptolemaios, Seleukos, Lysimachos und Kassander ihrem Beispiel folgten. Die Souveränität wurde nicht ohne schwere Kämpfe erreicht, die den verschiedenen Auffassungen entsprangen, welche die Diadochen von der Nachfolge Alexanders hatten:


Eine wichtige Rolle in den Parteitungen der Diadochen spielten die griechischen Staaten des Mutterlandes und Kleinasiens und andere staatliche Sondergebiete innerhalb des Reiches. Auf jeder Seite versuchte man,
Acta Classica is published annually by the Classical Association of South Africa. The journal has been in production since 1958. It is listed on both the ISI and the SAPSE list of approved publications.

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