ARRANGEMENT AND STRUCTURE OF SATIRES
IN HORACE, SERMONES, BOOK I, WITH MORE
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO SATIRES 1—4*

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On the subject of pattern or symmetry in the arrangement of Horace's Satires, published under the title Sermones, F. Boll in 1913¹ pointed out the following parallel scheme in the order of the poems of the second book (published in 30/29 B.C.):

1. Hälftle     2. Hälftle
   I          Consultation   V
   II         Ländliches Genügen   VI
   III        Saturnalienpredigt   VII
   IV         Gastrosephie   VIII

This scheme has been generally accepted by scholars as Horace's own principle of arrangement in his second book, some of their reservations² having been anticipated by Boll himself. Most recently Rudd concluded that 'when we contrast such symmetry, limited though it is, with the rather miscellaneous character of Book I, it is hard not to believe that one or two of the poems were written to fit the scheme . . . The plan, however, has no symbolic significance; it confers no extra meaning on any individual poem; and as far as I can discover it involves no mathematical secrets'.³

Of the first book of Satires (published in 35/34 B.C.) Boll thought that its material was not so suitable for a symmetrical division; however, he observed that 4 and 10 go together more closely, and also 1 and 6 as dedications to Maecenas; that 2 and 3 link up well with 1, and that the 'narrative' satires 5, 7, 8 and 9 are suitably grouped round no. 6.⁴ His conclusion was that 'die Satiren des ersten Buches sind noch einzeln und unabhängig von

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¹. F. Boll, Die Anordnung im zweiten Buch von Horaz' Satiren, in Hermes 48, 1913, 143—145.
². Cf. e.g. Ed. Fraenkel, Horace, Oxford 1957 (to be cited as Fraenkel, Horace), 137.
⁴. Boll 145. Boll also observed that 'die Krone der Horazischen Satirendichtung, Sat. II 6, hat ihren Platz innerhalb des Buches doch offenbar im Hinblick auf die ebenso persönliche Satire 1/6 erhalten'.

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der Absicht eines geschlossenen Buches entstanden; bei den späteren lag
dagegen der Gedanke, ein neues Buch zu geben, von vornherein näher.'

* * *

During the period of fifty years that followed Boll's observations, some
progress was made in regard to the analysis of the arrangement of satires
in Book 1. Heinze in 1921, in his introduction to the fifth revision of Kiessling's edition of the *Satiren*, pointed out that the number ten, and the
structural division into two halves — since 6 recalls 1 by its opening address
to Maecenas — recalled the appearance of Vergil's ten *Eclogues* about five
years before. At the same time he observed that this *formal* pattern is
crossed by another, based on *content*. Nos. 1—3 contain moral wisdom;
3 to 6 deal with the poet himself in various capacities; and 7—9 contain
amusing anecdotes; at the end of each triad, i.e. in poems 3, 6 and 9, we
have the most important poem for self-portraiture of the poet; and finally,
while no. 1 serves as an introduction to the book, no. 10 is an epilogue.

In 1962 Büchner briefly returned to the subject, and while approving of
Heinze's analysis as fundamentally correct, he maintained that the order
should not be regarded as too schematic. He added to Heinze that 6 recalls 1
not only by its opening address to Maecenas, but also by its theme of
contentment, and as similar formulations or parallel passages he listed the
following: 1, 1, 15—1, 6, 93, and 1, 1, 118 — 1, 6, 94.

In a proposed later contribution I shall point out a much more significant
parallelism between the two poems, viz. in 1, 1, 25—6 and 1, 6, 81—3; and
I shall also examine the significance of (and possible relation between) 1, 1
as dealing with 'avaritia' (as main theme), of 1, 2 as dealing with 'adulteria',
and of 1, 6 as dealing with 'ambitio'.

In addition to the relation between 4 and 10, in both of which Horace
deals with the relation between his satiric verse and that of Lucilius,
Büchner found a significant relation between 5 and 9 in so far as both are
'ine Selbstdarstellung im Maecenaskreise'; and he rightly observed that
'neben der mehr formellen Dreigliederung scheinen also Satire 4 und 5
vor dem Mitteleinschnitt mit den Schlußsatiren 9 und 10 in umgekehrter
Reihenfolge, aber deutlich in ihrer Intentionen zu korrespondieren.'

In 1966 Rudd reviewed the subject quite briefly, with reference to the
observations of Boll, Heinze and Büchner. He deals with the matter in a
somewhat perfunctory manner — no doubt because his main interest lies

5. See now 8. Auflage, Berlin 1961, XXII. This will be cited as Kiessling-Heinze.
6. On the number ten, or a multiple of it, in the works of Horace and some contem-
porary poets, see further Fraenkel, *Horace*, 112 and n. 1.
9. Rudd 160.
in giving an analysis and appreciation of each individual poem — and the criticisms that he offers of Heinze and Büchner only go to show that Horace retained something of the informality and mixed nature of the genre *satura*.

The brief — but not exhaustive — survey given above of some earlier investigations into the arrangement of, and relation between, the satires of Book I provides us with the following scheme:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Poem/Theme</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>On discontentment and avarice</td>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
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<tr>
<td>On extravagance, mainly sexual</td>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
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<tr>
<td>On friendship</td>
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<tr>
<td>H. the literary critic</td>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
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<td>H. the traveller</td>
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<tr>
<td>The ‘Pest’</td>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. the literary critic</td>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Having regard to the above scheme I would submit that little more than the surface of the subject in question has been touched; I propose therefore to go much further and, I hope, deeper, in an attempt to show that at a relatively early stage in the writing of his satires — and not merely during the final selection and editing of the first collection — Horace had in mind the publication of a *liber* in the sense of an organised book. In particular

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10. For brief references and/or observations see further E. Burck, Nachwort und bibliographische Nachträge, 396 in Kiessling-Heinze; Fraenkel, *Horace*, 96, 87 n. 2 and 127; and Rudd 14. I have now also seen the more detailed treatment of D. Armstrong, *Horace, Satires* 1, 1–3: A Structural Study, in *Arion* 3, 1964, 86–96.

11. This does not apply to Armstrong on 1, 1–3 as a triad (cited in n. 10). It will be seen, of course, that my concern is with Satires 1 and 2 as forming a distinct pair, and with Satire 3 as forming a pair with no. 4.

I propose to show that, apart from or in addition to the scheme illustrated above, Horace worked according to a principle of grouping which cuts across the division into triads. The principle is that of an arrangement into pairs: I mean not merely the disjunct or non-consecutive type of pair which has been observed so far, but a grouping into conjunct or consecutive pairs.

In illustrating this I submit that the use of the same word, or of similar phrases, is often more significant in linking up one satire — or part of a satire — with another than the mere employment of the same theme. Repetition of a theme may be mere repetition: it may be explained simply by the fact that the author had a special interest in this theme. But a repeated use of a particular word, or name, or of a special phrase, will be found to be even more significant in proving that the author, usually in a most subtle manner, deliberately wrote or edited two satires to form a pair, whether this be a conjunct or disjunct pair.

Now in regard to conjunct pairs this principle may be manifested in two ways:

either A:

1 2 3 4 etc.

or B:

1 2 3 4 etc.

Both types may be found in the *Sermones*, Book 1, but for reasons of economy I shall confine myself to type B in the main body of my text and give some brief illustrations of type A in the footnotes.

* * *

SATIRES 1 and 2.

The relation between the first and second satires forms part of the larger question of the relation between the first three satires as forming the first — and only real — 'triad' of Book I. Nonetheless, the first two satires form a distinct pair by reason of their rather similar structure, the fact that the doctrine of the Mean plays a more significant part (both explicit and implicit) in both, and by virtue of a number of significant verbal links between the two poems. The structure of the third satire deviates in part from the general scheme of the first two; and I propose to show that it contains arithmetical secrets of a more sophisticated nature, and that by virtue of its links with no. 4 it throws important light on the interpretation of the latter poem.

The main components of Satire 1 may be given as follows:

1—22: Introduction: The discontentment of people with their lot (memp-
*simoiria*, based professedly on a desire for easier work.

23—27: Transition, parenthetic.

28—107: Main body of the poem, which can be divided into:


61—107: Second main section. The ill repute and unhappiness of the miser who cannot have enough; *folly* of extremes, and the doctrine of the Mean (101—107).

108—121: Conclusion, linking 28—107 up with 1—22 ('illuc, unde abii, redeo', vs. 108). *Mempsimoiria* is ultimately caused by *avaritia*; and a development of the thought in vs. 40, 'that the greedy man is eager to surpass all competitors...' As a result of these modifications *μεμψίμοιρία* and *φιλαρχορία* both converge towards the larger concept of *πλανονέωλυς*. This vice had two complementary aims — more money for oneself and more money than other people.¹³

From the second half of the first main section (28—60) on we find a number of significant passages which anticipate, point forward and lead up to the doctrine of the Mean as formulated in 105—107. The first of these pointers occurs in 49b—51a:

\[
\text{vel dic quid referat intra}
\]
\[
\text{naturae finis viventi, iugera centum an mille aret?}
\]

The concept of a *limit* set by Nature links up with the concept of the wealth of Nature and with the doctrine, expressed by practical examples, that natural desires are equally satisfied from a large or a small supply.

The next pointer occurs at 'nil satis est' in 62 which, with the previous verse, marks the beginning of the *second* main section (61—107) of the poem, just as its echo, 'nil medium est', introduces the *first* main section (28—63) of the second satire. In the latter part of the second section 'nil satis est' finds its positive pointer in vs. 92,

\[
\text{denique sit finis quaerendi}
\]

which introduces the *concluding* section of the poet's homily to the miser. It is reinforced by 'finire laborem' in the following verse; and to illustrate these moral precepts Horace proceeds to tell the story of the miserly Ummidius who was so rich that he *measured* his money — 'ut metiretur nummos', 96 — instead of counting it.

I suspect that just as the moral precepts like 'sit finis quaerendi' anticipate

¹³. Rudd 14.
the doctrine of the Mean, so the proverbial expression of *measuring* one's money is a subtle if ironic pointer to the 'modus' which the miserly Ummidius failed to observe. Up to his last hour ('ad usque supremum tempus', 97b—98a) Ummidius feared he would die of starvation —

*at hunc liberta securi*  
divisit *medium* (99b—100a)

Once again, I am sure, we have an ironic pointer to the Mean, and Rudd quite rightly takes this line to signify that Ummidius 'only attained a knowledge of the middle way when he was split down the centre by a freedwoman's axe'.14 (But why a freedwoman? Would it be far-fetched to suggest that she points forward to the 'libertina' proposed by Horace in the next satire, 2, 47-48a as the *mean* between a 'matrona' and the 'meretrix' for the satisfying of sexual passion?)

What then? the miser asks: should he live like the spendthrifts Naevius or Nomentanus? To which Horace replies (101b—107):

\[
\text{pergis pugnantia secum}  
\text{frontibus adversis componere. non ego avarum}  
\text{cum veto te, fieri vappam iubeo ac nebulonem.}  
\text{est inter Tanain quiddam socerumque Viselli:}  
\text{est modus in rebus, sunt certi denique fines}  
\text{quos ultra citraque nequit consistere rectum.}
\]

Here, then, the concept of the 'naturae finis' (=fines) of vs. 50 is explicitly linked up with that of the Mean, which is also the 'rectum'.

The philosophic background of both the first and second satires has been traced and sketched by a long line of scholars, most recently and briefly by Rudd.15 What concerns us here is the application of the Aristotelian doctrine of the Mean to the Epicurean teaching of the bounty as well as the limits of Nature, and to the division by Epicurus — deriving from Plato and Aristotle16 — of desires (or pleasures) into three categories: those which are natural and necessary, those which are natural but not necessary, and those which are neither natural nor necessary.

Against this background we may now analyse the structure of Satire 2, and note a number of significant links between the first two satires in regard to form and content. A broad similarity of structure is clearly indicated,

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14. Cf. Rudd 22 f. I suspect that this is not the only pun contained in the passage. Horace is telling us in a most subtle manner that Ummidius — who knew no 'finis quaerendi' — only attained a knowledge of the Mean *when he made a 'finis' to his life when he was split down the centre by a freedwoman's axe.*
15. Rudd 23—25.
while the Introductions, transition passages and second main sections are exactly equal in length.

1—22: Introduction. The extravagance of the recently deceased Tigellius (implicitly an extravagant spendthrift) and other unbalanced characters such as the rich but unhappy Fufidius (an extreme miser). The moral which they illustrate is, as we shall see, the folly of running into either of two extremes: 'dum vitant stulti vitia, in contraria currunt' (vs. 24).

Most recently Armstrong17 has formulated the significance of this Introduction in regard to arrangement and structure: it is continuous with the concluding portion of the second main section of the first satire (101—107), since 'the material of 2, 1—22 is drawn with exact verbal echoes . . . from 1, 101—107', cf. e.g.

1, 104b—105

non ego avarum
cum veto te, fieri vappam iubeo ac nebulonem

with 2, 12:
Fufidius vappae famam timet ac nebulonis.18

It remains to point out another significant link, between the Introduction to 1, 2 and the main body (and Conclusion) of 1, 1. Horace is not concerned solely with the external aspect of extravagant actions (miserly or spendthriftly), neither of the avaricious in 1, 1 nor of the extravagant in 1, 2: he is as much concerned with, and about, the unhappy and unhealthy state of mind of both types in their restless acquisitiveness, their reckless extravagance or their uncharitable niggardliness. All have in common a fearful state of mind. Thus the 'timidus' of the miser in 1, 42 finds its echo in the 'timet' of the greedy Fufidius in 2, 12; the reputation of being 'miser' in 1, 63 is echoed by the 'miser' of the excessively harsh father in 2, 21; and the miser who has to lie awake 'metu exanimis', 1, 76, or — like Ummidius — to live in constant fear ('metuebat', 1, 99) of death by starvation, finds his opposite number in the miser who fears ('metuens', 2, 5) to be called a prodigal.

Likewise the 'avarus' — in the Conclusion to 1, 1 — who is constantly trying to surpass an endless series of wealthier people, like a charioteer lashing his horses in pursuit of the chariots in front of him, reappears in Fufidius — in the Introduction to 1, 2 — who presses ever harder his debtors the nearer they are to ruin.

18. Since 1, 1 was most probably written after 1, 2, Fraenkel's formulation in a different context regards this link from the opposite point of view (p. 96): '1.1.104 seems to point to 1.2.12, and the whole discussion from 1.1.101 on could be given the motto of that section of i. 2, dum vitant stulti vitia, in contraria currunt'. With contraria cf. pugnantia secum (1, 1, 102).
23—27: Moral conclusion and transition to main body of poem. Perhaps this should be taken to include 28a, 'nil medium est', which gives a more summary statement of 'dum vitant stulti vitia, in contraria currunt' (24). In fact, 'nil medium est' is retrospective and prospective, and provides the necessary link with 28b—110.

28—110: The main body of the poem, in which the doctrine of extremes and the Mean is applied solely to sexual gratification. The analysis and interpretation here offered may be regarded as an implicit refutation of the view that Horace does not keep consistently to an Aristotelian framework at least up to the middle of the poem (vs. 63); or that already from vs. 53b the idea of the Mean 'fades completely out of the picture'.

Vss. 28—110 may be clearly divided into two main sections, consisting of 28—63 and 64—110.

28—63: First main section: In its simplest form the Aristotelian framework of this section may be sketched as follows:

(a) 28—36: the two extremes of sexual gratification.
(b) 37—63:
   (i) 37—46: the one extreme, adultery.
   (ii) 47—54: in between, the Mean, intercourse with freedwomen — but within limits.
   (iii) 55—63: the other extreme, meretrices — again within limits.

We may now consider the sub-divisions of the first main section in some detail.

(a) 28—36: the two extremes of sexual gratification are adultery and (at the lowest level) the brothel, with an indication that the latter is to be regarded as the less serious extreme.

(b) (i) 37—46: the extreme of adultery. In 37—38a, a parody on two famous lines of Ennius, we have a new introduction, as it were, to the worst extreme, adultery: worst, however, not in a high moral sense, but simply in the Epicurean sense that it brings more 'dolor' than 'voluptas' and is

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19. Rudd 10f.
21. In 31—36 we find Cato congratulating a iuvenis emerging from a brothel for satisfying his lust there instead of with other men's wives. Rudd 31 points out that Horace does not mention a sequel to this story which we find in pseudo-Acron's comment on the passage. According to the commentator Cato said, after meeting the youth several times under the same circumstances: 'I commended you, young man, for paying an occasional visit, not for becoming an habitué.' Rudd comments: 'Clearly the weight of the story falls on the second half, yet Horace did not hesitate to suppress it, presumably because adultery was his chief concern and it did not suit his argument to have the brothel associated with a virtuous moderation.' See further n. 23 infra. When we look forward to vss. 55—63, it seems that Horace may also have 'suppressed' the second half of the story in vss. 28—36 because, in returning to the lesser extreme in vss. 55—63, he was in fact going to associate intercourse with meretrices with a kind of virtuous moderation, viz. liberality in moderation — in the sense of not squandering one's substance on these women.

22. 'Epicurean' here does not refer to Epicurus, but to some of his followers, cf. Kessling-Hienze ad loc.
attended by 'saepe pericla' (39—40). In fact, while 'nil medium est' in regard to 1—27 and 28—36 means 'they do not observe a mean', it can have only one meaning in regard to 37—46, viz. 'no mean exists'. In what, then, does the mean in the gratification of sexual passion consist? The answer is given briefly at the beginning of the next sub-section.

(ii) 47—54: the mean consists in trafficking with freedwomen:

\[\text{tutor at quanto merx est in classe secunda, libertinarum dico \ldots (47—48a)}\]

simply because it is safer. Horace then immediately proceeds to apply the doctrine of the mean in a different sense and to link up the Aristotelian virtue of liberality in moderation with the gratifying of sexual passion (48b—54):

\[\ldots \text{Sallustius in quas non minus insaniit quam qui moechatur. at hic si, qua res, qua ratio suaderet, quaque modesta munifico esse licet, vellet bonus atque benignus esse, daret quantum satis esset, nec sibi damno dedecorique foret. Verum hoc se amplectitur uno, hoc amat et laudat: 'matronam nullam ego tango'.}\]

The key-words here are 'insanit' and 'modeste'. Insanit, a strong word, refers to Sallust's unbalanced mental attitude in letting his passion run riot after freedwomen. This is not a new thought in the poem, for by implication — as the whole subsection shows — he is just as unbalanced as the adulterer who is an unbridled hunter of married women (28b—29). But the subsection on Sallust links up not only with section 28—36. The concept of insania in the sense of senseless extravagance has appeared already in the Introduction to the poem — thus linking it up with the main body of the satire — in characters such as the glutton who strips his paternal estate, or Fufidius, the greedy interest-hunter. Of all these it may be said, as Horace says of Sallust, that they were lacking in modestia or moderation.

This brings us to modesta, the second key-word, which is correctly explained by Kiessling as 'moderate': 'qua modesta (=moderate) munifico esse licet ganz objektiv auf das Maß von Freigebigkeit, welches als modestia beurteilt wird'. Here Horace no doubt had in mind the Aristotelian virtue
of being liberal in moderation, i.e. between the extremes of prodigality and meanness (both 'contraria' well illustrated in the Introduction to our poem), cf. E.N. 1107b8-10; and also the 'prodigal' as the man whose vice lies in 'wasting his substance' (το φθειρει την ουσίαν, E.N. 1120a1), a characteristic which is well illustrated in the following sub-section in our poem.

It should be noted that 'matronam nullam ego tango' in 54 clearly marks an incision or division at this point, just as 'in matrona' etc. in 63 marks the end of the following sub-section.

(iii) 55—63: the other extreme (to adultery). The link between this and the preceding sub-section is clearly given in 'ut quondam Marsæus'. This character boasts, like Sallust, that he does not touch other men's wives — but he does have dealings with the other extreme, though of a higher class than the lowest prostitutes contrasted with married women in 28—36, viz. with actresses and courtesans: 'mimae' and 'meretrices' (58). More significantly, he is like Sallust in wasting his substance: he has given his paternal home and farm to a 'mima', and, what is worse, he has lost his name. When Horace draws the conclusion, 'bonam deperdere farnam, / rem patris oblimare, malum est ubicumque', 61b—62a, we are reminded not only of Sallust (cf. 'nee sibi dannō / dedecorique foret', 52b—53a) but also of the extravagant characters in the Introduction who were so taken up with their reputation (cf. 4b—5a, 10, 12), and in particular of the 'prodigus' who 'parentis / praeclaram ingrata stringat malus ingluvie rem' (7b—8). On the other hand, the concluding sentence of our present subsection links up with the 'moechi' of 37—46 and with the two extremes in 28—36:

quoi inter­est in matrona, ancilla peccesne togata?

and, as we shall see, it looks forward to the second main section.

What is the significance of Horace's conclusion of this subsection, and at the same time his conclusion of the first main section 28—63? He is saying that to offend against the virtue of 'modestia' by squandering possessions and losing a good name is exactly the same, whether the loss is incurred over a 'matrona' or the opposite extreme.

It should be made quite clear that in so far as ancilla togata is retrospective in the poem, it represents or takes the place of the extreme opposed to married women, such as 'mimae' and 'meretrices' (vs. 58), and that here it does not refer to — or even include — the intermediate class of freed-women.25 In fact, this is not necessary, for Horace has already drawn

25. It has been frequently maintained, from the time of the pseudo-Acron commentator, that the 'ancilla togata' in 63 means 'libertina'. Cf. Lejay's note ad loc. Kiessling's conclusion is much the same as that of Lejay: 'die ehemalige Sklavin, jetzt Freiglaü bene, trägt als solche die Toga (vgl. 82)', etc. This identification may be refuted (i) by Horace's own usage of the word 'ancilla', since he nowhere else uses it in the sense of a 'libertina'
exactly the same conclusion — at the beginning of the previous subsection — in regard to 'matronae' and to 'libertinae', when he says of the latter: 'in quas / (Sallustius) non minus insanit quam qui moechatur' (48b—49). The insania, which leads to loss of fame and fortune, is equally bad in dealings with a married woman and a freedwoman.

64—110: Second main section. Adultery with 'matronae' in high society contrasted with the love of a 'togata'.

(a) 64—79: In the second main section Horace does not merely revert to the hazards of adultery. He now starts a new section on the unnatural and unnecessary desire of those who hunt only after high-born married ladies such as Fausta, and he offers them the following advice (73—79):

\begin{quote}
\textit{at quanto meliora monet pugnanti\textit{a}que istis divis opis natura suae, tu si modo recte dispensare velis ac non fugienda petendis inmiscere. tuo vitio rerum labores, nil referre putas? quare, ne paeinete\textit{a} te, desine sectari matronas, unde labor\textit{is} plus haurire mali est quam ex re decerpere fructus.}
\end{quote}

On the face of it we have in the last two verses (78—79) merely a repetition of the topic of 37—40. But in fact, whereas 37—40 dealt with 'matronae' in general, this word in vs. 78 has a narrower connotation. From the immediate and the wider context — cf. vss. 70—72, 80—82a, 94—100, 126 — it is clear that Horace is dealing with the high-born; and reverting to the bounty of Nature he teaches that Nature knows better than to go so much trouble in the pursuit of these ladies. On the other hand, the word 'togata' (which picks up 'ancilla togata' of vs. 63 in so far as it is prospective) in the following subsection has its connotation extended, if only in an implicit manner.

(b) 80—100. The 'togata' is usually preferable to the matron (82):

\begin{quote}
... atque etiam melius persaepe togatae\textit{a}.\textit{est.}
\end{quote}

but only of a 'serva': cf. Sat. 1, 2, 117; 2, 3, 215; Epist. 1, 18, 72; Carm. 2, 4, 1. We find the Thes. L.L. in agreement in assigning only one meaning to the word, viz. 'serva'; (i) by the context in which 'ancilla togata' appears in the satire under discussion: in the relevant subsection she stands for the same class as 'minae' and 'meretrices', vs. 58. To link her up with the 'libertia' of vs. 48 would be to commit two errors, firstly of failing to make an incision after vs. 54, and secondly of failing to note that the same conclusion in regard to the 'matrona' and the 'libertia' has already been drawn in 48—49. On the last-mentioned point, see supra.

See further W. Goethert in RE 2, Reihe, 12. Halbband, col. 1652 f.: 'In der Frauentracht wick die Toga früh der stola und verblieb nur den meretrices und iudicio publico damnatae et in adulterio deprehensae, denen das Kleid der ehrsamen Römerin zu tragen verboten war (Marquardt-Mau 44, 1).' Of course, 'meretrices' could include freedwomen, but Horace in 47—54 implicitly distinguishes the latter from the extreme of 'meretrices'.

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We have seen that in 63, at the end of the first main section, the ‘ancilla togata’ does not represent the intermediate class of freedwomen, but stands for the extreme opposed to married women. It is clear that the three-term Aristotelian framework of ‘matronae — libertinae — meretrices’ of the first main section has now been supplanted by a two-term framework consisting of (cf. vs. 72) the ‘(magno patre nata) matrona’ and of the ‘togata’ as general antithesis. 26

Despite the limitation imposed upon the framework, there is no lack of cohesion between the two main sections of the poem. For not only are both supported by the Epicurean theory of Nature as well as division of pleasures, but Horace is still using the same kind of terminology in the second main section in which Nature has taken over from the Mean. Thus in the long passage (73—9) quoted above under (a), we find that in 73

\[
\text{at quanto meliora monet pugnantiaque istis}
\]

there are direct echoes of ‘tutior at quanto merx est in classe secunda’ (on freedwomen as a Mean, 47) and of ‘pugnantia secum’ in the passage on the Mean in the previous satire quoted above (p. 43), cf. 1, 102b. In the following line, ‘recte’ (2, 74) recalls ‘rectum’ used in regard to the Mean in the same passage, 1, 107; while ‘divis opis natura suae’ (2, 74) and — in the concluding line — ‘plus haurire’ (2, 79) contain an echo of the passage on the ‘naturae finis’ and the bounty of Nature along with ‘tantundem haurire’ in 1, 49b—53. At the same time ‘Sallustius in quas non minus insanit quam qui moechatur’ of 2, 48b—49a points forward to the unnatural and unnecessary lust of the ‘moechus’ for the high-born which is stimulated by the barriers he encounters in seeking forbidden charms (96—97):

\[
\text{si interdicta petes, vallo circumdata (nam te hoc facit insanum), multae tibi tum officient res, etc.}
\]

\[c\] 101—110: By way of contrast the ‘togata’, i.e. the ‘cheap’, unattached woman, presents no hindrance. Through her transparent silk you can measure her body with your eye: ‘metiri possis oculo latus’, 103a. But, returning to the ‘insania’ of the adulterer in high society, the poet says in his rendering of the Callimachus epigram: The hunter sings of his love which (108):

\[
\text{transvolat in medio posita et fugientia captat.}
\]

Two things are clear. Firstly, ‘in medio posita’ alludes to the charms of the

26. To this extent Rudd is right in saying of the ‘togata’: “When she returns in vv. 82 ff. she is treated as the simple antithesis of the matrona, and thus she comes to stand in a general way for cheap, available satisfaction ‘with no strings attached’.”
'togata' which are 'ready to hand' (cf. 'altera, nil obstat', 101a; cf. also 119 and 122). Secondly, 'fugientia' alludes to the forbidden charms of the high-born 'matrona', and links up with 'fugienda' of vs. 75. At the same time it echoes 'fugientia captat flumina' used of Tantalus in 1, 68—69.

What may not be clear, I suggest, is that while Horace is contrasting the satisfaction of natural desire (with a 'togata') with the unnatural and unnecessary passion of the adulterer in high society, he is once again using language related to the theory of the Mean in the same subtle manner as he did in the parallel passage at the end of the second main section in the First Satire. Thus we get the following parallel scheme:

Satire 1
- 96: ut metiretur nummos
- 100: divisit medium
- 106: est modus in rebus

Satire 2
- 103: metiri possis oculo latus
- 108: transvolat in medio posita
- 111: cupidinibus statuat natura modum

With vs. 111 we have reached, of course, the first verse of the concluding section of the second poem.

111—134: Conclusion, on 'modus' in the sense of a natural limit applied to desires, and a personal application to Horace himself.

If you assign a natural limit to your desires, would you quench your thirst from a gold cup? Likewise with physical passion: go for the slave (girl or boy) who is ready to hand. The kind of girl the poet wants is the same as that required by Philodemus: neither expensive nor reluctant nor prettier than Nature has made her. When he makes love to her, she is as good as any society lady, nor does he fear that like an adulterer he may be surprised by an angry husband. With 'nee vereor' in 127 he links up the concluding section with the Introduction by implicitly contrasting his own enjoyment of natural pleasure with the fearful state of mind of the extravagant characters who give the setting for the poem.

Moreover, in the concluding line —

dependi miserum est: Fabio vel iudice vincam

— he gives a final emphasis to the unhappy lot of the extravagant, whether supposed adulterer like Fabius,26a or guilty party like the married lady ('miseram', 130, combined with 'metuat', 131), or hunter of the high-born matron like Villius ('miser', 64), or excessively harsh father ('miserum', 21) as in the play of Terence. The loss of reputation ('fama') in the last but one verse likewise stresses a theme which runs right through the poem — cf.

26a. On the problem of Fabius in 1, 2, 134, see Rudd 133 f.
vss. 12, 59, 61, 133 — and links up with the bad reputation of the ‘avarus’ in the previous satire (‘miserum’, 1, 63).

Finally we may note how Horace uses names to indicate a link between the two satires. In the last verse(s) of 1, 1 and 1, 2 he satirises briefly Crispinus and Fabius. These two form a pair in so far as both were long-winded Stoic writers. A different technique may be illustrated with regard to Fabius. In 1, 1, Horace concludes his list of examples of human discontent in the opening passage with a reference to Fabius, vs. 14. By way of balance and contrast he concludes the closing scene in 1, 2 with Fabius, vs. 134. In this way he brackets, as it were, the two poems as a pair. It is probably significant that while the name of Crispinus reappears in 1, 3 and 1, 4, the name of Fabius occurs only in the first two satires.

Armstrong has traced a number of important parallels in regard to structure and content — and also of structure as related to content — between the first three satires as forming a triad.\(^{27}\) Before setting out the similarity of structure of 1, 1 and 1, 2 in its external and arithmetic aspect, it remains for me to stress once more that in the first two poems Horace is not concerned solely or even primarily with the external aspect of the extremes of human folly, nor with the modus as simple medium between such extremes. He deals mainly with modus or moderation as a limit set by Nature to our desires and the indulging of our desires; and in both poems he is equally concerned with the unhappy, fearful and unhealthy state of mind of the avaricious and other extravagant types: in short, with their insania. Even the sexual mean consisting in relations with freedwomen is dealt with merely in passing as a mean between the two extremes of adultery and prostitution; and it seems probable that Horace realised the inadequacy of this concept of a sexual mean, and accordingly linked up the concept with moderation in regard to squandering one’s fortune on both freedwomen and ‘meretrices’. It is probably for this reason too that he dropped the Aristotelian three-term scheme in the second main section of 1, 2 and regarded the modus here as the gratification of natural desire — in the sexual sphere — with unattached women of easy virtue, in opposition to the unnatural pursuit of married women, particularly those in high society.

In the structural scheme which follows I shall point out some chiastic patterns which are probably not accidental, but part and parcel of Horace’s own design. Thus, e.g., we find — in order of publication — that while in 1, 1 he starts from the doctrine of Nature and its limits, in the first main section, and proceeds to the doctrine of the Mean at the end of the second main section, he reverses the process in 1, 2: here the first main section has a definite Aristotelian framework with a three-term scheme consisting of

\(^{27}\) Armstrong, Arion 3, 1964, 88–93, summarised 92 f. I do not propose to consider the differences in analysis and interpretation between the account of Armstrong and my own.
‘matronae — libertinae — meretrices’, while in the second main section Nature takes over with a two-term scheme.

I, 1

(The figures between brackets indicate total number of verses).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1—22 (22)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FABIUS, 14</td>
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<tr>
<td>23—7 (5)</td>
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<tr>
<td>28—107 (80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>= (i) 28—60: (a) 28—40 (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(33)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(b) 41—60 (20)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

NATURA

= (ii) 61—107: (a) 61—67 (7) |
| (47) |
| natura, 75 |
| (b) 68—100 (33) |
| (c) 101—107 (7) |

MODUS

(non fieri) vappam . . nebulonem, 104

modus + (naturae) fines, 106

cupidinibus statuat natura modum, 111

108—121 (14)

Crispinus, 120

I, 2

<table>
<thead>
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<th>1—22 (22)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Fufidius vappae famam timet etc., 12</td>
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<tr>
<td>23—27 (5)</td>
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<tr>
<td>28—110 (83)</td>
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<tr>
<td>= (i) 28—63: (a) 28—36 (9)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(36)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(b) 41—60 (20)</td>
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MEDIUM ← (b) 37—63 (27)

NATURA

= (ii) 64—110: (a) 64—79 (16) |
| (47) |
| natura, 75 |
| (b) 80—100 (21) |
| (c) 101—110 (10) |

MODUS

From the whole analysis, and from the scheme given above it should be clear, firstly, that Satires 1, 1 and 1, 2 were edited (if not written) as a pair; secondly, that there are no ‘structural uncertainties’ in 1, 2. On the contrary, it is quite manifest that Horace attained a mastery over form (in satira) in the structure of 1, 2, probably the earliest poem in the collection. This may be illustrated with special reference to the first and second main sections.

In 28—63 we find that the first sub-section, 28—36, starts with the one extreme, married ladies, and concludes with the other extreme, prostitutes; this is followed by a tripartite sub-section, 37—63, which consists of three parts dealing successively with the first extreme, with freedwomen as the Mean, and with the other extreme. In the last verse of the first subsection the poet reverts to the ‘matrona’, and at the end of each of the three subsequent parts he reverts either to the adulterer or to the ‘matrona’ in comparison with the ‘libertina’ and ‘togata’ respectively.

Schematically we get a double ring composition:
In the second main section we have a similar but subordinate — as opposed to co-ordinate — arrangement which may be represented as follows:

Here the concluding portion of the section as well as of each subsection deals with the high-born 'matrona', in each case pointing schematically to the same figure at the beginning of the section; and at the end of the first and second sub-sections we find an explicit contrast drawn between the society lady and the 'togata'.

* * *

While the structural analysis and interpretation of the content and significance of the poem given above has not been offered in a polemic spirit, it may be regarded as a correction of existing studies of the poem by e.g.
Eduard Fraenkel and Niall Rudd. Fraenkel considers the main theme of the main part of the poem, announced at vs. 40, to be 'the saepe pericla that threaten the adulterer, that is to say the lover of a matrona' (p. 78), with a repetition of the topic of 37–40 in the middle of the poem in vs. 78 f., 'desine matronas sectarier' etc. (the reading accepted by Fraenkel). On p. 79 the main theme of the satire as a whole is specified as 'the grave and quite unnecessary risks involved in adultery with women of society'. What has not been made clear in this account, due to an inadequate structural analysis, is that the saepe pericla and follies of the adulterer concern ordinary 'matronae', or married women in general, in the first main section of the poem; while in the second main section, 64–134, Horace proceeds to deal with the unnatural and unnecessary passion of adulterers involved with high-born ladies, and that in this section Nature takes over from the Mean (i.e. from the mean between two extremes). Moreover, the correlative is that from 64 on Horace is equally concerned with the idea that intercourse with a togata (the other extreme) is preferable to a liaison with a matrona in high society.

Furthermore, the topic of 'desine matronas sectarier', whether in ordinary or in high society, is only one main theme of the greater part of the satire. While Horace maintains a consistent Aristotelian three-term scheme down to vs. 63 (contra, by implication, Fraenkel on the mean on p. 77, cf. 78 n. 2), his other main theme — which runs right through the poem, implicitly in the opening and closing sections, and explicitly in the first and second main sections — concerns the mean not as a mean between extremes, but as a lack of modestia, or as an insanitia, a reckless extravagance, mentally and materially, which puts the unbalanced and spendthrift hunters of matronae, libertinae and meretrices on an equal footing, cf. vss. 48b–63, also 97.

This, then, is the second main theme of Satire 1, 2. What special importance Horace attached to it appears from the fact that 'insanit' and 'insanum', in 2, 49 and 97 respectively, become a refrain which echoes through Satires 3, 4, 5 and 6, and finally in Book 1, in the Tenth Satire. Horace uses these (or related) terms on all levels, whether with a mental, material, 'official' or literary (cultural) significance. In 3, 82 ff. the master who crucifies a slave because he (the master) cannot distinguish between a trivial and a serious offence, is called 'insanior' than Labeo (a 'crazy' jurisconsult). In Satire 4 the term occurs twice, taking up the sexual theme of 1, 2 in 'hic nuptarum insanit amoribus, hic puerorum', vs. 27, and in vs. 49 f. where we hear of a 'meretrice nepos insanus amica/filius' who rejected a wife with a large dowry. These two passages confirm the one main theme of 1, 2, while 'ne sequerer moechas, concessa cum venere uti/possem' etc. in the same poem, 4, 113b–114, confirms the other main theme of 1, 2 with its correlative; and a little later Horace says that thanks to this and other advice in his father's training he is 'sanus' from disastrous 'vitia', 129b–130.
In Satires 2 to 4 'insanit' and 'insanus' are used in a serious context. 'Sanus' in 4, 129 is used less seriously, and when we come to Satires 5 and 6 we shall find 'insanus' used, superficially at any rate, in a lighter tone with reference to those who pride themselves excessively on their official dress and insignia (5, 35 f. and 6, 27 f.). Whether the term has a deeper significance in 5 and 6, the middle pair in the book, remains to be seen at a later occasion (when 'insanius' in 10, 34 will also come up for consideration). In 5, 44 the use of 'sanus' will not be of any help in this connection, but in 6, 97 f. 'demens/iudicio volgi, sanus fortasse tuo' in its context will throw considerable light on the subject of those who entertain high political ambition; and since 5 and 6 form a pair, the latter may throw some light on the former.

*Sed haec hactenus.* Before we incur the charge of going off into ramblings, it is time to turn to Satires 3 and 4.

* * *

It is true, of course, that the first three satires form a triad in respect of form and content, and that consequently Satires 2 and 3 form a pair of type A distinguished above. That 1, 2 and 3 form a real triad has been demonstrated in some detail by Armstrong, while Rudd has briefly sketched the structural similarity as follows: 'Structurally . . . these poems are alike in having an opening theme of about twenty verses introduced by some striking hyperbole or comic effect, and then illustrated in a series of antithetical pairs. A second, related theme then emerges and receives a much more extended treatment . . . In two cases there is a short final section recalling earlier motifs, and in all three the end is enlivened by a gibe at the expense of a living person.'

Now Rudd has given us an analysis of 1, 3 which reveals the following structure:

1. 1—19: opening passage on the inconsistent and unbalanced behaviour of the singer Tigellius.
2. 19—24: transitional passage leading to:
3. 25—75: first main section, about 'aequitas' or fairness in criticising the faults of others.

28. Armstrong, *Arion* 3, 1964, 91—93. It falls outside the scope of the present article to treat in greater detail (than Armstrong) of the special links in content between 2 and 3. In passing, however, I mention 2, 90—93 and 3, 38—40 on the lover's blindness in regard to the 'mala' or 'vitia' of the loved one. In regard to names it is significant, of course, that (Sardes) Tigellius links up 2 and 3 (cf. 2, 3 and 3, 3 f.); on the other hand it is a different person (cf. Fraenkel, *Horace* 86 n. 2), the cantor Tigellius Hermogenes, who links up the pair 3 and 4 (cf. 3, 129 and 4, 72) and also the pair 4 and 10 (cf. 10, 90). Finally, the long-winded virtue-monger Crispinus links up 1 and 3 (cf. 1, 120 and 3, 139), where in both instances he appears as a humorous figure; but also 3 and 4, cf. 4, 14 where Horace is concerned with him — suitably to the context — as a wordy poet.

29. Rudd 14.
4. 76—118: second and related main section, about 'aequitas' in fixing penalties for offences.
5. 119—124: transitional passage to the effect that there is no fear that the Stoic (king) will punish too leniently.
6. 124—142: concluding passage containing a derisive attack on the Stoic tenet that the wise man is a king. 'The picture of the royal sage forms a companion piece to the opening picture of Tigellius,' and at the same time it recalls the theme of forbearance or fairness.

In what follows, and with regard to Satire 4, we shall be concerned chiefly with 3, 25—75, i.e. the first main section. But before proceeding to a brief analysis of its content and significance, it is necessary to point out some numerical secrets in the structure of no. 3 which have apparently escaped notice. If we arrange the structure in an anti-clockwise pattern, and determine the length of the sections more precisely, we get the following scheme:

1. 1—19a = 18 \frac{1}{2} verses
2. 19b—24 = 5 \frac{1}{2} verses
3. 25—75 = 51 verses
4. 76—118 = 43 verses
5. 119—124a = 5 \frac{1}{2} verses
6. 124b—142 = 18 \frac{1}{2} verses

How sensitive Horace could be to structure and symmetry, even in his satura, is indicated by the equal length of the opening and concluding passages and of the transitional passages respectively. Whether it is accidental that we get the verse numbers of the second transition passage by adding 100 to those of the first, is a matter for speculation. However that may be, the two main sections are not of equal length, no doubt because Horace knew how to observe a 'modus' in striving after symmetry in the structure of a satura.

* * *

SATIRES 3 and 4

In the first main section of Satire 3, i.e. vss. 25—75, Horace considers the requisites of 'aequitas' or fairness in dealing with the faults of others, particularly of our friends (observe how 'inter alnicos' in vs. 1 looks forward to 'in alnicorum vitiis', 26 and 'in amicitia', 41); and he lays down a number of procedures or principles in dealing with such faults.

First principle, 25—37: If a man is rather quick-tempered ('iracundior', 29) or rather slovenly in appearance ('rusticius', 31), he is still a 'bonus (vir)', 32, a friend ('amicus', 33), with a great natural ability ('ingenium ingens', 34) under that rough exterior. At the same time we should take a

32. This shows conclusively that the portrayal of Tigellius and that of the royal sage were meant to be companion pieces by Horace. On the inner structure of the opening passage, see Gnomon 40, 1968, 155 n. 1.
critical look at our own faults — 'denique te ipsum/concute', etc., 34—36 — in other words, we should also weigh a man's faults against our own.

Second principle, 38—66: A lover fails to observe the 'turpia vitia', 39, of his girl-friend. Likewise, in the sphere of friendship, we should minimise the faults of our friends at any rate, e.g. a man is somewhat tight-fisted ('parcius', 49): let him be called thrifty ('frugi'). This is followed by a description of faults mainly in the comparative, and of how they should be interpreted: 'iactantior', 50; 'truculentior atque fplus aequo tiber', 51 f.; 'caldior', 53; and 'simplicior', 63. In between the two last examples Horace criticises the tendency of some people who go to the opposite extreme of turning the virtues of others into faults.

In 67—72 and 73—75 Horace proceeds to expand on the first principle stated above. These passages confirm the two aspects of the first principle, viz. that it is fair that we should weigh a friend's virtues against his faults (and turn the scale in favour of the virtues, if they are in fact more numerous), and that we should weigh a friend's faults against our own. Complementary to this is the second principle which states simply that we should minimise the faults of our friends at any rate.

The comparatives, 'parcius' etc., in the section under consideration require special attention, since they are all-important in proving a link between Satires 3 and 4.

Finally, in the second main section, 76—118, Horace strongly insists on the difference between serious offences and lesser faults (and on the necessity of 'aequitas' in assigning suitable punishments to each). This distinction we shall also find to be relevant to the interpretation of 1, 4.

The fourth poem, which is the first of the literary satires, has been analysed and interpreted in various ways. It is best divided into eight sections, as follows:

(i) 1 — 8a = 7½ verses: on moral function of satire
(ii) 8b— 21a = 13 verses: mainly on artistic form
(iii) 21b— 38a = 17 verses: on moral function
(iv) 38b— 63 = 25½ verses: on artistic form
(v) 64 — 78a = 14½ verses: cf. (vii) = 14 verses (v)—(viii) on moral function
(vi) 78b—103a = 25 verses: cf. (vii) = 26 verses
(vii) 103b—129a = 26 verses.
(viii) 129b—143 = 14½ verses.

Once again we find that the poem has been constructed in a most artistic manner, and that its structure contains a number of numerical and other 'secrets'. Peculiar to the first and shorter half of the poem, 1—63, is the fact that the four sections deal alternately with the moral function and the artistic claims of satire. Peculiar to the second and longer half, 64—143, is that the four sections — which deal consecutively with various aspects of
the moral function — give the same type of numerical symmetry as we have found in Satire 3.

What is perhaps less obvious at first glance is, firstly, that of the eight sections, only the fourth (at vs. 63) and the eighth conclude at the end of a verse. With regard to the former this is explained by the fact that 63 marks a sharp incision between the two halves of the poem:

hactenus haec: alias iustum sit necne poema.

Horace, for the time being, is dropping the question of the artistic claims of satire, and in the second half he will deal with matters almost exclusively related to the content and moral function of the genre.

Secondly, the incision in the middle of a verse in the first half of the poem enables the poet to pass almost imperceptibly from the question of moral function to that of artistic form, in a manner which suits his purpose on each occasion. And finally, in the second half, the same type of incision enables him to knit together, as it were, diverse aspects of the moral function of satire.

In the light of these observations we may now turn to an examination of the eight sections of the poem and observe a number of important links between Satires 3 and 4. In particular I propose to show that the two principles laid down in the ethical sphere in regard to criticism of one’s friends in 1, 3 are translated fairly closely to the sphere of literary criticism in 1, 4.

(i) 1-8a. The opening passage may be quoted in full:

Eupolis atque Cratinus Aristophanesque poetae
atque alii quorum comoedia prisca virorumst,
siquis erat dignus describi, quod malus ac fur,
quo moechus foret aut sicarius aut alioqui
famous, multa cum libertate notabant.

hinc omnis pendet Lucilius, hosce secutus,
mutatis tan tum pedibus numerisque; facetus, 33
emunctae naris . . .

33. ‘Facetus’ in vs. 7 is usually, and misleadingly, translated ‘witty’. Its real meaning will become clear from an examination of the other passages of the Sermones in which it occurs — all in the first book (2, 25, contrast ‘inceptus’ in 4, 92; 4, 90; (10, 44); and 10, 64) and from Heinze’s notes ad loc. It means more or less the same as ‘urbanus’ in the sense ‘of urbane speech and humour’, an interpretation which is confirmed by Horace’s observation in 10, 64f.: ‘fuerit Lucilius, inquam / comis et urbanus’. Rudd 88 translates ‘facetus’ in 4, 7 as ‘witty’, but then he also translates ‘urbanus’ in 10, 65 as ‘witty’ (p. 115). H. J. Rose in The Eclogues of Vergil, Berkeley 1942, 25 concluded tentatively ‘that the word comes fairly near meaning “humorous” ’ in the ‘mole atque facetum’ which the Muses granted to Vergil, cf. Hor. Sat. 1, 10, 44. But in fact the word means here ‘graceful’, cf. Quint. I.O. 6, 3 on this passage, and Heinze ad loc., ‘anmutig’. C. O. Brink, Horace on Poetry, Cambridge 1963 (to be quoted as Brink), p. 158 interprets ‘facetus, emunctae naris’ as the ‘humour and . . . unerring eye for moral faults’ of Lucilius; but ‘emunctae naris’ need not relate exclusively to moral faults.
There are two lines of argument in the Fourth Satire: 'on the one hand Horace is examining certain stylistic requirements of the satura, on the other hand its moral justification.' Now Horace starts with the latter, i.e. with content and spirit, in the well-known passage which forms our first section. He notes the great masters of Greek Old Comedy and the moral function which they performed with great freedom of speech. He derives Lucilius, i.e. the Lucilian satura, completely or essentially (omnis) from the 'multa libertas' (=παρησία) of this Greek exemplar, maintaining that the Latin poet changed only the rhythm and the metre. Lucilius was likewise 'facetus', i.e. 'urbane' in the sense 'of urbane humour' (see note 33) and keen-scented in detecting faults. The whole passage down to the middle of vs. 8 is in praise of Lucilius. 

With regard to the previous satire, we cannot fail to note the resemblances with, and echoes of, the following lines in 1, 3:

stultus et improbus hic amor est dignusque notari, 24

and in particular vs. 106 —

ne quis fur esset neu latro neu quis adulter

which gives us not merely a chiastic scheme but a 'star' pattern in its relation to 4, 3—4:

moechus  sicarius  fur

fur  latro  adulter

(ii) 8b—21a. In the course of vs. 8 Horace makes an abrupt transition from the moral to the (mainly) stylistic, and from praise to criticism:

... durus conponere versus;
nam fuit hoc vitiosus: in hora saepe ducentos,
ut magnum, versus dictabat stans pede in uno;
cum flueret lutulentus, erat quod tollere velles;
garrulus atque piger scribendi ferre laborem,
scribendi recte; etc.

34. Fraenkel, Horace, 126.
35. It is true, of course, that in vs. 7, 'mutatis tantum pedibus numerisque', Horace is referring to poetic form, but he is not yet expressing a judgment on the style of Lucilius' work. On 'poetae' in vs. 1, see Rudd 89 (with n. 8 on p. 286).
36. That the opening passage contains praise, and not criticism or condemnation of Lucilius' spirit, has been shown once for all by Rudd 91, not only from the passage itself, but also from 10, 3—4. See also Rudd, ibid. on supposed criticisms of the Lucilian spirit in other passages in the Fourth Satire.
He criticises Lucilius for being harsh and unremitting — ‘durus’ — in composing verses, and for being muddy in his flow; in a word, for failing in the ‘ars scribendi recte’. He then switches his criticism to the poetaster Crispinus who is concerned solely with the quantity of his output; and he concludes the second section with ‘self-effacing’ thanks to the gods for fashioning him, Horace, a man of few words and of diffident spirit (vss. 17—18) — as opposed to Lucilius (though in the immediate context Crispinus is deliberately ‘substituted’ for Lucilius as the exemplar of the long-winded poet). 38

What are we to make of the second section in relation to the first? More particularly, what are we to make of Horace’s overstatement in making Lucilius ‘derive entirely’ from the ‘multa libertas’ or ‘parrhesia’ of Attic Comedy? And what of his understatement of his own ability in the second section?

Regarding the former, there can be no doubt that Horace incorporated a topos in his pronouncement on the dependence of Lucilius on Old Comedy. This topos probably derives from Varro; and Leo has even suggested that in so doing Horace was paying a discreet compliment to Varro. 39 However that may be, Rudd maintains, quite rightly, that we should regard the lines as a piece of special pleading in which Horace exaggerates the dependence of Lucilius on Old Comedy in order to claim that Aristophanes, Lucilius and (implicitly) himself are all links in the same illustrious tradition. 40 This, he says, should warn us against taking the rest of the poem as a dispassionate, carefully balanced essay in literary theory.

While I believe that in its structure and content the poem does have a peculiar balance, Rudd is certainly right in issuing a warning against taking the Fourth Satire as a dispassionate piece of literary criticism. I would

37. ‘Durus conponere versus’ is usually translated ‘harsh in his versification’ — and in the light of Sat. 1, 10, vss. 1—2, cf. 9—10, 58—59, this is what Horace had in mind, as effect of Lucilius’ prolixity. I interpret ‘harsh and unremitting’ to point out that in the immediate context in 1, 4 Horace explains the harshness (‘nam fuit hoc vitiosus’) by referring to Lucilius’ unfailing energy in composing verses (vss. 9—10); so also in 1, 10 the relevant verses (58—59) are followed by (60—61):

hoc tantum contentus, amet scripsisse ducentos
ante cibum versus, totidem cenatus . . .

— where ‘hoc tantum contentus’ recalls ‘nam fuit hoc vitiosus’ in 1, 4, 9.


38. By ‘substitute’ I indicate Horace’s technique of shifting his criticism from Lucilius to some other poet, thereby avoiding the impression of concentrating his criticism too severely on Lucilius. Cf. Sat. 10, 36—37, where ‘diffingit Rheni luteum caput’ should be compared with 4, 11 ‘cum flueret lutulentus’.


40. Rudd 89.
suggest, however, that the real ground for a warning of this nature goes much deeper than the polemical context to which Rudd assigns the first literary satire. Rudd suggests that we should see the two sections above as an application — in the sphere of literary theory and criticism — of the ethical principle in 1, 3 which we have called the first principle, viz. that it is fair that we should weigh a friend's virtues against his faults, and that we should weigh his faults against our own.

Now Horace is about to deal with the stylistic deficiencies of Lucilius, but he starts the poem with the moral justification of his predecessor's work (and his other virtues as a satirist), because it gives a better link with the previous satire — and indeed group of satires — which is concerned with vitia and with bona or virtutes (e.g. 3, 70, cf. 55). So much for form. In regard to content he is applying the first half of his first principle, but in an inverted order: before he mentions the rough exterior (cf. 'rusticius', 3, 31) of Lucilius' satires, i.e. his deficiency in respect of ars, he will first praise him for his ingenium, in fact for what in 3, 33 f. he has called the 'ingenium ingens' which 'inculto latet hoc sub corpore', and which in 4, 5—7a consists in his 'multa libertas' and his qualities as 'facetus, emunctae naris'.

After this Horace makes a swift transition to a sharp criticism of Lucilius' stylistic vitia: 'durus conponere versus' etc. He thus balances his virtutes with his vitia, but he quite clearly does not turn the scale in favour of the former, nor does he regard the latter as minor faults, but as serious ones, in terms of the second main section of 1, 3. However, as soon as he has made his point, or rather points, he applies the second half of the first ethical principle, i.e. he graciously or modestly — but certainly humorously — takes a look at his own faults. In an ironic manner he proceeds to search or examine himself in terms of 3, 33 f.: 'denique te ipsum concute' etc. And so he nicely balances the overstatement of the opening section on Lucilius with an understatement in regard to himself.

(iii) 21b—38a. In the third section Horace briefly professes that he shuns publicity; he then once again makes a switch in his argument, from the stylistic back to the moral viewpoint, claiming that he is afraid to recite in public because satire ('genus hoc', 24) displeases some people since most of them deserve censure: 'utpote pluris culpari dignos', 24b—25a. This is followed by a list of types whom Horace regards as 'culpari dignos', a

41. Rudd 88, cf. 286 n. 7.
43. When we read that Lucilius was 'piger scribendi ferre laborem, scribendi recte', we are reminded that in the previous three satires Horace was concerned, as in his satires in general, with the ars (and labor) 'vivendi recte' (for 'vivendi recte' cf. Epist. 1, 2, 41). For 'scribendi recte' cf. also A.P. 309, and on 'labor scribendi recte' as an Alexandrian ideal (and here in Horace's mind), see Brink 159 ff.
44. On this profession as part of a pose (in regard to publication), cf. C. A. Van Rooy, Studies in Classical Satire etc., Leyden 1965, 63
phrase which takes up 'dignus describi' of the first section; and they are reminiscent specifically of types described in Satires 1 and 2, cf. 4, 25 ff.:

quemvis media elige turba:
aut ob avaritiam aut misera ambitione laborat;
hic nuptarum insanit amoribus, hic puerorum;

After completing the list Horace goes on to say, in playful fashion, that all these people fear\textsuperscript{45} verses and hate poets.\textsuperscript{46} Why? 'If he can but raise a laugh, he will not spare himself, he will not spare any friend', 34b—35:

\textit{dummodo risum excutiat, sibi non, non cuı̈quam parcet amico.}

The careful reader will not fail to note that in vss. 34—38a Horace is giving a 'vulgar' version of the qualities which he has praised in Lucilius in the opening passage; and that the lines we have quoted hark back to the first main section of Satire 3, on friendship, and specifically to vss. 30b—33a:

\textit{rideri possit eo, quod rusticius tonso toga defluit et male laxus in pede calceus haeret; at est bonus, ut melior vir non alius quisquam, at tibi amicus . . .}

(iv) 38b—63. After presenting an exaggerated 'popular' image of the satiric poet, Horace replies to these accusations directed at the poetae, 38b—40a:

\textit{agedum, pauca accipe contra. primum ego me illorum, dederim quibus esse poetis, excerptam numero . . .}

In a most artful manner he dodges the 'moral' charges against the satiric poet by expressing his readiness — in a tentative manner — to remove his own name from the list of poets: and so returns to the stylistic argument which (artful dodger that he is) he had left hanging in the air at the end of the second section. At the same time we meet with the same kind of understatement (after the 'popular' overstatement of the satirist's function in the previous section), but this time exclusively in respect of the stylistic worth of his satires. The reader will note that Horace is using tenses and

\textsuperscript{45.} 'Metuunt' in vs. 33 perhaps links up with the fear of the avaricious and the extravagant (cf. 4, 25—32) in Satires 1 and 2 (see p. 44 \textit{supra}); but in the present context their fear relates to satiric verse.

\textsuperscript{46.} We shall presently note the significance of the term 'poetas' in vs. 34.
moods which are of a non-committal or ambiguous nature: ‘I shall (may?) exclude myself from those whom I should concede to be poets.’ He continues in the same strain, 40b—42: ‘For you would not call it (dixeris) sufficient to confine a verse within metrical limits, nor would you regard (putes) anyone a poet who like myself writes what is more akin to conversational language (sermoni propria).’ How should we interpret this section?

In the first section of 1, 4 Horace incorporated a topos in regard to the content and function of Lucilian satire. In the present section he is also incorporating a topos, one perhaps deriving from Lucilius himself,47 to the effect that the satura or sermo was not pure poetry. However, he is not simply alluding to a theory of satire; he is using it to manifest once again — in the sphere of literary criticism — his first principle on friendship in 1, 3. After allowing Lucilius ‘ingenium ingens’ in the first section, and denying him ars in the second, he now in a non-committal manner takes a critical look at his own verse, refers to similar views on the claims of comedy to the title of poetry, and concludes by putting his own verse on a level with that of Lucilius (vss. 56 ff.).

The section has been correctly interpreted by Brink 164: ‘Horace takes great pains not to seem to commit himself unduly to these views. He reports judgements that deny the poetic nature of comedy and satire; yet in the end he leaves the question open and does not fully accept the strictures’ — cf. 4, 63: ‘hactenus haec: alias iustum sit necne poema’. Now Horace is here looking forward to the Tenth Satire, when he will answer the question whether, or to what extent, satire is true poetry (at present we may take him to imply that it is not poetry in the grand style, cf. vss. 43—44).48 However, when dealing with the final section of 1, 4, I shall show that Horace gives a hint of how he is going to answer the question.

We have seen that 4, 63 marks a clear incision which divides the poem into two halves, that in the first half Horace alternates between the moral and stylistic requirements of satire, and that in regard to both requirements he applies his first principle on friendship relating to criticism. In the second and longer half he continues his discourse on the moral requirements and deals successively with four aspects which he knits together by passing from the one to the other in the middle of a verse on each occasion. After a transition section (64—78a) in which he picks up where he had left off in 38a, and returns briefly to the question of publication, we have a longer section (78b—103a) in which we shall hear a final echo of the first principle. This is followed in conclusion by two sections which are of an autobiographic nature: while the length of the first (103b—129a) balances with that of the preceding section — 26 verses as against 25 — the last (129b—143) is

47. Cf. Brink 168 on Lucilius’ record of the kind of reader he wished for; and idem 169 on Horace’s dexterous reversal of Lucilius’ pronouncement in 1, 10.
48. See further the article by Gregor Maurach in the present volume of Acta Classica, p. 80, n. 24.

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exactly equal in length to that of the transition or first section of the second half of the poem (both 14½ verses). In the second half of the poem, to which we now turn, Horace introduces his second principle on friendship into the sphere of literary criticism.

(v) 64—78a. Horace now once again reverts to the moral aspect of satire, and with the first two verses returns to the charge made against satire of being suspect in its intentions and the means it employs. The innocent are quite safe from the 'soap-box' satirists; and as for himself — once again a topos, not to be taken quite seriously — he, Horace, has no intention of publishing, nor does he recite his 'libelli' except to a few select friends, and that only after much pressing. This understatement in regard to his intentions is nicely balanced by an overstatement on those who recite in public, in the middle of the forum or even in the Baths, where the vaulted space echoes their voice to the delight of the frivolous.

(vi) 78b—103a. Horace now at last considers the charge of spiteful intent on the part of the satirist, and issues a vehement general denial of the charge 'laedere gaudes . . . et hoc studio pravus facis', 78 f., in particular of back-biting and failing to defend an absent friend, 81b—82:

absentem qui rodit amicum,
qui non defendit alio culpante . . .

We shall not fail to hear in this passage an echo of 3, 19—21 where Horace admits that he has faults, but not the same, and perhaps lesser ones: in particular he does not back-bite like Maenius, 21:

Maenius absentem Novium cum carperet . . .

— and shortly afterwards in the first main section of the Third Satire he proceeds to formulate his first principle that a man’s faults should be balanced with his virtues.

But to return to the section under discussion. In the passage immediately following vss. 81—2 (quoted above) Horace once more — as in 34—38a of the third section — gives a parody of the qualities for which he praised Lucilius in the opening section. And at the end he returns once again to the worst fault which to his mind could be manifested against a friend, that of malicious back-biting combined with a timid show of defence (93b—100); here once again Horace is serious, and makes a serious promise, that this vitium shall be far from his pages and from his mind.

To my knowledge only one scholar has—up to the present—indicated a link between the Third and Fourth Satires. I am referring to Walther Willi who observed twenty years ago: ‘Die Stelle, sat. 1, 4, 93—100, nimmt die
Gedanken der Satire 1, 3 über Freundschaft auf! 49 This is true, but in fact
the whole of the Fourth Satire, or rather the Satire as a whole, is based very
much on the ethical principles formulated on criticism in regard to friend­
ship in the Third. Of the extent to which these two poems are companion
pieces I shall now give the final proof.
(vii) 103b—129a.

When we read these verses, we cannot but pick up in the mind’s eye the
comparatives in vss. 38—66 of the preceding satire: ‘parcius ... iactantior
... truculentior atque plus aequo liber.’ What is Horace doing? He is asking
in effect that the second principle that he laid down there be applied to
himself, the principle, viz. that we should give a charitable interpretation of
the faulty qualities of our friends.

Now where do his own qualities of speaking ‘liberius ... iocosius’ derive
from? From his father, 105b—106:

insuevit pater optimus hoc me,
ut fugerem exemplis vitiorum quaeque notando.

Horace is still occupied with the moral function of satire, and ‘notando’
picks up ‘notabant’ of vs. 5; but he is on a different plane, for while in the
first section he derived Lucilius’ ingenium explicitly — and his own merely
implicitly — from the artistic example of the Old Masters of Attic Comedy,
he now derives his own ingenium in satire from the practical moral training
that his father had given him in censuring by name individuals who exem­
plified vices.

The examples which he gives from this training recall mainly parallels
from Satires 1 and 2; cf. ‘viverem uti contentus eo, quod mi ipse parasset’
(108) with ‘contentus vivat’ in 1, 2; and (4, 113 ff.) —

ne sequerer moechas, concessa cum venere uti
possem, ‘deprendi non. bella est fama Treboni’

with ‘desine sectari matronas’ and ‘deprendi miserum est’ in 2, 78 and 134.

And so, by the practice ‘exemplis ... notando’, his father sought by prac­tical means — not by the theoretical training of the ‘sapiens’, vs. 115 —
to teach him to live according to the mos maiorum, cf. ‘traditum ab antiquis

49. W. Will, Horaz und die augusteische Kultur, Basel 1948, 93 n. 3. See further n. 51
infra on a parallel reference in Fraenkel; though the latter, of course, does not link
the Third and Fourth Satires.

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morem servare', 117. To those who charged the satirist with malice, Horace
can therefore give a positive answer: he does not satirise from malice, so he
claims, but as a result of his father's moral teaching and training, which
tend to make him 'liberius' and 'iocosius'.

Brink comments as follows on 103b—106: "His father's naive 'exemplifying'
was notare practised by the light of nature: that, Horace is saying
humorously, put him on the way to the artistic notare which Lucilius had
practised before him" (p. 160). A different formulation strikes me as
possible. Horace is indicating two roots of Latin (and his own) satire, the
one Greek and Roman (Old Comedy and Lucilius), the other Italian and
Roman, viz. his father, who here illustrates the Roman moral practice of
notare, just as Lucilius had translated the Greek parrhesia into the Roman
literary practice of multa cum libertate notare. To Horace's mind — or at
least in his presentation — they are both complementary and distinct. In
Satire 4 he praises Lucilius in the opening passage for his imitation of the
Attic comic writers (cf. 10, 3b—4), and is vague concerning his own relation
to both. In Satire 10 (which forms a pair with the fourth) he will proceed
to qualify his praise of the satiric spirit of Lucilius, and state his own theory
of the correct imitation of Old Comedy by the satirist (vss. 5—17). At
present, in 1, 4, he presents his father, in his capacity as moral critic, as his
exemplar in writing satire.

Just how far Horace intended the passage on his father's example to be
humorous, I find difficult to judge. While it has been suggested that he
himself did not take it seriously,50 I should prefer to believe that it was
written out of true pietas and that it was probably a true if idealised
example. It certainly is an overstatement, just as the concluding section
which follows is mainly an understatement with a very revealing hint in its
humorous conclusion.

(viii) 129b—143. Horace makes the transition to the concluding passage
by claiming that thanks to his father's training he is 'sanus' and free of the
worst vitia, 129b—131a:

ex hoc ego sanus ab illis,
perniciem quaecumque fereant, mediocribus et quis
ignoscas vitium teneor.

In admitting that he is subject to lesser vitia such as one would excuse,

50. K. Zarzycka, Literarische Problematik in den Satiren von Horaz, in Römische
Satire, Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Universität Rostock, Ges. und Sprachw. Reihe,
15, Heft 4/5, 1966, 547: 'Die Berufung auf den vaterlichen Rat ist einer von seinen
Griffen, und diese Entschuldigung nimmt er selber nicht ernst, zumal er das Motiv der
pädagogischen Methode Terenz erinnert (Adeiph. 414; Heaut. 289), der diese Methode
in seinen Komödien lächerlich machte'. I am grateful to Dr. Werner Krenkel of Rostock,
the editor of Römische Satire, for making available to me a copy of the valuable collection
of papers contained in it.
Horace is recalling his admission in the third satire that he has ‘vitia minora’, cf. 3, 196b—20—

\[ \text{nunc aliquis dicat mihi ‘quid? tu nullane habes vitia?’ immo alia et fortasse minora} \]

— and also his opposition in the second main section of that poem\(^{51}\) to the rigid Stoic doctrine that ‘paria esse . . . peccata’ (3, 96), since in fact he considers it a major sin not to pardon a friend for a small offence, 3, 83b—85a:

\[ \text{quanto hoc furiosius atque maius peccatum est: paullum deliquit amicus, quod nisi concedes habeare insuavis, etc.} \]

In the last section of Satire 4 Horace goes on to say that perhaps he will make moral improvement with the passing of time, with the help of an outspoken friend (‘liber amicus’, 132) and by self-counsel, ‘consilium proprium’, 133, such as ‘rectius hoc est: / hoc faciens vivam melius’ etc., 134 ff. Thus he debates with himself, and in the expression of such thoughts does he amuse himself with his papers in his leisure time. Here we have the first formulation of Horace’s theory of satire as a means of self-expression and self-improvement, and significantly it follows immediately after a section which anticipates the theory with the practice (as taught by his father).

Finally, what of the question of the stylistic or artistic worth of his satiric verse which he had left open in vs. 63:

\[ \text{alias iustum sit necne poema.} \]

The ‘alias’, we have said, looks forward to Satire 10; however, in the humorous concluding verses of our present poem, 139b—143, we find not only an echo of the conceded passage in 3, 83—85 (cited above), together with a nice pun on concedere, but a hint as to whether Horace regarded himself as a poet in the writing of satire which he gives as an example of his mediocria vitia:

\[ \text{hoc est mediocribus illis ex vitis unum: cui si concedere nolis, multa poetarum veniet manus, auxilie quae sit mihi (nam multo plures sumus), ac veluti te Judaei cogemus in hanc concedere turbam.} \]

\(^{51}\) Cf. Fraenkel, *Horace* 87 (on this section of Sat. 3) and n. 2: ‘That mediocria vitia should be condoned is a principle which Horace, fully aware of his own shortcomings, has very much at heart, cf. 1.4.130 f. and 1.6.65 ff.’
And so, after tentatively leaving the fold of poets earlier in the poem (39 f.), he humorously holds forth the prospect of returning to the fold by calling to his aid a large band of poets to which he implicitly belongs: ‘nunc multo plures sumus’. 52

* * *

In retrospect I submit that while, in general, a poem may be regarded as a self-contained work of art — in the sense of carrying within itself all the material required for its interpretation 53 — nothing prevents us from interpreting it additionally in the light of another poem, provided that it can be shown that the poems concerned were purposely written and/or edited as a pair or as in some sense complementary to each other. In this way the ethical principles stated in 1, 3 throw important light on the interpretation of 1, 4.

In *Horace on Poetry* Brink asserts correctly that the poem should be studied equally in terms of contemporary literary feuds and of the poet’s own aspirations. 54 Now concerning the tenor of Horace’s satire and his aspirations as a satiric poet, problems arise immediately. With regard to the function and spirit of his satire, he is vague concerning the relation between himself and Lucilius and Old Comedy because — as Rudd 55 has reasonably inferred from the poem itself — he could otherwise not pose as a timid spirit anxious to avoid offence (17—18), and the influence of his father (103—129) would become a factor of minor importance. But why should he pose as a timid spirit? Not simply to suggest to his enemies that he was reluctant to give offence, but, as I have shown above, because he is applying his first principle in regard to criticism of one’s friends (in 1, 3) to himself, i.e., he is weighing his own faults against those of Lucilius — with his tongue in his cheek, because he is exaggerating his own incapacity.


54. Brink 157, n. 1, who rightly rejects the contention of G. L. Hendrickson that 1, 4 is not a defence on Horace’s behalf with a view to establishing the (relatively) milder tenor of his own satire, but a protest against the harsh personal satire of Lucilius, cf. *AJP* 21, 1900, 121—141. Brink accepts Rudd’s decisive refutation of Hendrickson’s interpretation (cf. *AJP* 76, 1955, 165—175 and *CQ* 49, 1955, 142—156), but maintains — as against Rudd — that the poem should not be studied primarily in terms of contemporary feuds, but equally in terms of the poet’s own aspirations. This qualification would now be accepted by Rudd, cf. his work cited in n. 3 supra, 286 n. 15.

55. Rudd 92.
The same applies to the way in which Horace underestimates the artistic quality of his satire. On the face of it he disclaims the title of poet partly as a dodge to avoid answering the moral charges levelled at the satiric poet. But when we read 1, 4 as one of a pair with 1, 3 — and I submit that it has been adequately demonstrated above that they were in fact intended to form a pair — we realise that he is once again applying his first principle from 1, 3, with the effect of underestimating his poetic facilities in satire. This conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that he could not justifiably have criticised Lucilius so severely for his stylistic faults in 1, 4 if he had not proved himself a master of form and style in the preceding three satires.  

Hereby I do not wish to suggest that the ethical principles stated in 1, 3 provide the only key to a full understanding of Horace's underestimation of his animus and his poetic ability in 1, 4 — but only that they form an indispensable key. For in general it is true, as Fraenkel has pointed out, that Horace 'was by nature and self-education an εἰρων and enjoyed minimizing his own potentialities.'  

It remains to answer the question, how far Horace — while defending the satirist's right to freedom of speech — proclaims that he will observe a milder tenor as moral critic than Lucilius (and Old Comedy). The upshot of 1, 4 is that Horace justifies the moral function of his work implicitly by an appeal to Lucilius (as related to the moral function and the δνομαστή κωμωδείν or personal satire of Old Comedy), and explicitly by an appeal to the practical example of his father in censuring individuals who exemplified vices. The difference which he concedes in manner or spirit is one of degree only; and it is to the effect (for the contrast is not drawn explicitly) that he will express himself not 'multa cum libertate' (with superlative force), but 'liberius', 'rather forthright', and 'iocosius', 'rather jocosely' (vss. 103, 104).  

If Horace is vague in 1, 4 about his theory of satire in relation to Lucilius and Old Comedy, he leaves us in no doubt that in practice he does not propose to give up the right of satirising by name. That his 'libertas' includes this right is shown not only by the fact that 1, 4 abounds in δνομαστή

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57. Fraenkel, Horace 434, with reference to Horace's excuses by pleading incapacity for doing what his friends wanted him to do, cf. Sat. 2, 1, 12 f., Carm. 1, 6, 5 ff.; 2, 12; and 4, 2 (the latter on Horace's declining to write a laudatory ode in Pindaric style for the occasion of Augustus' expected triumph in Rome after his return from the Rhine). Fraenkel goes on to say, 434 f.: 'It is also possible that he (Horace) was sometimes perfectly sincere in pleading incompetence. He may have felt that his production was slow and that, if he was to say something worth saying, he had to make a sustained effort. It is significant that a note very similar to operosa parvus carmina fingo had already been struck in one of his earliest works, Sat. 1, 4, 17 f., di bene fecerunt inopis me quadque pusilli finixerunt animi, raro et perpauca loquentes.' I submit that the two verses quoted from Sat. 1, 4 would not qualify for the category of 'perfectly sincere', and that they are an ironic understatement of the poet's capacities.
κωμωδεῖν (vss. 14, 21, 28, 65, 66, 69, 72), but in particular by the fact that his father — from whom he professedly derives the critical habit — practised moral censure of individuals by name (vss. 109, 110, 112, 113). However, these very examples in 1, 4 illustrate the milder tenor of Horace’s satire: in so far as his characters are real people, and alive at the time, they do not include the great and the powerful, but are all relatively insignificant people. There is a marked difference between 1, 4 (and the rest of Horace’s satires) on the one hand and 1, 258 on the other hand, where he had not merely jibed at the insignificant Rufillus and Gorgonius (vs. 27), but had censured Sallust (vs. 48), a man of some social consequence, and also the high-born Fausta, for adultery (vs. 64 f.).

There is one passage in 1, 4 in which Horace — with only a partial intrusion of parody (86—91 b) — quite seriously qualifies his animus in the writing of satiric poetry: it is 78b—103a, which has been considered above as section vi of the poem. He seriously denies that he wishes to cause pain, or that he writes with spiteful intent; and he dissociates himself most strongly from backbiting and failing to defend an absent friend. Whether he is here drawing a distinction between Lucilius (and Old Comedy) and himself is very doubtful, though it has to be admitted that our poet’s forerunners in the professed lineage would frequently have found it difficult — if not impossible — to deny the charge, ‘laedere gaude’ (vs. 78b). As for Horace himself, when in the Tenth Satire we find him lampooning his literary opponents by name — Hermogenes, Demetrius, Pantilius and Fannius — as a ‘pansy’, an ‘ape’, a ‘louse’ and a ‘blockhead’ respectively (vss. 17, 18, 78, 79), he might counter the charge of ‘laedere gaude’ and justify himself by pointing out that these people were back-biters (cf. vss. 78—80).

In the final section of 1, 4 (i.e. vss. 129b ff.) Horace deals his final card, as it were, to confound his critics. Because of his father’s educative example, he maintains, he is free of disastrous vices; as for his minor faults, perhaps he will be cured of them by ‘longa aetas, liber amicus, / consilium proprium’ (132b—133a). Thus he does not regard himself as above criticism; and the self-counsel that he practises will take the form of confidential talks to himself for the sake of his own improvement (133b—139a):

(neque enim) desum mihi: ‘rectius hoc est; —
hoc faciens vivam melius; — sic dulcis amicus
occurram; — hoc quidam non belle; numquid ego illi

58. It is generally recognised that 1, 2 is one of the earliest satires (perhaps the earliest in the collection), written in the Lucilian manner, and no doubt earlier than 1, 4. (That 1, 2, 27 is cited in 1, 4, 92 may, of course, be due to editing.)


60. Cf. Rudd 91 (also on 4, 65 ff.).
inprudens olim faciam simile? haec ego mecum compressis agito labris; ubi quid datur oti, inludo chartis.

And so he debates with himself with sealed lips — cf. 'mecum loquor haec tacitusque recordor' (Epist. 2, 2, 145) — and when he does put something down in writing, he does so for his own amusement.

'Thus the argument is resolved into uncommitted irony.'\(^{61}\) The poet's moral observations, whether positive or negative, have professedly no outward function, but are directed solely at his own self-improvement; and when he finds the leisure to compose something, it is merely a playful pastime — one of his minor 'vitia', for which he should be excused. And so we find once again Horace, the skilful advocate, acting as 'amicus sibi' in the sense of pleading his own case against the charges of his critics. By his theory of self-examination and self-improvement — the serious side of his 'doctrine' of 'quam sibi ... sit amicus' (cf. Sat. 2, 20), on which Gautar has made some noteworthy observations\(^{62}\) — he manages to effect a brilliant depreciation of the outward function of his satire, one which is of a pattern with the repeated understatements of his 'animus' and his poetic ability in 1, 4. That the poet's own moral observations — like those of his father — did fulfil a self-critical function, need not be doubted;\(^{63}\) but when we look forward to 1, 10, which is a continuation and an expansion of 1, 4, we shall not be deluded about the real, critical outward function of Horace's satire (cf. especially 10, 11—15). However, the subject of the Fourth and the Tenth Satires as a pair falls outside the scope of the present article.

* * *

The Fourth Satire marks a break in the formal sense of the word: it is a dividing line between the mainly serious homilies of 1—3 and the (superficially at any rate) completely playful Journey to Brundisium in Satire 5; as well as a dividing line between the triad 1—3 and Satires 5 and 6 which formally constitute a central pair of poems in the book. In what sense and in what ways 5 and 6 actually form a pair I propose to show at a later stage when I shall return to the subject of pairs in Horace, Sermones, Book I. In so doing I shall be mindful of the fact that the structure of the Book has other facets as well: at the lowest level a bi-partite division into two halves, with 1, 1 as an Introduction to the whole book, 1, 6 as an Introduction to the second half, and 1, 10 as a Conclusion to the whole; and at the top a

61. Brink 164.
62. K. Gautar, Horazens 'amicus sibi', in Acta Antiqua 12, 1964, 129—135. To the passages considered by Gautar, add Sat. 1, 4, 34b—35, reading 'sibi non, non cuiquam parcat amico'.
63. Gautar, ibid. 134 f.
division into three triads of which 1—3 go together more closely than 4—6, and 4—6 more closely than 7—9; also that, in regard to this division, no. 4 (with its two concluding autobiographical sections) is not only a break in the senses I have indicated above, but a link 64 with 5 and 6 as autobiographical satires. While previous investigation has been concerned mainly with the top and bottom structures, I propose to show how these are knitted together by a structural division into pairs, i.e. both consecutive and non-consecutive pairs; and finally, to point out what a variegated and artistic structure Horace conceived and executed with the formerly lowly satura.

For the present, let the line —

Brundisium longae finis chartaeque viaeque est

— mark the end of Satire 5 as well as the conclusion of the first half of Book I.


Bibliographical note: A forthcoming article by Walther Ludwig, in Poetica, entitled 'Die Komposition der beiden Satirenbücher des Horaz', has been announced (see Gnomon 40, 1968, Heft 4, cover p. 3). At the time of reading the present article in final proof (September 1968) this has not come to hand.
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