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In a previous paper I attempted to show that the views expressed by Aristotle in his lost dialogue *Eudemus* or *On the Soul* seems to conflict with some of the doctrines he advanced in his later works. Since the *Eudemus* is primarily, though not exclusively, a *consolatio mortis*, I alleged that this ‘conflict’ is somewhat irrelevant insofar as an eulogy of a departed ‘person near and dear’ is hardly the proper document from which to draw reliable inferences as to Aristotle’s true and ultimate convictions regarding the nature of the human soul. Nevertheless, his emphatic assertion in the *Eudemus* of the soul’s immortality apparently compelled the Stagirite to embark on a theoretic discussion of the nature of the soul in order to justify philosophically this claim for immortality.

In the *De Anima* 407 b 27, Aristotle insists that ‘there is yet another theory about the soul which has recommended itself to many people as no less probable than any of those we have heretofore mentioned. This theory has given a good account of itself in the arena of public discussion. The advocates of this theory proclaim that the soul is a kind of attunement (harmony) . . .’ Commenting in detail on this Aristotelian passage, Philoponus, Simplicius, Themistius, Olympiodorus, and Sophonias took issue with the statement that ‘the soul is a kind of attunement or harmony’. In doing so, they apparently also referred to what Aristotle said in the *Eudemus* about the nature of the soul.

Philoponus relates that ‘Aristotle, having criticized alike all those who had discussed the soul, for having said nothing about the body which was to receive it . . . as might be expected goes on to connect this criticism to his own opinion about the soul. Some thinkers tackled the same issue, namely,

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that the soul is not a body resulting from a mere accidental constitution that shares in the soul, but that it requires a definite constitution, just as attunement is not produced by any accidental state of the strings, but requires a definite degree of tension of these strings. These thinkers thought, therefore, that the soul too is an attunement of the body, and that the different kinds of soul correspond to the different attunements of the body. Aristotle states as well as rejects this opinion. At first he merely records the opinion itself, but presently he sets forth the arguments that led these thinkers to this opinion. He had already opposed this opinion elsewhere, namely, in the dialogue *Eudemus*. Before him Plato, in the *Phaedo* (92A-94E), has used some five arguments against this view . . . Aristotle himself . . . has used in the dialogue *Eudemus* the two following objections. One goes like this: “Attunement . . . has a contrary, namely, lack of attunement, but the soul has no contrary. Hence, the soul is not attunement.” One might object to this that there is strictly no contrary to attunement, but rather an indefinite privation, and the soul, being a kind of form, has an indefinite opposite. Or, as we say in the case of music, a certain lack of attunement changes into attunement. By the same token, a certain kind of privation changes into soul. Aristotle’s second objection is this: “The contrary of the attunement of the body is the lack of attunement of the body, and the lack of the attunement of the living body is disease, weakness and ugliness. Of these, disease is the lack of attunement of the elements, weakness the lack of attunement of the tissues, and ugliness the lack of attunement of the organs. If, then, lack of attunement is disease, weakness and ugliness, attunement is health, strength and beauty. But the soul is neither of these, neither health nor strength nor beauty. For even Thersites, the ugliest of men, had a soul. Hence, the soul is not attunement.” This is what Aristotle says in the *Eudemus*. But here (scil., in the *De Anima*) he has used four objections to refute this opinion, of which the third is the second of the objections made in the *Eudemus* . . . When Aristotle maintains that he said all this in his ‘public discussions’, he must refer either to his unwritten discussions with his associates (in the Academy) or to the exoteric compositions (among which are the dialogues, e.g. the *Eudemus*), which are called exoteric because they were not written for his real or intimate disciples, but for the general advantage of the many . . . ‘It is more appropriate to call health (or, more generally, the good physical state of the body) an attunement than to assert this of the soul.’ This is the third objection (the second in the *Eudemus*). That health is attunement he has shown in the *Eudemus*, reasoning from its being the contrary of disease. We have stated above the course of this syllogism.7

7. See note 2, supra.—In the *Phaedo* 92A-94A, Plato advances five arguments in favor of the immortality of the soul and against the definition of the soul as the attunement of the body: (1) the anamnesis implies that the soul pre-exists the body, but attunement
It appears from Philoponus’ comments that in the *Eudemus* Aristotle made two major objections to the thesis that the soul is nothing more than the attunement of the physical body. The first objection runs as follows: while attunement has obviously a contrary, the soul has no such contrary. Admittedly, this particular objection could possibly be defeated by the counter-argument that to everything, including attunement, might be opposed its contrary. The second objection is this: attunement of the physical body is its health, strength or beauty, but the soul is neither physical health nor strength nor beauty.

In the *De Anima* 407 b 30-408 a 18, Aristotle enumerates four objections to the thesis that the soul is a kind of attunement, that attunement is a blending or composition of opposites, and that the body is made up of contraries. Aristotle’s third objection reads as follows: ‘It would be more appropriate to call health (or generally one of the good states of the body) an attunement than to assert this about the soul.’ According to the testimony of Philoponus, this is but a restatement of the second objection made by Aristotle in the *Eudemus*, where the Stagirite apparently added the further remark that ‘health is an attunement’ and ‘the contrary of disease’.

Commenting on Aristotle, *De Anima* 407 b 30-408 a 18, Simplicius reports that ‘by the arguments used in public discussions Aristotle means those of the arguments’ which are adapted to the intelligence of most people, hinting perhaps at those made in the Platonic *Phaedo*, but meaning also those used by himself in the dialogue *Eudemus* in order to refute the

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13. Ibid. p. 147, lines 7-9.—The other three arguments against the thesis that the soul is attunement—arguments or objections advanced in Aristotle, *De Anima* 407 b 30-408 a 18, but apparently not contained in the *Eudemus*—are the following: (1) attunement is a certain proportion or harmony of the constituents (or components) thus blended, but the soul is neither of these (to wit, proportion or harmony); (2) the power of originating movement cannot belong to attunement; and (3) the soul is neither the attunement (or harmony) of the several component parts of the body nor the ratio of these several elements.
theory that the soul is attunement (or harmony)'. 14 In short, Simplicius claims outright 1. that in the Eudemus Aristotle objects to the theory that the soul is attunement; 2. that in the De Anima Aristotle takes up again these objections; 3. that in his refutations Aristotle also took account of the arguments made in Plato’s Phaedo; and 4. that these refutations, or some of them, were part of public discussions, or became the topic of some of his ‘exoteric’ writings.

Themistius relates that ‘another opinion about the soul has been handed down . . . and has been examined both in public and private discussions. Some maintain that the soul is attunement. For attunement is a mixture and combination of contraries, and the body is composed of contraries, so that that which brings these contraries into concord and harmonizes them . . . is nothing other than the soul, just as the attunement of (different) notes blends low notes with high notes. This argument is plausible, but it has been refuted in many instances both by Aristotle and Plato. The soul, these two men insist, is prior to the body, but attunement (or harmony) is posterior; the soul rules and oversees the body and frequently antagonizes it, but attunement (or harmony) does not antagonize the things that have been harmonized; attunement (or harmony) admits of a ’more’ and of a ’less’, but the soul does not; attunement (or harmony), so long as it is preserved, does not admit non-attunement or disharmony, but the soul admits wickedness; if non-attunement or disharmony of the body is illness, ugliness, or weakness, the attunement or harmony of the body must be beauty, health and strength, but never the soul. All these things have been said by the philosophers (sic., Plato and Aristotle) elsewhere, but what Aristotle says now is that . . . it is clear from what Aristotle has said here (sic., in the De Anima) and from what he has said elsewhere (sic., in the Eudemus) that those people who maintain that the soul is attunement (or harmony) seem to be neither very near nor very far from the truth’. 15

Themistius, it will be noted, fails expressly to mention the Eudemus, referring only in a general manner to what Aristotle says in the De Anima as well as ‘elsewhere’. When commenting on the thesis that the soul is ’a kind of attunement (or harmony)’, Themistius merely restates or, perhaps, paraphrases Aristotle’s arguments in the De Anima. Moreover, he briefly

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15. Themistius, op. cit. supra note 4, p. 24, line 13–p. 25, line 25.—It will be noted that, like Philoponus and Simplicius, Themistius refers to ’public (or private) discussions’. This could mean also the so-called ’exoteric’ works of Aristotle. See Philoponus, op. cit. supra note 2, p. 145, lines 21 ff.: ’When Aristotle maintains that he said this in his ’public’ discussions’, he must refer either to his unwritten discussions with his associates or to the exoteric writings (among which are the dialogues, e.g. the Eudemus), which are called ’exoteric’ because they were not written for his true and intimate disciples, but for the general advantage of the many . . . ’ But unlike Philoponus and Simplicius, Themistius does not mention specifically the Eudemus.
recites the five arguments against this thesis, four of which are actually the objections made by Plato in the *Phaedo*. The fifth argument listed by Themistius is actually the second objection of the *Eudemus*: “If non-attunement (or disharmony) of the body is illness, ugliness, or weakness, attunement (or harmony) of the body must be beauty, health and strength (δόνυμις, not ἵσχυς), but never the soul”.16 Themistius, on the other hand, does not record the first objection of the *Eudemus*, namely, that ‘attunement (harmony) has a contrary, that is, the lack of attunement (non-attunement, disharmony), but the soul has no contrary’.17

The differences between the comments of Themistius and those of Philoponus raise some interesting problems. It is not entirely impossible that Themistius, whose account is certainly more succinct and probably less accurate than that of Philoponus, derived his information from Alexander of Aphrodisias rather than directly from Aristotle’s original text. This, however, is by no means certain. The specific tradition on which Themistius relies did not in all likelihood report the first objection made by Aristotle in the *Eudemus*, to wit, that ‘the soul has no contrary’. Neither does Themistius refer to the ‘rebuttal’ or ‘counter-argument’ found in the commentary of Philoponus to the effect that ‘one might object to this argument (that the soul has no contrary) that there is strictly no contrary to attunement (or harmony), but rather an indefinite privation. And the soul, being a form, has an indefinite opposite’.18 These textual differences suggest not only that Philoponus relied on a different tradition than did Themistius—that Philoponus probably consulted the *Eudemus*—but also that the Aristotelian *Eudemus* apparently contained this ‘rebuttal’ or ‘counter-argument’. Hence, this ‘rebuttal’ might not be a later interpolation of some commentator (as some scholars have suggested), but rather constitutes an original thought expressed by Aristotle in the *Eudemus*. It is also interesting to observe that the first argument of the *Eudemus* has not been restated in Aristotle’s *De Anima*, while the second argument of the *Eudemus*, broadly speaking, is taken up again in the *De Anima*.19

Olympiodorus relates that ‘in the *Eudemus* Aristotle makes the following objection: “Disharmony (non-attunement) is contrary to harmony (attunement), but since the soul is a substance (οὐσία γὰρ), it has no contrary”. This conclusion is obvious. Moreover, if the disharmony of the elements in an animal is disease, the harmony must be health, but not the soul ... The

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17. See Philoponus, *op. cit.* p. 144, lines 24–25. It should also be noted that Themistius combines into one single objection what Philoponus considers two separate objections, namely, objections four and five.
19. Aristotle, *De Anima* 408 a 1–3.—It will be observed that Themistius uses the term δόνυμις, where Philoponus refers to ἵσχυς. See note 16, supra.
third argument (in Aristotle's *De Anima*) is the same as the second argument in the *Eudemus*. The only new information conveyed by Olympiodorus is the important statement that the soul 'is a substance' or, better, that in the *Eudemus* Aristotle might have called the soul a substance. Presumably, this statement was part of the first objection or argument contained in the *Eudemus*. But we cannot escape the impression that Olympiodorus' (or Aristotle's?) argumentation contains a *petitio principii* in that it simply presupposes the substantiality of the soul, which it is supposed to prove in order to disprove the contention that the soul is merely attunement or harmony.

Sophonias maintains that 'there has been handed down yet another opinion about the soul, which many people find plausible, as much as any of those opinions that have been recorded. This opinion, however, has already been dealt with and refuted by appropriate arguments which have been published—both by our arguments directed at Eudemus and by those contained in Plato's *Phaedo*. Nevertheless, these arguments will be criticized now as well. Some say that the soul is attunement (or harmony).'

It should be borne in mind, however, that any interpretation of the several fragments attributed to the *Eudemus* must always take into account the doctrinal foundation as well as the didactic range of the Platonic *Phaedo*. In the *Phaedo* Plato tackles, from a variety of approaches, the many problems connected with the soul: the soul constitutes the principle of life; it is the substance or being which can be held responsible for its own perfection or imperfection; and it may be called the 'locus of knowledge' of the Ideas. Sometimes Plato speaks—in a manner reminiscent of an 'exhortation to philosophy'—of the value or meaning inherent in a rational knowledge of things eternal, and of the means of achieving such knowledge. The dramatic setting of the *Phaedo* undoubtedly elevates this dialogue to a deeply moving *consolatio mortis*. All this raises the complex problem of whether, and to what extent, Aristotle in his *Eudemus* simply imitated the *Phaedo*—whether the *Eudemus* touches on the vast range of issues similar to those of the Platonic *Phaedo*. It must also be noted that by the year 353/52, the

21. See J. Bernays, *Die Dialoge des Aristoteles in ihrem Verhältnis zu seinen übrigen Werken* (Berlin, 1863), p. 145, note 15.—This *petitio principii* goes back to Plato's *Phaedo*. Philoponus, however, seems to avoid this *petitio principii*. Here the argument, at least by implication, proceeds from the absence of contraries to the fact that the soul is a substance. J. Bernays, *loc. cit.* See also W. Jaeger, *op. cit. supra* note 9, p. 44.
In the year in which Aristotle wrote the *Eudemus*, it was not very likely that Aristotle should be content with merely composing an imitation or, perhaps, a revised version of the Platonic *Phaedo*; or that he should discuss the question of whether the soul is attunement (or harmony) in exactly the same dialectical context as Plato had done some thirty years before.24

When discussing in detail the two objections (or proofs) of the *Eudemus*, (namely, that the soul is not merely attunement or harmony or the body; and that the soul is not the health, strength or beauty of the body,) W. Jaeger insists that the very nature of the *Eudemus*—the fact that it is really a *consolatio mortis*—furnishes the starting point for a theoretic-speculative discussion of the immortality of the soul.25 In a spirit reminiscent of the 'other-world-directed' eschatology so eloquently expounded in the Platonic *Phaedo*, Aristotle attacks, in the *Eudemus*, any and every position that is opposed to—or may threaten—the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. Aristotle's arguments, it will be noted, are essentially identical with those advanced in the *Phaedo*. Aristotle's basic premise cannot possibly admit that the soul is merely the attunement or harmony of the bodily elements—that the soul, while certainly different from the body, is merely the harmonious arrangement (or the product of the proper arrangement) of the bodily elements. To refute the allegation that the soul is only 'attunement', Aristotle uses two main arguments, of which the first one reads as follows: 'Attunement has a contrary—non-attunement—but the soul has no contrary. Hence, the soul cannot possibly be attunement'. In short, the non-identity of attunement and soul is demonstrated with the help of the non-identity of their respective ‘characteristics’ or contraries. This, in turn, implies that Aristotle grounds the identity of two objects on the identity of their respective attributes or contraries. This is, at least by implication, the line of argumentation which Aristotle uses in the *Categories*: ‘Another characteristic of a substance is that it has no contraries’.26 Moreover, Aristotle's argumentation in the *Eudemus* is presented in the form of a syllogism. This syllogism, however, does not merely demonstrate that the soul is not, and

Many more fragments of the *Eudemus* might possibly be retrieved from Hellenistic, Patristic and Alexandrian literature.

24. O. Gigon, *op. cit.* p. 21, and *ibid.* p. 29. Gigon, *ibid.* p. 30, also points out that the Platonic *Phaedo* differs from the *Eudemus* in that the former discusses the problem of immortality from the viewpoint of a man about to die (Socrates), while the latter discusses immortality from the standpoint of someone who grieves over the death of a recently deceased friend.


cannot be, identical with attunement, but it also proves, at least by implication, that the soul is a substance.27

It will also be remembered that in the *Phaedo* Plato had pointed out that attunement or harmony is an attribute of the soul, but never the soul itself.28 Here Plato's argument is based on a logical argument which in a more abstract form is restated by Aristotle in the *Categories*: 'One particular substance . . . cannot be "more or less" . . . The same quality is said to subsist in a thing in varying degrees . . . But a substance is not said to be "more or less" that which it is . . . Substance, then, does not admit of variation of degree.'29 Hence, if the soul, indeed, is a substance, there

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27. See also W. Jaeger, op. cit., pp. 40–41.—K. von Fritz, op. cit. supra note 26, pp. 473–474, argues as follows: the *Eudemus* contains the argument that since harmony has a contrary, namely, disharmony, the soul cannot be harmony because it has no contrary. This argument implies that the soul must be a substance, because a substance has no contrary. The fuller significance of this statement, according to Jaeger, becomes fully clear only when related to the *Categories* of Aristotle (?), which demonstrates that categories have no contraries. But the reasoning in the *Eudemus*, Von Fritz insists, does not necessarily presuppose that at the time Aristotle composed the *Eudemus*, that is, about 353/352 B.C., he had already developed the basic principles of his doctrine of categories. Without doubt, prior to the final development of his integrated doctrine of categories, as it can be found in the *Categories*, Aristotle did operate with certain isolated categories such as substance (which might have been discussed in the Academy and, it appears, in the Aristotelian *On Ideas*, commonly dated between 357 and 355 B.C.). But Aristotle did so in a context in which these isolated categories were not yet integrated into a system or doctrine of categories.

28. Plato, *Phaedo* 92 BD: 'My Theban friend [Simmias], you will have to think differently if you will maintain that harmony is a compound, and that the soul is a harmony which is made out of strings set in the frame of the body. For you will surely never allow yourself to say that a harmony is prior to the elements which make up that harmony . . . But do you not see that this is what you imply when you say that the soul existed before she took the form and body of man, and was composed of elements which as yet had no existence? For harmony is not like the soul, as you suppose. First the lyre, and the strings, and the sounds exists in a state of discord, and then harmony is produced last of all, and is the first to perish. And how can such a notion of the soul as this agree with the other? . . . And yet . . . there surely ought to be harmony in a discourse of which harmony is the theme . . . But there is no harmony . . . in the two propositions that knowledge is recollection, and that the soul is harmony. Which of them will you retain? I think, he replied, that I have a much stronger faith . . . in the first of the two, which has been fully demonstrated to me, than in the latter, which has not been demonstrated at all, but rests only on probability and plausible grounds and, therefore, is believed by the many. I know only too well that these arguments from mere probabilities are imposters, and unless much caution is used in the use of them, they are apt to be deceptive . . . But the doctrine of knowledge and recollection has been proven to me on trustworthy grounds. This proof was that the soul must have existed before she came into the body, because to her belongs the essence of which the very name implies existence. Having, as I am convinced, rightly accepted this conclusion, and on sufficient grounds, I must, as I suppose, cease to argue, or allow others to argue, that the soul is harmony.'


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cannot be different degrees of soul. Neither can the soul have contraries.\textsuperscript{30}

Aristotle's second argument runs as follows: 'The opposite of attunement (or harmony) of the body is non-attunement (disharmony) of the body. But this non-attunement (disharmony) of the living body is disease, weakness and ugliness . . . If, then, non-attunement (disharmony) is disease, weakness, and ugliness, attunement (harmony) is health, strength and beauty . . . Hence, the soul is not attunement (harmony).'\textsuperscript{31} As is commonly known, Plato frequently speaks of the virtues of the soul (wisdom, fortitude, temperance, and justice) as well as of the virtues of the body (health, strength, and beauty).\textsuperscript{32} Each of these sets of virtues has a set of opposites, namely, the vices of the soul (lack of wisdom, cowardice, intemperance, and injustice) as well as of the body. With Plato the virtues ultimately depend on a state of harmony (or symmetry), the vices on the disharmony (or lack of symmetry) within either the soul or the body.\textsuperscript{33}

Closer analysis of Aristotle's two arguments against any identification of the soul with attunement, harmony or symmetry should make it amply clear that Aristotle's earliest psychology, as he expounded it in the \textit{Eudemus}, is to a large extent grounded in Platonic metaphysics. Although technically differently formulated, these arguments, or rather, these proofs for the immortality of the soul are largely dependent on Plato's doctrine of the immortality of the soul. They are influenced by Plato's conception of substance as well as by Plato's conception of the soul.\textsuperscript{34} It will not be disputed, however, that the assertion, 'attunement (harmony) has a con-

\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Ibid.} 6 b 15 ff.: 'It is possible for relatives to have contraries. Thus virtue has a contrary, namely, vice, both of which are relatives . . . It also appears that relatives can admit of variation of degrees . . .' See also W. Jaeger, \textit{op. cit. supra} note 9, pp. 41-42. Jaeger insists that in the \textit{Phaedo} Plato infers the non-identity of soul and attunement (or harmony) from the impossibility of applying one and the same logical principle to both conceptions. Plato insists that a 'more or less' variation of degree can take place only in the 'indeterminate', but never in anything absolutely determined. The proposition, advanced in the \textit{Phaedo}, that a substance does not admit a 'more or less', is related in the \textit{Eudemus} to the prior proposition on which the first proposition depends, namely, to the insistence that a substance admits no contraries or opposites. See W. Jaeger, \textit{loc. cit.}

\textsuperscript{31} Philoponus, \textit{op. cit. supra} note 2, p. 144, lines 30–37.

\textsuperscript{32} See, for instance, Plato, \textit{Republic} 591B; Plato, \textit{Philebus} 25D ff.; Plato \textit{Laws} 631C; \textit{et passim.}

\textsuperscript{33} See, for instance, Plato, \textit{Republic} 444A ff.; and \textit{ibid.} 609A ff.; Plato, \textit{Sophist} 228A ff.; Plato, \textit{Statesmen} 296D; Plato, \textit{Laws} 906D, and \textit{ibid.} 653A ff.—See also W. Jaeger, \textit{op. cit. supra} note 9, p. 43. Jaeger maintains that Plato borrowed from contemporary medicine the definitions of disease, weakness, and ugliness as disharmony or lack of symmetry. By analogy, Plato's ethics, especially his notions of a 'therapy of the soul', is also modelled on contemporary medicine, for which he had much admiration. Plato's doctrine of virtues and vices is in fact a doctrine of the health or illness of the soul. It has as its underlying principle the concept of 'measure', harmony or symmetry. But if harmony is the principle of bodily virtues, the soul cannot itself be the harmony of the body.

\textsuperscript{34} W. Jaeger, \textit{op. cit.} p. 44.
trary, but the soul, being a substance, has no contrary', contains an overt, or at least, an implied *petitio principii*. This holds true not only as regards Aristotle's argumentation or proof in the *Eudemus*, but also as regards Plato's reasoning or dialectics in the *Phaedo*, where we encounter the same dogmatic presupposition that the soul is an independent substance.

A further analysis of the *Eudemus*, especially of Philoponus' *Commentary*, also indicates that Aristotle not only asserts the substantiality of the soul, but also endows his conception of the soul with certain attributes or 'qualities' characteristic of Plato's *Ideas*. These characteristics or 'qualities' become manifest when the soul is being compared with the physical body. This seems to follow from Philoponus' observation: 'One might object to the statement that strictly speaking there is no contrary to attunement (or harmony), but rather an indefinite privation. And the soul, being a kind of form (δύος τι), has an indefinite opposite . . . (and) a certain kind of privation changes into soul'. In other words, even the soul, if conceived as a kind of form (δύος τι), has in a certain sense something like a contrary, namely, privation. This can mean but one thing: the soul, in so far as it is conceived as the 'form (δύος) of animation', that is, as the principle of animation which converts any body into a living body, can have a sort of 'contrary', namely, the inanimate body. This does not preclude, however, that the soul, conceived as the 'Idea of animation', is a substance. An autonomous substance such as the soul can be both an independent substance and the principle of animation of the living body. In this sense it might also be called the 'form of a living body'—obviously a Platonic twist.

In the *De Anima* Aristotle points out that 'we are in the habit of recognizing substance as one determinate kind of what is, and this in several senses, namely, in the sense of matter or that which in itself is not "a this"; and, again, in the sense of form or essence, which is that precisely in virtue of which a thing is called "a this"; and, finally, in the sense of that which is compounded of both matter and form. Now matter is potentiality, form actuality. Of the latter there are two degrees which are related to one another as, for instance, knowledge is related to the exercise of knowledge. Among substances are by general consensus reckoned bodies and, especially, natural bodies. For they are the principles of all other bodies. Of natural bodies some have life in them, other not . . . Every natural body which has life in it is a substance in the sense of a composite. But since it is also a body of such and such a kind, viz. having life, the body cannot be a soul. The body is the subject or matter, not what is attributed to it. Hence, the soul must be a substance in the sense of the form of a natural body having

35. See note 21, supra.
36. This has been denied by Jaeger. See W. Jaeger, *op. cit.* pp. 39 ff.
life potentially without the body. 39

Thus, Aristotle insists that the substantial nature of the soul is not incompatible, but essentially connected, with the fact that it is also a 'form'. It will be noted that Aristotle contends that substance is the 'act' or, better, the 'actualization'. Hence, he defines the soul as the act of a physical body potentially endowed with life. In other words, the soul, as substance, is not the act of any physical body, but rather that of a living body, or at least, potentially living body. It is the actualization of a potentially living body or of a body which has the 'potency of living'—the principle or form by virtue of which the body becomes a living body, that is, an animated body. 40

This being so, the soul is inseparably connected with the living body, for as long as the body lives, it cannot be separated from the soul. Whenever the body ceases to live, the soul becomes separated from the body. And since the soul is a substance, it must live on and persist after this separation.

In his Commentary to Aristotle's De Anima, Simplicius maintains: 'Plato is in every case accustomed to call by the same name the forms and the corporeal things which are formed according to these forms. Aristotle, however, when the thing thus formed is divisible, avoids using the same term, because of the great differences between the divisible corporeal thing and the indivisible form. The reasoning soul he describes not only as limited, but also as a limit. For as the soul is between the indivisible and divisible, being in a sense both, so too the soul is between the limit and the limited, exhibiting both characteristics—the latter as moving discursively, the former because it always moves in obedience to limits, and because all that has been unfolded is gathered into one. In this respect it is likened to the limiting reason. And because of this he says in his dialogue on the soul entitled Eudemus that the soul is a kind of form (εἶδων), and praises those who describe the soul as being receptive of forms—not the whole soul, but only the rational soul, as knowing the forms that have the second degree of truth. For it is to reason, which is greater than the soul, that the really true forms correspond. 41

These remarks are directed at the passages in the De Anima, where Aristotle discusses the rational or intellectual soul. 42 Aristotle insists that, 'if thinking is like perceiving, thinking must be either a process in which the soul is acted upon by what can be thought, or a process different though analogous to that', then the rational soul is 'capable of receiving the form (εἶδων) of an object. Hence it must be potentially identical in character with its object without being this object itself. For the mind must be related to

40. See also W. Jaeger, op. cit. p. 45.
42. Aristotle, De Anima 429 a 10–29.

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what is thinkable...'

And 'since everything is potentially an object of thought, the intellect... must be free from all admixture. For the presence of what is alien to the intellect's nature is a hindrance and an obstacle. It follows, therefore, that the intellect too, like the sensitive part (of the soul), can have no nature of its own other than that of having a certain potentiality. Hence, that in the soul which is called the intellect, is, before it thinks, not actually any real thing. For this reason it cannot reasonably be regarded as integrated with the body. For if it were integrated, it would acquire some quality of the body... But as it is, it has none. It was a good idea to call the soul the "domicile of forms", although this description holds true only for the intellectual soul, and it holds the forms only potentially, not actually.'

Simplicius' comments, it appears, point to the fact that in the De Anima Aristotle proclaims a certain affinity between the intellectual soul and the 'forms' (εἴθην). This 'certain affinity' seems to consist in the fact that the intellectual soul is 'receptive of the forms'. Aristotle, Simplicius continues, prefers to call the intellectual soul a 'certain kind of form' (εἴδος τιν), and not simply a form (εἴθην). It will be remembered that in the Phaedo Plato refers to the form and to whatever possesses this form as εἴδος (such as the Idea of the Good or the Good). Aristotle avoids this identification, probably because the Idea of the Good is indivisible, while something good is plainly divisible. Since the rational or intellectual soul is capable of knowing all the forms (εἴθην), at least potentially, Aristotle chooses to call the soul εἴδος—a term which is common to all pure forms in general. Or to put it differently: in the Eudemus the soul is not 'the form of something' (εἴδος τινός), but rather a 'form of itself' (εἴδος τι)—an Idea or something of the nature of an Idea. Hence, it may be concluded that Simplicius' reference to the soul as εἴδος τι is primarily an attempt to give expression to the fact that the soul is something immaterial which is capable of intuitively grasping and, thus, of potentially possessing, the true forms (εἴθην)—the intelligible forms of all objects of rational knowledge.

43. Ibid. 429 a 13–17.
44. Ibid. 429 a 17–29.
45. See also W. Jaeger, op. cit. pp. 45–46.
46. See also E. Berti, op. cit. supra note 38, pp. 432–434.—As to Aristotle's notion of the 'intuitive' or 'mystic' vision of the 'primary, simple, and immaterial object and thus gaining true contact with the pure truth', see Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride (Moralia 382DE), a passage which some scholars (J. Croissant, E. Bignone, O. Gigon, W. D. Ross, and others) consider a fragment of the Eudemus. See frag. 10, Ross. Of no particular interest are frags. 11 and 12, Ross. Frag. 11 contains a passage from Al-Kindi, cod. Taimuriyya, Falsafa 55, which relates the story of a Greek king, 'whose soul, being caught up in ecstasy, for many days remained neither dead nor alive'. When the king regained full conscience, he related what he had seen in 'the other world', namely, 'souls, forms, and angels'. He also began to prophesy future events. 'Aristotle asserts that the explanation for all this was that his soul had acquired this knowledge because it had been near the living body and had in a certain way been separated from it, and so had seen what it had
In conclusion, the following might tentatively be said about the doctrinal content of the *Eudemus*: the soul is a substance, though an immaterial substance; it lives on after the body has died; the soul's life after the body's death is happier, more 'natural', and certainly far superior to its earthly sojourn; it probably existed before it became connected with the physical body; and it is the 'quickening' principle of the living body. All these characteristics and functions of the soul, to which we should add that the soul is an Idea and that it possesses recollection (*anamnesis*), are undoubtedly strongly under the influence of Plato's *Phaedo*, although we may discern that Aristotle does evince a certain independence of Plato on the subject of the soul. All this suggests that the *Eudemus* is also a 'reminiscence' of the Platonic *Phaedo*: both dialogues commemorate the death of a beloved person. In itself this would lend support to the assumption that the *Eudemus* and the *Phaedo* are fairly similar in content as well as aim. Hence, it might also be maintained that the *Eudemus* is modelled on a Platonic dialogue composed about thirty years earlier. One might object here that these intervening thirty years were a period of intensive re-thinking and rewriting, by Plato and the other members of the Academy, of the many problems discussed in the *Phaedo*. In this sense the *Eudemus*, which was composed about 353/352 B.C., might also be styled a 'regression' to a philosophic position held by Plato during the 'eighties. More than that, the *Eudemus* might actually be called the literary expression of a sentiment which found its natural and proper outlet in the reversion to a stage in the philosophic development of Plato that was already a thing of the past at the time the *Eudemus* was composed. This older position, however, provided an emotionally satisfying expression for the sentiments of an exalted *consolatio mortis*. And the *consolatio mortis* in a way is never outdated.

The observation of Olympiodorus that in the *Eudemus* Aristotle calls the soul a substance, has far-reaching consequences. In several passages which are traditionally considered fragments or excerpts from the Aristotelian *On
Philosophy, Cicero relates that according to Aristotle the soul has a nature (or substance) radically different from that of the four traditional (material) elements; and that it possesses a “non-material” (spiritual?) nature which is similar to, if not identical with, the nature of the divine. Assuming that Cicero accurately reports views held by Aristotle—and there exists no valid reason why we should doubt him—then at one time of his philosophic development Aristotle advocated the ‘non-material’ (spiritual?) nature of the human soul; the substantiality of this soul; the individuality of this self-same soul; the personal immortality of the soul; the independence of the soul from the material world; and the co-substantiality (or connaturality) of the human soul with the divine. Although these particular fragments or excerpts from Cicero have conventionally been assigned to Aristotle’s On Philosophy, it is quite likely that they refer to the Eudemus. Such a re-assignment, like any detailed discussion of the doctrinal content of these Ciceronian fragments, however requires a separate and lengthy treatment and, hence, are really outside the limited scope of this paper.

51. This is the opinion of O. Gigon. See O. Gigon, op. cit. supranote 48.
52. The present author is about to complete an investigation of these Ciceronian passages, which will appear in The New Scholasticism in the near future.
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