SOME HOMERIC TERMS FOR ANGER

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A valuable study of the Homeric terms for 'anger'/ 'angry' / 'be angry' appeared in 1950 as c.2 of J. Irmscher's Götterzorn bei Homer.1 The merits of the chapter, as of the book as a whole, have apparently tended to inhibit further enquiry and even to suggest that no further enquiry is necessary. Thus W. Kullmann2 writes: 'Über den Zorn der Götter hat J. Irmscher . . . das Entscheidende gesagt.' And H. Kleinknecht, writing on ὀργή in TWNT,3 accepts Irmscher's unsatisfactory account of μῆνις and relays it as fact to non-specialist readers: '(sc. divine wrath) . . . is not expressed at first by ὀργή, which in any case is not a Homeric word, but by χόλος and κότος (anger) and especially by the term μῆνις (anger) with its related words derived from the sacral sphere and almost exclusively confined to it.'

A footnote refers the reader to Irmscher for further details of Homeric words for the anger of the gods. This account of μῆνις is almost a reproduction of Irmscher's, with the very unfortunate addition in the English translation of the word 'especially', which gives the impression that μῆνις is a particularly common word for anger in Homer, if not the most common; in fact, although words meaning 'anger' are used over 350 times, μῆνις and its cognates occur only 27 times in the Iliad and 7 in the Odyssey. μῆνις is further discussed below.

The misrepresentation in TWNT is made possible by a serious defect in Irmscher's study; apart from an occasional acknowledgement of a ἀπ.λεγ. he gives no indication of the frequency of occurrence of the terms discussed. Thus no-one would suppose from reading his work—certainly Kleinknecht did not—that χώμα is an important anger term in Homer: it is in fact the second most frequent term for anger in the Iliad, occurring nearly 40 times (first is χόλος/χόλομα, nearly 100 times); but in Irmscher it receives scarcely more space than the Homeric ἀπ.λεγ. μοσεό. This lack of statistical information means that no idea is given of the usual Homeric terms for wrath, or of any lexical differences between the Iliad and the Odyssey. I offer the following provisional figures, the result of checking my own notes of wrath passages in Homer against the concordances.4

3. Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, edd. G. Kittel and G. Friedrich. ὀργή, Vol. 5, pp. 382–448. An English translation by Dorothea M. Black is now available as one of the Bible Key Words series, A. & C. Black, 1964. It is regrettable that c. 1 Wrath in Classical Antiquity is an abridgement of the original. The above quotation is from p. 4.
The *Iliad* has c. 250 occurrences of wrath terms, the *Odyssey* c. 100. A proportion of 3 : 2 might be expected in terms of length, and the actual proportion of 2.5 : 1 is readily explained in terms of subject matter. In both *Iliad* and *Odyssey* the percentage of wrath words used for divine wrath is almost exactly 40 per cent; in the *Iliad* 108 out of 251, in the *Odyssey* 40 out of 100.

The following table is a provisional summary of the lexical data.

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* Excluding νέμεσις/νεμεσσιπός (*Iliad* 11 times, *Odyssey* 6) and χαλέπος (*Iliad* 20, *Odyssey* 34). Each of these words merits an article to itself, but they are better omitted from a table like the above, as a glance at LSJ will show.

The further analysis of passages in which terms for the anger of the gods are used into those in which the anger is directed against mortals and those in which it is directed against other gods, is important but is not here attempted. This further analysis is complicated by the necessity of deciding when certain terms (notably νέμεσ-, χαλέπ- and δχθέα) are wrath terms and when they are not. The following notes deal with one term for anger not considered by Irmscher (δχθέα) and attempt a more precise definition of μηνίς and χόλος, both of which receive rather unsatisfactory treatment in his survey.

Μηνίς. Irmscher has a separate section on μηνίω and the noun derivatives of μηνίς, but includes in his section on the noun a number of passages

5. A study of the theme of divine wrath in Homer should also take account of passages which do not contain any specific term for anger, but clearly are wrath passages.
(including π 378 and ρ 14, the only two occurrences of (ἀπο-)μηνίς in the Odyssey) where the verb and not the noun appears. He holds that verb and noun are essentially religious words, and that the few examples of the use of the root for human wrath are restricted to the semi-divine Achilles and the god-like Agamemnon (‘... es scheint, als entstamme das Wort überhaupt der sakralen Sprache; denn ausser für den Groll des Achilles und sein Abbild, den des Aeneas (N460), steht μηνίς für menschlichen Zorn nur in bezug auf Agamemnon (A247), den sein Kronitum dem göttlichen Kreise annähert, und an zwei Odysseestellen ...‘, sup. cit., p. 7).

Thus it seems not to have occurred to Irmscher that there might be a difference in use between the noun and the verb; and apparently he was just too late to take account of an important article on μηνίς by H. Frisk, in which the true state of affairs is at least hinted at. Frisk also regards μηνίς as a ‘religious’ word, and is in general prepared to apply the same description to its cognates. ‘Wenigstens vom Grundwort μηνίς selbst (größtenteils auch von den Ableitungen) gilt, dass es von Anfang an ein ausgesprochen sakraler Ausdruck ist.’ (sup. cit., p. 29). But he acknowledges a more ‘secular’ flavour for the verb μηνίς: ‘Wenn irgend ein Unterschied besteht, dürfte er am ehesten der sein, dass das Verb einen etwas profaneren Klang hat als sein Grundwort.’ (p. 34). The extent of the ‘profanere Klang’ may be judged from the following figures, compiled before Frisk’s article became accessible to me.

In the Iliad the root is used 10 times of divine wrath (μηνίς 8, μηνίῳ 1, μηνίῳ 1) and 17 times of human wrath (μηνίς 4, μηνιθμόν 3, μηνίῳ 6, ἄπομηνίῳ 4); in the Odyssey a total of 7 uses of the root comprises 5 of divine wrath (μηνίς 4, μηνίῳ 1), 2 of human wrath (μηνίῳ 1, ἄπομηνίῳ 1). Thus of the 34 passages in Homer in which the root appears, 21 show a noun, 13 a verb; and of these 13 only one is concerned with divine wrath. It is evident therefore that the verb μηνίς, far from being mainly a religious term, is almost invariably used of human anger. Of the 12 occurrences of the noun μηνίς in the Iliad, 8 are of divine wrath, 4 of human (all of Achilles). If the 4 Odyssey passages in which the noun occurs are added, then μηνίς is used in Homer three times more often of divine than of human wrath. It is easy to conclude that it is a ‘religious’ term, and both Irmscher and Frisk do so. Such a conclusion is clearly intended as something more than a statistical statement of the form: ‘It so happens that in our records

6. Cf. E. Schwyzer, Drei Griechische Wörter, Rheinisches Museum 80, 1931, pp. 213–17. ‘μηνίς und das abgeleitete Verb μηνίω und die wieder von diesem ausgehenden Substantiva μηνίῳ und μηνιθμός gehören der Poesie und der kunstmässigen Prosa, öfter auch der sakralen Sphäre an.’ Irmscher refers several times to this article, and has apparently adopted such statements as the one quoted without examining them.

μήνις is used more often of divine than of human subjects. Cf. Irmscher: 'μήνις war somit der geeignetste Ausdruck, um den langanhaltenden Zorn von Göttern über Menschen zu bezeichnen . . .' (p. 7). Similarly Frisk: 'Diese beiden Hauptmerkmale der μήνις, ihre Verbindung mit höheren Mächten und ihre Entstehung aus der Kräakung von Recht und Sitte, kommen namentlich bei Homer zu Vorschein.' He quotes Schmidt's statement that μήνις is 'schon bei Homer größtenteils von dem dauernden Zorn der Götter gebraucht.' The question of the alleged ethical basis for μήνις is briefly mentioned below. It is subordinate to the further question: Was μήνις in fact a religious term, and if so in what sense? Does 'religious' here mean simply 'used of the gods'; or does it mean more narrowly 'belonging to the field of the numinous, and expressing the characteristic response of offended deity to human presumption'? (That there is an important difference between the two is obvious in the light of Homeric anthropopathism; cf. infra. Only if the term can be shown to have the latter meaning can it accurately be called 'religious'). The problem is not discussed in these terms by Irmscher, 8 and so something should first be said about his methodology.

One of the most unsatisfactory features of Irmscher’s account of μήνις is his explanation of the way in which words normally used of the gods could come to be used of men; this explanation is that words properly used of the gods could by an easy extension be used of men who were almost gods, or at least had connections with the gods which ordinary men cannot have. The argument takes the form (cf. the above quotation): Words used of gods alone are religious words; μήνις is used of gods and sometimes of heroes; therefore μήνις is a more or less religious word. This method of reasoning —it reappears in connection with χάλος—is superficially plausible (if not productive of any very precise results) but a little reflection shows that it is inadmissible when applied to the Homeric poems. It is inadmissible because it is tautological. Homeric poetry is heroic poetry, and by and large the only men in whom heroic poetry is really interested are heroes; therefore a great deal that is said about men in Homer, particularly in the Iliad, is likely to be said about heroes, and if certain words are used to describe the attitudes of gods and heroes, it does not follow that they were religious words, and that they would not have been used of the attitudes of ordinary mortals. It is of course possible that such words existed and even that they are used in Homer; but the nature of the material makes it difficult if not impossible to demonstrate that any given word is of this kind. Homer’s dominant anthropopathism would not lead us to expect any general tendency to use specialised terms for the expression of divine wrath, and the above statistics show that no such tendency existed.

8. Nor indeed by Frisk, who is pre-occupied with finding an ‘ethical’ basis for μήνις. Cf. note 11 below.
Is μῆνις an exceptional case? Stronger reasons exist for supposing that it is than those given by Irmscher, whose treatment of the material is confused. He writes as if he thinks that forms of the noun are used at A 247 and N 460; even if they were, the dismissal of N 460 as an ‘Abbildung’ would be inadmissible, and the plain fact would remain that the μῆνισσ group is used both of human and divine anger. But it has been shown that μῆνιοι is a human anger term, while μῆνις occurs only four times of human wrath, and in all four cases refers to the wrath of Achilles. Irmscher has made his task much more difficult by failing to observe this fact. His argument would carry a good deal more conviction in the form: “The noun μῆνις is used only of gods and of Achilles, the son of a goddess.” Clearly therefore the question of the religious status of μῆνις depends on the status of Achilles. If he is just a distinguished hero, a prince among his peers, then the proportion of μῆνις uses in the Iliad (Divine : Human = 2 : 1) must make one continue to hesitate to define the word as a religious term in the sense suggested above. But if Achilles is singled out as being in some way nearer to the gods than any of the other characters in the Iliad, so near to them that words used of them and of no other man can still be used of Achilles, then the total number of occurrences of the word certainly encourages the conclusion that it belongs to the vocabulary of religion in a special way.

Now nothing about Achilles is more clearly stated than his mortality. In spite of his divine parentage, he is as subject to death as any other man, and his mortality is frequently mentioned in circumstances of great solemnity and is an essential element in the tragedy. That which above all distinguishes human from divine in Homer is that man is mortal, the gods immortal; there is a great gulf between the two, and Achilles is on the human side of it. In what is most essential he is a man amongst men. And yet it will not do to draw the logical conclusion about μῆνις. Two further factors must be considered. They are conveniently and well discussed by C. H. Whitman in his book Homer and the Heroic Tradition. The first is Zeus’s identification of himself with Achilles’ cause and with his wrath. So Whitman, p. 225: ‘When Zeus promises to honour Achilles, a kind of identification with him begins to grow . . . Zeus in one place even speaks of the Wrath as his own.’ (The reference is not given, but presumably Whitman means O 68-73).

The second factor is that Achilles, though subject to death, is so indifferent to it that it seems not to have the power over him that it has over other men; and this indifference allows him to disregard it as a factor conditioning action as if he were a god. Cf. Whitman, p. 240: ‘The gods can suffer pity, pain, anger and all human passion except the fear or foreknowledge of

death; but this makes all the difference. It is the universal limitation of death which causes human beings to restrain passions, and Achilles's disregard of that limitation is what allows him to carry his passion so far and become more like a god than a man.'

The discussion of these points cannot be developed here. Achilles was a hero set apart from men and related to the gods in three ways—divine parentage, relation to Zeus, attitude to death. None of them perhaps was unique, but together they establish a prima facie case that if ἀνόητος were a religious word used specifically for the wrath of the gods against men, it could be used as a solemn term for the wrath of Achilles by a sort of dispensation which would be much less likely to operate in the case of any other hero in Homer. Conversely, the fact that ἀνόητος is used only of gods and Achilles, and that in the Iliad Achilles accounts for a third of the occurrences, demands explanation, and a satisfactory explanation is available in the above terms.

It remains to ask whether there is any contradictory evidence that would suggest a secular use for ἀνόητος. The fact that the cognate verb is used almost exclusively of human anger is not part of such evidence, but is an encouragement to seek it.

No conclusions can be drawn from the probable derivation of the word from ἀνόητος, still less from any putative widening of the semantic field by confusion with ἀνόησις (see Frisk, supra cit., p. 29). Even if continuance over a period of time is a mark of ἀνόητος, as Irmscher claims (supra cit., pp. 6-7), Frisk is surely right in seeing as its distinctive feature in relation to other wrath words not continuance but 'vielmehr seine Oertlichkeit und sein Stilcharakter'. It is just this 'Stilcharakter' that we are now investigating.

It is worth noticing that 25 per cent of the occurrences of ἀνόητος (1 out of 4 in the Odyssey, 2 out of 8 in the Iliad) are of the anger of the gods against each other. One might conclude that such cases do not show a genuine religious use of the word, and that mutatis mutandis it could in principle be used of the anger of men against each other. If the ἀνόητος were that of one god against another of equal status, the conclusion would be valid (cf. above on Homer's anthropopathism); but since in all three cases it is that of Zeus, and is mentioned in the context of his absolute power over the other gods, and the madness of their defying him, it is easier to see these passages as illustrations of an easy extension of the more purely religious use; the anger of Zeus against the other gods, when they disobey him, is closely analogous to that of a god against a recalcitrant mortal.

A more interesting piece of evidence is referred to by Irmscher as a problem, but is not discussed: 'Der Zorn des Poseidon, eines der Leitmotive der Odyssee, wird verwunderlicherweise niemals mit ἀνόητος bezeich-

10. E 34, O 122, Σ 146.
net.’ One simple answer to this would be to point to the fact that the word is used only four times in the *Odyssey* and that two of these occurrences are of Zeus, and to conclude that μῆνις is simply not a common enough word in the *Odyssey* for its non-association with Poseidon to be a cause of surprise (and the argument would be strengthened by the fact that verbal forms occur only twice in the *Odyssey*; see figures quoted above). But if we are right to be surprised by the non-appearance of the word for the wrath of Poseidon, we must ask why it is not so used. The answer to this question might run as follows: ‘The fact that μῆνις is not used of Poseidon’s wrath against Odysseus is only surprising in terms of the assumption that it is a religious word. An alternative explanation is easily found and must be preferred: μῆνις is not pre-eminently a term for divine wrath, but a *solemn epic* term for any wrath, divine or human. It is thus used appropriately as the first word of the *Iliad*, where it is part of the solemn invocation to the Muse, introducing the tragic events and the tragic hero which are the poet’s theme. Poseidon, on the other hand, while his wrath against Odysseus is formidable, is not a solemn figure; he bears Odysseus a grudge, he is furious with him for killing Cyclops, but there is lacking in his anger and its fitful expression the note of sustained resolve, the almost awe-inspiring seriousness, which characterises μῆνις.’ In support of such an account could be urged the fact that only half of the twelve occurrences of the word in the *Iliad* are of the wrath of gods against men; that it gives a simpler and equally coherent explanation of the fact that the word is used only of the gods and Achilles; and that it brings the use of the noun into closer relation to that of the verb. What makes it suspect is that it is devised to explain a fact that quite possibly does not need explanation, whereas the ‘religious’ interpretation represents a first impression which is confirmed by careful examination of the evidence.

But if the fact that μῆνις is not predicated of Poseidon requires some such explanation as the foregoing, are we left with the dilemma ‘either religious or secular’, the two accounts being mutually exclusive, but each supported by sound evidence? On the contrary. The ‘secular’ explanation paradoxically confirms the ‘religious’ by refining it in terms of the definition suggested above. In other words, μῆνις is not a religious term simply in the sense that it is characteristically used of divine subjects. In accordance with its ‘numinous’ associations, it is inevitably a *solemn* term, and its use implies high seriousness on the part of the being who entertains it, and a response of awe on the part of its object. On the basis of such a definition one can understand why it is not a suitable term to use of Poseidon, why it can easily be used of Zeus in relation to the other gods, and why it can be extended to Achilles.

I do not wish to examine here Frisk’s view, taken over from Schmidt, that μῆνις has an ethical basis, and is to be defined as ‘den Zorn den man
aus einer gerechten Ursache gegen jemandem hat'; except to say that such a notion is at best far below the surface in a considerable proportion of passages, whereas what may conveniently be called the sense of the numinous is almost always present; it is in these terms that the Stilcharakter of μῆνις and any ethical basis the word might have, are to be understood. 11

χόλος. It is not surprising, in view of its literal meaning, 'bile', that this term is used of human a good deal more often than of divine wrath. Irmscher proposes a restriction on its use similar to that which he sees in the use of μῆνις; he says that when χόλος is used of divine wrath it is usually of the wrath of one god for another, less commonly of a god for men, and then only when the men are heroes or kings. 'Seltener dagegen bezeichnet χόλος den Zorn der Götter über Menschen. Aber auch dann sind es doch Herren der Vorzeit... oder Menschen königlichen Stammes... gegen die sich der Göttergroll wendet' (sup. cit., p. 10). In other words, χόλος is not freely used to describe the anger of gods for men. This view is invalidated both by the argument used above in connection with Irmscher's account of the semantic field of μῆνις, and by the evidence of the passages in which it occurs. Thus in Δ 36 the object of the divine wrath is the Trojans in general, in Δ 42 it is a hypothetical city, in Ο 72 and 138 the Achaeans in general, in Ρ 399 a hypothetical army or individual, in Μ 348 Odysseus' crew. Of course in a majority of passages the object is an individual hero, but there can be no doubt that χόλος could be used in the most varied contexts of divine wrath directed against men. But not only is it incorrect to say that when χόλος is used of the anger of gods against men those men must be of heroic or royal stock; it is even wrong to say that it is more often used of the gods' anger against each other than of their anger against men. The statement is technically correct for the Ιliad. Of the 33 occurrences of χόλος for divine wrath, the noun is used nine times for anger against other gods (including three doublets), six times for anger against men; the verb is used nine times of anger against other gods, and nine times of anger against men (including one doublet). It is hardly helpful to conclude that the use for anger against other gods predominates. For the Οdyssey the statement is not even technically correct. The noun is used once of anger against other gods; three times of anger against men, the verb once of anger against other gods, six times of anger against men. Thus of the eleven passages where χόλος/χολοθμιμαι refers to divine wrath, only two are concerned with the gods' anger against each other.

It is therefore clear that although χόλος in Homer is naturally used more often of human than of divine wrath (the proportion is 2 : 1), there are no

11. Any word used of divine wrath is certain to be commonly used in cases where a man has transgressed some divinely sanctioned moral precept. Frisk does not attempt the vital demonstration that μῆνις shows a significantly higher proportion of such cases than other wrath words.
restrictions whatever on its use as a term for divine wrath; it is used freely of the gods' anger against each other and against men, of whatever status. The fact that in the *Iliad* the number of passages in which the object of divine χόλος is a god or gods is almost exactly equal to the number of passages in which the object is a man or men, while in the *Odyssey* the use in which men are the objects predominates, is of course due to the part the gods play in the action of the *Iliad*; the pro-Greek and pro-Trojan groups are naturally often described as being angry with each other.

A term not considered by Irmscher, but which must be included in the number of Homeric wrath words, is ὀξετερ. It is used in the aorist ὀξετερ in all but two cases (α 570, ο 101, both ὀξετερ ενα). It is found in twenty passages in the *Iliad* and in nine in the *Odyssey*; and is a term used to express deep emotion, as is evidenced by the fact that it is usually followed by an exclamation (often ὁ πότερον or ὁ μοῖον) or a direct appeal in which another character is addressed in the vocative. The word is used in three ways: it indicates (a) distress, (b) the characteristic distress caused by indecision or ignorance of the immediate future at a time of crisis, (c) anger. In some cases more than one of these ideas is present. The three meanings are divided fairly equally among the total of twenty-nine passages in which the word is used, except that meaning (a) unqualified by (b) or (c) is probably rare. The detailed figures are as follows:

**Iliad.** Total twenty passages, in seven of which a god is subject, in the other thirteen a man. In four of the seven passages in which a god is subject, he is presented as being angry (Δ 30, Θ 208, Ο 101, 184; the other three passages are Α 517, 570, H 454, of which the last may be a wrath passage). Of the thirteen passages in which a man is subject (Α 403, Π 48, P 18, 90, Σ 5, 97, T 419, Υ 344, Φ 53, 552, Χ 14, Ψ 98, 143) only one clearly expresses wrath (Χ 14) though several others could reasonably be interpreted in this sense (esp. Π 18; cf. Υ 344, Φ 53, T 419). Five of the twelve refer to the anguish of indecision (Α 403, Π 48, Ρ 90, Φ 552, Ψ 98).

**Odyssey.** All nine passages are concerned with men. In four the subject feels the anguish of indecision or ignorance of his immediate fate (interestingly enough, all are in Book 5: 298, 355, 407, 464), in four the subject seems to be angry (δ 30, 332, φ 248, ψ 182). In o 325 Eumaeus is shocked rather than angry.

A thorough and perceptive review of the twenty-nine Homeric ὀξετερ passages (with the addition of the one relevant passage in Hesiod, viz.

12. Both phonological and semantic considerations point to a connection with ἔχθος etc. J. Audiat (infra cit., n. 13) is rather over-sceptical in saying that 'la recherche éymologique ne mène à rien', and more so in his view that in relating ὀξετερ to ἔχθος 'aucune explication n'est donnée du vocalisme initial'. See H. Frisk, *Griechisches etymologisches Wörterbuch*, s.v. ὀξετερ. But it is true that the equation is of little use for the interpretation of the texts.
Theog. 558) has been made by J. Audiat. His general conclusions about the semantic field of the word are virtually identical with the above. (They include the refinement that it invariably refers to the onset of 'un trouble subit et profond . . . et peut-être est-ce justement parce qu'il note toujours l'apparition d'un état d'âme nouveau que ce verbe ne se rencontre qu'à l'aoriste'. Σ 5 and 143 are doubtful, but certainly in all other cases ὀχθήσας either must be or could be ingressive.)

Audiat rightly insists that the term is never 'faded' but is regularly found in contexts 'dont ia richesse psychologique et la valeur dramatique sont évidentes' and that 'il accompagne toute une série d'états d'âme variés dans leurs nuances et même dans leur nature, mais qu'il y a nul hiatus entre eux et qu'on parcourt insensiblement la gamme de ses valeurs diverses'.

This must not be taken to mean that the nuances of any given context are expressed by ὀχθίω rather than associated with it, although Audiat sometimes writes as if he thought that they were so expressed. On the one hand 'la plupart du temps c'est un état d'âme complexe qu'il traduit, dans lequel entrent des sentiments divers, parfois contradictoires, et souvent inavoués'. On the other, 'il n'indique jamais tel ou tel sentiment, même complexe, mais il sert toujours à traduire la naissance d'un trouble subit et profond . . .', and the suggested French translation is 'un terme assez large et assez souple pour couvrir toutes les nuances du verbe épique: vivement affecté'. In other words the 'sentiments divers' are not really part of the meaning of the term but are incidental in individual contexts, and the basic meaning of ὀχθίος is the lowest common denominator of the psychological states of the twenty-nine passages in which it occurs.

The principle here applied is obvious enough; all words depend on context for meaning and mean more or less different things in different contexts, and dictionary definitions depend on contextual analysis. But a consideration of the relevant Homeric passages (see above summary) suggests that Audiat has thrown his contextual net a good deal too wide, and that many of the subtleties brought out by his sensitive exposition are either part of the colouring of ὀχθίω in a particular context and not contributed by it to the context, or are even quite additional features of a situation in which the emotion expressed by ὀχθίω is also an element. In making the word mean too much, Audiat allows it to mean too little; for it has more specific meaning of its own than he grants it. In the great majority of passages, it expresses the frustrated reaction of one who finds himself in a disagreeable dilemma or in disagreeable circumstances which he

13. J. Audiat, Une Formule Homérique, Revue des Études Anciennes 49, 1947, pp. 41–57. A full and judicious discussion of the Homeric material will be found in this valuable article. Certain passages are interpreted in a slightly different way from that suggested by the above summary. One general reservation about A.'s conclusions is explained above.
is impotent to alter, and about which he is therefore likely to be angry. In nearly every case the subject feels puzzled or thwarted; and although it is not easy to find a convincing English word or phrase to translate διάθεση in the variety of contexts in which it occurs, that variety should not be allowed to obscure the fact that its semantic range is significantly narrower than that suggested by Audiat's definition.
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