There is still much scope for speculation on the primary sources for the history of the Alexanderreich, even though Tarn’s *magnum opus* has tended to cow originality into silence because of the mass of erudition underlying that study, and Professor Pearson’s *The Lost Histories of Alexander the Great* points to the frustrations that may attend an examination of the fragments that survive of these ‘lost histories’.

The correct method of approach is surely to discuss what sort of accounts one might expect the primary sources to be, and tie in with this a study of the fragments, and then one must jump to the secondary writers and examine their predilections, the period in which they lived and the historiographical methods and peculiarities of their era. Only when this is done is it safe to go hunting for new fragments of primary sources. In this respect Pearson does commence his work with an account of the literary and political traditions that were a common influence upon the writers of Alexander history, and of the corpus of scientific/geographical knowledge that was available to them.

This article will deal with three types of contemporary accounts of Alexander’s campaigns: first, official history, as written by Callisthenes, and official records, secondly, the memoirs of those involved in the campaigns, and thirdly, histories written by members of the philosophical schools.

One would not venture to say that official history put out under the Reich had the same effect upon historiography as did the publication of the pontifical *tabulae* by Scaevola in 123 B.C., but it is safe to assert that official history is produced in the hope of influencing historiography as well as for immediate political ends. As Callisthenes was summoned to join Alexander as official historian (Justin xii, 6, 17) it is strange that so little importance

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* This article in substance represents a paper delivered at the Classical Association of South Africa Conference in Pietermaritzburg in February 1963.

1 Unfortunately the detail he uses is often unsupported by convincing argument. A statement like ‘Cleitarchus has got to come in somewhere’ (Tarn, *Alex. the Gr.* II p. 101), for instance, creates the wrong impression.


3 In so far as they permit of classification, or biographical detail about the writer survives.

4 ‘Political traditions’ rather misleading; Jacoby conveys the desired sense: ‘A political attitude is characteristic of the general line of ancient history as far as this literature concerns itself with its own time’ (*Aithis* p. 76).

has been attached to him. Tarn refers to him in the Sources section six times, usually to assert that he was not the source for something that appears in a secondary source, and Pearson dismisses him as a flatterer.

A look at a contemporary event may help to restore the balance. Before the dust had settled after the Cuba crisis Kennedy detailed two men, Bartlett and Alsop, to write up an account of the development of ExComm policy and of its execution. Both are reputable journalists, but quite dispensable, a useful buffer should anything misfire or rebound. I need not elaborate upon the unfavourable portrayal they gave of Adlai Stevenson, nor upon the reaction of one section of the American public to it and the President’s comments on the report, nor need I stress the different ways in which this material was used to convey different messages to American right and left wingers, the international ‘public’ and the Russian leaders. For the present study the lessons of this are threefold: it helps to have as your official historians men who are reputable writers with some following, but who are yet dispensable; secondly, it is not necessary that the historian should understand how his writing is going to be used nor is it necessary that he should be forbidden to write the truth; and thirdly the life expectancy of a man in the career of writing propaganda will be limited to his usefulness or else by his ability to adjust himself to change.

Callisthenes’ appointment is not very surprising: through his relationship to Aristotle he had lived in Atarneus under Hermias and in Macedon under Philip and then Alexander, therefore he was conditioned to accept monarchy not only as a modus vivendi but also as a means towards the attainment of an ideal state based upon the rule of philosophically conditioned rulers, and then he would command support in Athens because of his Olynthian origin and again through Aristotle. Furthermore he had already gained a reputation as an historian and ideologically he was probably pan-Hellenist in outlook as Von Fritz and Monigiano have suggested.

His function initially was to hold Greek support. Now he survived till 328 B.C., which was as long as Alexander needed to keep up some sort of pretence to be ἶγέμον of the Greek League, and this power to survive—

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8 Sufficient has been written against Corssen’s contentions (Philologus 74, 1918 pp. 1–57) that Callisthenes only joined Alexander well on in the campaign and was not responsible for the Alexander History attributed to him (vide e.g. Berve, Das Alexanderreich 26, II.408 ad loc.; and see Jacoby’s article on Callisthenes in R.E. X). (It will be noted that this section on Callisthenes represents a return to guidance given by Jacoby R.E. X 1674 sq. and F.G.H. 2, 2 pp. 411 sq.)

7 Saturday Evening Post, 8th Dec., 1962.


9 Cf. Jacoby R.E. X, 1702. He rather weakens the propaganda theory by repeating the idea of a 2-year time lag between the events and C’s account of them. It is necessary to stress the role of letters as a means of propagation of the official view, cf. Beloch III.1, 49, 2 and Berve II, 408 ad loc.; Westermann, De Callisthene, Leipzig 1838 Pt. I, p. 19.
i.e. to be of use to the Reich—can hardly be explained by simple repetition of the old refrain that Callisthenes was 'a flatterer', or fond of the romantic element.\textsuperscript{10}

This opinion was expressed by Timæus\textsuperscript{11} and has generally remained a \textit{constat inter omnes} followed by Tarn and more recently by Maj. General Fuller\textsuperscript{12} who sums him up as 'a talkative busybody and a time-server who had an exaggerated opinion of his own importance, who flattered Alexander to his face and criticised him behind his back for doing the very things his flattery suggested'. The assumption that he was a mendacious flatterer, inherently improbable, has been challenged cautiously by Pearson and more openly by Dr. Badian. Others have tried to reconcile the flattery charge with Callisthenes' martyrdom in a way that is favourable to Callisthenes.\textsuperscript{13}

Callisthenes was held responsible for spreading the story that the sea made way for Alexander as he passed along the shore beneath Mt. Climax in Cilicia. Eustathius does record that Callisthenes reported Alexander's marvellous luck in being able to march along the shore, as the tide suddenly left the sand bare—but the additional phrase in Eustathius, 'so that it appeared the sea was making proskynesis (a symbol of worship to a Greek mind) to him' (ad H. \textit{Il} xiii, 26–30) may be his own addition.\textsuperscript{14} Significantly Plutarch does not mention proskynesis and adds that Alexander made no mention of this occurrence in his letters—note that he did not issue a corrective to Callisthenes' account—perhaps no corrective was needed, or, if it was, this omission was no doubt deliberate modesty on Alexander's part. Pearson diffidently raised this point about where the Callisthenes quote stops and Eustathius' words begin, but it is a characteristic feature of this book that the results of observations are not stressed when they are at variance with Tarn.

So again with Callisthenes' account of Alexander's journey to the Ammon shrine, Pearson shows that it may well have been true that Alexander marched by night to reach the oasis of Siwah and it may well be true that an oracular pronouncement was delivered to Alexander at Memphis from Miletus. So much Callisthenes reports like an honest journalist, and he goes on to report that the priest proclaimed 'ὅτι ήτιν Αἴγες νύσι' (Strabo, xvii, 1, 43). Now suppose that Strabo quotes Callisthenes verbatim, can this be regarded as abject flattery because he calls him Son of Zeus instead

\textsuperscript{10} E.g. Lesky op. cit. p. 577. Contra Jacoby \textit{R.E.} X 1702.

\textsuperscript{11} Ap. Polybius xii, 17–22, which has to be read \textit{in toto} to do justice to Callisthenes.

\textsuperscript{12} \textit{The Generalship of Alexander the Great}, London 1958, p. 67.


\textsuperscript{14} A point not spotted in early studies, e.g. J. G. Droysen, \textit{Geschichte des Hellenismus}, I, 3 ad loc., but noted recently by Pearson, \textit{Lost Histories} p. 37.
of Son of Ammon Re? Alexander became son of Ammon Re automatically by his conquest of Egypt and assumption of pharaonic power, and Herodotus, long before Alexander's day, picked up the habit of equating Egyptian gods with Greek gods and applying Greek names to Egyptian gods.\(^\text{15}\) In any case Alexander could claim divine descent by his membership of the Argead line in Macedon. One can hardly condemn Callisthenes for abject flattery on the grounds of this episode and one may feel that even Dr. Badian goes a little too far when he says: 'Alexander's divine sonship was the noble lie . . . that embodied a sincere belief in Alexander's mission'.\(^\text{16}\) Andreotti in *Saeculum* 1957 has rightly emphasised that one should not assess Alexander's motives at each stage from what he finally achieved. This principle is even more worth following in regard to Callisthenes. If Alexander, for instance, really did request the Greek cities to accord him divine honours in 324 B.C., there is no necessity to assume that Callisthenes' report of Alexander's visit to Siwah in 332 B.C. was directed to this end, and it may be dangerous to assume that the military reasons for pushing thus far into Egypt were unknown to Callisthenes. Certainly the primary sources make it plain that Alexander went to Gordium not just to cut the knot but for strategic reasons.\(^\text{17}\) (In passing one may note that Arrian attributes Alexander's journey to πόθος, a sudden impulse. Possibly this is Arrian's own idea to which he adds the explanation given by Ptolemy and Aristobulus, summarised by Grote as: 'Conceiving himself to be the son of Zeus with only a nominal human parentage, he resolved to go and ascertain the fact by questioning the infallible oracle of Zeus Ammon'.\(^\text{18}\)

In 332 Alexander was fairly self-confident with Asia Minor apparently subdued, Darius on the run, the Persian navy smashed (Arr. II, 21), and Egypt now in his hands. Even a factual report of his visit to Siwah might worry some Greeks but he could ride any storm at that moment. It is possible to go even further: Callisthenes is quoted by Plutarch as saying that at night birds by their cries guided stragglers to Alexander's company when he was marching to Siwah.\(^\text{19}\) This is not improbable as birds in the wild at any time can be relied upon to indicate the presence of a moving animal or man. As regards the text (Plut. *Alex.* XXVII), I think the sentence before

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\(^{15}\) R. Lattimore contends that the equations were made by Egyptian priests and taken over by Greeks (*Herodotus and Names of Egyptian Gods*, C.P. 34, 1939 pp. 357 sq.).


\(^{17}\) Arr. i, 24, 1-4; 29, 3-4; ii, 3, 1; C.R. iii, 1, 14–16; E. A. Fredricksmeyer, Alex., Midas, and the Oracle at Gordium, *C.P.* 56, 1961, pp. 160 sq.

\(^{18}\) Grote XII, 88; Arrian iii, 3, 1.

\(^{19}\) Grote, loc. cit., repeats these mythical elements without comment, a characteristic weakness noted in different context by Professor C. P. T. Naudé in a lecture delivered in Salisbury, August 1962.
δ ἐδὲ Ἐνὶ θεομασίωτατον is not necessarily part of the Callisthenes quotation and indeed it tallies with the statement of Aristobulus that birds guided Alexander's column (Arr. iii, 3, 6). Callisthenes is quoted then by Plutarch on this episode, but Plutarch does not say where he found the explanations for Alexander's march to Siwah which he gives as: Good fortune increased Alexander's drive and determination and his spirit was all the more obsessed with the invincible desire to overcome his enemies and the restrictions of time and geography.

Of course this may be Plutarch's own idea but it has the appearance of an assessment at the time: the first limb of the explanation about good fortune might well have been written in 332 before the big trouble in Greece broke out and when it looked as though the Persian Empire could be won by diplomacy or by success in a single full-scale battle. The second limb of the explanation about Alexander's desire for territorial gain is clearly a hint at the military reasons for the journey. Aristobulus and Ptolemy say that he went because the oracle was infallible and he wanted to consult it about his own origin. Diodorus Siculus, who, according to Tarn, employed Aristobulus to a great extent, also says that Alexander went to consult the oracle.

Tarn's idols Aristobulus and Ptolemy do not come very well out of this incident for whilst the helpfulness of Callisthenes' birds may be admitted, Ptolemy's story that two snakes guided Alexander's column to the shrine is more out of touch with reality (Arr. iii, 3, 5). Geier explained this curious aberration from the credible as long ago as 1844: the Rhodians consulted this same oracle for advice as to how they should show their gratitude to Alexander, and Ptolemy, of course, became king of Egypt which position was endowed with divine ornamentations so that it was difficult for him to detract from any marvel rumoured about the oracle. In other words Ptolemy was capable of a deliberate lie or as Pearson put it 'deciding to keep a miraculous element in the story, he preferred to have the details conform with local Egyptian tradition rather than with Greek sentiment' (LHA p. 207).

Incidentally, I think that Plutarch's Life of Alexander may contain a lot more information from Callisthenes' official history—ultimately if not immediately.20

It is irrelevant to discuss Callisthenes' interest in natural science, as it is irrelevant to cite Onesicritus' interest in philosophy as a token of the reliability of his historical writing.21

Obviously one is not supposed to ignore any account of the Reich that

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is not philosophical in content, nor fully annotated with geological, botanical and zoological background notes. These elements were, in part, conventional, and one needs to bear Pearson's point in mind, that first-generation historians of the Alexanderreich were influenced by a strong literary/legendary tradition, and by a common 'political tradition' and by the corpus of speculative and definitive works on geographical and scientific matters.22

Thus, in examining the primary sources one must allow for the operation of these influences and not forget that historiography has its conventions, so that one assesses an historian's merit more by the way he uses the convention and by the quality of material used—the latter is of course particularly true of the 'scientific' digressions in the sources under discussion.23

Pearson (LHA) seems to vacillate on the question as to whether any 'official' history—other than the Diary and the Stathmoi—was written after the fall of Callisthenes, because he talks of Onesicritus giving the official reason why Alexander advanced no further into India than the Hyphasis, yet in the rest of the account of Onesicritus he implies that Onesicritus followed his own interests and desires.

Pearson in an important article24 has shown that the official records—the Diary and the Stathmoi, i.e. ordnance reports—did not survive, presumably because what Eumenes had not destroyed was not published, or was not easily available to serious students, but that various writers produced 'Diaries' and 'Stathmoi' of their own, largely as a literary exercise. I would make the distinction between official history on the one hand in the sense I have used it with reference to Callisthenes, and official records on the other. The latter one would expect to be factual in content and not written or rather not used directly for propaganda purposes.

Perhaps one needs to look at the circumstances of Callisthenes' death to see why Alexander abandoned this form of propaganda. The death of Darius concluded the war as far as the Greeks were concerned, for the Asiatic Greeks had been 'liberated' and Xerxes' impieties had been avenged, and indeed the Greeks had been demobbed even before Darius' death—spring 330 B.C., though significantly after the sack of Persepolis. Alexander did not deliberately alienate the Greeks where it could be avoided (e.g., Arr. iii, 24), but the pressing problem for him now was to check the spread of dissidence within the ranks of the Macedonian nobles. He gradually imposed his will on this class by a series of concessions, alternating with acts of provocation. The first step that need concern us was the

22 Cf. e.g. P. Merlan, Isocrates, Aristotle and Alexander the Great, Hist. 3, 1954.
23 Save to note that I should hesitate to accept Jacoby's statement that Callisthenes' position was 'keine andere, als die eines Anaxarchos und der vielen anderen σοφίτων und ποίητων', R.E. X, 1676.
24 Vide supra n. 20.
elimination of his cavalry C.-in-C., Philotas, and Philotas’ father, the elder
statesman and military adviser, Parmenion. So far Callisthenes was useful,
for he had always opposed Parmenion—probably because the latter
represented Macedonian nationalism which ill-suited his own pan-Hellenic
outlook.

Even though this liquidation had legal backing, because Philotas could
not disprove a treason charge brought against him, it must have caused
alarm in the Macedonian camp and so a concession was made by Alexander.
The cavalry command was divided into two commissions, and while a
toady, Hephaestion, was appointed to one of the posts, the other was
allocated to Cleitus who could claim support from all sections of the
Macedonian soldiery.

As more Greek mercenaries joined Alexander 328/7 B.C. (Arr. iv, 7),
which meant that Alexander was that much less dependent upon the Mace­
donian soldiery, Alexander took the opportunity to reassert his leadership.
Cleitus was liquidated. Furthermore Alexander attempted to introduce the
Persian social custom of προσκύνησις amongst his own Macedonian
officers. Balsdon says that Alexander probably tried this to establish some
uniformity of procedure within his court where Greeks and barbarians
were now to be found, and that he regarded this form of salutation as of
social and not religious connotation, however his officers construed it.

This explanation certainly tallies with the information that mixed marriages
were encouraged at this time (D.S. xvii, Index 30) and that 30,000 young
‘barbarians’ were conscripted for military training in Macedonian fashion.

The Greek mercenaries were not to jibe at these innovations but the
Macedonian officers were getting increasingly concerned at the ‘barbarisa­
tion’ of the army and civil service.

Alexander might have weathered the discontent but another conspiracy
against his life was discovered, that of Hermolaus the squire. Perhaps the
plot was as ill-conceived as Aristobulus made out and as unlikely to
succeed, still, those involved included the son of a satrap, and the son of a
cavalry commander, the ilarch Sopolis. The leader Hermolaus was executed
but it was convenient to find a scapegoat in Callisthenes: as he was not a
Macedonian he did not have to be tried before the Macedonians; thus
there was no necessity for Alexander to reveal how far the plot spread nor
who was involved. Secondly, Callisthenes had opposed the Macedonian

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25 On the question of the extent of his power as adviser vide E. Badian, The Death of
26 Iterum, Hist. 1, 1950.
27 Cf. C.R. viii, 8, 19 quoted by Grote XII, 153 but implication of this not drawn out as
clearly as by Dr. Badian in a lecture at Durham in 1961.
28 Cf. J. R. Hamilton: ‘The king may well have wished to scotch any rumours regarding
the extent of the conspiracy . . . ’. (The Letters in Plutarch’s Alexander, P.A.C.A. 4, 1961
p. 16.)
nobility (vide supra) and his execution was a concession to their discontent. The pan-Hellenist was dispensable and his job was over: Alexander could count on recruiting men, especially cavalry, from Asia to offset any shortage of men coming out from Greece to join him as mercenaries. Of course news of Callisthenes' murder would not help Antipater if it leaked back to Greece by rumour alone, hence the letter to Antipater (apud Plat. 55) saying that Callisthenes was implicated in the Pages' conspiracy. The private letters sent to Alexander's officers Attalus, Craterus and Alcetas told a different tale—possibly the truth—that Callisthenes was not implicated.

Ptolemy and Aristobulus (ap. Arr. iv, 14,1) report that interrogation of the conspirators yielded information involving Callisthenes in the plot; whether this was true or not, at least Ptolemy and Aristobulus had reason to promulgate the report as they lived to return from the east and had to deal with Greeks again. Accordingly I would assert that Balsdon, in dealing with their vagueness about the precise details of Callisthenes' execution, goes astray in writing 'one of them evidently regarded Callisthenes as a man of such second-rate importance that he could not even be bothered to find out the truth about his death'.

His job was finished, therefore he could be removed without causing a gap, and he was important in a negative way, in that Alexander was looking for a scapegoat to appease the Macedonian officers, and important in a positive way, in that he stood for pan-Hellenism against both the Macedonian nobles and Alexander with his new policy of integration. In other words, he became important in his own right when he ceased to provide material Alexander could use for propaganda and entered the political lists against Alexander himself.

Coupled politically with this sacrifice of Callisthenes to the Macedonian nobility was the reorganisation of the Companion Cavalry. Alexander had tried before to keep the officer class contented by dividing up the cavalry command between a toady and Cleitus, loyal to the Macedonian nationalist cause, and this method he employed again with slightly different purpose. The cavalry command was divided up into four units and shared amongst Hephaestion, Coenus, Craterus and Perdiccas, men who had all earned Alexander's gratitude by the questionable roles they had played in the earlier liquidations, but men of sufficient diversity of outlook for there to be no danger of their conspiring against Alexander. Indeed Coenus was so bent on retrieving face with the common Macedonian soldiery that he championed their cause during the mutiny by the Hyphasis. Coenus was liquidated.

29 On the genuineness of these letters J. R. Hamilton, 3 Passages in Arrian, C.Q. n.s. 5, 1955.
30 Hist. 1, 1950 p. 382.
The historical point we need not pursue. As for 'official history', this was now pointless if of the kind and purpose that Callisthenes wrote, and there is no necessity to accept a suggestion that Aristobulus was an ‘official historian’ simply because he seems to follow the official line at times, nor need Anaximenes of Lampsacus be seen as Callisthenes’ successor. 32

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Next in importance to official history we might rate the numerous memoirs and reports written by men who took part in the campaign. The volume of books, columns and articles that has been churned out since the Second World War should give us some idea of what one should expect in looking at comparable material on the Alexanderreich. Pearson has properly emphasised that these accounts are essentially limited in scope, and one must add that memoirs are normally produced in an environment different from that of the experience related and after time has robbed the memory of much detail. We have already had cause to mention falsehoods in Ptolemy’s history of the campaign and Pearson has reacted markedly against Tarn’s praise of him but Dr. Badian’s corrective (Gnomon 1961, 666) needs to be repeated: ‘Being a king, he (Ptolemy) could not afford to be caught out in a lie. That is probably the meaning of Arrian’s notorious remark about his reason for trusting Ptolemy... What Arrian did not sufficiently consider... is that kings are perhaps more tempted than most others to indulge in lies in which they cannot be caught out.’ It has been a necessary task since Tarn’s Alexander the Great to check the tendency to divide the sources into ‘favourable’ and ‘unfavourable’ and Dr. Badian and Professor Pearson have done a great deal to show that the ‘unfavourable’ sources were not all lies; thus, for instance, Badian has retrieved the figure, if not the character, of Bagoas, the eunuch, Alexander’s favourite, 33 but to deny the possibility of gross misrepresentations of facts—deliberate or otherwise—would be to fly in the face of experience.

It may seem too compromising to be of any value when it is urged that one must expect veracity and mendaciousness in memoirs whether they be pro- or anti-Alexander, but this approach is realistic and perhaps less disastrous than Tarn’s dogmatic approach when, for example, he suggests that any commentary on the mercenaries in the sources, or upon Darius’ qualities or battle plans must derive from a Greek mercenary who served under Darius. This theory implies that it was quite impossible for anyone on Alexander’s staff to have deduced Darius’ plans from the manoeuvres of his troops in battle. Thus, for example, when Diodorus Siculus reports that at the Battle of Gaugamela in 331 B.C. a detachment of Sacas broke

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33 Bagoas the Eunuch, C.Q. n.s. 8, 1958.
through the Macedonian lines and captured the Macedonian camp 'to free
the female prisoners, i.e. Darius' family', Tarn comments. 'The "merc­
cenaries" source knew Darius' order, while Ptolemy naturally did not'.
Tarn's conclusion is far from inevitable; Darius' purpose might easily
have been surmised in light of the reports of earlier diplomatic exchanges
between Alexander and Darius when Darius offered Alexander control of
Asia as far as the Euphrates, 10,000 talents and a marriage alliance with his
daughter. Another consequence of dogged adherence to this idea is that
it precludes Alexander's admirers from having magnified Darius' stature
to enhance the glory of Alexander's victory.
Tarn's theory has found favour with Andreotti, A. R. Burn, and
Strasburger, but came under fire from Pearson, and more recently from
P. A. Brunt. Brunt's contention is that much that has been attributed to
a Greek mercenary in Darius' service may actually stem from information
 gained from deserters from the Persian side and from prisoners-of-war.
The argumentation in this article may seem to be weak in places, but his
method is worth following in that he disassociates the mainly historical
examination of primary sources from the mainly historiographical problem
of the secondary sources. Of memoirs, then, one must expect an infinite
variety of approaches and as many degrees of accuracy and quantitative
value.

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We turn to a third type of history to be included amongst the primary
sources and that is history produced by philosophical schools, represented,
for example, by the Peripatetic tradition—an unwritten history, thought
up by Tarn. This topic presents more of a historiographical problem than
do the other primary sources, for the transmission of a philosophical attitude
must be more restricted than the transmission of a simple historical account.
Thus, for instance, Tarn's theory seems improbable that Curtius Rufus
was the only extant historian to write down the Peripatetic tradition about
Alexander, namely that Alexander was taught correctly by Aristotle, but
success went to his head and he was corrupted by Fortune. His case is that
Callisthenes was related to Aristotle and a friend of his successor Theo-

34 D.S. xvii, 49, 7; cf. C.R. iv, 14, 22.
35 Alex. the Great II p. 74.
36 Arr. ii, 25.
37 Not his original idea, vide J. Kaerst, Gesch. des Hellen. Berlin 1927, 15 544.
38 Art. cit. n. 21 supra.
39 Reviewing Tarn's Alex. the Gt. in Bibl. Or. 1952 pp. 202 sq.
40 L.H.A. esp. pp. 78–82.
41 Persiau Accounts of Alexander's Campaigns, C.Q. n.s. 12. 1, 1962 pp. 141 sq. giving
support to a position held earlier by E. Schwartz, Griechische Geschichtschreiber p. 166.
42 Cf. earlier J. Stroux, Die stoische Beurteilung Alexanders des Grossen, Philologus
88, 1933 pp. 222–40, which I have not yet been able to consult.
phrastus, thus Callisthenes' execution evoked tremendous sympathy for him from the Peripatetics to whom Cassander leant his weight. Theophrastus sowed the seeds for a Life of Alexander in his treatise Callisthenes, which included observations like 'Alexander did not know how to use good fortune', 'Fortune it is, not wisdom, that rules human life' (Cic. Tusc. iii, 21; v, 25). Dicaearchus too was concerned to propagate such a view of Alexander, even going to the length of inventing a favourite for Alexander—the eunuch Bagoas. This tradition was passed down, leaving Curtius Rufus to be perhaps the first historian to write down the 'Peripatetic tradition'.

Again Tarn fails to convince, because he paid insufficient attention to historical detail in the early period and omitted to examine more fully other historiographical influences upon our secondary source, Curtius Rufus.

Under the first heading Dr. Badian has made a valuable contribution to Alexander study in his article 'The Eunuch Bagoas'.44 He shows, for example, how improbable it is to cite Dicaearchus as a possible source for Peripatetic lies, for Dicaearchus quarrelled with Aristotle,45 was not counted amongst Cassander's friends46 and as an opponent of Theophrastus he resented Aristotle's preference of Theophrastus to himself.47 He also emphasised that the Callisthenes tract was subtitled 'about Grief', and was a philosophical essay dedicated to, rather than written about Callisthenes. But now let us turn to Curtius Rufus. The date to which his work must be attributed has not finally been determined by Korzeniewski's recently published thesis,48 which attempts to show that a date as late as the Severi is out of the question, and that the most acceptable date is in the earlier years of Augustus' régime c. 25 B.C.49 Korzeniewski has found a supporter in Bruère,50 but a more recent discussion, that by H. V. Instinsky, reverts to a date in Vespasian's reign.51

Tarn's account is plausible on the surface, but there are peculiarities. One might have expected him to start by citing Curtius' comment on Parmenion: 'Felicissimo regi et omnia ad fortunae suae exigenti modum satisfecit'.52 (He satisfied a king who was most fortunate and who required that all

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44 Iterum C.Q. 1958 pp. i44 sq.
45 Themist. Orat. xxiii, 285c.
46 R.E. ad loc.
49 Cf. Tarn, who, incidentally, went on to assert that Curtius used Arrian who wrote in Hadrian's reign, a view that has been upheld also by Pearson.
51 Review in Hermes 1962 pp. 379 sq. On the basis of work I am doing upon Curtius Rufus' vocabulary, I would suggest that a date in the Augustan régime means that Curtius was ahead of the times in the meanings he gave to some words and in the phrases that do not appear again till some time after the Augustan era.
52 C.R. vii, 2, 33.
things should match the greatness of his good fortune—Loeb translation.) This is perhaps as close as one will get in Curtius to a surviving fragment of Theophrastus. Compare: ‘Theophrastus, bewailing the death of his comrade Callisthenes, says Callisthenes fell in with a very powerful and fortunate man, but one who did not understand how to use his good fortune,’69 and this surely is the crux of the matter: that what fortune corrupted was Alexander’s moral integrity. But, to cite as an indication of a Peripatetic source a passage where ‘fortuna’ is mentioned in an ‘amoral’ context is of dubious value. This is the case with Curtius’ account of the Hydaspes where he tells of the storm that started while Alexander was trying to cross the river under cover of night, a storm that made the crossing more difficult, but was felicitous in that it concealed the manoeuvre from the enemy: ‘incommoda quoque ad bonos eventus vertente Fortuna’.64 This is one of the numerous passages quoted by Tarn showing how ‘everlasting luck saves him from the consequences of his own mistakes and rashness and turns every disadvantage to profit’.65 Followed ad absudum Tarn’s case might suggest that the Peripatetics thought that Alexander could have gained control of East Iran and India without good fortune, had he regarded Callisthenes as his military adviser. Clearly for the Peripatetic source to be a convincing proposition one must expect it to be of higher moral content. Further, if the Peripatetics wished to assert that Alexander was corrupted by Fortune, then тови should have played an important role in their account of Alexander’s campaigns before the effects of this corruption became manifest.66

Now, as I said earlier, before we can proceed to look for fragments of the primary sources in our secondary sources, we must also start by noting what elements of historiography we could expect to find in the secondary

64 C.R. viii, 13, 22 quoted by Tarn Alex. the Gt. II p. 99.
66 Ibid.
66 Fortuna was a moral force, vide Tarn himself: ‘She was not blind chance but some order of affairs which men could not comprehend’ (Tarn and Griffith, Hellenistic Civilization 3rd Edition 1952 p. 340), contrast B. A. van Groningen, In the Grip of the Past, Leiden 1953 c. 9, pp. 109 sq. relevant to the earlier period of Greek thought. Tarn’s arguments on the Peripatetic tradition are weakened by the inadequacy of his view of тови: he notes the fate element (Alex. the Gt. II, 95; cf. Polyb. 1.41; ‘н oppermag wat die geskiedenis bestuur’, C. P. T. Naude, Ammianus Marcellinus in die lig van die antieke geskiedskrywing c. VI), and the role of fortuna as ‘the man’s own Fortune’ (Tarn ibid. p. 95). He has, however, omitted to discuss fortuna qua fickle force, as at Polybius 1, 63, 9 (cf. Nilsson, Handbuch d. gr. Relig. pp. 191 sq.; A. A. Buriks, peri тови 1948 p. 2), and its paradoxical role in moral teaching (vide Naude op. cit. passim c. VI). In this sense it seems to have replaced the function of fifth century δικ, as described by Sophocles.

Tarn could have made a far stronger case, but the objection would still have held that the Peripatetics are not the only ones who could have been Curtius’ source and inspiration. Historia xi, Heft 3, only arrived in time for me to note E. Mensching’s Peripatetiker über Alexander, pp. 274-282.
sources. By 'elements' I mean, for example, μύθοι,\textsuperscript{57} didactic, τοποί—as an example of this witness Diodorus' note on the bravery displayed by barbarians against a technically well-schooled conqueror—\textsuperscript{58}—and for another element we might consider διάλογοι, a term I mean to embrace both set speeches and debates and material stemming from suasoriae and philosophical problems. Bear in mind, too, that the writers of our secondary sources lived in the Roman Empire and one must be on the lookout for influences of contemporary politics in their writings.\textsuperscript{59}

Bearing all these considerations in mind, when we look at Curtius and see the sort of remark Tarn attributes to the Peripatetic tradition—like the comment that renown (gloria) is the gift (beneficium) more often of good luck than of manly qualities (virtus),\textsuperscript{60} we may wonder if he has not obfuscated the difference between primary and secondary sources. The example I stated obviously comes from the διάλογοι-τοποί elements of historiography representing an opposition between Blind Chance and Natural Law (or the law that a man's works do govern his fate), a 'school' theme and one that finds expression in the third century B.C. historian Phylarchus, Polybius, and Plutarch.\textsuperscript{61} If it were the case that Curtius' account of Fortuna was of higher moral content, then it would still have been for Tarn to show that the influence was not a literary one. In the Aeneid, Vergil shows how Fortune (chance, good luck) tempts a man to take his eye off the goal that Fatum has ordained for him. This is the significance of the Dido story. Curtius, reading of the ways in which Alexander antagonised his officers, and of his interest in oriental dress and manners, may have thought along similar lines to those of the Aeneid. This, however, cannot be pressed further until we come nearer to establishing a date for Curtius.

This paper has been in part an 'apologia vitae meae', to justify further study upon the sources of Alexander history after a decade that has seen so many fresh ideas emerge and so many points of detail corrected or brought to light. In a subject where so much material has been lost I am simply advocating that the odds be multiplied before money is staked.

\textsuperscript{57} A. E. Wardman, Myth in Greek Historiography, \textit{Hist.} 9, 1960 pp. 403–414 deals with range of meaning from base material to extravagances, though he omits reference to the very different Weltanschauung aspect of μύθος.
\textsuperscript{58} 'Ein beliebter Topos der hellenistischen und römischen Historiographie', Strasburger art. cit. \textit{Bibl. Or.} 1952 p. 208.
\textsuperscript{59} For recent work along these lines vide Korzeniewski, op. cit. on Curtius; A. B. Breebaart: \textit{Enige historiografische aspecten van Arrianus' Anabasis Alexandri}, Leiden 1960; and on Plutarch, J. Palm in \textit{Rom, Römertum u. Imperium in die gr. Literatur der Kaiserzeit}, Lund 1959.
\textsuperscript{60} C.R. viii, 10, 18.
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