EUNOMIA
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A. Andrewes maintains that the word εὐνομία 'at all times refers primarily to the behaviour of the citizens, and not directly to any sort of constitution.' He continues, saying that 'the two, or perhaps three, late instances which might be used to the contrary certainly do not justify the employment of the term as a name for the Spartan constitution or the laws of Lycurgus...'. In the opinion of J. L. Myres εὐνομία is derived from νόμος οὖν, and in the course of time 'one feature of εὐνομία after another was embodied in a formal νόμος''

W. den Boer maintains that this evolution was completed by Herodotus' time, and this justifies our employing the expression, as a name for the Spartan constitution or for Lycurgus' laws

It is the object of this article briefly to trace the derivation and the development of the meaning of εὐνομία from its earliest appearance in Homer through writers of the sixth, fifth and fourth centuries down to Diodorus and Plutarch

Andrewes believes that εὐνομία is not a new combination of εὖ and νόμος but the noun of εὐνομος and εὐνομοθεμα, meaning discipline and good order; a condition of the state in which the citizens obey the law, not a condition of

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Eunomia, as Andrewes, o.l. p. 89. Already in Hesiod, Theog. 900ff. she appears as one of the three Horai, the daughters of Zeus and Themis. Themis, whose name probably means 'steadfast', from root -θε- (O.C.D. p. 891), stands for law, order and justice and, as Andrewes puts it, 'she is the mother of the social order and of the organized life of the community' (o.l. p. 89). Hesiod was the first to give the Horai individual names, and these names stand for ethical and political concepts, viz. Eunomia, Dike and Eirene. Andrewes correctly points out that these three, as well as Themis, 'are concerned with the individual as the member of a community rather than as a person in himself' (o.l. p. 89).

That Eunomia was essentially a social virtue is also shown by Bacchylides XII, 186-189, where he says that Eirene (without which there can be no community life) is achieved by the practice of Eunomia. In XIV, 35-36 Bacchylides refers to the close association between Eunomia and Dike — Dike the personification of Justice, the basis of community life (Hesiod Works and Days 222f.), who rewards good (Aesch. Ag. 775), and punishes evil, as such being connected with the Erinyes (Aesch. Choeph. 946ff.; Eur. 551; Soph. Trach. 808). Through her close association with Dike, Eunomia became an expression and a symbol of the life of the polis. For Eunomia personified also cf. Pindar Ol. IX, 15-16; Ol. XIII, 67; Demosthenes XXV, 11; T. Bergk Lyrica Adestota, 140, 6.

A genealogy different from that given by Hesiod comes from Sparta. In one of his poems Alonius invokes Tyche as the sister of Eunomia and Peitho and the daughter of Prometheis (Diehl Anthologia Lyrica Graeca, vol. II, fr. 44). This genealogy has been investigated by several scholars, viz. U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff Hermes LXIV, 1928, p. 487; A. Andrewes, o. l. p. 89 n. 2; J. L. Myres, o. l. p. 81; V. Ehrenberg Aspects of the Ancient World, Oxford 1946, pp. 77ff. The context in which the fragment occurs, Plut. Moralia 318a, throws no light on the meaning of Eunomia here, and Ehrenberg, o. l. p. 77 admits that 'its explanation is difficult, and no interpretation can be guaranteed correct.'
state in which the laws are good". E. Ehrenberg maintains that ἐνομία is 'based on' the adjective ἐνομικός, the origin of which 'does not seem any more definite than that of the noun'. He does, however, prefer the derivation from the root νόμος. J. L. Myres has advocated the derivation from the verbal stem νομεῖν, to distribute among or assign to recipients.

The word ἐνομία first appears in the eighth century in Homer, Od. XVII, 487. Antinous struck the beggar Odysseus with his footstool, an act so rash that even the other suitors did not approve, and one of the young men censures Antinous, saying that the beggar may perhaps be a god, for the gods ἐπιστροφοῦσαι πόλης,

ἀνθρώπον ἢριν τε καὶ ἑνομίην ἐφορῶντες.

Now if we were to derive ἐνομία from νόμος, the problem would arise that ὁμοία is not used by Homer except that Zenodorus reads it in Od. I, 3: πολλοῖν ὁδόρρωτον ἤδην ἁστεά καὶ νόμον (νόμον) ἐγνα. Aristarchus denied that Homer used the word νόμος and read νόν in this line. Most commentators, rightly I think, accept Aristarchus' reading.

With Myres I believe that ἐνομία is derived from the verbal stem νομεῖν and that in the above passage from the Odyssey the verbal significance of the word is still prominent, the meaning of the passage being that the gods wander amongst men to see whether each man is given his due: to deny the beggar his due is ἁγρία, to give him his share is ἐμποίηα.

Myres maintains that ἐνομία is one of those words which 'have retained their primitive, and especially their verbal, sense, much later than is commonly

β) o.l. p. 89, cf. p. 91.
6 o.l. p. 74. What exactly does Ehrenberg mean by 'based on'? In any case, according to L. S. J. ἐνομία appears before ἐνομικός, which appears first in Pindar Istb. V (IV), 22; Ol. I, 37; Nem. IX, 29.
7 o.l. pp. 80—82.
8 According to Miss H. L. Lorimer Homer and the Monuments, London 1950, pp. 452ff., the Iliad and the Odyssey were both composed not before 750 B.C. but probably before 700 B.C. Miss Lorimer's dates are all the more acceptable if we take into consideration the fact that such long poems as the Iliad and the Odyssey in their complete form could hardly have been preserved, or even have come into existence, without the aid of some form of writing. The Greeks adopted the Phoenician alphabet in about the ninth century (cf. W. F. Albright The Archaeology of Palestine, Penguin 1956, p. 193; also Lorimer, o.l. p. 526 and n. 2 on pp. 526—527) and, although there is no positive evidence, the existence of writing in Greece during the so-called Dark Ages cannot be completely ruled out (cf. S. Davis, 'Writing and the Epic' in Acta Classica, vol. 1, 1958, pp. 139ff.). By 750—700 B.C. the art of writing must have been reasonably well-known, as is attested by the thirty-one potsherds excavated on Mt. Hymettos at Athens, belonging to c. 700 B.C., on which the Greek alphabet is represented in its mature form (cf. Lorimer, o.l. p. 129 n. 2).
9 Cf. M. van der Valk Textual Criticism of the Odyssey, Leiden 1949, p. 97. The reading νόν is to be preferred because: (a) it makes very good sense in this passage and is closely paralleled in VI, 120—121; (b) νόμος does not occur elsewhere in Homer and though this cannot be regarded as conclusive evidence against the use of the word here, yet if it is taken into consideration along with the fact that the terms θέμα (custom, usage) and θέματες (precedents of law, i.e. principles of judgement laid down by successive judges) are commonly used in Homer, it is quite probable that the use of the more abstract term νόμος is out of place in this passage. Most editors of the Odyssey accept the reading νόν. For a contrary view cf. A. Kiessling and U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Phil. Unters., 7. Heft, Homerische Untersuchungen, Berlin 1884, p. 20.
10 Cf. J. L. Myres, o.l. p. 81.
supposed' However, a number of questions now arise, viz. when was the verbal significance lost to the Greek mind, what meaning did the word then develop, and how did this development take place?

In an early sixth century fragment of Solon the effects of Eunomia and Dysnomia are contrasted. Solon describes Eunomia in the following terms: she makes everything ἐλκυσμα (on τὸ ἐλκυσμον amongst the Spartans cf. the speech of Archidamus in Thuc. I, 84, 3) and ἀρτια, i.e. exactly fitted; she often casts the unjust into chains; she smooths harshness (savageness), checks insolence, destroys wantonness; she puts a stop to seditious actions and ends the bitter anger of grievous quarrels — in fact ἐστι δ' ὅτι ἀδίκης/πάντα κατ' ἀνθρώπους ἀρμα καὶ πίνυτα (vss. 38—39).

Solon was appointed archon to terminate the civil strife at Athens, and though this fragment was written before his archonship (594/3) it is clear that in this poem he described the ideal conditions of state which he later attempted to establish. In this fragment the characteristics of a community enjoying eunomia are for the first time definitely described.

There is as yet no reference to a constitution, but the question arises whether in Solon’s time eunomia was not associated in some way with νόμος (meaning ‘law’). Ehrenberg denies this, but there is a passage in Solon, written after the passing of his laws, which seems to support such a conclusion, viz. Diehl fr. 24, vss. 15—20:

ταῦτα μὲν κράτει
νόμον βὴν τα καὶ δίκην συναρμόσας
ἐρέα καὶ διηλόθιν ὡς ὁπεσχήμην.
θεσμὸς δ’ ὁμοίος τῷ κακῷ τε κάναθοι
εἰδθέν εἰς ἐκαστόν ἁρμόσας δίκην
ἐγραμμα.

Ehrenberg prefers the reading ὁμοίοι in vs. 16 (Berlin papyrus; Aristides; Plutarch, Solon, 15) while Myres accepts νόμον, the reading of the London papyrus. In the second edition of his Anthologia Diehl prefers ὁμοίοι to νόμον which he accepted in his first edition. With Myres the present writer accepts νόμον as the correct reading, the objections to ὁμοίοι being that there is an excessive accumulation of conjunctive ideas; τα καὶ αὐθ- and sν- express the idea sufficiently, ὁμοίοι not only being redundant, but also making κράτει obscure. νόμον makes better sense and makes κράτει clear: Solon reconciled βὴν and δίκη by introducing a new power, the power of Law. νόμος is generic, in vs. 18 where Solon refers to specific laws he uses the term θεσμοὶ.

11 Ibid. p. 80.
13 The problem whether Solon legislated as archon in 594/3, or carried his laws at a later date when he was given special powers as διαλλακτής καὶ θεσμοθέτης (cf. C. Hignett A history of the Athenian Constitution, Oxford 1938, App. III, pp. 316ff.) does not affect our argument. The important point for the present discussion is that fr. 3 was written before his legislation, and fr. 24 (which is discussed below) after his legislation. For the chronological order of the Solonian fragments cf. R.E. 2. Reihe, 3. Band, 952—953.
14 o. l. p. 84, cf. p. 75.
15 Ibid. pp. 82—84.
16 o. l. p. 81.
17 Cf. F. Jacoby Athis, Oxford 1949, p. 309 n. 64.
Ehrenberg objects that νόμος in the time of Solon 'could only have had the meaning of custom, tradition, ancient order, not that of law'\(^8\). This I believe is doubtful. There were lawgivers in Greece and the Greek colonies before Solon, for instance Draco of Athens (621 B.C.) and Zaleukos of Locri\(^9\). The codes of these early lawgivers had important results, 'the very fact that the laws were revealed to the knowledge of all and sanctioned by the city marked an epoch in the history of justice… No longer were there themisites emerging from a shadowy tradition and distorted by treacherous memories or venal consciences; but in their place was the nomos, publicly promulgated, specifying exactly the division of rights and duties and, though it too was regarded as sacred, variable according to the exigences of common welfare'\(^20\). It is only reasonable to expect that the momentous changes brought about by the lawgivers should be reflected in the language of the people. Furthermore, it is possible that after Draco’s codification and as a result of the fact that his laws were submitted to writing, the word νόμος could have acquired the meaning ‘(written) law’ as opposed to ‘(unwritten) customs’.

In fr. 3 Solon points out that as a result of injustice (vss. 7, 11, 14) the city had come to a condition of κακή δουλοσύνη, and in vs. 31 he summarizes the evils of the city. Then he proceeds to paint the ideal conditions eunomia will bring about (vss. 32—39), the conditions which he later attempted to establish. The fragment implies no relationship between eunomia and nomos = ‘law’; it emphasizes the idea that eunomia makes everything ἀριστή, an idea which is closely related to that contained in ἔννοια, viz. right and just distribution.

In fr. 24, written after his legislation, he shows how he has solved the problems sketched in fr. 3: he has freed the land (vss. 5—6), brought those sold as slaves back to their fatherland (vss. 8—9), and set slaves free (vss. 13—15). In vss. 15—20 (quoted above) he summarizes his achievement and mentions the method by which he has healed the ills of the city. Lines 18—20 echo the idea in fr. 3 (vss. 32 and 39) that eunomia makes everything ἀριστή. The fragment suggests a relationship between ἐννομία and νόμος on the following grounds: (a) the ideal condition of eunomia, sketched in fr. 3, was brought about only by the intervention of law; (b) the problems which were solved by the laws of Solon (fr. 24) are precisely those which he sketched in fr. 3 as manifestations of dýnomia, which he regards as the opposite of eunomia; (c) despite the fact that Solon uses θερμοὶ when referring to particular laws, he uses the generic νόμος in fr. 24, vs. 16 to designate the power by which he reconciled ἔννοια and ἡ λόγος.

From the preceding argument follows the conclusion that, although Solon does not use the word ἐννομία in fr. 24, after his legislation the word probably implied a code of good laws as a prerequisite for the existence of a condition of eunomia. However, the old verbal significance derived from νέμειν was not lost, as is illustrated by fr. 24, vss. 18—20. Vss. 15—20 of fr. 24 and the relationship between fragments 3 and 24, make it clear that in Solon’s opinion a

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\(^8\) o.l. p. 83.


\(^20\) G. Glotz, o.l. pp. 106—107; also cf. pp. 135—137.
condition of equitable distribution could, and was in fact, brought about only
by bringing in a new force, the force of (written) law. In other words, in Solon
eunomia still means 'right distribution', but whereas it previously meant 'right
distribution by custom', it could now mean 'right distribution by law' 21.

The first fifth century examples are provided by Herodotus, viz. in I, 65—66;
I, 97, 2 and II, 124, 1.

In I, 65, the well-known passage on Sparta, Herodotus states that formerly
the Spartans 'κακονομώτατοι ήσαν σχεδόν πάντων Ἐλλήνων' but that they
μετέβαλον δὲ ὃδε ἐς εὐνομήν. Then, after quoting the oracle delivered to Ly­
curgus at Delphi, Herodotus gives the two traditions as to the origin of
Lycurgus' reforms, some people saying that he received from the Pythia τὸν νῦν
κατστεθτὰ κόσμον Σπαρτῆς, the Spartans themselves saying that his
reforms were inspired by the institutions of Crete. On his return to Sparta,
Lycurgus μετέτθησα τὰ νόμιμα πάντα καὶ διοίκαζε ταῦτα μὴ παραβανεν.
μετὰ δὲ τὰ ἐς πόλεμον ἔχοντα, ἑνομοσταὶ καὶ τρικάδας καὶ συνεστία, πρὸς τὲ
tούτοις τοὺς ἐφόρους καὶ γέροντας ἐστησε Λυκόφρονος. οὗτο μὲν μεταβαλόντας
εὐνομήσαν:....

Andrewes concludes that μετέβαλον δὲ ὃδε ἐς εὐνομήν means 'they decided
to lead better lives. There is here no word of the constitution, though it is clear
that there was an important change of some kind' 22.

Herodotus says that the Spartans μετέβαλον δὲ ὃδε ἐς εὐνομήν, ὃδε
meaning 'in the following manner', and after describing the activities of Lycurgus,
he summarizes οὗτο μὲν μεταβαλόντες εὐνομήσαν which resumes μετέβαλον
δὲ ὃδε ἐς εὐνομήν, οὗτο referring to what precedes. The description of Ly­
curgus activities which occurs between these two phrases contains the following
significant statements:

(a) τὸν νῦν κατστεθτὰ κόσμον. What is the meaning of κόσμος? Surely it
does not merely refer to the social ( συστήτα) and military ( τὰ ἐς πόλεμον
ἔχοντα ) reforms, but also a constitutional reform which is specifically implied
in the words τοὺς ἐφόρους καὶ γέροντας ἐστησε. The word here embraces
all the Spartan institutions including the constitution 23.

(b) μετέτθησα τὰ νόμιμα πάντα. These words also imply that the activities
of Lycurgus affected all Spartan institutions, including the constitution.

(c) τοὺς ἐφόρους καὶ γέροντας ἐστησε. Whether this statement is histor-

21 Another sixth century example is in Xenophanes (Diehl, fr. 2, exp. vs. 19). The
author denounces athletic achievements as of social value and states that it does not con­
tribute to the eunomia of the city. Eunomia is merely mentioned as a quality of the polis,
and the passage throws no light on the meaning of the passage as such.

The plural of eunomia is found in the Homeric Hymn to Mother Earth, XXX, lit.: αὐτοὶ ὃ
εὐνομῆσα πάλιν κατὰ καλλιγράφα κομμένους, ὃβος δὲ πόλις καὶ πλοῦτος ὁδηγεῖ. The
use of the plural may be the consequence of epic style or for metrical reasons. Eh­
renberg maintains that eunomia is here the equivalent of καλοὶ νόμοι (o.l. p. 81);
Andrewes finds the passage 'obscure' (o.l. p. 90 n.1). I find the passage completely non­
committal as to the meaning of eunomia and, in fact, it may be used to suit almost any
interpretation of the meaning of the word. It is, however, interesting to note that eunomia
is closely associated with the material welfare of the state, as the phrase ὃβος δὲ πόλις καὶ
πλοῦτος ὁδηγεῖ indicates.

22 O.J. p. 93.

23 For κόσμος in the sense of government, form of government and constitution cf.
LSJ. s.v. κόσμος 1, 4.
ically correct or not, the important point is that Herodotus ascribes a definite constitutional reform to Lycurgus as part of his reform programme which brought about the *eunomia* of the Spartans.

Clearly, the *eunomia* of the Spartans was not merely the result of a decision to lead better lives and to obey the laws. In his attempt to establish *eunomia*, Lycurgus further ensured obedience to his laws — *kαὶ διφλαξε τάστα μὴ παραβαίνειν*. To the mind of Herodotus, then, the *eunomia* of the Spartans was the result of an all-embracing reform (νόμιμα πάντα), including a constitutional reform, and obedience to the new laws.

In I, 97, 1 Herodotus describes the situation which drove the Medes to choose a king: *διοίκησις δὴ ἀρχαγῆς καὶ ἀνωμίας ἐτὶ πολλῶ μᾶλλον ἀνὰ τὰς κόμις ἢ πρότερον ἦν*. Their remedy for the ills of their state was: *φέρε στήσομεν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν βασιλέα καὶ οὗτο ἢ τε χόρη εὐνοήσεται καὶ αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἕργα τρεψόμεθα οὐδὲ ἢν ἀνωμίας ἀνάστατοι ἐσόμεθα.*

It is correct to maintain that the king was chosen to enforce order, but that is only part of the truth. Herodotus uses the term *ἀνωμία* to describe their condition prior to the election of a king. *ἀνωμία* may mean either 'lawless' or 'that there is no system or rule of assignment at all; all men seize what they can' (cf. ἀρχαγῆς). Now, Deiokes was elected king to put an end to ἀρχαγῆ and ἀνωμία, to introduce a system of just assignment, i.e. to enact laws (the implication being that the laws are good), and to enforce obedience to his laws. In short, he was to restore order in a state beset by chaos. The association of *eunomia* with the idea of law and order had become so prominent that the verbal significance, though perhaps vaguely retained at the back of the Greek mind, receded completely into the background. It is important to note that the *eunomia* of the Medes was established only as the result of a constitutional change. As in the Homeric Hymn to Mother Earth, *eunomia* is closely associated with the material prosperity of the state, for in a condition of *eunomia* ἐπιτευχθείσα πείρα των παντεσταται ἐσόμεθα.

In II, 124, 1 Herodotus states *μέχρι μὲν γὰρ Ἄρμυννίτου βασιλέως εἶναι ἐν Ἀιγύπτω πάσαι εὐνομίην ἔλεγον καὶ εὐθείαν Ἀιγυπτίων μεγάλος, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτον βασιλέσαντα σφενὸν Ἐποίη εἰς πᾶσαν κακότητα ἔλαθον. Very little indication is given as to the meaning of *eunomia* in this passage, and the use of *κακότητα* to indicate the opposite is of little help. One negative fact may be deduced with certainty: there is here no reference to the constitution. The

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24 Andrewes' interpretation of the meaning of *eunomia* in Her. I, 65—66 forces him to advance a new interpretation of the passage as a whole. He maintains that Herodotus has falsely combined two sets of facts in the passage, 'there is the change from παραβαίνειν to εὐνομία, a change which was effected about 600 B.C. and has not necessarily any bearing on the constitution whatever, and there is the system of Lycurgus, a system of which the Spartan constitution was a part, whose institution was placed, rightly or wrongly, at a very early stage in the history of Dorian Sparta' (o.l. p. 93). This theory has been refuted by W. den Boer Laconian Studies, pp. 25ff. An excellent study of this passage by N. G. L. Hammond appears in J.H.S. LXX, 1950, pp. 53f. Other discussions are by H. T. Wade-Gery C.A.H. vol. III, p. 562; W. W. How and J. Wells A Commentary on Herodotus, Oxford 1928, vol. I, pp. 87ff.; A. W. Gomme A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, Oxford 1945, vol. I, p. 128; K. M. T. Chrimes Ancient Sparta, Manchester 1949, pp. 329ff.

25 A. Andrewes, o.l. p. 89.

26 J. L. Myres, o.l. p. 81.
word may retain its verbal significance and mean something like 'perfect distribution of rights and duties' or 'perfect distribution of Justice' \(^{27}\). On the other hand it may have some reference to laws and mean 'good administration of the laws' \(^{28}\), or 'good order by law', a meaning which is probable in view of the meaning of *eunomia* in the other two Herodotean passages.

The next fifth century appearance of *eunomia* is in Thuc. I, 18, 1 \(^{20}\). The historian states that after the Dorian conquest, Lacedaemon remained unsettled (παλαιότατον καί ἡνομιότητα καὶ αἰτὶ ἄτυραννετος ἤν, and that by the end of the Peloponnesian War, Sparta has preserved the same form of government (τῇ αὐτῇ πολιτείᾳ χρόνῳ) for more than four hundred years. The verb *eunomoiômai* here designates a condition of state opposite to that expressed in *στάσις*, and that this condition was established by a *constitutional change*, is shown by the following sentence in which it is stated that Sparta has preserved the same form of government for over four hundred years. This sentence is introduced by γὰρ as an explanation of the fact that Sparta καὶ ἡνομιότητα καὶ ἄτυραννετος ἤν. Hence in Thucydides *eunomia* signifies a condition of state opposite to *stasis*, a condition of good order which, as the historian clearly implies, is established by the constitution, i.e. 'good order by law'. From the contrast with *στάσις* it may be inferred that for Thucydides *eunomia* also implied obedience to the laws: in a condition of *stasis* the citizens do not obey the laws of the state, but they consult only the interests of their own faction or their own personal interests. Aristotle says (Nic. Eth. 1167ae 34) that *stasis* occurs διὰ τῆς ἐκάκης καὶ τὸν ἀρχεῖν (ἀρχεῖν) βούλησθαι.

It follows that Herodotus marks a transition period in the development of the meaning of *eunomia*. The verbal significance recedes into the background and the condition of *good order resulting from just distribution* (by law) becomes more prominent, and the association with the idea of laws is more definite. In at least two passages, I, 65–66 and I, 97, *eunomia* is the result of a constitutional change. The word now appears to acquire the meaning 'good order by law', but it definitely does not yet mean 'good laws'. The original verbal significance may be stronger in II, 124 but the meaning 'good order by law', which is suggested by I, 65 and I, 97, also suits II, 124. In Thuc. I, 18, I *eunomia*

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\(^{27}\) Cf. H. F. Cary’s translation of Herodotus, Bohn’s Classical Library, London 1885, p. 144: ‘Now they told me, that to the reign of Rhampsinitus there was a perfect distribution of justice.’

\(^{28}\) Ch. M. van Deventer and J. W. van Rooijen apparently take it as such, as they translate ‘heerschte er ... een goed bestuur’. (Herodotus, Minerva, vol. I, Zutphen 1924, p. 184).

\(^{20}\) On the basis of his interpretation of the meaning of *eunomia*, Andrews has advanced a new interpretation of the meaning of this passage. He maintains that *αιτὶ ἄτυραννετος ἤν* is a distinct clause embodying a separate idea, and that the succeeding clause *ἐντὸς γὰρ ἄστη καὶ* qualifies *this* only, and not the remote ἐν ἡνομιοτητον ἡνομιότητα as well. Just as in the case of Her. I, 65 he here also reads two sets of facts into the passage: ‘Thus Thucydides dates the Spartan constitution to the ninth century ... but the end of the *στάσις*, the change to *eunomia*, is not dated, except by the words ἐν ἡνομιοτητον and the presumption that it comes within the four hundred years.’ This interpretation has been opposed by A. W. Gomme, *o.l.* pp. 130–131, and by N. G. L. Hammond, *o.l.* p. 54 n. 59. W. den Boer, *o.l.* p. 83 n. 1 is in agreement with Gomme and Hammond.
is also associated with a constitutional change and the contrast with stasis suggests that the word here means 'good order by law'. In Thuc. there is little, if any, implication of the original verbal significance of the word. In both Her. I, 65—66 and in Thuc. I, 18, 1 the idea of 'obedience to the laws' is also implied in the meaning of eunomia. N. G. L. Hammond has further pointed out that both Herodotus (I, 66) and Thucydides (I, 18, 1) use ευνομούμενοι in the aorist tense in the same context, and taking into consideration the fact that both the verb and especially the aorist tense are comparatively rare, he suggests that 'it looks like a technical term in relation to the reform at Sparta' 30. It is an attractive suggestion, but if we accept it, it must be stressed that it is a technical term designating the proverbial Good Order of Sparta which, according to Herodotus and Thucydides, resulted from the Lycurgean reforms — it is not yet a technical term designating the Spartan constitution as such 31.

In the late fifth and early fourth centuries, a period of political controversy, each author annexed eunomia as the peculiar attribute of the particular constitutional form he favoured. The oligarch's view is stated by Ps.-Xenophon, Ath. Pol. I, 8—9, who maintains that εἰ δὲ εὐνομίαν ἤτεις, πρῶτα μὲν ὅγει τοὺς δεξιοτάτους αὐτοῖς τοῖς νόμοις τιθέντας ἕπειτα κολάσουσιν οἱ χρηστοί τοὺς πονηροὺς... Eunomia is here mentioned only as the ideal condition of state and the passage does not allow any inference as to the meaning of the word. The passage emphasises the kind of people who are to make and enforce the laws; that these laws are of a certain kind and that they are to be obeyed, is only implied.

Aeschines, in Timarch. 5, gives the democrat's view. After contrasting autocracy, oligarchy and democracy, and pointing out that democracies are ruled according to established laws, but that autocracies and oligarchies are administered according to the tempers of their lords, he proceeds ἐντεθέν γὰρ ἵσχυσετε, ὅταν εὐνομήθητε καὶ μὴ καταλύσαθε ὑπὸ τῶν παρανομοῦντων καὶ ἀσέλγῶς βιοῦντων.

Andrewes 32 takes εὐνομήθητε as meaning obedience to the laws, being directly opposed to παρανομοῦντων. I would rather take καὶ as copulative and not as adversative, Aeschines' meaning being that the state will be strong when it

30 o.l. p. 55; also cf. p. 55 n. 60.
31 Andrewes, o.l. p. 90 n. 3 quotes Collitz G.D.I. 5075 line 35 as another fifth century example of the use of eunomia and concludes that the officials mentioned in the inscription were 'responsible for the keeping of the laws and not for the laws themselves'. In G.D.I. the line is restored as follows: ἐπώνυμων οἱ πρεσθησίων οἱ ἐπὶ τῆς εὐνομίας οἱ ἐπίκειται ἐπί τῶν παρανομοῦντων καὶ ἀσέλγῶς βιοῦντων...

But G.D.I. assigns the inscription to the first century B.C. (so Ehrenberg, o.l. p. 93). It also appears that eunomia is here used in a meaning peculiar to Crete. S.A. Xanthoudides Revue des études Grecques, 1912, p. 51, concludes ὅτι Εὐνομία εἶναι ὁ σύλλογος τῶν κόσμων καὶ ὅτι κατὰ τὸν διάτονον π.Χ. αἰώνα εἶχεν ἐπικρατήσει νὰ καλύτερα οὕτω τὸ συνέδριον τῶν πρῶτων ἀρχιτῶν τῶν Κρητικῶν πόλεως. J. Oehler further points out that 'die von Boeckh mit den νομοφύλακες verglichen πρεστησίων εὐνομίας Latos 5075, denen Caillemer gewisse polizeiliche Funktionen zuweist, hat Xanthudidis richtig als Vorsitzen des Kosmenkollegiums erklärt' (R.E. IX, 1819; also cf. 1497). Both because of the comparative lateness of the inscription, and because of the fact that eunomia is here used in a technical sense peculiar to Crete, where it probably underwent an independent development, the use of the word in Crete is not vital to the present argument.

32 o.l. p. 90 n. 5.
enjoys good laws (i.e. a democratic constitution) and when there are no revolutionary elements trying to upset the constitution. In his comparison of autocracy, oligarchy and democracy, Aeschines makes it clear that revolutionary elements are more likely to be found in the first two than in the latter, for in the latter the person of the citizen and the state are protected by law, and there is equality. 

\[\text{εὐνομία},\] therefore, here emphasises both the constitution, and obedience to the laws. That it refers to the constitution may be inferred from the context (where it means a democratic constitution); that it also refers to obedience to the laws may be inferred from \[\text{kai μὴ καταλήψατε ἅπα τὸν παρανομοῦντον καὶ ἄσελγος μινόντον},\] for where there are paranoimous, i.e. where the laws are not obeyed, there can be no eunomia.\[33\]

Demosthenes, XXIV, 139—140, describes the Locrians as unwilling to change their laws and calls Locris a πόλις εὐνομομενή. Here the reference is to the constitution or laws, but again the emphasis is equally on the obedience of the Locrians to the old laws: \[\text{kai γὰρ τοῖς κανόνις μὲν οὐ τολμᾶτε τίθεναι, τοῖς πάλαι κείμενις ἄχρισθος χρῄσται.}\] In contrast, at Athens the laws are readily changed and obedience is demanded to unjust laws (XXIV, 142).

Arist. Pol. 1294a, 3—7, gives a near definition of the meaning of eunomia, a definition which shows remarkable resemblance to the lines quoted above in n. 33 in translation from Aeschines. Aristotle is stating his reasons why he regards aristocracy as the best form of government and concludes: 'it seems an impossibility for a city not governed by aristocracy but by the base to have well-ordered government ( \[\text{εὐνομεσθαι}\] ), and similarly for a city that has not a well-ordered government to be governed aristocratically'.\[34\] He then proceeds to give his definition of eunomia: \[\text{οὐκ ἢπὶ δὲ εὐνομία τὸ ἐς κἀθαίρει τοῖς νόμοις, μὴ πείθεσθαι δὲ, διὸ μὴν μὲν εὐνομίαν ὑπολειπόντων εἶναι τὸ πείθεσθαι τοῖς κείμενοις νόμοις, ἐτέραν δὲ τὸ καλὸς κἀθαίρει οἷς ἐμμένουσιν. ἦστι γὰρ πείθεσθαι καὶ κακὸς καμένος.}\n
Andrewes maintains that Aristotle 'is quite clear that a good constitution or good laws are not in themselves \[\text{εὐνομία.}\]\n
Plainly the primary sense of the word is to him obedience to the laws. No doubt Aristotle goes further in distinction than is normal, and the reason why he has to distinguish is that in his day the word did carry an added implication that the laws obeyed were good, or of a particular political complexion.\[35\] But when Aristotle says that one aspect of eunomia is τὸ καλὸς κἀθαίρει τοῖς νόμοις οἷς ἐμμένουσιν, he does not merely go 'further in distinction than is normal' but he regards it as an integral part of the meaning of eunomia. I consider that the first sentence, \[\text{οὐκ ἢπὶ δὲ εὐνομία τὸ ἐς κἀθαίρει τοῖς νόμοις,}\] forms a close unity with the phrase which follows, \[\text{μὴ πείθεσθαι δὲ.}\] N. G. L. Hammond\[36\] is therefore correct.

\[33\] The lines following immediately upon those quoted in the text also indicate that the emphasis is on the constitution and on obedience to the laws: 'And it behoves us, I think, not only when we are enacting laws, to consider always how the laws that we make may be good and advantageous to the democracy, but when once we have enacted them, it especially behoves us, if all is to be well with the state, to obey the laws we have enacted and punish those who do not obey them' (C. D. Adam's translation, The Speeches of Aeschines, Loeb Classical Library).

\[34\] Rackham's translation quoted by N. G. L. Hammond, o.l. p. 55 n. 60.

\[35\] o.l. p. 91.

\[36\] o.l. p. 99 n. 60.
in his assumption that 'the noun εὐνομία properly comprises both ideas, that of well-ordered government and that of orderliness in the citizens; either idea without the other is an incorrect usage of the word, whether it be to disobey good laws or to obey bad laws.' Andrewes' theory that 'the primary sense of the word is to him obedience to the law' is further disproved by the last phrase of the definition, ἐξιτί γὰρ πείθεσθαι καὶ κακῶς κειμένοις — Aristotle's reasons for adding this phrase being: since he regards aristocracy as the best form of government and the only form of government conducive to εὐνομία, he emphasises the fact that εὐνομία can only be attained by enacting good laws (i.e. by an aristocracy) and by the obedience of the citizens to these laws. In a state where bad laws have been enacted (e.g. by a democracy) and where these bad laws are obeyed, there can be no εὐνομία.

Andrewes mentions another Aristotelean passage which merits closer investigation. In Pol. 1326a, 25ff. Aristotle says it is difficult, if not impossible, for a state with a large population εὐνομεῖσθαι. All states reputed to be well-governed (πολιτεύεσθαι καλῶς) do not have large populations. He then proves his point by the evidence of theory: ὅ τε γὰρ νόμος τάξις τῆς ἔσται, καὶ τὴν εὐνομίαν ἀναγκαῖον εὔταξίαν εἶναι. ὅ τε λιαν ὑπερβάλλον ἀρίθμος οὐ δύναται μετέχειν τάξιος. The association of εὐνομεῖσθαι with πολιτεύεσθαι and of εὐνομία with τάξις and νόμος, proves that to Aristotle εὐνομία definitely referred to laws, the implication being that the laws are good — cf. εὔταξίαν.

The double significance of the word in Aristotle is also illustrated in the De Motu Animalium 703a, 30ff., where it is said that the constitution of an animal must resemble the πόλις εὐνομομένη the qualities of which are:

(a) as soon as political order has been established (ὅταν ἔταξε συστή ἢ τάξις), i.e. as soon as a good constitution has been established, there is no need for rulers with special powers;

(b) once order has been achieved, there is obedience in the citizens — ἀλλ' ἀυτὸς ἑκατότος ποιεῖ τὰ αὐτὸν ὡς τετάκται.

(c) everything goes its peaceful and normal way year after year — καὶ γίγνεται τὸδε μετά τὸδε διὰ τὸ δῆθος.

At this stage we may briefly summarize the conclusions based on the evidence of the late fifth (Ps.-Xenophon) and fourth centuries. In this period εὐνομία came to be regarded as the peculiar attribute of specific constitutional forms and hence the word came to refer to good laws or to a definite constitution as

37 That Aristotle associates εὐνομία with laws and well-ordered government, and that to him the sense of the word is not primarily obedience to the laws, is clearly illustrated in his Rhetoric 1354a, 15ff. In this passage Aristotle says that previously the art of rhetoric was chiefly aimed at arousing prejudice, compassion or anger; and therefore, in certain states where speaking outside the subject was forbidden, this kind of rhetoric has no place. He concludes ὅτι' ἐν περὶ τῶν ἅπαντος λόγων καθάπερ ἐν κίνει γὰρ τῶν κράτων καθάπερ ἐν κίνει γὰρ τῶν λόγων καὶ μᾶλλον τὰς εὐνομομένας, οὐδὲν ἐν ἄλων ὃ τι λέγων. He then proceeds saying that some men think that the theory of the laws (τοὺς νόμους) should forbid speaking outside the subject, and others apply this principle in practice, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν Ἀρείᾳ ἀγῷ. Cf. Rhetoric 1404a, 1ff. where he says that a case should be fought on the facts alone and though everything else is superfluous, style is nevertheless important διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἄριστου μοχθηρίαν.

38 o.l. p. 91 n. 3.

39 In Pol. 1527a, 12 and 15 the reference is also to laws.
such. Already in Herodotus and Thucydides we have found that 'obedience to the laws' is implied in the meaning of *eunomia*. In Ps.-Xenophon we still find 'obedience to the laws' implicitly contained in the meaning of *eunomia*; but in the fourth century, in Aeschines, Demosthenes and Aristotle, we find that 'obedience to the laws' is explicitly contained in the meaning of the word. In the fourth century, therefore, the meaning of *eunomia* explicitly comprises two aspects, well-ordered government (good laws) as well as orderliness in the citizens.

Two later examples of the use of *eunomia*, with specific reference to Sparta, come from Diodorus and from Plutarch.

Diodorus VII, fr. 12 added the following two lines to the oracle given in Herodotus I, 65, 3:

\[
\text{ἡκείς δ' \ εὐνομίαν διεἰμενος' αὐτάρ \ έγογξε}
\]
\[
\text{δόσαι \ τὴν \ οὐκ \ ἄλλη \ ἐπικαθοδον \ πόλις \ έξει.}
\]

Now if we take into consideration the fact that *euenomia* in Herodotus and Thucydides appears to have some technical reference to the reform at Sparta, and that in the late fifth and fourth centuries *eunomia* and *euenomia* acquired the meaning of good laws and were often used with reference to particular constitutional forms, it seems highly probable that Diodorus here employs the term as a name for the Spartan constitution.40

Plutarch, *Ly. c. V*, says that before the Lycurgian reforms the Spartan people behaved insolently towards the kings, their insolence reaching such a pitch that even the kings longed for the return of Lycurgus (V, 1—2). Lycurgus was convinced that these conditions could be changed only by a radical reform of the constitution (V, 2). He first proceeded to Delphi and returned with the 'well-known' oracle, and *euenomia* δὲ χρῆσοντι διδόναι καὶ κατανεὼν ἔρη τὸν θεὸν ἢ πολὺ κρατίσθη τὸν ἄλλον ἔσται κοινωνίαν. The singular41 indicates that his request for a 'good constitution' had been granted; but *eunomia* does not here merely mean a 'good constitution', the whole context and tone of the passage suggests that it really means 'the Spartan constitution'.

I would therefore conclude: In Homer the verbal significance of the word is still prominent and it means something like 'right distribution' or 'right apportionment'. In Solon fr. 3 the derivation from the verbal stem is maintained, but after the passing of his laws and the establishment of 'right distribution' at Athens by the intervention of law, the word probably acquired the meaning of 'right distribution by law'. In Herodotus the verbal significance of the word recedes into the background and the condition of good order resulting from 'right distribution' becomes more prominent. When Herodotus and Thucydides use the term with reference to Sparta, they use it in the sense of 'good order by law' and it appears as if they both used the verb *euenomia* as a kind of

40 It is interesting to note that even as late as Diodorus VII, fr. 12, 2) *eunomia* has not lost its double significance: Lycurgus asks the goddess what customs he should establish so that the Spartans might receive the greatest advantage, and her reply is ἕκαν τοὺς μὲν καλὸς ἁγναῖς, τοὺς δὲ παθαρχεῖν *νομοθήσῃ*. It is clear from the context (and from *nomothēsia*) that the emphasis is on good laws, but the idea of obedience to the laws is retained (παθαρχεῖν).

41 That *euenomia* is gen. singular with χρῆσοντι, and not acc. plural with διδόναι, is clearly suggested by the use of the singular in the qualifying phrase ἢ πολὺ κρατίσθη τῶν ἄλλων ἔσται κοινωνίαν.
technical term designating the proverbial good order of Sparta. In the fourth century the association with law became increasingly prominent and the term was often employed to designate a specific kind of constitution. The moral aspect (obedience to the laws), implicitly contained in the meaning of the word in Herodotus, Thucydides and Ps.-Xenophon, is now placed on an equal basis with the good-laws aspect. When Diodorus and Plutarch used eunomia as the name of the Spartan constitution, they had Herodotus and Thucydides, and the writers of the fourth century, before them. Hence the use of eunomia as the name of the Spartan constitution is not necessarily a 'doubtful' practice 42.

42 Andrews, o.l. p. 91.

An interesting use of eunomia is found in a line of Aeschylus quoted by Strabo, 300–301 (fr. 158):

Δλλ’ ἵππακης βροτήρες ἕνομοι Σκύθαι.

Andrewes points out that it is 'more than likely that Aeschylus referred to their pastureland and not at all to their manners, but the interpretation later put upon his words is none the less important' (o.l. p. 89 n. 5). Strabo in his discussion of Eratosthenes' statement that the Scythians were a peaceful people, quotes this line to show that Eratosthenes is supported on this score by Aeschylus. He proceeds, saying that the Scythians were thought a simple people, little inclined to mischief, but that the Greek mode of life has introduced luxury and sensual pleasures which gave rise to the moral deterioration of the people. Eunomia here probably refers to the moral good order of the people.

Eúnoúla or its derivatives also occur in the following passages which allow no inference as to the meaning of the word as such: Pindar Ἀιθ. IV, 22; Nem. IX, 29; Ol. I, 37; Plato Leges 815b; Timæus 20a, 2; Aristotle Pol. 1280b, 6; Nic. Eth. 1112b, 14.
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